Heirloom_Tomato

Several times in my career (well, two different careers), it was brought home to me how much can be determined with a few pieces of information from varied sources, when presented to subject matter experts. And we have some of that here as well - a number of people who have real life experience at certain aspects, in which I include a comprehensive knowledge of history, military or otherwise.
In the Army we routinely and on "special occasions" got intelligence briefings on things. Sometimes it was political/military situations in general because being in the 82d always meant you were on call to be sent to the next hot spot, like, this afternoon if necessary, so we were briefed a lot on what was going on in the world. Some general, some classified. Then there were briefings on new equipment. One time in particular we got a picture of a new Russian tank in a factory. Someone mentioned seeing the exact same picture in Newsweek. But what the Newsweek pic didn't show was the factory. The tank was on a white background. Including the factory would have given a clue (maybe pointed right at) WHO took that picture. Sources. We got to see the assembly line. Newsweek readers saw the tank.
At Electric Boat (US nuclear submarine shipyard for those not familiar) I had occasions to participate in some studies for the Office of Naval Intelligence. I can't say a lot about these but let's just say we were trying to reverse engineer new Russian sub designs from bits and pieces of data the ONI would feed us. We could ask questions too, and sometimes in a week or two we might get an answer, sometimes they'd say not available, use your judgement. What was impressive was that when you put 20 experienced submarine design experts from various fields together, and with just a scattering of facts provided how scary close you can get to the answer. And we know how close because several years later we could compare our "guess" to what we could see of the real thing from open sources. My part was determining the reactor shield design, which is a significant weight account. Had to do this using what we knew from Russian naval reactor designs, and some assumptions on what Russia allows for radiation exposure (more than the US/UK and I assume France). But I designed reactor shielding for a living. Physics doesn't change and there are limited materials that are useful.
That in particular emphasizes how easy it is to have something compromised by just feeding a few bits of good info to real experts and having them analyze and collate.  And many times individual facts are not classified, because they don't show the whole picture. But given enough individual facts you can find the big picture, which makes you think that more facts should be classified 🙂 .
Bottom line is that even data from open sources, put in the right hands or group of hands, can come remarkably close to classified secrets.

Dave

I doubt 700 000 meant as "in the army", more likely this is all force structures - Armed Forces (Ground Forces, Air Forces, Naval Forces, Territorial Defense Command, Air-assault command), SOF + their volunteers, SBU special forces + their volunteers, National Guard, State Border Guard Service. Also very likely special police units like KORD. Or maybe even whole police. I have no clue where to place 700K in current army structure even with Reserve Corps deployed. 
Pre-war picture in artillery was much worse. Because of losses of 2014-2015 and exhausting of barrels life in 2016-2021, the number of artillery was significantly reduced. Mech. or tank brigade had 18 2S1 (3 batteries x 6 barrels), 12 2S3 (3 batteries x 4 barrels) and 12 Grad (3 batteries x 4 launchers). Maybe, when the war started, all "shortened" battalions got additional guns/launchers for 36/18 number, but I don't know.
Number in 17 brigades also not correct. We had 13 "heavy" brigades (tank, mech. and mountain-assault) +1 training center, which can consider as brigade or at least "large BTG". For this 13 brigades we should have 234 122 mm SP-howitzers and per 156 152 mm SP-howitzers and 122 mm MLRS launchers. OK, I will add per 18/12/12 for training center too. 
Next we had 4 "light" motorized infantry brigades, which should have the same brigade artillery group, but 152 mm towed D-20 howitzers insted 2S3. And probably because D-20 was enough quantity, they could have 18 howitzers in battalion. So +72/72/48
One yager infantry brigade. There is few info about it, but it 100 % had battalion of 2S1. +18 122 mm
Next, 4 Air-assault/airborne brigades: 2 battalions of 122 mm howitzers in each (D-30 and 2S1) + MLRS battalion (12 Grad), also one BTG in 80th brigade has own arty battalion (18 D-30), also separate artillery battalion of Air-Assault Command level (12 2S3), So +162/12/48
Next, 2 Marines brigades - each had 18 2S1 and 12 Grad-1. Also at least two separate battalions of theese brigades had own 2S1 batteies. So +48/0/24
National Guard. Among all units there are 5 x 122 mm battalions and one 122 mm battery = 96 x 122 mm (2S1, D-30)
So pre-war ground forces brigade level required 648 x 122 mm, 252 x 152 mm, 288 x 122 mm MLRS
Artillery brigades 5 in Ground Forces and one in Naval Forces. I assume they had reduced 4-barrel batteries too, so we should have 18 x 152 mm battalions (2S19, 2S5, 2A65, 2A36) with 212 barrels and 4 x 203 mm battalions (2S7) with 48 barrels.
MLRS brigades - 3 in Ground Forces and 1 in Naval Forces. Total 6 battalions of 220 mm Uragan per 8 in each = 48 launchers, and 11 battalions of 300 mm Smerch/Vil'kha per 4 in each = 44 launchers
Missile brigade:  4 battalions of Tochka-U = 12...16 launchers
Since the war began, Reserve Corps was depolyed 3 tank, 3 mech., 3 infantry/yager, 2 air-assault and 2 artillery brigades. This is potentially +234 x 122 mm howitzers, at least 108 x 152 mm howitzeres, 120 x 122 mm MLRS and 72 x 152 mm long-range howitzers (2A65)
Territorial defense brigades don't have artillery (except MT-12), looks like some of them received D-20, but this more exception, so I will not count them. 
So, totally we should have:
882 x 122 mm howitzers (147 batteries). I think, they still in service, because a lot of ammunition remained. But Air-assault and marines units probably will be betetr to re-arm on 105 mm caliber (35 batteries). Or to made one battalion on M777 and the second on L118. M777 is light and mobile howitzer, it should be in mobile units, I think, but because of its range, theese howitzers now first of all go to artillery brigades. 
360 x 152 mm howitzers (69 batteries). Or to reach all full-strenght batteries in 6 barrels we should have 486 x 152 mm howitzers. I see M109 or Krab, replacing 2S3/D-20
212 x 152 mm long-range guns/howitzers (53 battreies). Or 318 barrels for full-strength. Caesar, Pz2000 or our perspective Bohdana is our future in this class.
420 x 122 mm Grad-class MLRS (35 batteries). Or 630 launchers for full-strength battalions. I think, Grads can be taken from former Warsaw pact/Aisa/Africa stores. In future we are capable to close this class with own developments.
48 x 220 mm Uragan (6 batteries). This is dead end Soviet MLRS branch. After the war we should say goodbye to it. But Uragans can be substituted with M270 MLRS. 
44 x 300 mm Smerch (11 batteries). M270 ATACMS or HIMARS critically needs to this class! Or at least future modifications of our Vil'kha
16 x ballistic missile launchers. HIMARS ATACMS. Or our Hrim-2 in future.  
Of course for reserve and losses substitution we should have +20-30% more of each class. 
 
 

First let me say for the record I hope he's ok and back involved in the forum soon too.
LOL that reminds me of a funny story. When I applied for my very first job - volunteering in a hospital - I made mention in my resume that I did modelling. I do not remember how I phrased it but clearly I did a poor job of wording it. I had a lot of scale models for war gaming - that's what I meant. I could tell the interviewers were confused about something on my resume about half way through the interview. The finally asked what I had done modelling for and I clarified I meant scale modelling. 14 year old me never even considered there was such a thing as posing for photos for money - WTF that makes no sense. The interviewers clearly correctly deduced that no one would pay me for that and could not understand what I was talking about on my resume.
Embarrassing at the time. Makes me laugh quietly to my self now.

Looks like crisis of first days of Popasna breakthough passed, UKR troops got reinforcements and more 155 mm barrels, so in last two days we have seen Russian advance stalled. Initially they tried to attack from Popasna in several directions simultainously. In more critical night (two days ago, as I recall) Russians could reach the Bakhmut - Lysychansk road and set two chekpoints there with 50 men (likely VDV company). But at the morning UKR troops after artillery strike counter-attacked and pushed Russians away from the road, clearing the road again, though, Russians could shell it anyway.   
Yesterday UKR troops pushed Russians further from the road. Also, reportedly they recaptured Komyshuvakha village north from Popasna, which partially was captured by Russians in previous days. 
On this directions Russians already have a lack of manpower, throwing in the battle elements of 6th cossack motor-rifle regiment of LPR (regular unit) and probably LPR conscripts. During one attack cossacks lost almost all company. 
More northward LPR forces advanced from Toshkivka toward Ustynivka on 1,5 km. But Toshkivka still an arena of heavy clashes - today UKR froces again restored own positions in the part of this village, lost in previous day.
In Siverodonetsk Russians rejected from mass attacks, which cost them many personnel and involved special units, in particular Kadyrov's troops. Two days ago they could seize "Myr" hotel and bus station area on the NE outskirt of the city, all attempts of UKR troops to push them off were unsuccessfull, but enemy's attempts to avdance further inside the city also failed. 
Looks like Russians "plan D" to make a pocket between Siverodonetsk and Bakhmut is also failing so, Russians can claim "plan E" victory - to make three little pockets  - Avdiivka, Zolote and Siverodonetsk 

"Plan E" Left to right  - Siverodonetsk, Komyshuvakha - Zolote, Avdiivka

This map some incorrect. What I could understand from some information from locals, our troops crossed the river in Bilohirka, where we can see natural bridgehead, but not in Davydiv Brid (meaning in eng. "Davyd's ford") - this village still under Russian control or in grey zone, according to different information. Against our troops, again, according to differnet information either elements of 11th air-assault brigade or 56th air-assault regiment. Very likely first line of defense occupied LDPR conscripts, so our forces hit exactly their positions to breakthrough, but this is just my opinion. 
As I know, the clashes for Inhulets crossing have been lasting about 10 days or even two weeks, maybe not very intensive, maybe there were some unsuccessful probes, and only now, when our troops firmly took the ground and could push the enemy, OPSEC curtain was lifted officilally

Caught the BMP by surprise.
No one expects the Spanish Instalaza.

The fruit of war in Ukraine 
https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-deadly-fruit-shells-rockets/31871324.html
https://gdb.rferl.org/0a630000-0aff-0242-abe3-08da3fc2ea44_w866_r0_s_d2.jpeg

So...DOOOOOOOOOOM?
Well all war is negotiation and sacrifice, so the question will come down to both sides coming to terms with those two factors.  My pushback to the "inevitable partitioned Ukraine" is that Russia talks a good game but Ukraine has lived it.  Russia is only just starting to feel the pain and like any good nut-sack shot, that pain takes some time to build. 
Here is a dirty little inside baseball secret - professional soldiers are supposed to die, it is what we get paid for; civilians, not so much.  Every society knows this and accepts it.  We can lose people who choose this lifestyle who, like mercs, take the Queen's Coin and do the dirty work.  We have Remembrance Days and "Thank you for your service"-free coffee but in order for a society to be truly tested in war, it must be willing to feed it people who had nothing to do with warfare before it started.  The harsh calculus of regular everyday people dying in numbers is a threshold that we in the West have not crossed in a very long time (e.g. WW2 for Canada and Vietnam for the US).  Nor has Russia by this point, but it is approaching it quickly. 
However, you know who is already living in that stark land?...Ukrainians.  They have been "all in" since 24 Feb, to the point that there are no longer "regular Ukrainian civilians", the whole nation is in on this.  I see pictures of 12 year old holding a wooden AK properly and that says it all; war, has become the way of life for Ukraine.  Out of everyone talking and positioning, only Ukraine (and possibly the folks in the DPR/LPR...many involuntarily by the looks of things) has crossed that threshold.  Putin is very nervous of it, and it shows.  The US was terrified of it in Iraq, that is why they imposed all sorts of crazy things to try and keep the professional troops they had.
So before I pass judgement on the current situation with finality, I would want to see how Russia reacts when the civilian population starts bleeding heavily.  They are hurting but it has been a slow burn, and frankly I think Russia is culturally masochistic...to a point. However, despite a bunch of retired Russian warhawks barking from the cheap seats, Russia has not been tested in this trial in a very long time either.  Ukraine is the single largest hot-war they have been involved in since WW2.  History looks great in the movies and we can all get our pulses up watch Saving Private Sasha; however, watching the guy next to you get blown in half by long range arty when you were working at a now-closed Starbucks a month ago, is an entirely different experience.
So no, I do not think Russia and Ukraine or on the same wavelength when it comes to negotiation and sacrifice...at least not yet.
As to communication:
We have been over the challenge of the Russian Defence, which they need in order to "freeze" this conflict.  Right now they are keeping Ukraine busy by this very slow grinding offence, but it has been costly as hell.  At some point if they want to "freeze" they are going to need to dig in and let the UA crash upon the shores of the great Russian Steel Wall.
Problem is what it will take to build that wall.  Did some research and frankly we do not have modern troop density calcs for this sort of thing - we have lots on peacekeeping/making and COIN but basically sweet FA on modern conventional conflict.  So we are going to have to make some assumptions here and keep checking them.  In warfare the concept of "troop density" is a bit controversial.  It is a hold over of the Jomini-esque "war is math" approach.  It holds water but it is not deterministic as we already know a lot of soft non-linear factors play into this.  With this in mind, all caveats etc lets break this down a bit:
- We are talking about 800kms of frontage from the Russian western position around Kharkiv to its position ion the East near Kherson.  That is a long active front...very long.  In WW1 the Western Front was about 400 miles, or about 640 kms in comparison.
- Troop density requirements have decreased over time.  It is well documented that weapons ranges, ISR and battlefield mobility have increased the combat influence each soldier has on the battlefield over time.  Problem here is that reality cuts both ways.  In both offence and defence effectiveness and range have increased, so it is competitive. 
- Troop density in WW1 - a frozen conflict - was in and around "5000 troops for mile" or roughly 3125 per km: (https://books.google.ca/books?id=nhhlHGWCnzYC&pg=PA30&lpg=PA30&dq=troop+density+western+front&source=bl&ots=WWfd6Y7VIl&sig=ACfU3U1M05Ef9GIbmBAREwu-_obJPnXEpw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwi_rO_4jf33AhXvjIkEHRJEDUoQ6AF6BAg7EAM#v=onepage&q=troop density western front&f=false).  This jives with the roughly 2 million troops each side had to sustain in the trenches, in depth, replacements and rotation, in order to sustain that deadlock.  This does not count logistics and support overhead -which is likely why each side had on the order of 12-15 million troops in total.
- Based on WW1 metrics, Russia would need approximately 2.5 million men in those trenches to achieve the same deadlock...and then have the architecture behind them to sustain it, which at a very generous 1:1 (which means a very slow burn war) means roughly 5 million men to dig in and hold that front a la WW1.  But as I noted we are not in WWI - although if the Russians tried to force generate these numbers they would probably start looking like they were from that era equipment-wise. 
- Actual Russian troop numbers as of today are hard to find; however, with the 200k they brought with them and assuming they have kept that force level (big assumption), Russia currently has a troop density of 250 men per km of frontage.  This is less than ten percent than the WW1 number. But as we noted modern forces can cover more ground, which makes this a weak analogy.  The question is, "versus a very well armed attacker, how much troop density does Russia need to "freeze" this front?"  My bet is a lot more than 200k troops, but how much more?
So let's tackle this from another direction.  Things in this war are challenging a lot of our rules of thumb; however, we can go with the 1:3 ratio of defender to attacker, at least locally.  So Russia likely needs to put at least a Company per km frontage.  This forces the UA to concentrate a BG on the attack, with all the support bells and whistles in order to make an effective shot at it.  This makes sense from a force-space-time perspective for both attacker and defender but I am not sure about firepower in the least [Note: it might be a lot less if things like UAVs and precision artillery are involved.  This is one of the unknowns]. Terrain may also give them a break, particularly on the Dnipro, however, they also have urban areas so I am betting things even out.  
So a Russian Company of say 150 men per km.  They will need at least on more company behind them to create effective depth and prevent breakthrough of that UA BG, while also accounting for attrition, so now 300 men per km.  And then they will need to rotate troops in and out of those positions.  We are not designed to live in the open, under harassing artillery/Switchblade fire indefinitely.  So we are now looking at another company for rotation and sustainment.  Throw in an armored reserve to plug holes and supporting fires/assets and we are getting dangerously close to a BTG, per km.  This would bring the Russians up to about 1500 (a fat BTG) men per km, about half of WW1 troop density.  Or 1.2 million men.  And that is just the fight stuff and basic tactical logistics.  As we know from this war, the Russians like to travel light on logistics and formation-level support, so we can probably add another third of that number, say 400k to build the backbone to keep those 1.2 million men in the field = about 1.6 million men...and they have to sustain that for years, under increasingly crushing sanctions.
I have to be honest, if I was an average Russian and I saw these types of numbers I would be asking myself "how badly do we need Putin". 
Finally, checking the old CIA factbook (https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/russia/#people-and-society) Russia has roughly 37 million fighting aged men aged 15-54 (I am going to assume good old Putin male chauvinism holds and they do not a start tapping women).  You can throw out a third right off the top for all sorts of medical conditions etc that make them simply unfit for service.  So roughly 24 million men to draw from, in entirety.  To freeze this Ukrainian war, to the point that you can force Ukraine to "tap out" you need to commit at least 5 percent of all eligible fighting aged males...up front.  And you count on needing an extra 1.2 million just to sustain it over time.  Now I can hear the demographic nerds out there pointing out that over time more men come of age...well the news for Russia in that regard is not good either:

Russia is in a bit of a demographic hole right now and it is going to take what look like 3-5 years to dig its way out.  Worse the big bulges in the 35-44 range are going to age out in the same timeframe.
And finally, finally, this does not take into account the the standing military bill for the rest of the country - Russia can make all the noise it wants with Finland and Sweden, everyone is going to be fully engaged on this Ukrainian thing for a few years so you may as well shut down everything else.  
So What?  After all that it comes back to: how much does the average Russian want a bunch of new broken Republics vs how much does Ukraine want its country back? 
If I were a betting man, I would put my money on the country that has already demonstrated the commitment.  If this war goes long, we will likely need to shift from send guns and bullets (fish), to funding the creation of a Ukrainian domestic arms industry (fishing rods) and then figuring out what to do when Russia totally collapses under the weight of this thing.

Back to the bridging ... there was talk of current and drift so I figured it was worth finding this out ...

I think most of the questions you had for me have already been broadly covered, and I don't have too much to add. JonS answered the quadcopters question with exactly what I had in mind - currently, they don't have the technical capabilities to produce effective and targetable data. Now granted, I have some bias myself, as I have spent the last two years observing training in a desert, and it's much harder to terrain associate you quadcopter footage with Google Maps in a barren wasteland, as opposed to Ukraine with it's clearly defined fields and villages. But adjustments become a problem as you don't have a firm grip on your observer direction, and then there is the vulnerability to small arms as you have to get much closer to produce more accurate data. You could certainly kit up a quadcopter to achieve those effects, but then you run into weight issues, and power issues, and size issues; is your quadcopter now something that you can hand off to an infantryman and have him stuff in a truck? I think it will be a useful tool for observation and mortar fire on enemy battle positions, but not something you can routinely use to target maneuvering formations.
I wouldn't describe a lot of opinions on drones as "pushback", but more along the lines of hesitancy. Militaries are quick to tout the capabilities of their new systems, but when the soldiers get a hold of them, reality rears its ugly head and the ground truth of their real capabilities becomes apparent. The US Army is full of such examples, some that you probably wouldn't even realize. Yes, at some point in the future we may be able to solve some or even most of these problems, but you also can't write doctrine based on a future capability that isn't even fully realized. Look at something like Nett Warrior, which has gone through many iterations and different equipment sets but has yet to be realized in the extent originally envisioned. The Army could probably dump a lot of time and effort on developing doctrine for an infantry platoon that has the capability to seamlessly network with every rifleman, but why would we, when we don't even have a system of record that can achieve that. You don't want to fight the previous war but you also can't pretend the next war is going to be fought with systems that haven't even been proven yet. Not saying the UAV isn't proven - clearly they are effective systems in the current operational environments - but more along the lines of things like micro UAVs or UGVs.
I'm not foolish enough to believe that war never changes and things will always be the same, but I'm also not going to buy off on having to completely change up our doctrine to counter threats that haven't even been fully realized. Drones  are dangerous and units will have to adapt their procedures to survive, but at the end of the day countering UAVs is about reducing the enemy's ability to observe you, and HEY, maybe you should figure out how to make the thing flying around and looking at you go away first, before completely changing up how we do things. Right now there is certainly an equipment gap when it comes to dealing with UAVs that is making things difficult, but a slow, poorly armored aircraft, with limited sensors and payloads, and a critical requirement to maintain comms to do its mission, and that has no effective means of cover or concealment and relies solely on a small signature and distance for survivability, certainly strikes me as system with vulnerabilities. Drones may be cheaper then manned aircraft but there is a limit on how many can be shot down before UAV operators have to start changing their tactics.
But I'm a pessimist I guess, and have burned by plenty of equipment that didn't hold up to what was promised. If you're gonna tout the next new thing that's going to change war, you need to prove to me that it's actually achievable first. I guess I won't be applying to Army Futures Command any time soon. 😁
In regards to a question I can't find anymore, about what I think potential solutions to the UAV problem may be:
I think there are a couple options out there. We can already target mid-size drones (think TB-2 or RQ-7 equivalents) fairly easily with current equipment, the main issue is probably range. So maybe we need a UAV specific missile that sacrifices speed and payload for range, as they aren't chasing down high performance jets at altitude anymore.
Where are the anti-UAV drones? We need a new Fokker Scourge, with drones swooping out of the sun to shoot buckshot at loitering quadcopters. I mean it sounds cool, right??
If we can track a small mortar round traveling hundreds of feet per second through the air with counterfire radars, how come we can't utilize similar technology to locate small UAVs? I am not a radar expert by any means, but it sounds feasible? Tie in a decentralized UAV finding radar with Avenger style systems operating down to the company level, and anytime a UAV comes within your bubble, rollout of cover and shoot it down with missiles or - even cheaper - proximity fuzed 20mm cannon rounds. Provide some sort of optical assistance and you can maybe even forgo the radar except for early warning.
Maybe some sort of weapon system that takes advantage of the noise a drone creates? Quadcopters have quite the unique sound profile, maybe there is some sort of way we can take advantage of that. I don't know, I'm just a dumb artilleryman.
Thank you for these insights! Good to see the mortar still has their traditional place on the battlefield. I imagine the infantry fight is much harder to turn into sexy Twitter videos and we won't see a lot of this on OSINT channels.
So honestly some of the hits do look like ATGM hits. The "B Roll" footage interspersed shows a much closer view of the convoy that seems to be well within ATGM range, you can clearly see the lead vehicles engaging something with their main gun, and (gonna channel my inner Trent here) some of the hits on the vehicles have a very distinctive "plume" of rising smoke I see with a lot of ATGM hits. And near the end, one of them definitely hits a mine. I think what we may be seeing is a perfect doctrinal example of an Engagement Area - artillery and mortars to disrupt movement and keep infantry in cover or in their vehicles; dismounted ATGM teams engaging lead vehicles of the convoy to stop forward movement; all in concert with an obstacle plan.
This is an excellent observation, and one I hadn't really internalized! I agree that this is probably due to survivability requirements. 
Digital Fire Control Systems are not so much about precision but rather speed. Digital systems greatly speed up the ability to lay and shoot howitzers. The howitzer is firing the same data that it would be if it were using optical systems, the difference is that the crew can just lay the howitzer faster and easier. If anything, I would argue that the digital FCS's greatest advantage is in fact the ability to mass even more. A wide range of howitzers unit could mass quickly on a single mission, displace and have the ability to conduct a quick "hip shoot" at any point during their survivability move - theoretically at least. Reality is, as always, more complicated.  But still, digital fire control systems have probably been the largest gain in capability for executing indirect fires in the last 100 years, I think even more so then the introduction of computing software to calculate firing data.
I'm sorry, but I don't buy the logistical issues. Army's have been firing unfathomably large amounts of howitzer rounds since World War I, with much worse logistical transportation equipment. I'm sure the invention of the machine gun and automatic rifle greatly increased small arms expenditures beyond what militaries were used to but I don't think the answer was reduce our ability to output small arms fire. You couldn't have replaced German machineguns at the Somme with snipers and achieved the same effects. Large volumes of artillery fires brings a certain suppressive effect that can't be matched with other systems. And mass isn't about blasting every treeline - it's about bringing all your available assets to bear at the same time to achieve a desired effect- sometimes that's a rear area command post, sometimes that's a platoon in a trench in a treeline. And a lot of times it's not even about killing the platoon in the trench - it's about keeping their heads down until my infantry can maneuver in and shoot them in the face.
In regards to GOs and obsession with precision, in 2014 the Field Artillery Commandant laid out a standard that 80% of targets acquired should have a Target Location Error within 10m to 5m

8 years later we didn't even come close to achieving this as an Army and the goal is long forgotten. Why? Because the ability to achieve that Category 1 and 2 TLE required cumbersome additional steps that are completely unfeasible for forward observers to accomplish in LSCO environment. You'd be hard pressed to make these requirements go away as well due to the physical and geographical nature of the target mensuration steps required to achieve CAT 1. Is it worth generating that CAT 1 grid for a command post? Absolutely, you wanna make that round count. But the infantry commander on the ground? He doesn't have time to wait on his FSO to mess around with his target mensuration software, squinting at a blurry satellite image and making sure that he is picking the right tree in the forest that's hiding the machine gun position. He needs suppressive fires now, and needs it for the next 30 minutes so he can organize his troops and maneuver on the enemy. Precision munitions are not as simple as point laser, shoot PGM - when you're dodging incoming small arms fire, you don't have time to make sure you have the right grid for the machine gun position, instead of the bush that's 50 meters in front of it that your laser clipped. For a precision round, that's enough distance to greatly limit your effectiveness, no matter how cheap they are.
 

Some of the conversation over the few pages have referenced the former Yugoslavia.  Which brings back... well, not so good memories.
I was a Canadian peacekeeper in Bosnia in latter half of '93.   During the Croatian offensive in the Medak in Sept of '93, I was with the 2 PPCLI when we went into the sh*tstorm to try to stop the ethnic cleansing going on.  The Croatian army attacked our unit during that operation, a thing that the Croatian government denies to this very day.  Despite us photographing the Croatian dead after the battle and collecting their ID, etc.    We had god damn evidence and to this day, the Croatian government position is that they never attacked us.
Part of our job, beside trying to keep the warring factions apart, was to document evidence of ethnic cleansing and I was in charge (I was an officer) of a evidence collection team.  So, literally thousands of photos, videos.  Transcripts of interviews with witnesses and victims.  Six months exposed to that living hell, day after f*n day....
So I had the evidence, because sometimes our official recording devices ran out film or tape and we used our personal recording devices to finish up at a site.
After I got out the military, I found myself sometimes on various military forms about games, such as this one.  Arma forums, military wargame forums... that sort of thing.  And as it happened, I ran into forum members from Croatia and Bosnia Serbs and we would get into it.
Universally, every Croatian or Bosnian Serb forum poster denied what happened there.  And I was called a liar on many occasions for telling them them the truth of that war as I was there and they weren't.  And I have evidence to back up my claims.  No one believed me and if I offered visual proof, they didn't want to see it or they disclaimed it as fake.
I remember a particular Bosnian Serb who was not in the war but we got deep into the weeds discussing what happened during that war.  Deny, deny, deny.  It never happened.  Until videos that the Bosnian Serbs took of them killing civilians and dumping them in mass graves what was recorded by the very soldiers who committed the atrocities surfaced and made it onto their local media and they couldn't deny it any longer.  Those videos were part of the process besides sanctions that resulted in some notable Bosnia Serb / Serbian leaders being turned over to the ICC for prosecution for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.  After the revelation came out, this individual on that forum who I had spent hours engaging with about the culpability of Serbs in the atrocities simply ignored me from that point onwards.  I will never know why.... was it that he discovered that I was right all a long and he was wrong and he was ashamed (as he would have been) or he simply wanted to hang onto his delusion of what narrative he wanted to believe was true and he knew that I would keep chipping away.   
Denial is a powerful thing.   I don't understand why it has such power but it does.  People can dismiss an outright objective reality because to accept the truth is to undermine what they think reality is or should be.   I don't get it and is beyond madding to see the denials in the face of objective reality happen over and over.
Sigh.   I don't know why the hell I rambled on with this.  Maybe it was a story I need to tell to remain sane in light of the same brutality I witnessed back in Bosnia happening in Ukraine now.  Or maybe I still am the greater fool for believing my experiences in Bosnia can be an object lesson to others about holding onto a narrative that is personally comfortable but runs counter to all the real evidence to the contrary.   DMS, I am looking at you....
The truth will come out after all this is over.  At least, I hope it does.  The truth of this war needs to be told and codified so generations that follow can know what really happend.
Now at the end of this and reviewing it, I feel that I should have deleted this or apologize for it.  
I am hitting post. It is my truth.  Let people accept it and learn something from it or ignore it.  I needed to say this for a long time.   
 
 

Ya, can't let this one slide.  This was a really good post but it fails right about here because it misses a major point.  First off I do not subscribe to the "every able body Russian should take their suitcases of money and flee to a less inconvenient locale (i.e. "sunbelt)".  This is frankly insensitive and demonstrates a serious western bias: when the going gets tough, well just move to Hawaii in your yacht and sip Mai Tais...it will be fine.  What about the rest who cannot afford to move?..."oh I am sure they will figure it out".
You make a solid case for a fracturing of the Russian Federation as a result of this, and a severe risk of "significant civil violence".  I will simply state it, we are talking about a significant risk of another Russian Civil War here.  You note "lack of Moscow military power" as reason this will be avoided, well 1) Will is the primary determiner of civil war, not military power.  Savage civil wars have waged with a lot less than what Moscow will have left, and 2) the unfortunate reality of a civil war in a state that has the majority of the worlds nuclear weapons.  We came close to this during the break up of the Soviet Union but saner heads prevailed; we have no guarantees this time.
I very much think that a NATO v Russia global nuclear war is an extremely low probability.  However, a nation in a civil war, cannot guarantee the security of that arsenal and even a small nuclear exchange has global impacts (https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-00794-y).  So what?  Well, here we need to recognize a harsh truth - none of us are "safe at our keyboards" in this thing.  The stakes are much higher than the normal western ennuie of "war somewhere over there, donate to charity, feel bad and change the channel).  So, no, do not "move to the sunbelt", try and do something about it.
I am a veteran of two separate wars, both civil in nature, and know exactly what risks we are asking Russian's to take here. However, the risks of "not doing anything" is frankly what got them into this fix in the first place.  And there is a risk of a lot more than "trouble over there" at stake here.  This is why I keep coming back to "Russia needs to figure out how to lose this war and survive".
As to resistance, well simply coming on this board and being exposed to the truth, or at least "other facts" is a first important step.  DMS lives in a country where publicly saying "war" is outlawed and they are being lied to daily on their mainstream media.  My advice is to "get the word out" any way you can as an important first step.  There is opposition to this war in Russia, and there is opposition to the current regime...it needs all the help it can get.
We are a small little wargame forum in a great big dangerous world.  But it is a platform to exchange ideas and voice apolitical opinions freely (well we do have limits), which in this day and age is hard to find.  In a perfect world every Russian would read this website and what we did here and at least a few would go "huh?  Wait a minute."  That would be enough for a start.

About drone usage, there was interesting interview of Aerorozvidka volunteer UAV unit commader. There is no need to give all text here in Ukrainan, so main things:
- Ukrainan units have huge advantage in tactical drones of close and average zone. He says in some moments about half-dozen of DJI or AUTEL drones can fly over battelfield. Russians have small drones like Granat and Zala, but only in special units like recons, when UKR units sometime have commercial drones even on the level of mech.platoon (but most usual of course are recons, AT-teams, HQs, mortars etc). In avarage class we are using Leleka-100, Furia and PD-1, they all have about 50-100 km of range and 1,5-2 hours of endurance.
- But the main problem - Russia has huge advantage in operative level drones. This is about Orlan-10. It can fly 16 hours and sneak up to 600 km in autonomous mode (120 km in guiding mode). It can carry various equipment - optic, thermal, ELINT, SIGINT, EW. New modification, which was adopted since 2017 alraedy has 5500 m of ceiling instead 5000 m, its control lines became more stable for EW, so UKR forces have minimal chances to shot down or to hijack new version of Orlan-10 if the weather is clear and Orlan flies over 5000 m. Even our newest EW systems often can't do nothing. Our commander said Orlans is hovering like a bees over battlefield and monitoring situation on battlefierld almost all 24 hours. This caused many problems on open terrain, because Russian HQs get information and transmit it to artillery
- TB2 Bayraktars became to use mostly for recon missions and don't approach to frontline too close. Since the war became more positional, Russians deployed many AD assets like TOR and Pantsyr, which dangerous for TB2. Today's operation near Zmiinyi island became possible only after destroying of Moskva cruiser (huge floating SAM platform) and destroying of AD assets on the island. But on the other hand TB2 already several times used for strikes against facilities on Russian territory. 2 or 3 TB2 were shot down. 
- Other problem the same both of UKR and RUS - low integration level of drones to weapon systems and information systems of battle control, especially for close zone drones. For example, only Furia can make targeting and automatic fire adjustment. Other drones can maintain only visual adjustment and if you need to know coordinates with better accuracy than "on eye" from the screen, you should return drone back, take a memory card and visually match the image with a map.     

I'll see your Flight Simulator and raise you map army ...
MilitaryMap - Plan your Mission
I've been noodling around this one as well and am miles off finishing but I've done enough to work out in terms of ground alone that a Russian attack is going to be a big ask.

The images above are different map/imagery sets of the same area with the red line being the approximate FEBA as of a few days ago.  The area shown is basically Izyum-Slovyansk-Kramatorsk.
The broad COAs for Russian are basically:
COA1 - Deep Envelopment. COA2 - Medium Envelopment. COA3 - Shallow Envelopment.
Of the three COAs - COA1 offers the best opportunity for manoeuvre and is the preferred COA.  COAs 2 and 3 both involve moving through severely restricted terrain and a battle for Slovyansk.  As a guesstimate, moving through the woods to Slovyansk will swallow up a minimum of three BTGs if the Ukrainians choose to disrupt the advance on the approaches to Slovyansk.  Slovyansk cannot be bypassed which means that if it is going to be defended, it will require a minimum of 4-5 BTGs to subdue.  A number of 22 x BTGs has been banded around for the force assembling in Izyum meaning that COAs 2 and 3 will expend nearly a third of the available combat power in Izyum covering the first 35km.  That is assuming that Russia can knock Slovyansk over easily for which there is little evidence to suggest that it is capable of doing so should it be defended.  It will also probably take at least a week to clear out the defenders which means that COAs 2 and 3 stand little chance of achieving a face saving "victory" by 09 May.  In fact COA 2 will definitely fail to deliver on that timeline.
Map Army Files are below if anybody wants to rummage around the detail bearing in mind this is WIP.
BAE.milxlyzRussian FLOT 10 Apr.milxlyz
 

Yes I agree it's to early to know what happened, I was careful to keep my post neutral.  That said though, I do admit to thinking that none of those people would be dead if the RF hadn't crossed the border.  Such a colossal waste of life.

Your western hypertrophied tolerance, false humanism and "real politic" led to Russian attrocities in Georgia, Syria and Ukraine. Western world - the stronghold and the stream of civilization turned out to the bunch of frightened wimps which deadly scared of this "superstate", made from "s**t and sticks" and gave us "48 hours to new political reality". So, this is our right how to relate to Russians. Here, in ruined Mariupol and Izium, in looted, raped, murdered Kyiv outskirt cities and villages, here completely other reality, where all liberal or leftist ideology voices must shut up and keep silence until last Russian scum find own death here. 
Yes, even among SS troopers not all were murderers. But whole SS was criminal organization and the spot of blood fell to all. So this is no matter either private Vania looted or murdered or not. The spot of dirt on them all. 
This is not Putin loots and murders. This is Russian soldiers. This is not "SOME".  This is "USUAL". The army is a cross section of society. So it reflects Russian society. So if I hear "common Russians shouldn't bear the brunt of sanctions", "stop bulling and cancelling of Russian" etc., I say "Too few sanctions. Too few cancelling. Too few rusophobia". Russia must be destroyed, derashizied and de-nuclearezied.   
My hate speech is finished.

Ok, I know what is being said at many levels on "what we think about what Putin is thinking" and it plays well in political theatre, but any professional military assessment is going to be very concerned with what the other side is thinking, why they are thinking it, and how they keep thinking it.  The only exception is a war of extermination where your opponents frameworks are completely irrelevant because you are aiming to completely erase them from the books.  Neither side in this war is at that level, in fact that level is very rare - think Mongols.
This is also much bigger than "Putin".  For all we know he is already in favour of WMDs to "solve this" and it is the domestic response, linked to military response that is keeping him in check - despite the noise, he is not a god-king - and sustained attacks on Russian homeland, especially when a missile goes off course and hits a school, is strategically risky.  I say "risky" because obviously there are benefits in sending a message but potential costs as well...all war is negotiation as well.
"Maximal support for Ukraine" - no, because that would include us attacking Russia directly up to and including nuclear weapons.  I am all for Ukraine an this one but we are not "all in" on this one.  One needs only go online and read the predictions of a full nuclear exchange and you can see why.  We may even be "all in" as a proxy war, for the most part (e.g.  I don't think we will be sending WMDs to Ukraine) but direct confrontation with between two nuclear states has only occurred a few times since we opened that box and every time it was like a barfight when someone pulls out a gun...a "whoa" moment.
Finally, this is not about "Putin desperate", he is already there.  This is about "Russians desperate" and any realistic assessment of this thing needs to separate those two concepts.  Go check the history books on what happens when the Russian's get desperate, nothing good.  The strategy being employed here is "poison-perogy-to-induce-vomiting", not to destroy Russia in fire and righteousness.  

You're missing my point which has been nicely demonstrated already by the citizens of Belgorod turning fuel stations into carparks following the strike desperate to get fuel - this wouldn't have happened had the attack hit a military fuel depot.  It has also been demonstrated in part by the response of the Russian authorities as they have publicly admitted it has taken place.  The net result is that there is a section of the population that now knows that the 'mighty' Russian armed forces cannot protect them, that this war is by no means over and for those living in Belgorod it has triggered panic buying.  It may trigger some of them to evacuate which means that the message propagates more widely.  A small additional bonus effect maybe, but this will also cause some traffic disruption thus hampering military movement down the highways in the area.
Now let's' say that those helicopters zapped some Russian logistical node in a remote area/"Nowheregrad".  The attack can be denied by the Russians and this has less effect in the information operations domain and its a rinse a repeat of other military logistical vehicles getting whacked which we have seen ad nauseum now.  Such attacks of course have an effect but it is more physical than cognitive, and it is very localized say to XX Motor Rifle Brigade's ability to manoeuvre.  
By attacking something in a city we have had a reaction and the Russian military now needs to consider ringing its border cities with SAM systems and/or committing aircraft to CAP coverage of the borders - all of which divert resources from the front.  Or it ignores the problem and risks a repeat attack and more civilian dismay.
There's been a lot of talk here about what 'new warfare' looks like and I think this is an example of it.  Small forces exploiting gaps in a dispersed battlespace attacking carefully selected and weakly defended centres of gravity/targets to achieve operational effects.

Most likely the prisoner abuse is real (who knows what situation these guys are returning from, and it seems to be too chaotic to be some planned out torture, rather than a spontaneous outburst), but I see a real trend spreading to highlight and “both sides” this rather minor and isolated possible war crime (way down the totem pole from raping, torturing and executing civilians).  Bit sickening when this is on CNN but not the 10 or so eyewitness accounts of abuse / killing of civilians I have heard today alone. Me thinks some in the West are seeking relief for their guilt and excuses to turn away and stop looking.  What better excuse to click on that Will Smith link instead.
I don’t see why it really matters since Ukraine already stated their clear policy and indicated reports of abuse would be investigated.  There is really nothing more you can do other than hope that cooler heads prevail in these situations.

Ref the Captain as BTT CO, above...I keep following the mental thread of just how bad could things be for the Russians in certain units. 
If you think further, there's yet another layer of "Well, She's All Facked Up Now" to this.
There's multiple Capts in a battalion, and they absolutely are not all equal in ability or experience, with a formal seniority and an internal, ability-based seniority. So once the Btt CO/XO are pancaked you step up the most experienced and able guy, right?
But now that the repl. Captain is another a crater in the ground, so who's next?
Well if your C&C is getting whacked again and again I bet the rest of the Btt officer core is also getting ground down. So the pool of available, non-dead/bleedy "talent" is now a shrinking puddle.
Comrad Capt. WhatsHisBloodyNamovich of the Motor Pool? The arschlock who stole all the handwarmers during the January deployments? That guy?

Let's take an "Operational Pause" here, a few KM back...Like, ALLLL the way back...

There it is...moving the goal post.  I have avoided getting into "well here is how the Russian's could have succeeded" discussions too deeply as there is still a real war and it is kinda disrespectful to people still fighting and dying but maybe we are far enough along to offer a few ideas.
If Russia had made the Donbas and the infamous "land bridge" to the Crimea to sole operational objectives of this war, they may have actually achieved, or at least had a better chance at their strategic and political ones.  If they had focused their main efforts to 2 main axis of advance with a limit of exploitation pretty close to what we are seeing on the maps now in the SE, along with "shock and awe" strikes across Ukraine they could theoretically have:
- Achieved their objectives much faster by concentrating their combat power and logistical capability.  This would have prevented or at least mitigated the UA build up and influx of western support.
- They could have simply dug in, took Mariupol and the land bridge and declare "mission accomplished".  Russia would have demonstrated its "immense power" to the world.  A shortened war (and I am not talking 72 hours but maybe a couple weeks) would have lessened western resolve and shaped the negotiation table.
- A short hard modest successful demonstration would have left a lot of "doubt" on the table for the West and Ukraine.  This would have made a threat of "further special actions" much more effective on the calculus on the West.  It also would have kept a lot more strategic options open as compared to where they find themselves now.
- It may have fractured the west more than fused it.  If Russia could demonstrate restraint and humanity in a "internal border dispute" it immediately call into question the economic sacrifices the rest of Europe will be making in what has become an economic war with Russia.  Further, it would play on the ever widening political divides in just about every western democracy.  It would have kept China very happy, without risking becoming one of their provinces. 
- If Putin really was a "genius", his play would be to immediately call for UN Peacekeepers in a ZOS once he had gained what he needed to.  Not western troops but Malaysians or Brazilians, a crew he could keep in his pocket.  We would have crumbled into a hot burning mess if Russia, backed by China and India, called on the global collective diplomacy and security body to intervene...it would have broken us.  If we say "no freakin way", then who are the warmongers who are pushing their agenda and supporting a massive military industrial complex?  If we say yes, we are in for years of negotiation and diplomacy, likely false but we built the system now we have to use it, all the while those sanctions start to go stale and erode.  
But here we are on the possible threshold of some really scary stuff, led by an insulated and deluded madman surrounded by yes-men, who decided that he could pull off a modern land invasion on the scale of the Fall of France with a couple hundred thousand poorly supported troops and complete failure to establish pre-conditions or align his strategies. 

This is the most awesome thing in the world. Prove me wrong.

I do computer simulations for a living, physics-based simulations, no human decisions involved.  I'd say the issue is not AI or quantum calcs or anything that fancy.  The issue is the data entered into the simulations.  If the russians and ukrainians were modeled accurately and the simulation 'physics' could handle the small scale unit effects, then it could be modeled.  The reality is that Russia was entered as steel when it's actually cheap plastic, while the ukrainians were entered as plastic instead of steel.

Somebody needs to tell him, cough @Battlefront.com cough, that he has the wrong computer analysis. 
Take any CM title, seriously any CM title, and play an Attack Quick Battle. Choose mechanized/armoured/motorized attackers. Be generous and say 20% are Crack, 30% Veteran, 30% Regular and 20% Green. Set morale to High, Normal, Low and Poor respectively. Leadership levels from +1 to -2. Give them one off map battery for every Company.
For the defenders, make sure they have an abundance of AT assets. I think the force skill level can be the same, however the leadership should all be +1 or better and morale a mix of Extreme and High. One off map battery for every two Companies.
Choose a large rural map, fields and forests with a small town or two. A river or a couple of streams would be ideal. Set the ground conditions to muddy, cool or cold and light rain.
Play the battle as the attacker, on iron mode, ideally with enemy icons off.
Let us all know how that turns out.