Reassessment of Italian Combat Prowess

[Michael Emrys]

Anyway this would be of interest to ME on US training and the 90th and why Divisions perform badly

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA506897

Thanks, dt. Have downloaded and will examine at my leisure. Should be interesting.

Michael

[Sailor Malan2]

I have come to this thread very late, and so I thought I would try and summarise the relative positions. Forgive me, if in paraphrasing the debate, I inadvertantly distort it.

Firstly, Italian Combat prowess:

There are the inevitable 2 views here; the Italians were without any redeeming actions whatsoever, and their combat performance was execrable. Or secondly, they were generally poor, largely due to inadequate equipment and leadership with good bits.

On the first view we have North Africa 1940 - which, it has to be said is a world class example of a poor performance. For the second, some performances are worthy of a second look; may I suggest that people read up about Italian Naval elite forces (the human torpedoes for example were very good, did in fact sink 2 battleships in Alexandria Harbour, but were very unlucky that the depth of water made it not obvious to air photography, and made them salvageable). To continue the naval story,the performance of the Italian Navy has been derided, however 2 factors need to be taken in to account. One, countries that don't have a naval tradition tend to have trouble with using navies - the high leadership of the country just isn't navally minded, and tends to misuse the capital ships. Two, remember who the Regia Marina was fighting. I am not implying the RN was some supernavy, however it was one of the better ones on earth, with a very navy minded country, and hundreds of years of tradition. The effect that a service that has had 200 years of knowing (not just thinking) that it is the best navy on earth is incalculable on morale and boldness. Note: I am not saying that the RN was the best (USN, quality wise showed a challenge even in 1812), but that in the minds of its officers and men, they were educated (indoctrinated) with the view that it was. A navy used timidly is the worst of all possible options - a fleet in being is very important strategically, and aggressive use is important tactically.Timid use (especially constrained by politics) just puts you in harms way for little gain, and tends to colour the mindset of local commanders who rarely shine. The KM showed many similar problems with its surface fleet.

So is the RM a sensible example of a performance with creditable aspects given circumstances that it is hard to imagine could be much worse, or another point in Italy's execrable performance... and does it really matter? I think the key issue is we avoid the temptation to generalise on stereotypical national characteristic, and talk facts. A good way of producing a bad performance from any nationality on earth would be to put them in the situation of the Italian armed forces - yes even WW2 Germany!

The second major issue seems to be whether the German army of 1940 was better than 1944. People have cited reduced numbers of troops per division, reduced quality of troops etc as indicating that it had to be, whilst others have cited combat power per division, equipment and 'combat learning' as showing that it wasn't.

I think many people have a misguided view of the German army of 1940. I will quote a couple of passages from "The Blitzkreig Legend, the 1940 campaign in the west", by Karl-Heinz Frieser (Naval Institute Press 2012 - although been available in German since the 1990's):

"In the spring of 1940 one might well describe the German Army as semimodern. A very small number of the best-equipped and best-trained elite divisions were offset by many second- and third-rate divdions..... But it is only those 16 elite divisions that can be categorised as krieg divisions [the 10 Panzer and 6 motorized divs]. The remaining 90 percent were better suited for defense, less suitable for attack, and not at all suited for a blitzkieg."

Now, this is part of a discussion as to whether the German Army was designed to achieve what it did in France or whether it stumbled in to it, but you get the picture. And there is more... remember, this is all about 1940.

"... the drop in quality between the first-wave divisions and the following waves became increasingly alarming as regards armament, training, and office strength. The first wave consisted of the active duty divisions of the peacetime army that had been reinforced with reservists. The second wave consisted of mostly younger soldiers from Reserve I (fully trained). The third and fourth waves included soldiers from Reserve II, in other words, members of the white age classes who had merely gone trhough a brief training cycle lasting two to three months."

'white age' refers mainly to those men too old to be conscripted after 1935, when it was reintroduced, but still below 40, i.e. those born between 1901 and 1913. So the 3rd and 4th wave units were manned by 27-39 year olds even in 1940). Of the 135 Divisions in May 1940 in the west, 42 were reserve divisions (i.e. the mostly untrained troops), and the remainder had the mix of troop qualities above.

"The Polish campaign was not nearly as smooth as claimed in the reports coming from National Socialist propaganda. But when von Bauchitsch, the commander in chief of the army, dared to warn Hitler and point out the serious training deficiencies, Hitler went in to a rage and threatened to relieve him immediately..... General Rohricht, the former chief of the Training Department of the army general staff, later confirmed: 'One big worry sprang from the deficient skills of the officer corps who had been moved into commanding positions as a result of the hasty expansion of the army; that officer corps had to be considered to a great extent as being unequal to the tasks connected with its position"

Thus on this point I am inclined to think that the contrast between 1940 and 1944 is not as pronounced as some people think, regarding personnel. The performance in France can be put down to a few divisions, and even fewer Generals (Guderian, Halder - surprisingly, Rommel etc) having vision, and being rewarded by a French army command that was intellectually, psychologically and organisationally in November 1918. Now, the German army personnel quality probably peaked in mid 1941, but pure quality of personnel is only a fraction of the effectiveness of an army. Policy, tactics, equipment, logistics and a host of other factors determine combat performance. However I think the effectiveness of the German Army in 1944 was a large percentage bigger than most have given it credit. Now, of course, the Allies in the west had improved by rather a larger percentage, but the 'most improved army of WW2' award has to go to the Soviets, who went from rather poor, on a par with a minor power in 1941 (for all sorts of reasons) to in the right league with the major powers in 1943-5.

I think JasonC can add a further data point to his series - we know who would win between Germany 1940 and France 1918, because we have the data point!

Oh, and I wont even try to enter the maths debate!

OK gentlemen: shoot.

[ASL Veteran]

I have come to this thread very late, and so I thought I would try and summarise the relative positions. Forgive me, if in paraphrasing the debate, I inadvertantly distort it.

Why anyone would want to revive this thread is beyond my understanding.

I think many people have a misguided view of the German army of 1940. I will quote a couple of passages from "The Blitzkreig Legend, the 1940 campaign in the west", by Karl-Heinz Frieser (Naval Institute Press 2012 - although been available in German since the 1990's):

"In the spring of 1940 one might well describe the German Army as semimodern. A very small number of the best-equipped and best-trained elite divisions were offset by many second- and third-rate divdions..... But it is only those 16 elite divisions that can be categorised as krieg divisions [the 10 Panzer and 6 motorized divs]. The remaining 90 percent were better suited for defense, less suitable for attack, and not at all suited for a blitzkieg."

The only reason why I'm bothering to respond at all is because you seem to be implying that some of us are uninformed and swayed by propaganda or mythmaking. I think that most of us who are contributing to this thread are fully aware of the state of motorization or lack thereof in the German army throughout the war. While you might think you are making a clever revelation you are actually contributing almost nothing with that information.

Now, this is part of a discussion as to whether the German Army was designed to achieve what it did in France or whether it stumbled in to it, but you get the picture. And there is more... remember, this is all about 1940.

"... the drop in quality between the first-wave divisions and the following waves became increasingly alarming as regards armament, training, and office strength. The first wave consisted of the active duty divisions of the peacetime army that had been reinforced with reservists. The second wave consisted of mostly younger soldiers from Reserve I (fully trained). The third and fourth waves included soldiers from Reserve II, in other words, members of the white age classes who had merely gone trhough a brief training cycle lasting two to three months."

'white age' refers mainly to those men too old to be conscripted after 1935, when it was reintroduced, but still below 40, i.e. those born between 1901 and 1913. So the 3rd and 4th wave units were manned by 27-39 year olds even in 1940). Of the 135 Divisions in May 1940 in the west, 42 were reserve divisions (i.e. the mostly untrained troops), and the remainder had the mix of troop qualities above.

Let me put a little more flesh on those bones that are being tossed around out there as revelatory 'facts'.

Wave 1 - formed 1934 - 1938 39 divisions

Wave 2 - formed August 1939 15 divisions

Wave 3 - formed September 1939 20 divisions

Wave 4 - formed August 1939 14 divisions

Wave 5 - formed September 1939 5 divisions

Wave 6 - formed November 1939 4 divisions

Wave 7 - formed January 1940 14 divisions

Wave 8 - formed February 1940 10 divisions

Wave 9 - formed March 1940 10 divisions

Okay, so when was France invaded .... I believe it was May of 1940. What does your esteemed author think these divisions were doing before May of 1940? Apparently nothing but sitting around campfires drinking beer. Do you seriously think that several months isn't enough time to train a soldier? I think it's disingenuous for the author to imply that the German army was fielding untrained divisions in the invasion of France.

Thus on this point I am inclined to think that the contrast between 1940 and 1944 is not as pronounced as some people think, regarding personnel.

I'm sorry but you are mistaken. It's not even close. Don't take one author's mythbusting viewpoint as gospel. Check multiple sources before reaching a conclusion.

The performance in France can be put down to a few divisions, and even fewer Generals (Guderian, Halder - surprisingly, Rommel etc) having vision, and being rewarded by a French army command that was intellectually, psychologically and organisationally in November 1918.

Perhaps, but the French army was considered to be one of the most powerful in the world in 1940 so that opinion seems irrelevant to me. All it does is discount the opposition rather than give credit where credit is due. In other words, "The Germans only did good because their opposition was incompetent." as opposed to "The Germans did good because they were better trained and led." It's a moving goal post that can never be 'proven' one way or another because both opinions have some basis in fact.

Now, the German army personnel quality probably peaked in mid 1941,

I don't disagree with that

but pure quality of personnel is only a fraction of the effectiveness of an army. Policy, tactics, equipment, logistics and a host of other factors determine combat performance.

Personnel - 1940 beats 1944

Policy - tie

tactics - tie

equipment - 1944 beats 1940

logistics - 1940 beats 1944 (this is a joke right?)

host of other factors - too undefined to be relevant

OK gentlemen: shoot.

I was actually hoping the thread would be closed since it's up past 300 now.

[Sailor Malan2]

Why anyone would want to revive this thread is beyond my understanding.

.....

I was actually hoping the thread would be closed since it's up past 300 now.

So your objective in replying was what exactly?

[ASL Veteran]

So your objective in replying was what exactly?

The only reason why I'm bothering to respond at all is because you seem to be implying that some of us are uninformed and swayed by propaganda or mythmaking. That's what I put in my second paragraph above.

[Rickusty]

Hello everyone,

as an Italian citizen, and coming SO much later than most of you here, I would like to add my small pieace of theory about this matter.

The thread is very interesting, there are some very accurate datas and numbers, and all the ipothesis and theories are very very interesting.

Unfortunately, as someone said in one of the post back in some of the 30+ pages, there are tons of italian-language only historical and very interesting books about our war effort in the last world war.

It's quite a shame really that not so many people can read them.

Well .. where should I start?

In my humble opinion, and trying to be not patriotic at all (something which I am not by the way) , the italian armed forces did well in the war, given the circumstances, given the equipment, given their adversaries, given the political situations and decisions, given their leadership, given their logistics.

What I find sometime very strange to look at here on the net, is the believing , by many people, that weapons alone or numbers of enemy destroyed or killed are the parameters to judge a campaign, a war, a result.

The questions about these are relevant sometimes, but on a wider spectrum of a global war, there are other factors which played and play a much important role IMO.

Which MGs or airplane or tank was superior to the other nation is a miselading thought most of the time.

If we count , for example, as I read, which Navy lost more ships or sunk more enemy ones, IMO doesn't reflect "totally" the wider war theatre mentality.

(if that would be the case, considering only the numbers , the Vietnam war would have been won totally by the USA, same as the Eastern campaign in ww2 by the germans...)

I would like to start mentioning the "big" problems, apart from the single armed forces.

Political Decisions

This is the MAIN CULPRIT of the inefficiency of the italian armed forces.

All that follows is related to this single matter.

Mussolini knew the state of his armed forces. He knew that the British wouldn't have just surrendered.

He knew the "megalomany" of Adolf Hitler, the mistrust he had of him

He knew that Hitler would not have allowed any other leader to be on the same level as him, and that everything that was not german, was for them inferior.

We can also say, he also knew the historic antipathy and mistrust of the italians towards the germans.

He entered a war trying to gain something from the others, like in a gamble, thinking that the German armed forces could have destroyed anyone and anything, and trying to obtain something from them as well.

IMO the italians knew this, and in the deep spot of their hearts, they just didn't like to play this role.

Whereas in the Eastern Africa campaign the troops were eager to enter the war, considering that war a "just war", or even an act of revenge and civilization, now they felt like the 2nd rate army trying to shine well to look AS GOOD as the Germans.

All the decisions of Mussolini and his people were awful.

The worst of them all was maybe the declaration of war on Greece.

A delinquent choice, without preparation whatsover, with very limited troops (they myth of the overwhelming italian army is pure fiction... i could digress much more on this...) in the wrong season, without preparation, and.... most of all, without even asking and talking to the Chiefs of Staffs of the Regia Aeronautica and the Regia Marina!!!

From then on it was disaster.

The Merchant Navy

Mussolini entered the war while most of the italian merchant fleet was in foreign ports, 212 ships for about 1 milion and 200.000 tonnage of very useful cargos to supply the armies in africa and the balkans...

The rest of the fleet was used to supply the fronts, especially the north african one, and... they succeded in it.

For more than 3 long years, the italian Regia Marina and the merchant navy were able to resupply the front.

They took a beating, an hard one we can say, but they won the most important logistical war on the sea.

THIS is the main victory of the Regia Marina. (more to follow when talking about it later)

When , in the end, the Regia Marina lost the control of the sea and the merchant navy had its majority of ships sunk, the war was definetely over.

But for 3 years the Regia Marina didn't lose the control of the Central mediterranean sea.

De-mobilization

Mussolini had the bright idea to de-mobilize the italian army just a few days after the entry into the war (to give the civilians a feel of safety he said...).

What this did was disastrous... Why it is seldom mentioned, I don't know.

Most diaries and memories of officers talk of this.

Entire divisions, regiments, battalions, which had for years created and coherently integrated soldiers in an efficient fighting force, were disbanded and everything had to be started over and over again.

This created chaos, logistical problems, incoherent formations, soldiers that didn't know each other when they were re-assigned in their duties, officers not knowing their soldiers. Most of soldiers were somehow "each on their own". Weird...

A crazy idea, really.

Logistics

Another huge problem of the italian armed forces was the in the logistics' departments.

How important are logistics ,and good logistics, is IMO underestimated sometimes in wars and its studies.

The italian logistics were aweful, aweful.

Oil was scarce, the few drops of petroleum that we found in Albania was in those days being refined and discovered. Its quality was not great and the quantity very small.

The oil in Lybia was not discovered much at that time unfortunately. There was a scarcity of oil for the Navy especially, and the Germans had to supply it from 1941 onward, with their own.

Italy didn't produce and refine oil at that time in useful quantities.

Not to talk about gum, iron, steel and important war materials which we simply didn't have, after years of "Autarchy" , or, a policy of building everything by ourselves and not depend on the other nations. All of this from the international sanctions after the Easter african campaign in Ethiopia of 1936..

In 1940 we entered a war with a severe shortage of everything, after 4 years of trying to be self-sufficient.

War reserves were small, stocks of artillery shells were very old and most of the shells were from ww1 era and used in captured austrian weapons.

500kg bombs for the italian bombers were in theory there, but nobody saw them (and I am not joking...) because there were so few of them for example.

Submarines were told to fire not full salvos of torpedoes to not deplete much the overall quantities left at their bases...

While the early stage of the Balkan campaign must be called chaotic and aweful, even in the logistic field, with time it improved, also given the relative small distance between Albania and the southern Puglia ports.

But initially the troops were sent with very few ammo, very few food, not winter-clothes equipments... a mess.

The North African troops were relatively a little better fed, supplied and refuelled, but the convoys that tried to get through sometimes took a beating , and the distance between the motherland and Libya was bigger than from Albania.

Mentality

This is a tricky aspect, which can be confused and which is not always "correct", and is just my opinion of it.

Please take this as an almost hilarious rant by myself... More than a feeling , than something real... )

Historically, and even today, I think we as Italians have been and are masters in everything, but in small teams, in small groups, in elite departments.

From the Renaissance on, single artists , single sculptors, craftsmen etc have been always at the edge.

When we work in group and in huge numbers, we are inefficient. When we work in smaller environments we are good.

We can build Ferrari, Maserati, Lamborghini , Pagani cars, in very limited numbers... and they are masterpieces, mostly even created by hand.

We can build brilliant machines like this.

If we try to build something "for the masses", in huge numbers, we are not so great. Good yeah, but a little back there.

This mentality is still here I think , as we have the highest number of micro-small to small companies in Italy compared to Europe and not very large ones.

This mentality reflected in our elite corps and formations, which were very very good, efficient, brave, ruthless, very effective.

The 10th Flotilla MAS , led by Borghese was an elite unit which was simply astonishing in its feat , as many have remembered also here.

The same can be said of an entire Division, the Airborne "Folgore" 182th one, which fought really well at El-Alamain.

The same can be said of the elite Alpini units, even their entire divisions, which fought very very well in Greece.

The elite Ski-Battalion Monte Cervino was really an astonishing unit.

Some cavalry units were quite good as well.

The torpedo-bombers also were good, but they were a small group of pilots and specialists as well.

And we must add a half-truth here: that italians are not a fighting and war people. I think this is quite true to be honest. And it's something not to be ashamed at all

(in fact , it's quite the opposite to think about it). But really, the hearts of the soldiers was not much in the war, the population didn't believe in it, they didn't understand it, and most of all, WE ATTACKED, we didn't defend from anyone.

We had not any "moral highground" to stand for in creating our propaganda. We didn't defend the soil from anyone, nobody tried to attack us first, nobody wanted to penetrate the Alpine border and destroy our peace.

The population knew this, felt uncomfortable with this, didn't want to do anything with this, especially, they just didn't believe in this.

Weaponry

Now, it's best to single-out this matter for each armed force, as they had different varieties of quality in their armaments.

In summary.

The Regia Marina had very good weapons and ships in numbers (badly used...)

The Regia Aeronautica had adeguate weapons and ships (with very low numbers though)

The Regio Esercito had sufficient to bad weapons

The Regio Esercito

The main problems of the italian army laid... in the minds of their leaders and high-ranking officers.

The junior officers, contrary to popular belief , especially in the english speaking world, were ,generally speaking , good or sufficient in fulfilling their tasks in a modern war.

High ranking officers were most of the time and often in a different world. There was a distinct "separation" between those ranks.

Often high rank officers had an old mentality, didn't adapt to modern war standards, were too obiedent on their superiors and generally were not "bright" in their decisions.

Not always of course.

Gen. Guzzoni acted well in Sicily in 1943, his pre-landing defensive plan was quite good in theory, considering the outcome and what we know today of sea-landings. The theory of Armored combat groups attached very closely to the beacheads and to act as fast as possible to "seal-off" the landing grounds, could be considered a good idea, as seen from today. (that the plan didn't work could be discussed at lenght as to why....)

His pre-war plan to invade Greece (in the Plan-G) was actually wise and well studied, but not followed.

Gen. Visconti-Prasca and his ill-fated decision to invade Greece had the impulsivity of a Rommel, without having his talented tactical beahaviour, and was generally a disaster and really a failure of a General.

Awful.

Gen. Gambara and his madness of an attack on March 1941 in Albania is a case of study of a very bad plan.

Generally speaking, most of them, in the north african campaign, in the balkan campaign and the russian one, were sub-par, sub-standard, old-fashioned, not tactically bright, not modern.

Usually they still had in their heart the mentality that the single soldier, the single rank, was a useless piece of meat, that it could be wasted and used without care to achieve something.

The "frontal attack" and the "mass infantry attack" mentality was really still there.

The junior officers were generally not too bad, it depended on many factors.

Training of "di complemento" officers or , we could say reservist (not totally correct work though) were generally inferior than normal serving officers, but, IMO, they made the impossible with what and whom was above them.

The soldiers.

Italy was quite a poor country in 1940. Its middle class was not very numerous at all, the majority of the population was not literate, mostly paesants coming from all the small cities of our country, with very little technical background. This may seem simplistic, but it has quite a weight on a fighting force and its ranks. There were of course exceptions, but generally speaking the ranks were really not "mechanically-minded", not "industrialized" and not "modern" , if we can use the word.

In comparison, the Red Army had maybe something similiar (even worst I guess),but as this is only one small part of the big problems, it didn't stop it from being an effective fighting force. (while in the italian armed forces many things didn't work well, in the red army this was just one of the problem, all the rest was working well and efficiently)

Training.

The training was VERY inadeguate. There are stories of soldiers being sent in Albania in 1940-1941 with 1 week of field training, after having been recalled at 28-30-32 years old, after years of civil life.

Some diaries of soldiers and officers clearly speaks of this. The situation was so mad there that nobody cared and they were sent nonetheless.

Usually these units disbanded easily at the first combat.

Usually Alpini units were well trained , well grouped and cohesive, they had a strong esprit de corp and in fact they fought very well.

Cavalry units had a good training and they behaved rather well.

Infantry Divisions were generally sub-standards, all of them. Some divisions were really bad, especially the "Occupation Divisions" like the "Murge" Division in the Balkans which had a very bad history of combat. The training of their ranks was very very low.

Even normal and , in theory , good divisions were not very efficient most of the time.

CCNN , black shirts units were attached to the normal infantry divisions after someone realized finally that the "Pariani Ordinament", the 2-regiments-Division, was not working as some thought them to work. They were in even worse position with regard of armament and training compared to the normal infantry!

They had a higher esprit de corp and cohesion, and sometimes this alone was able to create some admirable feats of arms in North Africa, like the Bir-El-Gubi defensive action of the Young Fascists in December 1941 and others.

In the Balkans they didn't really fight too well, same as in Russia.

And generally normal soldiers and especially officers looked down on them as "fascist thugs" and most were not happy about them.

more to follow...

[dieseltaylor]

Very good post Rickusty.

I am shocked by the revelation of the *De-mobilization*

which is bonkers. It is very saddening that so many died for such a tinpot dictator.

[Erwin]

+1 re the demob. revelation.

Thank you for the interesting insights, Rickusty.

[JasonC]

"The inefficiency of the italian armed forces..."

"All the decisions of Mussolini and his people were awful..."

"From then on it was disaster..."

"They took a beating, a hard one we can say..."

"What this did was disastrous..."

"This created chaos, logistical problems, incoherent formations..."

"A crazy idea, really..."

"Another huge problem..."

"Italian logistics were awful..."

"Important war materials which we simply didn't have..."

"Entered a war with a severe shortage of everything..."

"Most of the shells were from ww1 era and used in captured Austrian weapons..."

"When we work in group and in huge numbers, we are inefficient..."

"Italians are not a fighting and war people..."

"The hearts of the soldiers was not much in the war, the population didn't believe in it..."

"That the plan didn't work could be discussed at length..."

"Generally a disaster and really a failure of a General..."

"A case of study of a very bad plan..."

"Training was VERY inadequate..."

"The situation was so mad there that nobody cared..."

"Some divisions were really bad..."

"They didn't really fight too well..."

But, I mean, other than THAT, Mrs Lincoln, how did you like the play?

If this is praise, then we must conclude that the Italian armed forces of WW II - blew chunks. Which, of course, they did.

[Sailor Malan2]

I was going to leave this as it lay, but I am going to have respond to some of your points:

... I think that most of us who are contributing to this thread are fully aware of the state of motorization or lack thereof in the German army throughout the war. While you might think you are making a clever revelation you are actually contributing almost nothing with that information. .

I quoted the comment on the "blitzkrieg" divisions because it is relevant to the "strength" of the 1940 German army, You may be well aware, but are you so confident of the state of everyone else's knowledge? The thread morphed from Italy to Germany on page 6, but your first post was on page 8. I was not thinking of you when I wrote my post, and find it intriguing that you feel I was aiming at you.

Let me put a little more flesh on those bones that are being tossed around out there as revelatory 'facts'.

Wave 1 - formed 1934 - 1938 39 divisions

Wave 2 - formed August 1939 15 divisions

Wave 3 - formed September 1939 20 divisions

Wave 4 - formed August 1939 14 divisions

Wave 5 - formed September 1939 5 divisions

Wave 6 - formed November 1939 4 divisions

Wave 7 - formed January 1940 14 divisions

Wave 8 - formed February 1940 10 divisions

Wave 9 - formed March 1940 10 divisions

Okay, so when was France invaded .... I believe it was May of 1940. What does your esteemed author think these divisions were doing before May of 1940? Apparently nothing but sitting around campfires drinking beer. Do you seriously think that several months isn't enough time to train a soldier? I think it's disingenuous for the author to imply that the German army was fielding untrained divisions in the invasion of France.

Thank you for this info, I couldn't find it when I wanted it. So divisions after wave 5 were raised less than 6 months before the invasion of France? I haven't checked for the modern US Army and can't find a reference to German infantry training duration, but in the UK, combined basic and advanced infantry training is 26 weeks. More technical branches are longer. Thus if German practice were similar waves 6-9 should be somewhere in their initial personal training. After that, you have company, battalion, regimental and divisional level training. The US document reference earlier (http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA506897) quoted that the US army plan to raise divisions in WW2 had a plan lasting 2 years! I did not say that these partially/completely untrained divisions were fielded in France (certainly not in the front line). But the debate is about the power/srtength/effectiveness of the army, not the effectiveness of Panzergruppe Kleist. Thus not only does your additiional information not question my point, I find it intriguing that you think it does.

I'm sorry but you are mistaken. It's not even close. Don't take one author's mythbusting viewpoint as gospel. Check multiple sources before reaching a conclusion.

Of course, you are correct, however I thought my post was long enough already without multiple sources on the same subject. Perhaps you would help point me to some other sources? I seem to have missed your sources in this discussion. I should warn you that my history teachers were dubious as to the usefulness of popular culture references such as Hollywood.

Perhaps, but the French army was considered to be one of the most powerful in the world in 1940 so that opinion seems irrelevant to me.

Considered by whom? The Titanic was considered unsinkable by some people (http://historyonthenet.com/Titanic/unsinkable.htm), however people's opinions are not fact, nor particularly relevant to the ship's peformance when hit by the iceberg.

It is indeed true that some people thought this about the French army pre-war. However the facts are that the French army command was completely unable to deal with fast moving warfare of the type that occurred in 1940, and misused their mobile forces leaving themselves with no reserves. As an aside, the combat performance of the best French units against the bulk of the German army was not really tested, since they were mostly involved in the low countries steeplechase around Belgium. The Panzer units hit second rate units in a "quiet" sector.

All it does is discount the opposition rather than give credit where credit is due. In other words, "The Germans only did good because their opposition was incompetent." as opposed to "The Germans did good because they were better trained and led." It's a moving goal post that can never be 'proven' one way or another because both opinions have some basis in fact.

But here you are wrong. These things can be studied and examined. The first step is to disregard broad stereotypical views and look at the actual facts available. And the fact that the French army was poorly commanded does not affect an objective view of the strength (or otherwise) of the German army. Nor is it an either/or choice. The Germans won because of a range of issues not just one.

Personnel - 1940 beats 1944

Policy - tie

tactics - tie

equipment - 1944 beats 1940

logistics - 1940 beats 1944 (this is a joke right?)

host of other factors - too undefined to be relevant

I did not indicate which of these I felt went which way, but lets look at yours.

Personnel, ok - although we have to be specific as to whether we are talking 'best', 'average' or 'worst' units here, and intrinsic physical fitness and motivation or acquired 'culture' and skills.

Policy - you say tie. Interesting, since this implies the German Army learnt nothing in 4 years of war? But still, I have no hard facts on this one without some reading

Tactics - as above. Do you really think that the German army didn't improve its tactics at all in 4 years? No new capabilties were incorporated into their battle plan? 1944 tanks engaged at 1940 ranges? Infantry squads behaved the same despite the change in organisation and weapons? Interesting...

Logistics - you seem to be indicating that German logistics were unquestioningly better in 1940. Is this correct? Sources please. My view is that in 1940, they sustained (just!) a 6 week campaign which was rapidly moving, but with little to no interdiction of supplies by air power. In 1944 they sustained an 11 week (mainly static) campaign reasonably well under complete Allied air superiority, with transport infrastucture decimated and under attack from resistance fighters. Which is 'better'? Good question, I dont have enought facts to call it. Do you?

If you would like to continue this debate, I would appreciate a level of academic rigour, and am quite happy to be called out on any lack on my part. However I repeat, my post was aimed at the general reader, and contained information that the general public (certainly in UK) has no knowledge of. Your state of knowledge and expertise remains opaque to me.

[Sailor Malan2]

If this is praise, then we must conclude that the Italian armed forces of WW II - blew chunks. Which, of course, they did.

I find your posts very informative and accurate generally, and usually agree with you wholeheartedly. However posts like this can be percieved very differently depending on the background and culture of the reader. It is probably a US to woolly European liberal thing... I mean, over here we think that letting people have a gun without rigorous background checks is bizarre and dangerous. I know! Weird or what:eek:.?

I think we can all agree that the overall performance of Italian Armed Forces in WW2 left something to be desired. we need to be careful that this does not get percieved as attacks on Italy or the character of its people.

[preach mode OFF]

BTW in Britain, 'performance.... left something to be desired' translates to something like 'sucks big time' in US .

I know this probably isnt by John Cleese, but if you like national stereotypes: http://www.freelists.org/post/hahs_63-68/FW-John-Cleeses-Perspective

[JasonC]

"we need to be careful that this does not get percieved as attacks on Italy or the character of its people."

No, see, we just don't.

Truth matters, stupid nationalist touchiness and misplaced pride, and any desire not to be offended about the failing of notorious tyrannies of the past - does not matter. Not even remotely. Not even the slightest little itty-bitty bit.

It is a positive moral duty to smash those things in the face at every conceivable opportunity.

An Italian who can heartily agree that the Italian military of WW II was just flat-out horrible, is a healthy person with his feet on the ground. Because it is the simple truth.

One who wants to sugar coat that into how hard they tried and how noble it was to face up to such adversity and all that rot - is not. Because he is being misled by a misplaced pride in things he (one) had no part in, and (two) should take no pride in whatsoever.

[Sailor Malan2]

I am struggling with your point here. You seem to be saying we must be factual about the performance of the Italian military, and accept its performance was 'flat-out horrible'. OK, in general it was. However I think there are isolated instances where performance was at least creditable (albeit small and infrequent). The reason why I think these distinctions are relevant is that (for me), an understanding of the underlying reasons why the military did so badly is at least as interesting as the bare story of the disasters. By studying the slight glimmers of success we can see a little of the causes for the rest. Also, the performance of 55th Infantry Div at Sedan May 1940 (for example) was just as poor. Why is this? Is it connected to Italian failings? If not why not. Etc.

In addition, you imply that the failings of the Italian military are down to Mussolini and the fascists ("...any desire not to be offended about the failing of notorious tyrannies of the past"). Yet you also say "One who wants to sugar coat that into how hard they tried and how noble it was to face up to such adversity and all that rot - is not [a healthy person]". So, which is it; the Italian military was a disaster because of Mussolini, or it was a disaster full stop [period], with no features even worthy of discussion?

I maintain that the whole nation of Italy was managed appallingly by Mussolini (not just the military), and never had the infrastucture to fight in WW2, especially ouside Italy. However there are some very significant failings elsewhere in the military leadership that could (and occasionally were) overcome. Studying the pure performance of the organisation without taking account of these is pointless and boring.

I do not now, nor have I ever had in my family tree (back to c1840) have any connection to Italy whatsoever (barring a couple of trips to the place). I work with them a lot, and they drive me to distraction sometimes. I am merely a seeker of truth in all its forms. Generalisations rarely shed much light on anything.

Oh, and even if you are right, I still wish to have no part in attacks on Italy or the character of its people.

[JonS]

Italian military, ... its performance was 'flat-out horrible'. OK, in general it was. However I think there are isolated instances where performance was at least creditable (albeit small and infrequent).

A broken clock is perfectly accurate twice a day, and tolerably accurate for about 30 minutes each day. That doesn't make it any less useless as a clock.

The reason why I think these distinctions are relevant is that (for me), an understanding of the underlying reasons why the military did so badly is at least as interesting as the bare story of the disasters.

Sure, I agree. The 'how' and 'why' questions are infinitely (but probably not null aleph infinitely) more interesting that the 'who' 'what' 'where' and 'when' questions. But there's no particular reason to go around handing out 'attaboys' to make people feel better while you're asking those questions.

The Italian military in WWII was horrible. There were occasional bits of non-horribleness, and even a few units that were not usually horrible in their performance*. But those exceptions don't change that basic fact that the Italian military was horrible.

By studying the slight glimmers of success we can see a little of the causes for the rest.

You could do it that way, although it is just one of a couple of viable approaches.

Jon

* based on a very cursory examination, the non-horrible units seem to me to have had some combination of the following characteristics: small (battalion sized or smaller), select membership, single use or task or focus, somewhat cavaliering, not dependent on any external support in battle, not expected to support anybody else in battle. Another way of looking at that list of characteristics is that Italy could sometimes produce small one-shot wonders that did ok, but were terrible at producing in mass and of decent quality the kind of units that are needed to win high intensity conventional wars; line infantry, armour, etc.

[Michael Emrys]

So divisions after wave 5 were raised less than 6 months before the invasion of France? I haven't checked for the modern US Army and can't find a reference to German infantry training duration, but in the UK, combined basic and advanced infantry training is 26 weeks. More technical branches are longer. Thus if German practice were similar waves 6-9 should be somewhere in their initial personal training.

On what grounds do you assume that? Why not assume that divisions were raised with soldiers who had at least completed personal training, and possibly platoon and company level as well? Remember, most of these men, at least the younger ones, had been through the Hitler Jugend and/or similar paramilitary organizations, so were physically fit, were experienced in basic fieldcraft, were accustomed to military discipline, etc., and may have had some weapons training even before they joined the army per se.

BTW, in case you may have forgotten, 26 weeks is six months.

Considered by whom?

More or less the militaries of the entire world. The German army certainly regarded them as a formidable opponent that they would rather not fight just yet. Hitler had to virtually drive them to fight.

However the facts are that the French army command was completely unable to deal with fast moving warfare of the type that occurred in 1940, and misused their mobile forces leaving themselves with no reserves.

That certainly became obvious once battle had joined, but who knew it before hand? Not many SFAIK.

Michael

[dieseltaylor]

"we need to be careful that this does not get percieved as attacks on US or the character of its people."

No, see, we just don't.

Truth matters, stupid nationalist touchiness and misplaced pride, and any desire not to be offended about the failing of notorious tyrannies of the past - does not matter. Not even remotely. Not even the slightest little itty-bitty bit.

It is a positive moral duty to smash those things in the face at every conceivable opportunity.

An American who can heartily agree that the American military in Vietnam and Afghanistan was just flat-out horrible, is a healthy person with his feet on the ground. Because it is the simple truth.

One who wants to sugar coat that into how hard they tried and how noble it was to face up to such adversity and all that rot - is not. Because he is being misled by a misplaced pride in things he (one) had no part in, and (two) should take no pride in whatsoever.

I just wondered how it would read when I changed the countries.

[Vanir Ausf B]

I just wondered how it would read when I changed the countries.

Like a lie. Equating US military performance in Afghanistan and Vietnam to that of Italy in WW2 would be absurd.

[Rickusty]

Erwin and dieseltaylor, thank you!

* based on a very cursory examination, the non-horrible units seem to me to have had some combination of the following characteristics: small (battalion sized or smaller), select membership, single use or task or focus, somewhat cavaliering, not dependent on any external support in battle, not expected to support anybody else in battle. Another way of looking at that list of characteristics is that Italy could sometimes produce small one-shot wonders that did ok, but were terrible at producing in mass and of decent quality the kind of units that are needed to win high intensity conventional wars; line infantry, armour, etc.

This is very interesting JonS. As I wrote earlier, this seems the case when we are talking about the italian armed forces' history in the last world war.

Btw, I am not trying to praise the role of the italian armed forces during the last world war, but just to try to express a feeling from someone who is italian, who had many relatives who fought there, to try to asses it with a critic mind hopefully, and to see what good there was, and if there ever was.

Not everything is pure black and white, and while we can all agree that the average performance of the italian armed forces was bad during the war, we could try to see why it was like that, where it originated, and when and why sometimes it was not and some units behaved very well.

It's an interesting topic I think. And it has nothing to do with pride, country-bashing , apology or patriotism,

My grandfather was a medic in the 180th Field Hospital attached to the 1st Infantry Division "Superga" who fought in the Tunisian Campaign in 1942-1943 and he had some amazing stories to tell, even though he rarely spoke about them, from being strafed by British fighters as soon as he arrived by transport planes to his last stand before his hospital surrendered to British troops and was sent to Gibraltar. To note though, that until his last day of life, he had the highest esteem for the British soldiers either as soldiers and as human beings. He worked closely for 2 years in Gibraltar in a british hospital.

His brother was in Jugoslavia in anti-partisans duties there, and it's better not to write what he sometimes remembered about that cruel war there.

Another relative was in Albania-Greece as a Leutenant in the Alpini "Julia" Division and then to Russia, and came back mostly on feet...

An Army, a Navy, an Air force are big complicated organizations, which may or may not work efficiently, depending on a huge variety of factors.

As a whole, it could not work efficiently on the battlefield , but it could create special elite units which shined when tested on the field.

Apart from the units which I mentioned, almost all the Bersaglieri Regiments and Battalions fought really well (even Rommel praised them in one famous quote), but there were not many of them.

Of course they were much more trained and their esprit de corp was higher than the standard infantry.

As I tried and try to repeat here is that: out of all the armed branches of the Italian armed forces, the one who really was a failure was the Royal Army, the Regio Esercito.

The Navy and the Air Force fought well IMO, considering everything.

The Army just "collapsed" when faced with reality.

For many reasons.

One thing which I forgot to write as to one of the most important factor in our war was the Strategical Errors and the numbers of Fronts in which the armed forces fought.

Strategical errors

After the political reasons behind the failure of the armed forces'machine , which is undeniably the most important aspect of the reasons of the bad performance of the italian armed forces, the Comando Supremo made huge , incomprehensive, absurd errors since the 1st day of the war.

° As soon as the war was started, no plans were made to invade Malta, which could have been taken if a properly conceived plan had been prepared and carried out.

This was maybe one of the biggest mistake ever.

° No plans as to "how" invade Egypt and as to what was really needed in that front, which equipment, which strategy overall.

Marshall Graziani was just ordered to advance as much as possible with his mostly infantry divisions in the heat of the desert and meet the enemy. No plans whatsever as to what to do once Sidi Barrani was reached and what to do next

° The Eastern Africa contingent had a strenght and williness to fight which was (surprisingly) higher than elsewhere, and Gen. Nasi conquered Somaliland (maybe the real land based italian-only campaign victory of the war) using really antiquated weaponry (Fiat Cr.32 fighters had to use training bullets for WEEKS before a lot of new 12,7mm bullets arrived by air from Italy...) but their feats had no real outcome, as they were too far from Italy and could be supplied only by air.

° The attack on Greece was a folly. Unjustified, wrong, ethically ,military you name it. If it could have been a rapid victory, then at least it would have had a meaning and a justification, having been well planned and executed. Instead it was very badly planned (Ciano especially was among the main culprit here...) but the troops fought well.

The few troops there managed to even keep the front stabilized (which is ironic I know... but given the situation it was half a miracle) in January - February 1941, after having been on the defensive against overwhelming and better supplied fresh greek troops.

° The Navy and the Air force acted timidly. The air force acted more aggressively though, and throughout the war its pilots mantained a high standard of fitness, flying qualities and skill, and this I think is quite undeniable.

All of these reasons have somehow a justification.

Of course not everyone was an idiot in the High command.

The simple reason behind this sort of behaviour was that the war was already won in their minds.

Few people in the world would have predicted France to fall so rapidly in 1940. Germany was attackind (and winning) everywhere.

Mussolini thought that he could gain something by entering the war at the side of Hitler (and don't forget that they were being allies for quite a lot of years in 1940 , it was not a decision taken during a night) and not sacrificing entire divisions, ships, planes, soldiers.

He once famously said to Ciano that "Italy needs just a thousand dead to sit at the winners' table" after he declared war in 1940.

Mussolini thought that Greece could fall rapidly and easily as to gain something there also, but that was not the case with an attacking force of 6 (SIX!) divisions, composed as I said before by 2 infantry regiments each (apart from the Centauro "Armoured" division armed with L.3 iron coffins).

In total there were 45 battalions against 39 greek battalions. Attacking with these low numbers with low trained troops was madness.

When they realized that instead the war would have continued , they found themselves in the position of trying to "save what was salvageable", to remedy on the ineptitude of the years before, to do something. But it was really too late, the initiative was lost, the Army was on the whole inefficient from the start and everyone had progressed but the italian armed force had not.

Too many fronts

Given the limited resources of the Italian war machine, Mussolini and his entourage decided to wage war almost in all the theatres of war where Germany was already fighting.

Our main front-line was not always in North Africa. We had lots of troops there, but also on the Eastern Africa colonies. We sent precious submarines in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, we sent planes against Britain, we sent precious troops in Russia, we sent small submarines there to attack their cargos, we waged war on Greece, on Yugoslavia, on France, we occupied these territories. The front-line was huge.

And we just didn't have the materials to support something like this.

Instead of grouping and massing elite units in a single front and use them at their best, they were used in a piecemeal manner everywhere.

To make an example of the scarcity of the number of pieces of italian war materials, I should point out here that Italy produced a grand total of 12.100 planes from 1940-1943, but 650 were exported, so a total of 11.500 planes, of ALL TYPES!

The British alone built more than 14.000 Hawker Hurricanes... just a single type of fighter!

Can you imagine fighting in different theatres with very few numbers of planes and using them to cover all the theatres?

That is the reason why I wrote earlier that, given the circumstances, actually the troops on the field didn't act too bad sometimes.

It's hard to fight an enemy you know is more powerful, better armed, better equipped, and one that can kill you faster than you can kill him,

-------

Following the assesment on the Regio Esercito I wrote earlier.

Doctrines

The Regio Esercito had a strange ToE organization in 1940. The majority of the Infantry divisions were in fact "reinforced" Brigades, composed of 2 infantry regiments + 1 artillery regiments + supporting arms.

The "Pariani directives" of 1938 changed the organization of the Army thinking of creating a smaller, lighter, faster division by eliminating 1 infantry regiment, but retaining the numbers of artillery pieces in the artillery regiment.

In theory these divisions were subordined to the Corps level, the one who really had the initiative on the field (the infantry division having lost it somehow) as to how to manouver the divisions on the field and "how to encircle" the enemy.

The 3 axis of movement of a normal infantry division (one regiment attacking, another one supporting, another one possibly encircling the enemy) was now non-existant.

The Infantry division was left with "two columns" of attack, with serious risks and drawbacks in the attacks and in the defences as well.

In the attack, as it has been said, the infantry division could not operate indipendently with the 3 axis of movement, and had to rely mostly of the time on frontal attacks with 1 regiment with the other one supporting it in manpower, firepower and supply. After the 1st regiment would have advanced, the second one should have taken its place, but the third one was missing.

In the defense, the lack of manpower per division was felt a lot, the divisions' fronts were narrower than standard.

The idea behind this changing ideas was that the division could have been faster (on feet, mind you!!) and could have been more apt to rapidly advance against the enemy.

But this enemy had to be really weak and much less powerful to allow the italian division to pass.

Not all the high brass officers were idiot or blind though, and many were against this new directive.

As soon as Gen. Soddu and then Gen. Cavallero took command they immediately tried to remedy on this error, by introducing finally a 3rd infantry regiment, the CCNN Blackshirt regiment.

I already wrote how inefficient these "legions" were. They sometimes fought with fanatism, but their lack of training was always felt on the field.

The "binary" division just didn't work well. Especially against the strong Greek divisions, it suffered.

The Armoured Divisions, the Ariete, Littorio, Centauro especially, fought IMO well all things considered. The armoured troops' tactic doctrines were really very modern even in 1940-1941, and if one has the time to read them in detail, they really were maybe the most modern doctrines written and employed by the italian divisions in the war.

ToE of these divisions was adeguate, the Bersaglieri regiments attached to them were good fighters, the tankers themselves were professional and fought well in their iron coffins, all things considered. They won battles, they had a weight on the battlefield, only ruined by the quality of the tanks they went to fight into.

The Recce units were somehow standard in their equipments and training, same as the Motorized (the FULLY motorized, as there were the fake ones) ones.

The Artillery was the star of the land divisions though. Artillerymen were quite well trained, fought bravely, most of the time dying near their guns and they won the respect of the enemy many times.

Alpini units as I wrote earlier, fought very well. So well in fact, that Gen. Cavallero even tried to ask for only Alpini units in the Albanian theatre for the offensive of 1941, but only a single and then a second division fought there. All the rest was normal infantry.

We must also add that Alpini soldiers were mostly recruited from the Northern part of Italy, the richest one.

It was the standard "grunt" , the typical soldier in the normal division that failed the test. The normal infantry divisions were , well, sub-standard.

The failure of the Army laid there, in the 90% of its force.

Weapons

While most of the weapons, especially tanks and the like, were derided, and rightly so, I think that in 1940 there was not much wrong with most of the equipment.

It's in the way it was used that we should look upon further...

An M13/40 tank or even an M11/39 one in 1939-1940 was adeguate. It was not the best of this world, but it had a decent gun of 47mm, 3 mgs, and a weak armor, not distant in characteristics from a British A.13, a Panzer IIIA, A Somoua 35.

The problem with the italian tanks is that... they basically remained the same for all the three years!

The M14 and the M15 were basically the same tank, but with different and slightly more powerful engines. The M15 had a better gun though, but still of 47mm caliber.

The Semovente da 75/18 was a good weapon system, but nothing revolutionary. Its gun at least was good and able to defeat a Sherman (at last...)

The rest of the light tanks, the L.6/40 for example, was a normal light tank, similiar in performance to a Panzer II.

The L.3 was a joke though... But still, people went to fight the British in them.

The P.40 took almost 3 years to have a proper engine installed... which speaks volume of the inefficiency not only of the political choices, but of the industrialists as well.

The Artillery park was mostly outdated. And this was the greatest error. If Artillery is the King of the battlefield, well, a 90 year old King with a sword is pretty much useless.

We had some special high quality pieces, the 149/35 was excellent, the 90mm AA as well, but the moajority of the Infantry diivsions' artillery regiment was formed of Austrian-captured or old italian weapons. Their caliber was obsolete as well... 24 guns in the artillery regiment were of 75mm caliber, while only 12 were of 100mm caliber.

Too few, too old, too small.

Anti-tank cannons: we had the 47mm, a decent piece which was very useful and originally conceived as an infantry gun AND an anti-tank gun if the case allowed.

Not a sparkling performer, but in 1940 it was a good piece. But again... nothing was changed, no new weapons was introduced in 3 long years, we still had the 47mm against the Allies in Sicily. Crazy.

We employed some German 37mm Pak 36, some german 88s , Soluthurn anti-tank rifles, even polish AT ones. Nothing revolutionary.

I remember that we employed even some captured 75mm gun captured from the French by the Germans, but in very few numbers.

There were many prototopies of all weapons, self-automatic rifles, 75mm AT cannons (some of which were used though..), fast Saharian tank, etc but most of them remained there, in their factories.

The recce vehicles were generally good, the AB40 AB41 were quite modern and well armed, not too bad.

What we had of very good quality though, (always IMO) were the.... trucks.

They were modern, of high quality, reliable most of the time, quite big and powerful.

I know many people just want to look at tanks and cannons, but they had an important role as well.

Mortars: the 81mm was used almost by anyone and was a good weapon. And the Italian Army used a special heavy round for it of about 6,9 kg, which was very powerful and highly regarded.

The 45mm Brixia was a strange weapon. I read some account of its use by veterans. Some of them wrote about it calling it useless, some of them not.

AA guns were normal, up to modern standards, 20,37,75,90mm pieces.

Infantry small-weapons were normal, average quality, standard bolt-action rifles, a bad LMG, a good MMG. The Beretta 38 SMG was very very rarely used, and it's an error IMO to see it in the game in so many units. Most of them were used by the "Folgore" Parachute Division and the PAI (Italian colonial Police) and other police and home-land units.

They were really rarely seen up until the armistice in 1943. From then on, they played a huge role in the civil war that followed. So ironically, the Beretta 38 SMG was used the most by italians against... italians.

All in all, it was not the quality of the armament that was bad in my opinion. It was just that the numbers were few, they were not replaced after 1940 and they soon became obsolete.

More to follow... (given time hopefully!)

[dieseltaylor]

You are probably right VAB. Though history will show both embarked on wars which they lost.

[Vanir Ausf B]

Sure. So did Napoleon. That doesn't mean the Grande Armée was crap.

[dieseltaylor]

Rickusty - Nice to have a new light on the Italian perspective. I was wondering if the professional services - that is the Navy and the Airforce - being more technical had high proportions of intelligent and committed men than the army.

I suspect the US services like the Air Force , Navy, and Marines all feel superior to the footsloggers. Probably true also of the UK and other countries.

[dieseltaylor]

Sure. So did Napoleon. That doesn't mean the Grande Armée was crap.

To be fair it was one mostly country against all of Europe over roughly 25 years so the surrendermonkeys did quite well.

I am glad you took up the gauntlet as Jason's comment:

Truth matters, stupid nationalist touchiness and misplaced pride, and any desire not to be offended about the failing of notorious tyrannies of the past - does not matter. Not even remotely. Not even the slightest little itty-bitty bit. It is a positive moral duty to smash those things in the face at every conceivable opportunity. ....

One who wants to sugar coat that into how hard they tried and how noble it was to face up to such adversity and all that rot - is not. Because he is being misled by a misplaced pride in things he (one) had no part in, and (two) should take no pride in whatsoever.

Seemed very harsh on those who fought gallantly in wars but lost. So going on his principle it is the result that matters and excuses are of no interest. Very Pattonesque.

[Vanir Ausf B]

To be fair, the US never suffered a major military defeat in either Vietnam or Afghanistan. Public support waned and so they packed up and left of their own accord, or are planning on doing so in the case of Afghanistan. And I don't think that is actually what Jason said at all. Germany lost too but he doesn't seem to think the Wehrmacht was horrible. But I'm not picking up his gauntlet in any case.

[Rickusty]

Rickusty - Nice to have a new light on the Italian perspective. I was wondering if the professional services - that is the Navy and the Airforce - being more technical had high proportions of intelligent and committed men than the army.

I suspect the US services like the Air Force , Navy, and Marines all feel superior to the footsloggers. Probably true also of the UK and other countries.

Hello dieseltaylor, thank you, yup, that was what I am trying to say and to show.

Also here, Air Force and Navy personnel feel and felt somehow superior to the classic land soldier.

Maybe even more back then than now.

IMO, the Regia Aeronautica fought very well with what it had on hand, mechanics and pilots were generally skilled.

Planes were very few and always the same, but at least they were able to get their hands on pretty good machines from 1941 on, Macchi C.202 and 205 most of them.

I think the Regia Aeronautica was the best Armed force we had during the war, the most efficient, the most respected, the most present and fought 'till the end.

One quote from a british pilot , Group Captain Duncan-Smith DSO DFC on these Italian pilots fighting on Malta read:

"In general the standard of flying of the Italian pilots was very high indeed, and in encounters with Macchi 205s particularly we were up against aircraft that could turn and dog-fight with our Spitfires extremely well."

Or from a German pilot's point of view

The Royal Navy, the Regia Marina, also was composed mainly of skilled men, or at least , being a technical Force,people who were more skilled than the normal infantry for sure, but their doctrines and mentality were fundamentally wrong, old-fashioned and very very prudent.

We should keep this in mind just to make some math. If we lost 1-2 battleship or 2-4 heavy cruisers in a battle, we could have had our fleet almost cut in half, while the British could use a larger number of vessels and not suffer as much. It was mostly a "poor man's view" what made the Regia Marina commanders decide strategically: to not risk to lose any big ships and try to attack in different ways with smaller vessels and using the air forces and minefields as much as possible.

I would like to write more about this in the future here.

[Sailor Malan2]

On what grounds do you assume that? Why not assume that divisions were raised with soldiers who had at least completed personal training, and possibly platoon and company level as well?

You need to read both my posts. The later wave division were raised from older men, who specifically had not had prior traning, i.e. men born between 1901 (too young for ww1), and 1913 (too old to be conscripted in 1935 on). From 1919 to 1935 the German army was limited to 100000 men with no conscription. There is a severe limit on the number of men who can have military experience with an army that size.

Remember, most of these men, at least the younger ones, had been through the Hitler Jugend and/or similar paramilitary organizations, so were physically fit, were experienced in basic fieldcraft, were accustomed to military discipline, etc., and may have had some weapons training even before they joined the army per se.

The HJ had negigable effect prior to the introduction of conscription - onlt 25000 members by 1930, vs. the millions of people in that age group. Also, the graduates of the HJ would often have been the right age for conscription to hit them, and so these numbers are already in the 'trained men' category.

...

More or less the militaries of the entire world. The German army certainly regarded them as a formidable opponent that they would rather not fight just yet. Hitler had to virtually drive them to fight.

I am well aware of this. The remark was in reaction to an accusation of my only citing one source. It draws attention to the absence of sources in the counter post. And my second point is it doesn't matter who considered what pre 1940 - when the test came the French high command was found wanting on many (if not all) levels.

That certainly became obvious once battle had joined, but who knew it before hand? Not many SFAIK.

Michael

Yes, but the success of the French campaign is (partly) attributable to the execrable actual performance of the French high command, and who thought what before hand is not really relevant. I mean, the RAF thought the Defiant was a good idea before 1940. The LW didnt read that opinion, and caused them to be withdrawn from day combat in less than 4 months with a rather bad loss rate...