Tank hunter teams, another grog question

[Georgie]

With the spotting ability of tanks, even to the rear and sides, how successful were the tank hunter teams IRL? The faust in the game has a range of only 30m. Sometimes the spotting ability of tanks in the game remind me of Robocop.

[YankeeDog]

In general, not very. If you look at the armor casualty statistics, across all WWII fronts and time periods, only a fairly small percentage of tank losses were to infantry AT weapons. Large caliber gun AT rounds (75mm+) are far and away the biggest killers of medium and heavy armor AFVs in 1944 and 1945. There is a reason why the Germans awarded a medal to every infantryman who successfully close-assaulted a tank.

I'd wager most players who play CM with any frequency see more successful tank close assaults over a few months of gaming than were seen over the course of the entire Normandy campaign.

% of tanks knocked out by infantry AT weapons does start to tick upwards towards the end of the war, esp. on the East Front. This is probably primarily due to two factors (1) The Allies and especially the Russians aggressively pushing armor into towns, cities, and other dense areas where infantry ambush of armor is easier, and (2) increasing availability of more potent, longer-range German IAT weapons such as the Pz-60 and Pz-100.

[Sgt Joch]

yes, WW2 infantry AT weapons/tactics were more a morale booster than anything else.

The higher % of AFVs knocked out by Panzerfausts towards the end of the war can also be partly expalined by the fact that the Germans were running out of ATGs/AFVs.

[Georgie]

That is good to hear. I know that in CM1 if a panzerfaust or a shrek was nearby then there was a good chance that they would get some of your Shermans. The way it is portrayed now in the game seems , according to what has been written on this thread thus far, to be more true to life.

[Killkess]

One can also interprete these numbers differently: Historicaly tanks were used much more cautious in infantry "friendly" terrain compared to what we see in CMBN. CMBN clearly favours armor due to the überspotting and almost non excisting restrictions of tanks in urban warfare combined with a bad tac-ai on the infantry side.

[YankeeDog]

Historicaly tanks were used much more cautious in infantry "friendly" terrain compared to what we see in CMBN.

Sometimes, but not always. Relevant to the ETO, the 4th Armored division in particular was known for deploying a tactic not unlike the modern "Thunder Run", where they'd send columns Shermans charging through enemy-held towns, machine guns blazing.

And then, of course, there's the East Front...

[Vanir Ausf B]

One can also interprete these numbers differently: Historicaly tanks were used much more cautious in infantry "friendly" terrain compared to what we see in CMBN. CMBN clearly favours armor due to the überspotting and almost non excisting restrictions of tanks in urban warfare combined with a bad tac-ai on the infantry side.

I agree. I suppose the answer depends on what the OP meant by "successful". I don't think you can use the total loss numbers to judge the difficulty of infantry engaging tanks at very short range.

[Michael Emrys]

One can also interprete these numbers differently: Historicaly tanks were used much more cautious in infantry "friendly" terrain...

This is similar to a point I wanted to make, which is that the existence of infantry held AT weaponry forces the armor to slow down to the pace of accompanying infantry on foot. This is a pretty dramatic change from the rip-roaring days of the Blitzkrieg when sending a battalion of pure armor charging full on pretty much guaranteed mass surrender by the enemy infantry. Of course it needs to be said that the presence of larger numbers of effective AT guns supporting the infantry had something to do with that as well.

Michael

[Sublime]

couple of points- the wheat fields are perfect for tank hunting teams. I think people forget that its a wheat field or field with high vegetation. if u have them crawl or hide tanks or even men have to be almost on top of them to see them.

most people have success with schrecks, but I often see posts where people say they never get kills with fausts. Its a lot harder but its an art and lately as my skill increases so do my kills with fausts.

I believe womble came up with the idea originally, but I used to end move orders at the location I wanted the team to fire. it was a bad idea, now I order them to quick or move fast past the location I want them to fire (unless they ambushing, laying in wait) because the team will run and the faust guy will stop and fire anyways. huge difference using that.

32m cover arcs are important, hold shift for 360 cover arcs (essential for tank hunting)

I also suspect as the series progress as the 60m and 100m fausts come out people will start making a lot more kills.

But how about the zooks? in a qb against schultzie, US vs US I had some very interesting results. First of all I took a couple of platoons of M10s (with a couple airborne companies) against schultzies platoons of Sherman easy 8s.

First thing I noticed - tank destroyers, arent. besides being open topped their armor is paper thin, and the gun surprisingly did not penetrate the shermans armor most of the time. Veeerrry bad news. I lost about 7-10 M10s for 1 dead sherman, 1 immobilized. I was shocked.

Even more shocking was a heroic couple of parachute teams with zook men took on a sherman head on, close range. Front turret penetration. tanks reply? all 3 mgs gun down the team. another team charges in, front upper hull penetration. they got gunned down too, tho apparently it wounded the driver.

The zook has piss poor behind armor effects apparently =(

(no im not saying its broken, its just all luck, just observations)

[sburke]

the wheat fields are perfect for tank hunting

Yeah I have had one opportunity taking on a wolverine in a wheatfield where a PF would have been ideal. Unfortunately it was a scout team that had none and had to try just close assault...they failed though they came pretty darn close.

They are tough to use, but I am slowly learning what it takes to be able to use them. Shreks on the other hand, one of my favorite weapons. I'll take Shrek teams over ATGs any day. Particularly in bocage country.

[John Kettler]

Sublime,

If you want an American TD with actual armor protection worth mentioning, am afraid you'll have to wait for the M36. That was built on a Sherman hull and is a relative Tiger tank in armor protection compared to an M10. The M10, though is heavily protected compared to an M18 Hellcat.

Georgie,

I believe the Russians lost some 400 tanks in the Battle of Berlin, mostly to Panzerfausts and Panzerschrecks, which were ubiquitous.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Sublime]

all I know is that Ive discovered some glaring flaws in the US tank destroyer doctrine, especially when the tank destroyers cant handled by the tanks. initially when the battle began it was duels of 2-3 M10s vs 1 Sherman at a time, and even then I was losing!

Historically did they come to a similar conclusion about their TDs? I know M10s saw service in Korea, but I could believe that would also be because of ubiquitous numbers and it being so near WW2.

When was the whole TD idea discarded in favor of an all around MBT?

[Boche]

all I know is that Ive discovered some glaring flaws in the US tank destroyer doctrine, especially when the tank destroyers cant handled by the tanks. initially when the battle began it was duels of 2-3 M10s vs 1 Sherman at a time, and even then I was losing!

Historically did they come to a similar conclusion about their TDs? I know M10s saw service in Korea, but I could believe that would also be because of ubiquitous numbers and it being so near WW2.

When was the whole TD idea discarded in favor of an all around MBT?

AFAIK there was a long long thread (or atleast a conversation) on this subject a while back, really interesting.

Let me see if I can find it.

[Michael Emrys]

First thing I noticed - tank destroyers, arent. besides being open topped their armor is paper thin, and the gun surprisingly did not penetrate the shermans armor most of the time. Veeerrry bad news. I lost about 7-10 M10s for 1 dead sherman, 1 immobilized.

If you were trying to go head to head with the Shermans, that's not at all surprising. Correct employment of the M10 (not always easy to achieve in CM) would be to hide in ambush and wait for the enemy to come along. When the first enemy tank appears, fire a shot or two, preferably at his flanks. If you get a kill, fine. Once it is likely that your presence has been twigged, pop smoke and displace to the next firing position. Don't wait until someone starts shooting at you or—as you have discovered—you will likely die. If you can score a kill or two in the process, fine. But just forcing the enemy formation to stop, deploy, and spend time shooting up a now empty hedgerow or copse is a win.

The name of the game is delay. As the division commander what you want is to slow down the enemy armored spearhead long enough for you to move reserves and set up a kill zone where you can stop him cold. And even there the goal is not necessarily to annihilate the enemy (although doing so can be good for your morale ), but to prevent him from achieving his objective. Or even failing that, make the attainment of his objective so expensive in terms of men, matériel, and time that he is unable to exploit his success immediately.

You can do this by employing your TDs in pairs or more, and leap frogging other pairs already in position in the next ambush position, to reach a third ambush position. Done skillfully, this forces the enemy to pause at each position, possibly absorb losses, but deploy and engage an enemy that may have already moved on. Meanwhile the clock is ticking.

As I say, using your M10s, M18s, or whatever in this way is not easy in CM unless you are playing a scenario on a map specifically designed to allow it. But in any event, the point is not to think of Allied TDs as inadequate Jagdpanthers, designed to go head to head against tanks and win, but as AT guns on a self-propelled chassis. Once you learn to exploit that mobility, you'll start to enjoy greater success.

Michael

[womble]

all I know is that Ive discovered some glaring flaws in the US tank destroyer doctrine...

In a lot of ways it wasn't the doctrine that was flawed. In doctrine, M10s are just ATGs with an inbuilt prime mover. They're an artillery arm that replaced ATG formations. The problem was that there were never enough tanks to go around (by definition, really) and so American TDs were too often pressed into service (outside doctrine) as tank substitutes, where they lack one of the features needed to shine, namely protection.

And this is exactly how they're usually used in CM games.

Historically did they come to a similar conclusion about their TDs?

Do you see any TD regiments in the current OrBat? Yes, they reached the same conclusion, and developed the MBT doctrine of tank construction for battlefield fighting that persists to date.

[Macisle]

Normally, I play QBs as the attacker, but the other night I felt like an experiment, so I took a company of Heer, a platoon of PIVs and one 75mm ATG and put them on defense (QB map 258) against a full company of Shermans and a company of American infantry. Both sides were typical and had some artillery. The game style was turn-based Elite.

I had loads of fun! PFs took down several tanks. Shreks even more. The ATG knocked out five tanks before running out of ammo and being knocked as I tried to withdraw it. I have to say, the PIVs also performed well beyond what I expected. I lost one from the first shot from a Sherman coming onto the main road at long distance. The others all survived the battle, taking out multiple tanks from ambush positions. One took THREE hits from Sherman at point blank range, before dispatching it (was immobilized, but in an ideal spot and it remained critical to the defense).

The moment I remember most was when a Sherman took a shreck hit, popped smoke and retreated into a spot that was very dangerous to my defense. Several groups of my infantry were hiding in the buildings immediately around the smoke-shrouded tank and none had AT weapons left. All exits on opposite sides of the buildings from the tank were suicide due to surrounding enemy units. So, while the smoke was still thick, I sent a PF team running across the street to the tank's position. For s few seconds, they saw nothing. Then they and the tank mutually gained vis. It started to rotate its turret...They raised their PF at PB range...and fired. BOOM! Sandwiched between a building and the tank, they were both killed by the PF blast, but they char-broiled the tank and then some.

The AI had lost most of its tanks by the time it started to move its infantry in. By then, I was able to set up an infantry block, knock out the last enemy tanks and then move two PIVs (of the other two, one was immobile and one held in reserve) in to support an infantry attack on the only enemy-held VL. They surrendered for a total victory (it's the AI on the attack though, so of course no bragging rights.)

I would highly recommend this for a fun experiment to people. 258 is a great map, with a full mix of terrain and perfect for setting up an ambush-laden defense. Doubt it would work with a human opponent, though. He would give the tanks infantry support!

As for the infantry AT weapons, the PFs were awesome at the right range. Assuming a hit, the shrecks were less deadly, of course, but still usually took out their targets. I have not done specific testing of the American bazookas, but from casual observation, they seem pretty accurate, but lacking in penetration power vs anything beyond light armor. I've seen PIVs and Stugs shrug off up to FIVE 'zook hits (including side and rear). I think they were much deadlier in CMx1. I assume they are more accurately modeled now, but I don't know the numbers. PIATs seem pretty accurate and effective.

[YankeeDog]

Sublime,

If you want an American TD with actual armor protection worth mentioning, am afraid you'll have to wait for the M36. That was built on a Sherman hull and is a relative Tiger tank in armor protection compared to an M10.

Not really. The M36 had somewhat thicker armor in certain specific areas, such as part (but not all) of the front lower hull plate. But for the most part, the M36 was just an upgunned M10, and many of the armor plates on the M36, such as the front upper hull plate, are exactly the same as the M10's. On the very important turret front, the M36's mantlet is thicker than the M10's. but also less sloped (on average, the mantlets are complex shapes), so the overall protection level offered is probably not all that different, on average. In general, where the M36 does have thicker armor, the difference is not really enough thicker to make a substantial difference against the common German AT weapons of '45, such as the PaK40.

What the M36 did have was a much more powerful gun; the 90mm was the only AFV gun the U.S. fielded during the war that could reliably penetrate the Big Cats' frontal armor at typical combat ranges.

[Bigduke6]

To be fair, part of this is due to the Axis running short of armor and indeed AT weapons in the East, and the Soviets being able to achieve armored breakthroughs (more or less, I'm generalizing here) at will. This brought down Red armor onto Axis infantry a whole lot more often than say in the early-to-mid war period, and of course a normal outcome of T-34 brigades rampaging through an Axis rear area is that Axis infantry is going to get itself to the closest town, village or city if at all possible.

But even in Berlin something like 8-10 per cent all lost Soviet armored vehicles were to infantry weapons, and that was a battle where most of the Germans literally had nowhere to run.

In general, not very. If you look at the armor casualty statistics, across all WWII fronts and time periods, only a fairly small percentage of tank losses were to infantry AT weapons. Large caliber gun AT rounds (75mm+) are far and away the biggest killers of medium and heavy armor AFVs in 1944 and 1945. There is a reason why the Germans awarded a medal to every infantryman who successfully close-assaulted a tank.

I'd wager most players who play CM with any frequency see more successful tank close assaults over a few months of gaming than were seen over the course of the entire Normandy campaign.

% of tanks knocked out by infantry AT weapons does start to tick upwards towards the end of the war, esp. on the East Front. This is probably primarily due to two factors (1) The Allies and especially the Russians aggressively pushing armor into towns, cities, and other dense areas where infantry ambush of armor is easier, and (2) increasing availability of more potent, longer-range German IAT weapons such as the Pz-60 and Pz-100.

[winkelried]

In a lot of ways it wasn't the doctrine that was flawed. In doctrine, M10s are just ATGs with an inbuilt prime mover. They're an artillery arm that replaced ATG formations. The problem was that there were never enough tanks to go around (by definition, really) and so American TDs were too often pressed into service (outside doctrine) as tank substitutes, where they lack one of the features needed to shine, namely protection.

you're probably right with doctrine. the original doctrine for SP TDs was applied only once during the whole war in the battle of El Guettar in 1942 it seems. And even repulsing successfully an attack by 57 German tanks the 601st TD Bn lost 2/3s of its strength! afterwards TDs were used piecemeal or as "auxiliary" tanks or even as artillery (which was one of the secondary missions defined by the doctrine).

again for doctrine: one thing a lot of people forget, is that the self-propelled TD batallion has one recon company and each TD platoon has two armored cars for recon. FM 18-5 "Tactical Employment, Tank Destroyer Unit" puts a lot of focus of the proper employment of the recon forces available to the SP TD batallion. In my experience the proper use of the recon elements is key in CMx too.

The other thing to remember is, that the M-10 was to heavy and too slow to properly implement TD doctrine. Only the M-18 Hellcat had the speed and mobility to live up to the doctrine.

[Erwin]

"order them (AT teams) to quick or move fast past the location I want them to fire (unless they ambushing, laying in wait) because the team will run and the faust guy will stop and fire anyways."

Yes, found that a very effective way of killing tanks. Should be in a sticky USEFUL TACTICS section.

[Michael Emrys]

I think the biggest problem with the TDs is that by the time they arrived, the peril they were intended to address had more or less disappeared. The TD battalions were intended to respond to German mass armored penetrations, but after 1943 the Western Allies seldom had to face any of those. Perhaps the best course at that point would have been to terminate the production of TDs, or at least the M10, and concentrate on the production of more tanks, but production sometimes has a momentum of its own.

Michael

[A Canadian Cat]

I believe womble came up with the idea originally, but I used to end move orders at the location I wanted the team to fire. it was a bad idea, now I order them to quick or move fast past the location I want them to fire (unless they ambushing, laying in wait) because the team will run and the faust guy will stop and fire anyways. huge difference using that.

Interesting I have to admit I do not "get" this. In what situation can you do this? When running from cover to a flanking or rear position to the enemy tank?

How does this work? What difference does it make if I give the order end point to the AS I want them to fire from or the AS one square closer to the target? I thought they would not setup to fire until they stopped moving and moving an additional 8m would mean more time until they fire.

I hope someone can shed some light on how this works.

[YankeeDog]

It's important to differentiate between the tank destroyer doctrine, as conceived and proselytized mostly by Gen. Lesley J. McNair, and "tank destroyer" weapons systems like the M10, M18 etc. The former is generally considered to be a deeply flawed doctrine. But this doesn't necessarily invalidate the value of "tank destroyer" AFVs as weapons systems.

Pretty much all WWII combatants developed and deployed "tank destroyers" of one kind or another, and many of these designs were quite successful. And "tank destroyers" are still in Army TOEs today; both the U.S. Army TOW Stryker or USMC TOW LAV are really "Tank Destroyers" in the tradition of the M18 Hellcat, if you think about it.

As for the doctrine, it's a long and complex subject, but speaking very generally, IMHO the essential failing of TD doctrine is that it failed to fully appreciate the combined-arms nature of the so-called "Blitzkrieg" attack it was intended to counter. TD doctrine envisioned that large, independent formations of mobile anti-armor weapons (in early iterations of the doctrine, towed AT guns, but eventually changed to TD AFVs) could be used to stop the vanguard of enemy attacking formations, which the doctrine imagined would be composed mostly, if not exclusively, of tanks with little or no infantry or artillery support. So it was anticipating more-or-less "pure" large-scale TD vs. Tank engagements. On cursory analysis, at least, this sounds great. Stop tanks with weapons designed to fight tanks.

Ironically, one the reasons American planners thought this doctrine would be successful is that there were serious deficiencies in U.S. Army Armored doctrine and organization in the late 1930s and early 40s. So when the new TD formations were tested in wargames, they were very successful in part because the U.S. armored formations they were fighting against had very little infantry or artillery support. It wasn't until after the U.S. entered the war that the Army began to realize the deficiencies in its Armored TOEs and doctrine, and beef up the mobile infantry and artillery components of Armored TOEs.

Of course, German doctrine didn't call for homogenous tank attacks at all, but rather highly mobile combined arms forces that included motorized or (ideally) mechanized infantry and artillery the could keep up with and support the advancing tanks. And by the time the U.S. entered the war at the end of 1941, other combatants like the British and the Russians were going to school on this aspect of German doctrine. The logical counter to the combined arms attack was that you really need a combined arms defense. "Tanks Destroyer" weapons systems might be part of a combined arms defense, but by themselves they are only one tool in the kit, so to speak.

General McNair clung to TD doctrine for quite a long time. Some other U.S. senior commanders recognized deficiencies and began making de facto changes in the field, long before the doctrine was officially abandoned. But McNair kept singing the same tune. He was directly involved in delaying the development and deployment of U.S. tanks like the 76mm Sherman and the M26 Pershing well into 1942 -- he saw these improved tank designs as an unnecessary waste of time and resources, since it would be the TD formations doing most of the fighting against enemy armor. If it weren't for him, there's a good chance the U.S. Army would have hit the beaches of Normandy with at least a few M26s operational, and they definitely would have had M26s in action by the end of 1944. So it's easy to understand why his ideas are not held in much reverence today. Amongst other questionable legacies, he also had a strong role in the design and implementation of the infamous Repple-Depple replacement system, and seemed to have a singular ability to select and promote subordinate commanders with poor command abilities -- one of his proteges was General Fredenall, probably one of the worst senior-level U.S. officers of the war.

But considering he made the ultimate sacrifice for his country at St. Lo, it's best not to speak too ill of the man. Whatever his faults, he was a dedicated professional officer serving his country to the best of his abilities.

[Michael Emrys]

Pretty much all WWII combatants developed and deployed "tank destroyers" of one kind or another, and many of these designs were quite successful.

Generally this came about because it was desired to put the most powerful AT weapon available on an armored chassis and it wouldn't fit in any available turret. So you ended up with a limited traverse weapon, often open topped, often thinly armored. The Soviets were exceptional in that theirs had armor overhead and usually a heavy frontal armor. Likewise for the German Stug III, JgdPz IV, and V.

Michael

[altipueri]

Didn't Patton also hold up the development of the Pershing?