kluge

A negotiated end to the conflict, ideally one where Ukraine can dictate the terms from a position of strength.
It never was. The objectives of the US and NATO are not completely aligned with those of Ukraine's. But that's a mostly unspoken truth since politicians keep putting their feet in their mouths whenever they attempt to say as much.
Poland and the US have similar goals but different roles to play.
The US wishes to send military aid to Ukraine without compromising its current capabilities (most of which are allocated to allied nations, and Ukraine is not a treaty ally). It does however have the industrial and economic capacity to eventually replace the hardware being sent to Ukraine, just not immediately. Poland also wishes to send military aid to Ukraine but unlike the US it can afford to temporarily compromise its current capabilities (most of which is allocated to deterring Russian aggression, which clearly will not happen while Russia is tied up in Ukraine).
Thus, Poland and other NATO nations are sending their existing hardware to Ukraine while simultaneously making purchase orders for future deliveries of US equipment.

A negotiated end to the conflict, ideally one where Ukraine can dictate the terms from a position of strength.
It never was. The objectives of the US and NATO are not completely aligned with those of Ukraine's. But that's a mostly unspoken truth since politicians keep putting their feet in their mouths whenever they attempt to say as much.
Poland and the US have similar goals but different roles to play.
The US wishes to send military aid to Ukraine without compromising its current capabilities (most of which are allocated to allied nations, and Ukraine is not a treaty ally). It does however have the industrial and economic capacity to eventually replace the hardware being sent to Ukraine, just not immediately. Poland also wishes to send military aid to Ukraine but unlike the US it can afford to temporarily compromise its current capabilities (most of which is allocated to deterring Russian aggression, which clearly will not happen while Russia is tied up in Ukraine).
Thus, Poland and other NATO nations are sending their existing hardware to Ukraine while simultaneously making purchase orders for future deliveries of US equipment.

It shouldn't come as the slightest surprise that there would be something akin to a significant SF presence in Ukraine. One of the core published missions of most SF are Foreign Internal defense and unconventional Warfare in the service of Host nation assistance. (Basically training and advising) in particular in high risk environments. Likewise general support of the intel and diplomatic personnel in the country. These are mundane but vital tasks.

100 % old Soviet stocks. We hadn't own SA-missiles production. There were some projects like a missile, based on R-27 AA, but it wasn't realized to serial production. So, we can only to extend resourse of existimg SA misiles.  

I wouldn't read those documents in that spirit- US must balance help provided (likely sharper strategy vouched by DoD) with more global needs to contain Russia and its atomic arsenal (my very limited understanding of division as to strategy re UA points to Department of State as "doves").
A lot issues here- already known  capabilities, faster delivery, aaccessibility of trained personnel on Soviet stuff etc. Strykers did started to appear on Ukrainian soil, while I did not see Bradleys yet.
Yes, Central Europe (minus Hungary) naturally has simple view of this conflict- kick Muscovites into the stomach as much as possible. But truth to be told, no state here has traditions of for example nuclear deterrence and thousands of caveats attached to it, and very few understand what it means to play a conflict on a globe, not on map, with keeping global economy running, trade circulation unobstructed, global balance of forces etc. So in a way we undestand more due to closeness to Russia, but on the other- less than US.

The idea of partisans rising up and lack thereof is disappointing is a ridiculous notion, their value is in intelligence gathering. End of the day, satellites, and monitoring can only do so much, and much that is controlled by foreign powers, (and those foreign powers are terrified at "excessiveness") Ukraine of course will have their methods of intelligence gathering, and getting them killed when we have HIMARS firing at rear areas is silly as hell.

Mind you, significant money has been pledged or given to Ukraine, so the idea of Poland and U.S clashing needs more supporting data, end of the day, the money that flows to Ukraine that then is used to purchase or ramp up aid, a lot of it is from the U.S.
End of the day, it is also preferred that Ukraine has not one significant backer, being the U.S but more. Actions like joint Polish-Ukrainian repair facilities or EU led action on artillery shells to Ukraine are essential for establishing broad support for Ukraine, should the U.S ever draw away from supporting Ukraine.

Shashank is a good guy and certainly one of the better commentators on the war in Ukraine but I think there's some very important caveats that should be hanging over these revelations: 
1. While US has been quite good at penetrating Russian signals and assessing Russian strategy it's been quite bad at assessing Russian execution or lack thereof. 
2. The US has been even worse at assessing Ukrainian ability to organize and succeed at offensive and defensive action. 
3.  Reported intelligence ("40,000 Egyptian missiles!!!") isn't the same as executed policy ("Delivery of those missiles? <insert shrug emoji here>). 
4. Definitions of success color intelligence assessments. The Pentagon would absolutely *love* to get this war over with by Christmas. That translates into seeing something like the recapture of the rest of Kherson and cutting the land bridge to Crimea as a "modest territorial gain" despite the fact that in strategic terms it is likely decisive. 
This is a leak of a moment in time from a highly interested player with strong institutional and national interests. 
Caveat emptor. 

The form of the leak  as described by the Guardian is kind of amusing - but a little baffling to me .
"In this case, the evidence suggests the person responsible is most likely a gaming and weapons enthusiast with motives no more complicated than a desire to impress other members of his internet chat group"
I mean  somebody who is a member of such a group -  I would expect to be posting materials on tank net or more serious forums  rather than  "Thug Shaker Central" or  minecraft groups  .  This implies "youth" to me which begs the question how they would have access to such documentation ? Stealing from Dad's Briefcase ? .
Looking forward to finding out more about how this leak occurred .

The leak has some numbers on the Buk + Sea Sparrow combination (also called "Project FrankenSAM" in there), I'm not sure if the numbers refer to launchers or missiles, however.

We have no information (or I've seen no information) on the use of US Sea Sparrow missiles fired by Ukrainian BUK AA. No info on missile number imported, launcher platforms modified, missiles fired or success rate. They may have gone a long way towards redressing Ukraine's AA missile crisis since the leaked documents were produced. I imagine US has enormous stockpiles of Sea Sparrows to spare.

After the Battle for the "T" position, part 2:
Looks like they had a 9K115 Metis ATGM launcher in the position, although soldier here refers to "Kornet".  Maybe the partially-buried tube is for Kornet also?  Looks too big for Metis.

A detailed breakdown of how the leaked documents made it out into the public:
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2023/04/09/from-discord-to-4chan-the-improbable-journey-of-a-us-defence-leak/
Going to bet that the source of the leak will be positively identified by the purchase of the specific make and model of hunting scope in the background of one of the photos.

They should either go east of Melitopol, and the then straight for the approaches to Crimea, which would threaten to cut off all the Russian forces in Melitopol, and all of the forces along the Dnipro. Or, attack from near Vuhledar to one side or the other of Mariupol. That brings the Kerch bridge into HIMARS range and would make life very unpleasant for ALL the Russian forces in Crimea and the land bridge. Of course if they are strong enough, do both. It would leave the Russian forces in three different pockets with supply situations that would range from very bad to nonexistent. The Russians could retreat of course, it is the only thing they are good at. But that would mean the only thing the Russians have gained in this war is bits of Northern Luhansk.

Melitopol is the best option insofar as it is the point where Russian supply lines are the longest in the south in all directions, both via the land bridge in the east and via Crimean railway in the south. It is also closest to the current front line.
That being said, the bulk of defensive fortifications in the south are concentrated on the avenue of approach from Zaporizhzhia to Melitopol. So it's more likely that Ukraine will attempt to bypass them using the open terrain somewhere to the east of Melitopol before swinging back west.
I would bet on an initial broad push that goes halfway to the sea- cutting off the only railroad that connects Melitopol and Mariupol and thus imposing a limit on the number of reinforcements that can be moved in to the area.

Seeing more data on this and it’s definitely a real leak with some after the fact doctoring in various versions. It’s *not* so far another Snowden level event despite what some of the more excitable folks in media are saying. It’s not even clear there is much operational value to the leaks for Russia. It will be a hit on Ukrainian trust vis a vis the Pentagon/NATO for now.
I like the theory that there’s an ideologically driven E-5 somewhere in the food chain who let this out to his groyper pals and it got out of hand. The spread of topics and delivery method seems to rule out anything that you could call professional. Of course, the jail time will be.

In some quarters, in some cases, each copy of some classified documents is uniquely identifiable. If two or three such unique copies are among those released, access will be immediately narrowed even further. The overlap/ Venn Diagram could be quite revealing.

It was said here many times that it is better to give your enemy dilemma rather than a problem, because problem might have a solution but dilemma has two both bad. This multiplies when you give your enemy a trilemma - and as such I'm sure Ukraine will push for Rostov, Belgorod and Minsk.

This is the nub of any UKR offensive to the south  -  do they assault a major city as part of the op,  or focus on cutting external GLOCs?
I feel that "Take it" glosses over the huge amount of killing needed to achieve success in taking a city. Melitopol has been somewhat fortified,  its a major troop concentration point and is absolutely critical to the Russian position. No matter how stupid a lot of Russian decisions are, they do have enough smarter guys to see and plan  for this operational reality.
The Ivan could be relied  on to fight hard for it, and even a cursory look at the city's terrain shows it no piece of cake (no city is, of course).
Melitopol is not Kherson and would require an enormous commitment. It would essentially become THE battle of 2023, and probably negate anything else major this year,  and its not even certain if it could be taken this year. It's the type of fight the Russians would love to have a d which feeds nicely into their current force weighting. Plus ZSU would need a lot, a LOT of artillery ammo,  which could be used elsewhere to better effect. 
I suspect ZSU has enough forces and sustainment capacity to rout the AFRF in the field, possibly multiple times but against Melitopol they would dash their New Model Army to pieces in a direct city assault (much less an actual siege). Plus the Offensive Guard units and the like seem to have been training for field ops more than anything else. 
Only an extremely rapid coup de main would work, and that is an extremely risky thing. Kharkiv is not a good indicator as it was field fight- forward units could maneuver,  fallback,  etc. A city assault is a straight up kill fest and would force the ZSU to rebuild another entirely new force for 2024.
I'll be very surprised this year if the ZSU lets its new forces get drawn into extended,  slow urban assault. 
That said, a fixing force could drag Russian forces into defending a perceived assault on Melitopol,  stripping units from field forces and making external operations easier for the ZSU. 
Ukraine doesn't have to take Melitopol, it can fall later and I'll be very bemused if they try in 2023.

Drive straight at Rostov; with it lost both Crimea and Donbas are doomed 😜 Seriously though, the only thing I’m really sure of is that I’ll be surprised.

Ukraine needs to have amassed a metric butt-load of HIMARS and 155 ammo before they start rolling metal. They need HIMARS to interdict Russian LOC and countermoves, since their airforce can't do that, and they need 155s, precision and plain old boom-boom to support their breakthroughs, from tubes that can FFE from outside effective RUS counterbattery fire. I think these factors are actually more important than the presence of NATO armour of whatever weight. With enough tubes to service the targets identified by the overwhelming UKR ISR superiority, UKR can "do the necessary" with their Soviet-class direct armour, and the hotch-potch of MRAPS and oldtech APCs they already have.
Which leaves the NATO supplied formations as their replacements for the elements that will, inevitably, get beaten up in their offensive, giving UKR the "confidence to go for it" with their familiar equipment.
But of the NATO equipment that's being provided to UKR it's the indirect fire assets that are most important after ISR, but that's pretty much a given.

Even with x2 (add mobilized and tossed on frontline), these are very low densities.  Take Zap-Blue.  Double the density to 214 per km.  So chop a third for logistics/support, so 140-150 actual frontline troops (which is generous).  That is a healthy company with no one behind it, nor an ability to rotate out and off the line.  Based on what we have seen troop rotations are likely happening horizontally from loud to quiet sectors, not from front to rear.
This is the Russian problem.  A lot of people are handwringing about “frozen front lines” and Russian defensive belts but that is an enormous frontage to try and defend and nowhere enough troops to do it with.  Russian LOCs are interdict-able - I would be saving a lot of deep strike for that, so as the UA assaults the RA are going to be challenged to c-move (which will be highly visible).  The RA is simply spread too thin and likely does not have the logistics, ISR or C2 to be able to cover those sorts of ranges.  
I think that once the UA drops the hammer that whole thing is going to crack like an eggshell.  The RA counter-moves are going to get hit while trying to re-position.  RA targeting cycles are too slow and its logistics are fragile.  This has all the hallmarks of the setup for an operational collapse.

I've discovered my own cache of top secret government documents. Its totally legit, I swear!
 

Who publishes maps using miles outside the US? 
It'd be like trying to submit a scientific paper using pounds and inches. Good luck with that. 
H

It has fake written all over it. Who needs a daily update on which countries are in Nato? And a daily reminder of the number of SOF in Ukraine...
And the alleged photoshopping of casualty figures is likely only intended to make you believe that the original, "unphotoshopped" figures are true. Russia only lost around 40,000 KIA? I find that hard to believe after a year of total failwar.