Reassessment of Italian Combat Prowess

[JasonC]

So now we have Michael arguing that being stronger man for man makes an army weaker because each lost man hurts its combat power more. So the strongest army would be one made of small ants - or something. dt wants to change the subject to Wellington, who -news flash - did not exactly defeat Napoleon by himself, or with a smaller army. Napoleon was defeated in epic battles like Leipzig by the assembled forces of all of Europe, outnumbering him about 2 to 1 - and Waterloo, not by a small army of British regulars supposedly relying on quality, but by a force half Prussian, and the "British" half actually half from the low countries, and a quarter from Germany, and only a quarter from Britain. That oh right, again outnumbered Napoleon by 3 to 2.

Large multinational coalitions that bring everyone and his brother from the ends of the earth to grind down with relentless attrition over years, single hostile nations led by reckless tyrants, are not small armies of professionals supposedly triumphing by superior skill.

But it is all a sidebar and a distraction. Ask yourselves, why the resistance to so simple a proposition? What are all the red herrings and sophistries needed for? What is at stake in just admitting that sure, the German army of 1940 was much weaker than the German army of early 1944, and the Allies beat the German army at its strongest?

Isn't it almost mathematically obvious that the combat power of the German army must follow some curve or other, that curve must have a highest point, it must decline from that point in the last period of the war, and the allies necessarily were stronger than however strong it was at that highest point, since they demolished it?

The only thing that history can tell us is where in time that point falls - the basic shape is determined by mere mathematics and the actual outcome of the war. And history does tell us, and its answers "quite late", with the breaks down coming in 1944, and the peaks in late 1943 to early 1944.

What the resisters apparently want to think instead, in the teeth of the evidence of actual numbers, equipment, and battlefield outcomes etc, is that the German army in its period of success was one animal, and the German army losing was another animal entirely, with no real connection between them; that its victories coincide not with the period of weakness or inexperience on the part of its enemies, but with some special internal attribute of the German army itself, that mysteriously disappears at some midwar point (when the decisive holy Initiatve was lost, perhaps?)

As for costard's hopeless modern political red herring, Americans freely choose their leadership in each of the last 5 presidential elections (strange time frame to pick, incidentally), are richer than sin, and about the most pampered people in world history. Speak to me of the hardships of the Congolese if you like, but not of the hardships of the poor Americans. We are not poor, nobody has laid a glove on us in a generation, and neither whining nor envy are virtues.

[76mm]

Isn't it almost mathematically obvious that the combat power of the German army must follow some curve or other, that curve must have a highest point, it must decline from that point in the last period of the war, and the allies necessarily were stronger than however strong it was at that highest point, since they demolished it?

Well as someone who has followed this thread with some amusement, it sure seems like people have been talking about all different types of "combat power"--at the level of the individual median soldier, company, battalion, division, wehrmacht, etc., each one of which could have at least one such curve, and in reality you could draw an infinite number of such curves, each of them different to some extent, based on what you are trying to graph and what you are trying to reflect.

So from my perspective, while lots of intelligent people have made various interesting poitns, this whole thread is a bit ridiculous...

[Erwin]

"...the strongest army would be one made of small ants..." Well, actually Jon, yes. If the ants ever got organized, we humans would be in trouble.

Not saying I disagree with some of your primary arguments. But, maybe this was a poor example.

[Michael Emrys]

So now we have Michael arguing that being stronger man for man makes an army weaker because each lost man hurts its combat power more. So the strongest army would be one made of small ants - or something.

Come on, Jason, you're not even trying to be serious here. I did not say "that being stronger man for man makes an army weaker", I said that having fewer men on the line made it more brittle. Surely that distinction is not one exceeding your capacity to grasp. A German rifle company up to its full TO&E could certainly put a lot of hurt on its opposition, and did so repeatedly up until the last months of the war. But once it began to take serious casualties—say over 10%—its combat power begins to erode and then melt away. That happened in any army, the question is, did it happen faster in the late war Heer rifle company than in the early war version? I'm guessing that it did. If you can muster convincing proof to the contrary, I'm all ears. Just don't try to set me up as a straw man so that you can repeat what you've been claiming all along.

Michael

[JasonC]

Michael - the German army of 1944 had 50% more men in the field army and Waffen SS than the German army of 1940. So it wasn't "more brittle" because it had "fewer men on the line". It had more men on the line, not less, and more guns and heavy weapons per man, as well.

[JasonC]

76mm - yes you could draw an infinite number of such curves (aleph 1 of them, in fact). But they would all have a max on the interval, a lower starting and ending point, and would all decline from their max. Also, on every metric, the German army of the late war was stronger than the early war one, so all the max points would run from sometime in 1943 to sometime in 1944, not way back in 1940. We can get more precise with more relevant measures of combat power, and we have. And those cluster even more tightly, late 1943 to early 1944. Lots of curves, as many as you like, all saying the same basic thing.

And people on the thread desperately looking for any sophism to avoid hearing it...

[Michael Emrys]

Jason, you keep talking about armies and I am talking about companies and divisions. They aren't the same thing and their experience is not the same. That point seems to continually escape you. Yeah, the army as a whole could absorb a lot of losses and still hang in there, but in order to, they had to keep swapping out divisions that had been broken and replacing them with divisions that had either been rebuilt or newly raised. Now I have already conceded early in this thread that most of that is due to the increased combined combat power of its enemies after 1943. But isn't it also intuitively suggestive that some of it is also due to the restructuring forced on it by losses prior to that date and the resultant drain on available manpower?

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

And people on the thread desperately looking for any sophism to avoid hearing it...

Rubbish. I accepted that point long before this thread ever started. You just can't seem to get that I am talking about something else.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Well as someone who has followed this thread with some amusement, it sure seems like people have been talking about all different types of "combat power"--at the level of the individual median soldier, company, battalion, division, wehrmacht...

Yeah, that is the problem. There is a lot of miscommunication going on due to a failure to recognize that what is true for an army as a whole may not apply at the company level.

Michael

[Sgt Joch]

Its old quantity vs quality debate. In terms of raw numbers, german ground forces reached a peek in 44 and even as late feb. 45, still had 4,000 tanks: 1,500 Pz IV, 2,200 Panthers, 250 Tigers. The Kriegsmarine still had 396 U-boats in may 45.

However quality started going down from 41. In 42, infantry training courses were shortened to get recruits up to the front faster. In spring 42, the Germans could not even bring their divisions back up to strength on the Ostfront so they reduced the TO&E of 2/3rds of the infantry divisions by 2/3rds and stripped them of most of their vehicles just to get the infantry/armor divisions on the southern front up to strength.

By spring 44, the germans were recruiting 16-17 year old boys and men in the 25-34 range who had previously been passed over for fitness issues to bring their regular army divisions back up to strength.

JasonC had done a good overview of Waffen SS formations in normandy in 1944 which points out many of the quality problems:

http://www.battlefront.com/community/showpost.php?p=1256228&postcount=123

[JonS]

Jon, isn't "how forces are used" a function of leadership?

In the sense that all armys are led? Yes, of course. What else would it be a function of?

But "good leadership" isn't some single absolute attribute. "Leadership" is a complex concept that covers moral, intellectual, charismatic, and other areas. The Italians, for example, undoubtedly had some moral and charismatic leaders. But that didn't matter much in the end because the employment of the Italian army - their intellectual understanding of how to use force on the battlefield - was horrible from start to finish.

[ArgusEye]

76mm - yes you could draw an infinite number of such curves (aleph 1 of them, in fact).

I didn't want to get sucked into this whole thread, but some things are sufficiently WRONG that I cannot resist. It isn't aleph one curves. Quit that.

As to the main thrust of the discussion, to compare the strengths of 40 Wehrmacht vs 44 Wehrmacht is kind of pointless. Different people with different tools in a very different environment. What is the comparison for, anyway? It all starts with a straw man argument way back in post 65.

In the end it would come down to this: the 40 Wehrmacht would win every battle. Because the 44 Wehrmacht would show up four years late. Just as trite as the rest of the bickering. Which is too bad, because the original point of debate was quite interesting.

[76mm]

But they would all have a max on the interval, a lower starting and ending point, and would all decline from their max. Also, on every metric, the German army of the late war was stronger than the early war one, so all the max points would run from sometime in 1943 to sometime in 1944, not way back in 1940.

JasonC, I actually agree with many of your points, and agree the the max for *most* curves would peak in the later years, but I'm not sure that you can say that for "every metric"...for instance, one could argue that soldiers and officers in 1940 were better trained and in better physical condition (to the extent that matters)...or one could argue that soldiers and officers in 1944 had more combat experience and were better-conditioned for combat conditions? So which soldiers were better? I don't know and I don't think you can convince me that you know either.

Anyway, I don't mean to get drawn into a debate on this topic because frankly I consider the whole argument rather sterile and pointless.

[er, I don't even now what aleph 1 is...]

[dieseltaylor]

Michael - the German army was vastly stronger in June of 1944 than it was in June of 1941. So were its enemies, of course. But the force of 1941 had about 3000 tanks, a third of them already obsolete in 1941, and another third that would be toys in 1944. Both tech and force strengths were moving way too fast for their army of 1941 to have been any threat to any of the major Allied powers of 1944.

Rather like saying breathing is a good thing. I am astonished that you considered Michael would suggest that a 1941 army would be effective against an Allied Army in 1944.

So ....

But it is all a sidebar and a distraction. Ask yourselves, why the resistance to so simple a proposition? What are all the red herrings and sophistries needed for?

I think its because you are the way you are.

[dieseltaylor]

JonS-

I have not read the book but do agree with the basic premise in spades.

I am currently reading a book on the 30th Commando and its genesis comes from the antics of the Germans in capturing the 4th Yugoslavian Army HQ and using the captured ciphers and communications to tell the troops that Yugoslavia had capitulated.

Using intelligence to multiply effectiveness or destroy enemy cohesion is not dependent on Army size or superior technology - its the smarts to make best use.

[dieseltaylor]

It is interesting that the US came out of WW2 with management skills that are still to be matched elsewhere in the world (and on the decline for twenty years now).

Are you actually serious!? Or is it sarcasm?

I can think of many countries with higher standards of living, longer life spans, better education, less corruption, less unemployment, and decent economies. We therefore might assume their management, to reach these levels, has been superior to that of the US rather than merely matching post-war US levels. Germany might be an obvious case in point.

And if you want to choose 1992 as the beginning of a US decline from pre-eminence in management I still think you are doing a disservice to many countries in northern Europe.

[costard]

Ugh, how to defend the indefensible argument (with a hangover). Or, chasing down the red herrings to show you that they're actually maroon.

The twenty year time-frame came out of a simple, quick and rough guesstimate of when the power establishment in the US stopped working for the general populace and shifted it's focus to the benefit of themselves - divide and conquer applied to their own nation. I suspect the rot actually arose on both sides of the Atlantic and in some ways was facilitated by the lack of mission that came about when the Curtain fell.

Diesel - I think the simple scale of the US achievements in the post-war period is manifestly unmatched in any period of recorded history by any other civilisation (for example, it has held together in face of self-engineered disasters at least as well as the Roman Empire, all the time maintaining and extending a technological lead over its competitors). The value and free dissemination of US management systems developed during WW2 has meant that other countries have benefited from applying the lessons, the particular philosophical bent and requirements of those various nations leading to modifications that, in some instances, have promoted relative superiority in results.

The complexity of the systems that underlie that success require superior management, in their design and in their maintenance. Where the competency in management skills was selected from a very broad base during the war (a breakdown of class distinctions and a recognition of both the fact of exploitable competency being available in the lower classes and a need to exploit those competencies), it is now being made from a diminishing resource, a club of monied interests that has very little claim on moral or intellectual integrity (which lack denies them moral and intellectual authority and therefore, a justifiable claim on leadership status). For sure, the requirements of highly skilled leaders are partly met by the quality of the methods and metrics brought to bear in analysing the problems the leadership is required to solve, and I'd argue the the US was streets ahead in this regard during and just after WW2.

[ASL Veteran]

Rubbish. I accepted that point long before this thread ever started. You just can't seem to get that I am talking about something else.

Michael

Whenever you get into a discussion with Jason C, you will never be 'correct' and your points will never be valid . His brain is so vast that there isn't a single angle he hasn't already considered and dismissed as irrelevant.

[JonS]

I was reading through some old threads recently, and came across this gem:

here is your problem. When you jump into a conversation to disagree with statements others have made, people expect that you are saying something other than what those already in that conservation, that you are explicitly pretending to correct, just said themselves. If you are, you have to defend the difference. If you aren't, the interruption is a bit of impertinence.

No prizes for guessing who wrote it

[JonS]

I am currently reading a book on the 30th Commando and its genesis comes from the antics of the Germans in capturing the 4th Yugoslavian Army HQ and using the captured ciphers and communications to tell the troops that Yugoslavia had capitulated. Using intelligence to multiply effectiveness or destroy enemy cohesion is not dependent on Army size or superior technology - its the smarts to make best use.

Yep. Efficiency is sometimes the last - and only - refuge of the underdog. The development of British artillery doctrine, practice, and use in WWI (and to a lesser extent in WWII) is an excellent example. The development of all forms of intelligence by the British in WWII (and to a lesser extent WWI) is another.

In both WWI and WWII the British started from behind the 8-ball, and were forced to use their resources wisely and efficiently or go under. And they managed to do so in both cases, although it took years to get it together. By the time the Germans were faced with the same imperative they were already on the downslope, and ran out of resources - including especially time - before they could come up with equivalents, or even counters.

[Sublime]

Well the Brits definitely were efficient. I'm always reminded of the anecdote of German troops reporting the Brits were armed heavily with MGs when it was just superbly trained riflemen shooting enfields really, really fast.

[Sgt Joch]

Whenever you get into a discussion with Jason C, you will never be 'correct' and your points will never be valid . His brain is so vast that there isn't a single angle he hasn't already considered and dismissed as irrelevant.

c'mon guys, let's keep this on the issues.

[Michael Emrys]

c'mon guys, let's keep this on the issues.

I agree. If you just feel like slamming somebody personally, go to the Peng thread. But be prepared to get slammed back...by experts.

Michael

[ASL Veteran]

c'mon guys, let's keep this on the issues.

I actually like Jason even though it looks like I'm ripping him. He does add a lot of flavor to the forums. Trying to discuss anything with him can be a complete waste of time though because it's not really a discussion. It's just an exercise of him repeating the same thing over and over again and him ignoring any points you make. You are right though - let's look at the issues. Jason apparently says that the German army was bigger in 1944 than in 1940. Okay sure. Because it's bigger that means it's better - well that's not necessarily the case.

It's simply an indisputable biological fact that every single German male that was of military age between 1939 and 1945 was alive before the war even began. Therefore the maximum size of the army was already set in stone before the war even starts. So the fact that the 1944 army was bigger than the 1940 army is completely meaningless since every man who was in the 1944 army was alive in 1940. They just weren't all called to the colors yet. Not only that, but every man who was KIA or WIA between 1941 and 1943 weren't KIA or WIA in 1940 yet. So for someone to say that the army of 1944 is bigger than the army of 1940 and is therefore somehow more resiliant or better is ..... I'm sorry to say .... a completely ignorant representation that flies in the face of biological fact.

An army isn't more resiliant because of how big it is but rather how big it is and what manpower reserves are available to it. The manpower reserves are what makes it resiliant. The army of 1940 was smaller .... so what. There were more manpower reserves available to the 1940 army than the entire size of the standing army of 1944 and overall those who were in the army of 1944 weren't the physical equal of the soldiers of 1940. It's simply biologically impossible. The soldiers of 1940 were the cream of the crop in terms of fitness, age, and training because the German army could pick and choose who to call to the colors. By 1944 the Germans were calling up pretty much everyone who could walk.

So hopefully we can dispense with the size bit of Jason's position. If we dispense with that then we are left with the technological aspect. German technology was more advanced in 1944 than it was in 1940. Okay, well if that's all he's got then I'm not really sure what his point is or what he's trying to convince us of because nobody will dispute that the German military was more advanced in 1944 than it was in 1940. Of course everyone else was more advanced to so .....?

So I guess what we are discussing then is whether the technologically more advanced Germans of 1944 were better against their Allied 1944 counterparts than the primitive Germans of 1940 were against their primitive 1940 Allied counterparts? Uh, well the record doesn't support that so now what? Oh yeah, that's why he keeps going back to the size of the 1944 army .... yeah .... but of course that's a biologically challenged representation as I indicated above. So we are then left with the Allies of 1940 were incompetent relative to the Germans of 1940.

Well the French army before the war started was considered one of the best armies in the world. In fact, I think you would be hard pressed to find an army in 1940 that was more highly regarded than the French army - and that includes the German army. It is only through hindsight that we now see the German army as superior to the French, but at the time that was certainly not known. Certainly it's doubtful that the French army would have very many equals in 1940. So if the French army isn't considered 'good enough' then I'm not really sure what qualifies as 'good enough' to judge against the German army of 1940 relative to the army of 1944.

So around and around we go where it stops nobody knows. Hopefully I can get off this ride now and stay off. I will certainly try. By the way Jason, I really do appreciate your contributions to the forum. Your presence reminds me of the CMx1 heydays. Hopefully more of the old guard CMx1 types will be coming around as the series progresses. (gets off the unicorn and steps off the merri go round.)

[76mm]

Well the Brits definitely were efficient. I'm always reminded of the anecdote of German troops reporting the Brits were armed heavily with MGs when it was just superbly trained riflemen shooting enfields really, really fast.

hmm, and the Germans were able to convince every British and American soldier that every German tank approaching the battlefield was a Tiger.