Probus

Again about sanctions and bypassing...
 

It was discussed here:
 

Someone rang?  Oh good a tank argument.  The problem with tanks as we are observing in Ukraine is 1) not all about tanks - get over to yourselves tank lovers.  The issue is much larger than a single platform regardless how much you might love the thing.  Mechanized mass is currently in the wind.  2) It isn’t that tanks are dying.  It is that tanks are dying before they can deliver the effects we want the tank to do. They cannot mass. They cannot break in, through or out.  We are seeing sniping and indirect fires (seriously wtf?) as their primary roles on the ground right now.  And 3) those who come out defending the tank really do not fully understand just how fundamental the shifts are appearing.  Mass as we knew it is failing.  Force ratios are out the window.  Denial appears to have battlefield primacy.  The tank, along with a lot of other things are being dislocated from their ability to deliver results.
Now could a massive NATO mech force still roll over a smaller less capable force?  Sure.  But the cost is likely going to go up significantly.  To the point operational and strategic calculus will need to change.  If we run into a force empowered by a supporting great power’s C4ISR and the levels of precision and autonomous systems we are only seeing hints of on the modern battlefield, we are going to be in serious trouble.  We do not have effective counters.  The other thing the tank lusters also tend to gloss over is that the current wars we are seeing are last-Gen technology.  The more modern stuff has not even appeared on the battlefield.  The trend for mechanized mass is not good overall.
Yes, people have been predicting the end of the tank since the 60’s….what if they were right?  We have never seen modern armor tested in an environment like Ukraine.  We talked and “exercised” a lot of threat reality away back in the 90s and leapt headlong into confirmation bias as we crushed Iraq (freakin Iraq?!).  I am strongly suspecting that the tank was in trouble back in the 80s.  As of 2023, the entire mechanized edifice is in trouble.  
Lastly, narrowing this back down to tanks.  The other reality that is getting sidestepped (conveniently) is that a tank is part of a much larger system extending back to the factory.  We can wrap tanks in APS and bubble wrap but the fuel trucks, ammo resupply, maintenance and spare parts are strung out on highly visible and vulnerable supply chains.  Even if the tank manages to pull off what it is supposed to deliver, we likely cannot sustain it.
First video I saw out of this Israeli conflict was a tank getting nailed by a UAS…the idea has gone viral.  Normally I really would not care if the tank, or IFV or whatever was going obsolete but given that we are likely going to looking at billions in investment in the old fleets to keep them “competitive” I think it is a damned important conversation to have.  Personally I would double down on C4ISR, UAS/UGV, PGM and light fast highly empowered infantry because it has pretty much been definitively proven that on the current battlefield that is what works on the defence at least.  Solving for offence is likely going to be the challenge of the next decade.
But hey, we will always have CM.

They haven't started using the Abrams yet as far as I know (at least none have shown up on Oryx yet), so no information on them just yet. But they should perform similarly to the Leopard 2s. What I've heard about the Bradleys and Leopard 2s so far has been glowing, emphasizing crew survivability. Overall my impression is that the usefulness of these vehicles is severely limited by the small numbers that they have been provided in. After nearly two years of war Ukraine just doesn't have enough tanks and IFVs left to be able to accept any further significant losses, and the small numbers of western tanks and IFVs being provided isn't enough to give them confidence that any losses taken now will be replaced. Regardless of how good a piece of equipment is on a one for one basis, numbers still matter. That's mainly why I really don't think that the 31 Abrams that have been provided are going to make any difference. The M1A1 Abrams that have been provided are good tanks, but no 31 of any tank will ever be enough to move the needle. I was hopeful back when the delivery of Abrams was first announced that the 31 reported merely represented the first batch, not the total number to be sent. But I have yet to hear of any further batches.
I seriously doubt that we are witnessing the end of the tank. Drones do represent a significant change in warfare. The battlefield is significantly more transparent now than it used to be. Drones have significantly changed how battles are viewed and coordinated by the leaders involved (company commanders in Ukraine now coordinate their engagements from a command post in the rear, from which they can see the drone feeds from each of their platoons (company commanders are relatively low ranking as officers go (only around 100-200 men under their command), and in earlier wars they would have been in the frontline with their men)). They have significantly enhanced the capabilities of artillery. They have increased the emphasis on overhead concealment and made tactical surprise far more difficult to achieve. But they don't really impact the relevance of tanks. They are an additional threat that tanks need to worry about. Drones can direct precision artillery onto tanks that remain stationary for too long in inadequately concealed positions. Loitering munitions are one more asset that can be used to damage or destroy tanks. But none of this has increased tank losses out of proportion to what we've seen in past wars, nor have they replaced the tank's ability to provide responsive and accurate flat-trajectory fire.
People who argue for the obsolescence of tanks point to the large numbers of tanks that we can see being knocked out in the abundance of available combat footage, and to the sparing use of tanks by the Ukrainians. I think people who bring up the first point have a poor understanding of military history. Tanks have always been lost in large numbers in every single war in which they have played a significant role. The anti-tank gun repeatedly proved its superiority over tanks in head to head engagements as early as 1941 in North Africa. The British lost huge numbers of tanks in the Battle of Cambrai in 1917 because the Germans had figured out they could be easily knocked out by artillery firing in the direct-fire role. Pointing to heavy tank losses alone can't prove the obsolescence of tanks in modern warfare, since such heavy losses do not set a modern war apart from any other war in history.
The second point, that the Ukrainians have been very sparing in their use of tanks, preferring to use small groups of infantry in most of their attacks, is much more valid. But I think it is easily explained by the fact that the Ukrainians cannot count on timely and substantial replacements for any tanks they lose. Heavy tank losses in earlier wars were acceptable because the armies involved could count on those losses being replaced. The Russians have also started switching to less mechanized, and more infantry heavy attacks. And I think it is for the same reason. They don't have the industrial might of the old Soviet Union, so can't produce new tanks at the rate they are being lost in the war. They've been counting on their large stockpile of stored tanks to replace losses. But a large portion of their stored tanks have already been used up, and it doesn't look like the war is going to end anytime soon. If they are going to make their finite reserves of tanks last as long as they probably need to, they need to be much more sparing in their use of tanks. If the US found itself in a major war today I doubt we'd have the same problem. Like the Russians, we also have thousands of tanks in storage (though not as many thousands), and unlike the Russians we have considerably more industrial potential. We probably couldn't scale up tank production to the tens of thousands per year that was achieved in WW2 (Abrams are a tad more complicated than Shermans), but I'd bet that we could probably scale up into the thousands per year. Not that anyone really knows for sure. No one in US industry in 1940 had the slightest idea of what US industry would be capable of in 1942 either, so we might be able to manage more than we think.
Frankly the line that the tank is obsolete is pretty tired at this point. People heralded the death of the tank after WW1, WW2, and the 1973 Yom Kippur War. In each case they turned out to be wrong. I think there is a long running assumption that tanks are the modern cavalry, and therefore must eventually suffer the same fate as cavalry. I wish I didn't need to point out how absurdly over simplistic that point of view is. Tanks and motorized infantry may have finalized the obsolescence of cavalry, but they are not cavalry.
To get things back on topic for this thread, I think the Israelis probably can afford tank losses on the scale we've seen so far. Even if the footage we've seen in Gaza so far really does represent actual knocked out Merkavas (which remains unclear, since none of the footage lasts long enough to show whether or not the hits actually destroyed the tanks (or even whether they were genuine hits, and not intercepted by the APS just short of the tank)). They have fewer tanks than the Ukrainians (I heard around 400 tanks at the beginning of the war, though I'm not sure if that was prewar active-duty tanks or total tank in their inventory). But they are fighting a smaller war, and they can count on their own domestic industry to replace losses without having to count on donations from allies.

Very interesting. Unfortunately, as always, none of the footage clearly shows whether or not any of the vehicles were actually knocked out.
I'm surprised that I haven't yet seen any footage of Hamas fighters firing salvos of two or more rockets at the same time at an Israeli tank. It's one of the obvious adaptations to APS. Theoretically the APS shouldn't be able to reset in time to intercept the second rocket of such a salvo. Possible explanations that I can think of at short notice include:
1. The APS is less effective or less common than I'd assumed. Making such tactics unnecessary.
2. The APS is more effective than I'd assumed. Making such tactics ineffective.
3. Hamas fighters just haven't thought of it. Hamas my lack enough of a centralized system for disseminating lessons learned to implement such a tactic on a wide scale.
4. They may not have enough RPGs to implement such a tactic. Obviously firing a salvo of two or more rockets at a tank at the same time requires that you have two or more RPGs in the same place at the same time.
5. Other tactics may be effective enough to limit the value of implementing this particular tactic. We've seen Hamas fighters running up to place warheads directly on Israeli tanks, which would get the warhead past the APS. And APS have a limited number of charges, so it may be enough to simply saturate the APS with one rocket at a time until one finally gets through.

Should I bore you with my Israel story? Skip over it if you want.
I am not an army guy. I was a navy guy. Diving & Salvage, ship repair, dry-docking. I had the job as 6th Fleet Salvage Officer in Naples and in late 2000 my old Nokia banana phone rings in the middle of the night. Long story short. An FFG ran aground off of Alexandria. yada yada yada. Israel Shipyard In Haifa got the contract to do repairs. Sonar Dome gone. Rudder and single screw all effed up. Towed to Haifa. I was there 6 weeks to do the drydocking (floating drydock). What a great time. Haifa reminded me of Carmel, California. I was lucky to be there during a peaceful timeframe. I drove all over Israel with shipyard buddies. Went bowling in Israel? Yep. As usual, I learned a little of some language. Hebrew? Yiddish? Maybe both. Alcol beseder! I saw all the young soldiers walking around with their weapons slung. Almost all the guys at the same shipyard had been in the IDF. Moshe was a paratrooper. He got sent to Ghana to guard the embassy after Yom Kippur 73 and banged some local girls. Love the local food. 
Sonuvabidge but I was right back there a few months later when a big amphib ran aground in the Great Bitter Lake. Like a reunion back at the same shipyard. I visited the Golan Heights and saw some cool stuff. I was a tourist I guess but we fixed those ships. When I was in my hotel room I always talked out loud and said hello in case "they" were listening to me. At the airport when I left the 2nd time I rattled off a bunch of answers to the very pretty female questioner. I had already heard all their questions of why I was there, etc. She said "I will ask the questions!" 
I never have met any Palestinians or Hamas guys. But I love the Israelis I met. SHALOM! 🇮🇱

That evil genius Bond-villain wannabe is way ahead of you.
https://www.boringcompany.com/tunnels

I was 14 when Hunt For Red October came out so pretty sure it is me that is channeling.  Just noticing some similarities in asymmetries and wondering how that would have gone down.

I suspect it may drive tac UAS lower but these things are already able to hug tree lines.  I mean we are talking about detecting something the size of a small bird while moving with much more agility than one.  And we are talking about a lot of them.
We are watching UAS killing tanks with repurposed DPICM rounds.  The shaped charges on those have about a half pound charge with with likely quarter pound NEQ (about 150 g).   What makes them deadly in UA hands is they can target specific parts of the vehicle (like an open hatch).  So NEQ is kinda a red herring because that missile can likely easily carry enough to damage or even kill a vehicle.  It’s guidance to find and hit a small UAS - and we are talking this generations set of UAS, not then next one - is extremely precise so again…why waste it on freakin UAS when you can just kill the forces the UAS is designed to support?  If I have 50 of those missiles, that is 50 dead vehicles or soldiers.  I mean sure go ahead and hit the UAS but those thing being fired at me is what I worry more about as opposed to UAS.
Current ATGM technology can already spot signatures on the ground (eg self loitering, Javelin).  That tech on a small cheap missile that can hit a UAS would be a nightmare for ground forces…and naval for that matter.  I am not sure people get how hard it is to spot and engage a small target like that effectively.  And again, if you could solve for it then whatever you introduce will be absolutely deadly to everything on the battlefield.  UAS will be an after thought if one is facing a smart-missile swarm with the abilities they would need to hit a UAS.
Now you could just go for a kinetic collision kill and skip the explosives to take out the UAS but a small warhead like that could fly up a tanks tailpipe, so why not put a charge on it?  In reality this is a multi-purpose missile nightmare if it ever came to full fruition.  It is like an effective CRAM, if you could do that to the level required nothing above ground would be safe.

Mumble Hamas numbers about Palestinian casualties mumble reliable mumble.

I was a little hesitant to advertise my own tool here but... given that I actually promised to deliver it in this thread some 2000 pages ago, the cold season is now in full swing (time for making maps and actually playing CM!) ... and we were discussing means by which aliens would invade recently:
If you are interested in automatically generating maps from OpenStreetMap data, CMAutoEditor now has a profile for CMBS. "Automatically" means, CMAutoEditor converts OpenStreetMap data into CM tiles and generates the map by automatizing the clicking in the Scenario Editor.
Let's just keep in mind that depicting actual places in an actual war might be a sensitive topic, especially for the Ukrainian forumites, so be a little circumspect when doing that. Still, if it is not asking too much, if someone knows about good elevation data for Ukraine (i.e. not globally available satellite data like SRTM or ALOS), please contact me.
 

More footage from the IDF:
 

So it's a VDV?  Hang on, the Russians already have a VDV, might get confusing 😉.

More footage from the IDF:
 

Good pic to demonstrate tank positioning for greatest armor slope. 
 

Latest from Gaza:

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/israel-gaza-situation-report-hamas-lost-control-in-the-north-idf-says
 

I've been thinking about what Hamas and their backers are hoping to get out of this war. Because they must have known it would end up like this. They are fanatics and indifferent to human life, but I don't think they are stupid as such.
Not really sure which explanation is more correct, but I think it must be one of these two:
1) It's basically one big suicide attack, involving the whole organisation. They are already used to do what they call "martyrdom operations", so maybe they thought they'd just all go out in a blaze of what they consider glory and take as many Israelis with them as they can. Also damage Israel's reputation by provoking them to attack civilian targets, which has already happened.
2) Or maybe Hamas actually think they can mount a proper defence against the Israeli army. The purpose of the hostages is to prevent Israel from simply flooding their tunnels, which would be their major weak point. And then Hamas thinks they can keeping fighting and ambushing their enemies inside Gaza for a long time. Maybe indefinitely, if they can keep supplies coming in through tunnels to Egypt? So basically moving the battle to a place where they have the home advantage.
 

Hamas leaders may have thought that there was no strategic alternative. Saudi Arabia was on the verge of normalizing relations with Israel. The other Arab leaders might make noise about the plight of the Palestinian people, but they have no interest in becoming involved. The Oct. 7 attack puts Palestine back in the foreground.

Released IDF footage:
 

Released IDF footage:
 

Way too slow.  This is actually basically how sappers do silent breaches but switch out vehicle with 8 guys at night.  Problem with people is that they show up on thermals.
The vehicle will draw fire as soon as it enters the minefield.  If somehow it manages to stay quiet it sure as hell will draw fire after the first charge goes off.

A bit of statistics about this thread.
First post 11.2.2022.
Page 1000 on 7.7.2022, 2000 on 3.2.2023 and 3000 on 6.11.2023.
It took 146 days for the first 1000. Then 211 for the next and another 276 for the last. So we are slowing down.
With a bit of extrapolation, it will take 318 days for the next 1000 - that would be September 19, 2024. Let's hope we are discussion the end of the war by then.
 

Tis But A Scratch.

Well yes, but how about a micro bone about the new game? 

I am pretty sure that automatically makes you a Canadian citizen.