Combatintman

This has been sat on my hard drive in an 'almost finished' state for a couple of years now.  Prompted by this thread:
I decided to finish it off.
Some tasters ...
Scenario Image:

Strategic Map:

Operational Map:

Tactical Map:

Overhead Comparison CM and Google Earth

Eye Level Comparison CM and Google Earth:

The basic premise is that Russia attacks the Suwalki Gap after a period of tension on the Russian and Belarusian borders with NATO (sound familiar anyone ...).  This mission is set in Lithuania's western border with the Kaliningrad Oblast where a US force has hurriedly deployed in response to a threat of a thrust east out of Kaliningrad in support of the Suwalki Gap attack.
The map is 3,328m x 1,920m ...
Watch this space ...

I'm trying to get this uploaded to the scenario depot and have messaged @Bootie for assistance.
In the meantime, get it here
 
 
... Opening Encounter.btt

I'm trying to get this uploaded to the scenario depot and have messaged @Bootie for assistance.
In the meantime, get it here
 
 
... Opening Encounter.btt

My contribution, which is close to being finished, is discussed here ...
 

My contribution, which is close to being finished, is discussed here ...
 

So here are the draft orders ...
Situation
Amid a background of tensions on the Russian and Belarusian borders with the Baltic states, Russia announced its Zapad exercise, which traditionally takes place in September, early causing alarm to NATO governments.  This saw Russian forces move to border regions and the reinforcement of the Kaliningrad Oblast with airborne formations.  The exercises finished a week ago, but these forward deployments are unchanged leading NATO intelligence analysts to assess that Russia and its Belarusian ally planned to attack the Suwalki Gap.  In response NATO has started to move reinforcements into the area including the 1st Infantry Brigade Combat Team (1 IBCT)/82nd Airborne Division which started to arrive in Vilkaviskis, Lithuania last night.  A Troop 3rd Squadron/73rd Cavalry Regiment (A/3/73 Cav) was one of the first units to arrive and has been rushed west to deal with any Russian supporting eastward attack from the Kaliningrad Oblast.  It is now 1100hrs on June 01, 2017, and the Russians crossed the border 30 minutes ago.  It is warm, clear and there is a gentle west to east wind.
Mission
A/3/73 Cav guards in the vicinity of Maldenai until 1200hrs, 01 June in order to delay the enemy assault on Vilkaviskis.
Tasks:
Destroy enemy reconnaissance.
Disrupt the enemy first echelon battalion.
Deny enemy penetration in greater than platoon strength of the Battle Handover Line.
Maintain 60% combat effectiveness.
Withdraw no later than 1230hrs, 01 June.
Friendly Forces
A/3/73 Cav complete comprising 1st, 2nd and 3rd Platoons each with 2 x M1151 HUMMWV M2, 2 x M1151 HUMMWV Mk19, 2 x M1167 HUMMWV TOW and an LMTV truck.  Also organic to A Troop are 2 x M120 120mm mortars and 1 x RQ11B UAV.  Other support available comes mainly from 3rd Battalion/319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment (3/319 AFAR) comprising Battery A (6 x 105mm M119A3), Battery B (6 x 105mm M119A3) and Battery C (6 x 155mm M777A2).  An additional RQ11B UAV has been assigned to A Troop from 3/73 Cav.
Enemy Forces
Intelligence assesses that either 7th Guards Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment (7 GMRR) or 79th Guards Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (79 GMRB), both of 11th Army Corps normally based in the Kaliningrad Oblast will lead the attack.  The S2 assesses that 7 GMRR is the most likely of the two.  Both are equipped with T-72 tanks, 7 GMRR is BMP-2 equipped while 79 GMRB is MTLB equipped.  Whichever formation leads, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) indicates that the enemy unit will be a battalion-sized force tactically deployed to conduct a meeting engagement.  Its likely mission is to defeat the friendly covering force and secure a jump off point for subsequent echelons to assault Vilkaviskis 7km east of the Battle Handover Line.  There is no threat from enemy air assets.
Plan
It is your choice commander but be aware that you have been given a tough mission which will stretch the capabilities of your light and small force given that you will be facing a mechanized force that outnumbers you by approximately three to one and your force is not optimized for this kind of mission.
Your plan will need to make best use of ground and your key assets which are your long-range anti-tank and indirect fire weapons.
You must exit the eastern edge of the map (Battle Handover Line) before the mission ends.
Conceptually this is a simple mission that requires a trade-off between inflicting casualties on the enemy, slowing enemy progress across the map while minimizing your own casualties and picking the right time to withdraw and exit the map.  The enemy gets points for advancing across the map, exiting units from the eastern edge of the map and for inflicting blue casualties while minimizing red casualties.  You lack the combat power to destroy every single vehicle, so you need to track your kills and enemy progress in order to choose the right moment to withdraw.  Once you have withdrawn, you should ceasefire.
Notes
This mission was going to be part of a campaign depicting a ‘what if’ Russian attack on Lithuania which I never really progressed with.  The Russian and US units have been researched and the map is as good as the Combat Mission editor can reproduce of the area depicted.  I spent a lot of time in Street View in Google Earth while making it and I hope you appreciate the result.  If you want to check yourself, the middle of the lake on the map is at Grid 34U FF 2386 5620.  This mission has four Russian AI plans so if at first you don’t succeed, try, try again.
I hope you enjoy playing the mission.
Combatintman

This has been sat on my hard drive in an 'almost finished' state for a couple of years now.  Prompted by this thread:
I decided to finish it off.
Some tasters ...
Scenario Image:

Strategic Map:

Operational Map:

Tactical Map:

Overhead Comparison CM and Google Earth

Eye Level Comparison CM and Google Earth:

The basic premise is that Russia attacks the Suwalki Gap after a period of tension on the Russian and Belarusian borders with NATO (sound familiar anyone ...).  This mission is set in Lithuania's western border with the Kaliningrad Oblast where a US force has hurriedly deployed in response to a threat of a thrust east out of Kaliningrad in support of the Suwalki Gap attack.
The map is 3,328m x 1,920m ...
Watch this space ...

Ok … so let’s start with what ChuckDyke said:
“Here is something for house fighting and the difficulty of maintaining command and control during MOUT operations.”
He posted a video about the Battle for Binh Ba in South Vietnam 
Let’s see what I said in response:
“Binh Ba was hardly Hue, Fallujah, Berlin or Stalingrad though was it?  This was a skirmish over a non-descript village which didn't even fill a grid square in Vietnam involving no more than 500 combatants on both sides and 100 casualties. The Australian Army lacks the size and experience to do offensive operations against a well-prepared enemy in anything larger than a village so MOUT is certainly not the appropriate descriptor here.”
For those not familiar with Binh Ba, this is a contemporary map.  The grid squares are 1km so the total mapped area is 4km². 

Note that it does not fill that area.
Moving on then to the Australian Army’s own doctrinal publications as an example:
According to Land Warfare Publication-G 3-9-6, Operations in Urban Environments,
The urban environment is classified into the following zones:
a. the city core,
b. the core periphery,
c. commercial ribbons,
d. residential sprawl,
e. industrial areas,
f. outlying high-rise areas, and
g. shanty towns
This is just one reason I stated that Binh Ba was not an urban environment as it only has one of those characteristics.  The same publication cites the battles for Fallujah, Grozny, Hue and Stalingrad in its examples of urban combat.  That publication makes one reference to Binh Ba as the preface to Chapter 7 – Building Clearance as follows (my bold):
The battle was triggered shortly after 8.00am when a Centurion tank travelling through the village was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade. Initial intelligence suggested there were two Viet Cong platoons in the village. From the strength of the fire met by the company sent to deal with them, however, it was apparent that the enemy presence was much greater. There followed several hours of devastatingly fierce fighting. Twice tanks swept through the village, returning enemy fire by blowing open the walls of the houses. Then each house was cleared room by room by the infantry. By nightfall the village was still not secure and fighting continued in the area the following day. When the battle was finally over the enemy toll was 91 – at a cost of just one Australian life and eight wounded.
The battle of Binh Ba posed the perennial problem of the war in Vietnam – how to separate the enemy from innocent civilians. The occupation of towns and villages by the Viet Cong was a deliberate tactic designed either to ambush the relieving troops or to cause the Australians to use an excess of force.
Now ChuckDyke initially said (my bold):  “Here is something for house fighting and the difficulty of maintaining command and control during MOUT operations.”  My response said:  “MOUT is certainly not the appropriate descriptor here.”
Taking my argument that the Australian Army lacks the capability to do offensive operations against a well-prepared enemy in anything larger than a village let’s go back to LWP-G 3-9-6, Operations in Urban Environments.  Its Combined Arms Scenarios section (Chapter 8 refers) shows a Company Team attack in the context of a Battlegroup.  The example imagery map for that scenario has the Battlegroup boundary covering three streets and 22 buildings.  Hold that thought …
The Australian Army is basically capable of deploying a division of three combat brigades.  This would be war of national survival stuff as its more recent deployments where the usual premise of ‘to deploy one, you need three’ comes into effect has been to deploy nothing bigger than a brigade.  Australian Army brigades sit in the three to four battalion range.  Being generous let’s say four battalions which gives you four battlegroups.  Keeping one in reserve, because it is good practice to have one then according to the example in the Australian Army’s official doctrine on urban operations, a brigade can conduct an offensive operation comprising nine streets with 66 buildings.  If we go for the war of national survival then, assuming one brigade is the divisional commander’s reserve, then that is 18 streets and 132 buildings.
Here is a map of Hue where some of the calculations above have been applied to illustrate the point:

The image below is the zoomed area that I have marked as a green rectangle in the overall city map.

So in simple terms, according to the Australian Army's own doctrine, a brigade can conduct an attack on a small corner of a city.
My point about the capabilities of the Australian Army is based on having served in it and knowing what it can and cannot do which I think the argument presented above demonstrates.  It is no more an insult than saying the Australian Army cannot deploy a parachute battalion.  Why?  It doesn’t have one.  Facing up to reality and knowing your strengths and weaknesses is an important discussion to have.  Nations/militaries that overestimate their own capabilities and don’t challenge them generally end up coming second in wars.  I recall that the British Army claimed (and bored everyone to death) that they were the masters of limited war/COIN because of Borneo, Malaya, Northern Ireland and the killer tactic of wearing berets/soft hats only to end up having to eat humble pie in Basra.  There are few people in British military circles and veterans who served there who disagree with the assertion that Basra was an utterly miserable performance on the part of the British Army.  One of my friends was killed there by the way so I have little interest in denigrating the sacrifice of those whose lives were changed there.
On then to impugning the courage and sacrifice of veterans … Recalling that ChuckDyke said that my comments would not be welcome in an RSL (Returned Services League – a veteran’s association) I pointed out that I have been a member of it for 10 years.  Later ChuckDyke changes his position on the RSL and decides that it is not such a good thing after all because of the way it treated Vietnam Veterans.  A claim I don’t dispute, it is well documented, and it was not the organization’s finest hour.  Anyway – I think we can agree that his position on the RSL is inconsistent.  Whatever the argument, my membership subs help Australian veterans and while serving in the Australian Army I collected in Brisbane and Sydney for Legacy ... a veteran’s charity.
For my part, I have been and continue to be a member of the RSL.  I am also a member of the Royal British Legion … you’ve guessed it … another veteran’s association.  This month I have given the equivalent of three full working days (in addition to my day job and my hobby ‘job’ for Battlefront) collecting for the Poppy Appeal plus assisting with the organization of, and attending, a cross laying ceremony at the town church as well of course as attending Remembrance Day itself and participated in the RBL committee meeting at which this most important appeal and other issues affecting veterans were discussed.
One of those issues was our disgust that the County level RBL have decided that organizing the ANZAC service at the Commonwealth War Graves Cemetery on Cannock Chase is ‘too difficult.’  My branch is now taking it on and I am one of the lead members in this initiative.  The majority of the Commonwealth dead there are New Zealanders.  A country whose army I have never served in but the people commemorated there are fellow ANZACs.  Most of them died of Spanish Flu which the more ungenerous might say wasn’t a war death.  However, the Commonwealth War Graves Commission rightly designates them as war deaths and, incidentally, many of them had fought some hard actions on the Western Front before being brought back to the UK.  Hardly the behaviour of someone with no respect for the fallen.
Nowhere in the phrase "this was a skirmish over a non-descript village which didn't even fill a grid square in Vietnam involving no more than 500 combatants on both sides and 100 casualties," do I denigrate veterans.  Non-descript village is a fact is the number of casualties and participants on both sides. 
Anyway, I think I’ve made my point.

This has been sat on my hard drive in an 'almost finished' state for a couple of years now.  Prompted by this thread:
I decided to finish it off.
Some tasters ...
Scenario Image:

Strategic Map:

Operational Map:

Tactical Map:

Overhead Comparison CM and Google Earth

Eye Level Comparison CM and Google Earth:

The basic premise is that Russia attacks the Suwalki Gap after a period of tension on the Russian and Belarusian borders with NATO (sound familiar anyone ...).  This mission is set in Lithuania's western border with the Kaliningrad Oblast where a US force has hurriedly deployed in response to a threat of a thrust east out of Kaliningrad in support of the Suwalki Gap attack.
The map is 3,328m x 1,920m ...
Watch this space ...

Funnily enough - I did the IPB for the Australian mentors supporting the Iraqi CTS who took the brunt of that battle during my Iraq tour with the Australian Army from May-December 2016.

Correct - AI plans are only a factor if:
One exists for that side. A human is not playing that side.

Ok … so let’s start with what ChuckDyke said:
“Here is something for house fighting and the difficulty of maintaining command and control during MOUT operations.”
He posted a video about the Battle for Binh Ba in South Vietnam 
Let’s see what I said in response:
“Binh Ba was hardly Hue, Fallujah, Berlin or Stalingrad though was it?  This was a skirmish over a non-descript village which didn't even fill a grid square in Vietnam involving no more than 500 combatants on both sides and 100 casualties. The Australian Army lacks the size and experience to do offensive operations against a well-prepared enemy in anything larger than a village so MOUT is certainly not the appropriate descriptor here.”
For those not familiar with Binh Ba, this is a contemporary map.  The grid squares are 1km so the total mapped area is 4km². 

Note that it does not fill that area.
Moving on then to the Australian Army’s own doctrinal publications as an example:
According to Land Warfare Publication-G 3-9-6, Operations in Urban Environments,
The urban environment is classified into the following zones:
a. the city core,
b. the core periphery,
c. commercial ribbons,
d. residential sprawl,
e. industrial areas,
f. outlying high-rise areas, and
g. shanty towns
This is just one reason I stated that Binh Ba was not an urban environment as it only has one of those characteristics.  The same publication cites the battles for Fallujah, Grozny, Hue and Stalingrad in its examples of urban combat.  That publication makes one reference to Binh Ba as the preface to Chapter 7 – Building Clearance as follows (my bold):
The battle was triggered shortly after 8.00am when a Centurion tank travelling through the village was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade. Initial intelligence suggested there were two Viet Cong platoons in the village. From the strength of the fire met by the company sent to deal with them, however, it was apparent that the enemy presence was much greater. There followed several hours of devastatingly fierce fighting. Twice tanks swept through the village, returning enemy fire by blowing open the walls of the houses. Then each house was cleared room by room by the infantry. By nightfall the village was still not secure and fighting continued in the area the following day. When the battle was finally over the enemy toll was 91 – at a cost of just one Australian life and eight wounded.
The battle of Binh Ba posed the perennial problem of the war in Vietnam – how to separate the enemy from innocent civilians. The occupation of towns and villages by the Viet Cong was a deliberate tactic designed either to ambush the relieving troops or to cause the Australians to use an excess of force.
Now ChuckDyke initially said (my bold):  “Here is something for house fighting and the difficulty of maintaining command and control during MOUT operations.”  My response said:  “MOUT is certainly not the appropriate descriptor here.”
Taking my argument that the Australian Army lacks the capability to do offensive operations against a well-prepared enemy in anything larger than a village let’s go back to LWP-G 3-9-6, Operations in Urban Environments.  Its Combined Arms Scenarios section (Chapter 8 refers) shows a Company Team attack in the context of a Battlegroup.  The example imagery map for that scenario has the Battlegroup boundary covering three streets and 22 buildings.  Hold that thought …
The Australian Army is basically capable of deploying a division of three combat brigades.  This would be war of national survival stuff as its more recent deployments where the usual premise of ‘to deploy one, you need three’ comes into effect has been to deploy nothing bigger than a brigade.  Australian Army brigades sit in the three to four battalion range.  Being generous let’s say four battalions which gives you four battlegroups.  Keeping one in reserve, because it is good practice to have one then according to the example in the Australian Army’s official doctrine on urban operations, a brigade can conduct an offensive operation comprising nine streets with 66 buildings.  If we go for the war of national survival then, assuming one brigade is the divisional commander’s reserve, then that is 18 streets and 132 buildings.
Here is a map of Hue where some of the calculations above have been applied to illustrate the point:

The image below is the zoomed area that I have marked as a green rectangle in the overall city map.

So in simple terms, according to the Australian Army's own doctrine, a brigade can conduct an attack on a small corner of a city.
My point about the capabilities of the Australian Army is based on having served in it and knowing what it can and cannot do which I think the argument presented above demonstrates.  It is no more an insult than saying the Australian Army cannot deploy a parachute battalion.  Why?  It doesn’t have one.  Facing up to reality and knowing your strengths and weaknesses is an important discussion to have.  Nations/militaries that overestimate their own capabilities and don’t challenge them generally end up coming second in wars.  I recall that the British Army claimed (and bored everyone to death) that they were the masters of limited war/COIN because of Borneo, Malaya, Northern Ireland and the killer tactic of wearing berets/soft hats only to end up having to eat humble pie in Basra.  There are few people in British military circles and veterans who served there who disagree with the assertion that Basra was an utterly miserable performance on the part of the British Army.  One of my friends was killed there by the way so I have little interest in denigrating the sacrifice of those whose lives were changed there.
On then to impugning the courage and sacrifice of veterans … Recalling that ChuckDyke said that my comments would not be welcome in an RSL (Returned Services League – a veteran’s association) I pointed out that I have been a member of it for 10 years.  Later ChuckDyke changes his position on the RSL and decides that it is not such a good thing after all because of the way it treated Vietnam Veterans.  A claim I don’t dispute, it is well documented, and it was not the organization’s finest hour.  Anyway – I think we can agree that his position on the RSL is inconsistent.  Whatever the argument, my membership subs help Australian veterans and while serving in the Australian Army I collected in Brisbane and Sydney for Legacy ... a veteran’s charity.
For my part, I have been and continue to be a member of the RSL.  I am also a member of the Royal British Legion … you’ve guessed it … another veteran’s association.  This month I have given the equivalent of three full working days (in addition to my day job and my hobby ‘job’ for Battlefront) collecting for the Poppy Appeal plus assisting with the organization of, and attending, a cross laying ceremony at the town church as well of course as attending Remembrance Day itself and participated in the RBL committee meeting at which this most important appeal and other issues affecting veterans were discussed.
One of those issues was our disgust that the County level RBL have decided that organizing the ANZAC service at the Commonwealth War Graves Cemetery on Cannock Chase is ‘too difficult.’  My branch is now taking it on and I am one of the lead members in this initiative.  The majority of the Commonwealth dead there are New Zealanders.  A country whose army I have never served in but the people commemorated there are fellow ANZACs.  Most of them died of Spanish Flu which the more ungenerous might say wasn’t a war death.  However, the Commonwealth War Graves Commission rightly designates them as war deaths and, incidentally, many of them had fought some hard actions on the Western Front before being brought back to the UK.  Hardly the behaviour of someone with no respect for the fallen.
Nowhere in the phrase "this was a skirmish over a non-descript village which didn't even fill a grid square in Vietnam involving no more than 500 combatants on both sides and 100 casualties," do I denigrate veterans.  Non-descript village is a fact is the number of casualties and participants on both sides. 
Anyway, I think I’ve made my point.

Ok … so let’s start with what ChuckDyke said:
“Here is something for house fighting and the difficulty of maintaining command and control during MOUT operations.”
He posted a video about the Battle for Binh Ba in South Vietnam 
Let’s see what I said in response:
“Binh Ba was hardly Hue, Fallujah, Berlin or Stalingrad though was it?  This was a skirmish over a non-descript village which didn't even fill a grid square in Vietnam involving no more than 500 combatants on both sides and 100 casualties. The Australian Army lacks the size and experience to do offensive operations against a well-prepared enemy in anything larger than a village so MOUT is certainly not the appropriate descriptor here.”
For those not familiar with Binh Ba, this is a contemporary map.  The grid squares are 1km so the total mapped area is 4km². 

Note that it does not fill that area.
Moving on then to the Australian Army’s own doctrinal publications as an example:
According to Land Warfare Publication-G 3-9-6, Operations in Urban Environments,
The urban environment is classified into the following zones:
a. the city core,
b. the core periphery,
c. commercial ribbons,
d. residential sprawl,
e. industrial areas,
f. outlying high-rise areas, and
g. shanty towns
This is just one reason I stated that Binh Ba was not an urban environment as it only has one of those characteristics.  The same publication cites the battles for Fallujah, Grozny, Hue and Stalingrad in its examples of urban combat.  That publication makes one reference to Binh Ba as the preface to Chapter 7 – Building Clearance as follows (my bold):
The battle was triggered shortly after 8.00am when a Centurion tank travelling through the village was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade. Initial intelligence suggested there were two Viet Cong platoons in the village. From the strength of the fire met by the company sent to deal with them, however, it was apparent that the enemy presence was much greater. There followed several hours of devastatingly fierce fighting. Twice tanks swept through the village, returning enemy fire by blowing open the walls of the houses. Then each house was cleared room by room by the infantry. By nightfall the village was still not secure and fighting continued in the area the following day. When the battle was finally over the enemy toll was 91 – at a cost of just one Australian life and eight wounded.
The battle of Binh Ba posed the perennial problem of the war in Vietnam – how to separate the enemy from innocent civilians. The occupation of towns and villages by the Viet Cong was a deliberate tactic designed either to ambush the relieving troops or to cause the Australians to use an excess of force.
Now ChuckDyke initially said (my bold):  “Here is something for house fighting and the difficulty of maintaining command and control during MOUT operations.”  My response said:  “MOUT is certainly not the appropriate descriptor here.”
Taking my argument that the Australian Army lacks the capability to do offensive operations against a well-prepared enemy in anything larger than a village let’s go back to LWP-G 3-9-6, Operations in Urban Environments.  Its Combined Arms Scenarios section (Chapter 8 refers) shows a Company Team attack in the context of a Battlegroup.  The example imagery map for that scenario has the Battlegroup boundary covering three streets and 22 buildings.  Hold that thought …
The Australian Army is basically capable of deploying a division of three combat brigades.  This would be war of national survival stuff as its more recent deployments where the usual premise of ‘to deploy one, you need three’ comes into effect has been to deploy nothing bigger than a brigade.  Australian Army brigades sit in the three to four battalion range.  Being generous let’s say four battalions which gives you four battlegroups.  Keeping one in reserve, because it is good practice to have one then according to the example in the Australian Army’s official doctrine on urban operations, a brigade can conduct an offensive operation comprising nine streets with 66 buildings.  If we go for the war of national survival then, assuming one brigade is the divisional commander’s reserve, then that is 18 streets and 132 buildings.
Here is a map of Hue where some of the calculations above have been applied to illustrate the point:

The image below is the zoomed area that I have marked as a green rectangle in the overall city map.

So in simple terms, according to the Australian Army's own doctrine, a brigade can conduct an attack on a small corner of a city.
My point about the capabilities of the Australian Army is based on having served in it and knowing what it can and cannot do which I think the argument presented above demonstrates.  It is no more an insult than saying the Australian Army cannot deploy a parachute battalion.  Why?  It doesn’t have one.  Facing up to reality and knowing your strengths and weaknesses is an important discussion to have.  Nations/militaries that overestimate their own capabilities and don’t challenge them generally end up coming second in wars.  I recall that the British Army claimed (and bored everyone to death) that they were the masters of limited war/COIN because of Borneo, Malaya, Northern Ireland and the killer tactic of wearing berets/soft hats only to end up having to eat humble pie in Basra.  There are few people in British military circles and veterans who served there who disagree with the assertion that Basra was an utterly miserable performance on the part of the British Army.  One of my friends was killed there by the way so I have little interest in denigrating the sacrifice of those whose lives were changed there.
On then to impugning the courage and sacrifice of veterans … Recalling that ChuckDyke said that my comments would not be welcome in an RSL (Returned Services League – a veteran’s association) I pointed out that I have been a member of it for 10 years.  Later ChuckDyke changes his position on the RSL and decides that it is not such a good thing after all because of the way it treated Vietnam Veterans.  A claim I don’t dispute, it is well documented, and it was not the organization’s finest hour.  Anyway – I think we can agree that his position on the RSL is inconsistent.  Whatever the argument, my membership subs help Australian veterans and while serving in the Australian Army I collected in Brisbane and Sydney for Legacy ... a veteran’s charity.
For my part, I have been and continue to be a member of the RSL.  I am also a member of the Royal British Legion … you’ve guessed it … another veteran’s association.  This month I have given the equivalent of three full working days (in addition to my day job and my hobby ‘job’ for Battlefront) collecting for the Poppy Appeal plus assisting with the organization of, and attending, a cross laying ceremony at the town church as well of course as attending Remembrance Day itself and participated in the RBL committee meeting at which this most important appeal and other issues affecting veterans were discussed.
One of those issues was our disgust that the County level RBL have decided that organizing the ANZAC service at the Commonwealth War Graves Cemetery on Cannock Chase is ‘too difficult.’  My branch is now taking it on and I am one of the lead members in this initiative.  The majority of the Commonwealth dead there are New Zealanders.  A country whose army I have never served in but the people commemorated there are fellow ANZACs.  Most of them died of Spanish Flu which the more ungenerous might say wasn’t a war death.  However, the Commonwealth War Graves Commission rightly designates them as war deaths and, incidentally, many of them had fought some hard actions on the Western Front before being brought back to the UK.  Hardly the behaviour of someone with no respect for the fallen.
Nowhere in the phrase "this was a skirmish over a non-descript village which didn't even fill a grid square in Vietnam involving no more than 500 combatants on both sides and 100 casualties," do I denigrate veterans.  Non-descript village is a fact is the number of casualties and participants on both sides. 
Anyway, I think I’ve made my point.

The 5th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (5 RAR), the main infantry unit involved in Binh Ba on 06 June 1969, was involved in a mine strike on 15 June 1969.  There were, according to the 5 RAR War Diary, 2 x Australian KIA and 21 x Australian WIA in that mine strike or put another way ... double the losses of the so-called 'major engagement' at Binh Ba.  All of 5 RAR's operational reporting of the Binh Ba battle refers to it as a village ... which goes back to my point that Binh Ba is not an example of MOUT as was claimed.
In Combat Mission terms - it scrapes in as a 'Large' scenario and actually is a battle you could do in the editor as a single mission, unlike Berlin, Fallujah etc ...

Ok … so let’s start with what ChuckDyke said:
“Here is something for house fighting and the difficulty of maintaining command and control during MOUT operations.”
He posted a video about the Battle for Binh Ba in South Vietnam 
Let’s see what I said in response:
“Binh Ba was hardly Hue, Fallujah, Berlin or Stalingrad though was it?  This was a skirmish over a non-descript village which didn't even fill a grid square in Vietnam involving no more than 500 combatants on both sides and 100 casualties. The Australian Army lacks the size and experience to do offensive operations against a well-prepared enemy in anything larger than a village so MOUT is certainly not the appropriate descriptor here.”
For those not familiar with Binh Ba, this is a contemporary map.  The grid squares are 1km so the total mapped area is 4km². 

Note that it does not fill that area.
Moving on then to the Australian Army’s own doctrinal publications as an example:
According to Land Warfare Publication-G 3-9-6, Operations in Urban Environments,
The urban environment is classified into the following zones:
a. the city core,
b. the core periphery,
c. commercial ribbons,
d. residential sprawl,
e. industrial areas,
f. outlying high-rise areas, and
g. shanty towns
This is just one reason I stated that Binh Ba was not an urban environment as it only has one of those characteristics.  The same publication cites the battles for Fallujah, Grozny, Hue and Stalingrad in its examples of urban combat.  That publication makes one reference to Binh Ba as the preface to Chapter 7 – Building Clearance as follows (my bold):
The battle was triggered shortly after 8.00am when a Centurion tank travelling through the village was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade. Initial intelligence suggested there were two Viet Cong platoons in the village. From the strength of the fire met by the company sent to deal with them, however, it was apparent that the enemy presence was much greater. There followed several hours of devastatingly fierce fighting. Twice tanks swept through the village, returning enemy fire by blowing open the walls of the houses. Then each house was cleared room by room by the infantry. By nightfall the village was still not secure and fighting continued in the area the following day. When the battle was finally over the enemy toll was 91 – at a cost of just one Australian life and eight wounded.
The battle of Binh Ba posed the perennial problem of the war in Vietnam – how to separate the enemy from innocent civilians. The occupation of towns and villages by the Viet Cong was a deliberate tactic designed either to ambush the relieving troops or to cause the Australians to use an excess of force.
Now ChuckDyke initially said (my bold):  “Here is something for house fighting and the difficulty of maintaining command and control during MOUT operations.”  My response said:  “MOUT is certainly not the appropriate descriptor here.”
Taking my argument that the Australian Army lacks the capability to do offensive operations against a well-prepared enemy in anything larger than a village let’s go back to LWP-G 3-9-6, Operations in Urban Environments.  Its Combined Arms Scenarios section (Chapter 8 refers) shows a Company Team attack in the context of a Battlegroup.  The example imagery map for that scenario has the Battlegroup boundary covering three streets and 22 buildings.  Hold that thought …
The Australian Army is basically capable of deploying a division of three combat brigades.  This would be war of national survival stuff as its more recent deployments where the usual premise of ‘to deploy one, you need three’ comes into effect has been to deploy nothing bigger than a brigade.  Australian Army brigades sit in the three to four battalion range.  Being generous let’s say four battalions which gives you four battlegroups.  Keeping one in reserve, because it is good practice to have one then according to the example in the Australian Army’s official doctrine on urban operations, a brigade can conduct an offensive operation comprising nine streets with 66 buildings.  If we go for the war of national survival then, assuming one brigade is the divisional commander’s reserve, then that is 18 streets and 132 buildings.
Here is a map of Hue where some of the calculations above have been applied to illustrate the point:

The image below is the zoomed area that I have marked as a green rectangle in the overall city map.

So in simple terms, according to the Australian Army's own doctrine, a brigade can conduct an attack on a small corner of a city.
My point about the capabilities of the Australian Army is based on having served in it and knowing what it can and cannot do which I think the argument presented above demonstrates.  It is no more an insult than saying the Australian Army cannot deploy a parachute battalion.  Why?  It doesn’t have one.  Facing up to reality and knowing your strengths and weaknesses is an important discussion to have.  Nations/militaries that overestimate their own capabilities and don’t challenge them generally end up coming second in wars.  I recall that the British Army claimed (and bored everyone to death) that they were the masters of limited war/COIN because of Borneo, Malaya, Northern Ireland and the killer tactic of wearing berets/soft hats only to end up having to eat humble pie in Basra.  There are few people in British military circles and veterans who served there who disagree with the assertion that Basra was an utterly miserable performance on the part of the British Army.  One of my friends was killed there by the way so I have little interest in denigrating the sacrifice of those whose lives were changed there.
On then to impugning the courage and sacrifice of veterans … Recalling that ChuckDyke said that my comments would not be welcome in an RSL (Returned Services League – a veteran’s association) I pointed out that I have been a member of it for 10 years.  Later ChuckDyke changes his position on the RSL and decides that it is not such a good thing after all because of the way it treated Vietnam Veterans.  A claim I don’t dispute, it is well documented, and it was not the organization’s finest hour.  Anyway – I think we can agree that his position on the RSL is inconsistent.  Whatever the argument, my membership subs help Australian veterans and while serving in the Australian Army I collected in Brisbane and Sydney for Legacy ... a veteran’s charity.
For my part, I have been and continue to be a member of the RSL.  I am also a member of the Royal British Legion … you’ve guessed it … another veteran’s association.  This month I have given the equivalent of three full working days (in addition to my day job and my hobby ‘job’ for Battlefront) collecting for the Poppy Appeal plus assisting with the organization of, and attending, a cross laying ceremony at the town church as well of course as attending Remembrance Day itself and participated in the RBL committee meeting at which this most important appeal and other issues affecting veterans were discussed.
One of those issues was our disgust that the County level RBL have decided that organizing the ANZAC service at the Commonwealth War Graves Cemetery on Cannock Chase is ‘too difficult.’  My branch is now taking it on and I am one of the lead members in this initiative.  The majority of the Commonwealth dead there are New Zealanders.  A country whose army I have never served in but the people commemorated there are fellow ANZACs.  Most of them died of Spanish Flu which the more ungenerous might say wasn’t a war death.  However, the Commonwealth War Graves Commission rightly designates them as war deaths and, incidentally, many of them had fought some hard actions on the Western Front before being brought back to the UK.  Hardly the behaviour of someone with no respect for the fallen.
Nowhere in the phrase "this was a skirmish over a non-descript village which didn't even fill a grid square in Vietnam involving no more than 500 combatants on both sides and 100 casualties," do I denigrate veterans.  Non-descript village is a fact is the number of casualties and participants on both sides. 
Anyway, I think I’ve made my point.

Just a couple more teaser screen shots while I crunch through the final checks ...

Ok … so let’s start with what ChuckDyke said:
“Here is something for house fighting and the difficulty of maintaining command and control during MOUT operations.”
He posted a video about the Battle for Binh Ba in South Vietnam 
Let’s see what I said in response:
“Binh Ba was hardly Hue, Fallujah, Berlin or Stalingrad though was it?  This was a skirmish over a non-descript village which didn't even fill a grid square in Vietnam involving no more than 500 combatants on both sides and 100 casualties. The Australian Army lacks the size and experience to do offensive operations against a well-prepared enemy in anything larger than a village so MOUT is certainly not the appropriate descriptor here.”
For those not familiar with Binh Ba, this is a contemporary map.  The grid squares are 1km so the total mapped area is 4km². 

Note that it does not fill that area.
Moving on then to the Australian Army’s own doctrinal publications as an example:
According to Land Warfare Publication-G 3-9-6, Operations in Urban Environments,
The urban environment is classified into the following zones:
a. the city core,
b. the core periphery,
c. commercial ribbons,
d. residential sprawl,
e. industrial areas,
f. outlying high-rise areas, and
g. shanty towns
This is just one reason I stated that Binh Ba was not an urban environment as it only has one of those characteristics.  The same publication cites the battles for Fallujah, Grozny, Hue and Stalingrad in its examples of urban combat.  That publication makes one reference to Binh Ba as the preface to Chapter 7 – Building Clearance as follows (my bold):
The battle was triggered shortly after 8.00am when a Centurion tank travelling through the village was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade. Initial intelligence suggested there were two Viet Cong platoons in the village. From the strength of the fire met by the company sent to deal with them, however, it was apparent that the enemy presence was much greater. There followed several hours of devastatingly fierce fighting. Twice tanks swept through the village, returning enemy fire by blowing open the walls of the houses. Then each house was cleared room by room by the infantry. By nightfall the village was still not secure and fighting continued in the area the following day. When the battle was finally over the enemy toll was 91 – at a cost of just one Australian life and eight wounded.
The battle of Binh Ba posed the perennial problem of the war in Vietnam – how to separate the enemy from innocent civilians. The occupation of towns and villages by the Viet Cong was a deliberate tactic designed either to ambush the relieving troops or to cause the Australians to use an excess of force.
Now ChuckDyke initially said (my bold):  “Here is something for house fighting and the difficulty of maintaining command and control during MOUT operations.”  My response said:  “MOUT is certainly not the appropriate descriptor here.”
Taking my argument that the Australian Army lacks the capability to do offensive operations against a well-prepared enemy in anything larger than a village let’s go back to LWP-G 3-9-6, Operations in Urban Environments.  Its Combined Arms Scenarios section (Chapter 8 refers) shows a Company Team attack in the context of a Battlegroup.  The example imagery map for that scenario has the Battlegroup boundary covering three streets and 22 buildings.  Hold that thought …
The Australian Army is basically capable of deploying a division of three combat brigades.  This would be war of national survival stuff as its more recent deployments where the usual premise of ‘to deploy one, you need three’ comes into effect has been to deploy nothing bigger than a brigade.  Australian Army brigades sit in the three to four battalion range.  Being generous let’s say four battalions which gives you four battlegroups.  Keeping one in reserve, because it is good practice to have one then according to the example in the Australian Army’s official doctrine on urban operations, a brigade can conduct an offensive operation comprising nine streets with 66 buildings.  If we go for the war of national survival then, assuming one brigade is the divisional commander’s reserve, then that is 18 streets and 132 buildings.
Here is a map of Hue where some of the calculations above have been applied to illustrate the point:

The image below is the zoomed area that I have marked as a green rectangle in the overall city map.

So in simple terms, according to the Australian Army's own doctrine, a brigade can conduct an attack on a small corner of a city.
My point about the capabilities of the Australian Army is based on having served in it and knowing what it can and cannot do which I think the argument presented above demonstrates.  It is no more an insult than saying the Australian Army cannot deploy a parachute battalion.  Why?  It doesn’t have one.  Facing up to reality and knowing your strengths and weaknesses is an important discussion to have.  Nations/militaries that overestimate their own capabilities and don’t challenge them generally end up coming second in wars.  I recall that the British Army claimed (and bored everyone to death) that they were the masters of limited war/COIN because of Borneo, Malaya, Northern Ireland and the killer tactic of wearing berets/soft hats only to end up having to eat humble pie in Basra.  There are few people in British military circles and veterans who served there who disagree with the assertion that Basra was an utterly miserable performance on the part of the British Army.  One of my friends was killed there by the way so I have little interest in denigrating the sacrifice of those whose lives were changed there.
On then to impugning the courage and sacrifice of veterans … Recalling that ChuckDyke said that my comments would not be welcome in an RSL (Returned Services League – a veteran’s association) I pointed out that I have been a member of it for 10 years.  Later ChuckDyke changes his position on the RSL and decides that it is not such a good thing after all because of the way it treated Vietnam Veterans.  A claim I don’t dispute, it is well documented, and it was not the organization’s finest hour.  Anyway – I think we can agree that his position on the RSL is inconsistent.  Whatever the argument, my membership subs help Australian veterans and while serving in the Australian Army I collected in Brisbane and Sydney for Legacy ... a veteran’s charity.
For my part, I have been and continue to be a member of the RSL.  I am also a member of the Royal British Legion … you’ve guessed it … another veteran’s association.  This month I have given the equivalent of three full working days (in addition to my day job and my hobby ‘job’ for Battlefront) collecting for the Poppy Appeal plus assisting with the organization of, and attending, a cross laying ceremony at the town church as well of course as attending Remembrance Day itself and participated in the RBL committee meeting at which this most important appeal and other issues affecting veterans were discussed.
One of those issues was our disgust that the County level RBL have decided that organizing the ANZAC service at the Commonwealth War Graves Cemetery on Cannock Chase is ‘too difficult.’  My branch is now taking it on and I am one of the lead members in this initiative.  The majority of the Commonwealth dead there are New Zealanders.  A country whose army I have never served in but the people commemorated there are fellow ANZACs.  Most of them died of Spanish Flu which the more ungenerous might say wasn’t a war death.  However, the Commonwealth War Graves Commission rightly designates them as war deaths and, incidentally, many of them had fought some hard actions on the Western Front before being brought back to the UK.  Hardly the behaviour of someone with no respect for the fallen.
Nowhere in the phrase "this was a skirmish over a non-descript village which didn't even fill a grid square in Vietnam involving no more than 500 combatants on both sides and 100 casualties," do I denigrate veterans.  Non-descript village is a fact is the number of casualties and participants on both sides. 
Anyway, I think I’ve made my point.

The most common descriptors are Tactical Echelon and Operational Echelon and the employment of the terms can be a bit loose.  The term echelon would also be used in relation to formations.  So you could talk of a X Tank Regiment's first echelon battalions, or Y Motor Rifle Division's second echelon regiment.  A division generally is regarded as tactical so 47 Guards Tank Division might be described as the first tactical echelon if it is the lead element in 3 Shock Army's scheme of manoeuvre.  3 Shock Army would be classed as operational and; therefore, would be described as GSFG's/WGF's first operational echelon if it was the lead element in the scheme of manouevre with, say, 20 Guards Army as GSFG's/WGF's second operational echelon if it was the follow-on element in the scheme of manoeuvre.

Ok … so let’s start with what ChuckDyke said:
“Here is something for house fighting and the difficulty of maintaining command and control during MOUT operations.”
He posted a video about the Battle for Binh Ba in South Vietnam 
Let’s see what I said in response:
“Binh Ba was hardly Hue, Fallujah, Berlin or Stalingrad though was it?  This was a skirmish over a non-descript village which didn't even fill a grid square in Vietnam involving no more than 500 combatants on both sides and 100 casualties. The Australian Army lacks the size and experience to do offensive operations against a well-prepared enemy in anything larger than a village so MOUT is certainly not the appropriate descriptor here.”
For those not familiar with Binh Ba, this is a contemporary map.  The grid squares are 1km so the total mapped area is 4km². 

Note that it does not fill that area.
Moving on then to the Australian Army’s own doctrinal publications as an example:
According to Land Warfare Publication-G 3-9-6, Operations in Urban Environments,
The urban environment is classified into the following zones:
a. the city core,
b. the core periphery,
c. commercial ribbons,
d. residential sprawl,
e. industrial areas,
f. outlying high-rise areas, and
g. shanty towns
This is just one reason I stated that Binh Ba was not an urban environment as it only has one of those characteristics.  The same publication cites the battles for Fallujah, Grozny, Hue and Stalingrad in its examples of urban combat.  That publication makes one reference to Binh Ba as the preface to Chapter 7 – Building Clearance as follows (my bold):
The battle was triggered shortly after 8.00am when a Centurion tank travelling through the village was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade. Initial intelligence suggested there were two Viet Cong platoons in the village. From the strength of the fire met by the company sent to deal with them, however, it was apparent that the enemy presence was much greater. There followed several hours of devastatingly fierce fighting. Twice tanks swept through the village, returning enemy fire by blowing open the walls of the houses. Then each house was cleared room by room by the infantry. By nightfall the village was still not secure and fighting continued in the area the following day. When the battle was finally over the enemy toll was 91 – at a cost of just one Australian life and eight wounded.
The battle of Binh Ba posed the perennial problem of the war in Vietnam – how to separate the enemy from innocent civilians. The occupation of towns and villages by the Viet Cong was a deliberate tactic designed either to ambush the relieving troops or to cause the Australians to use an excess of force.
Now ChuckDyke initially said (my bold):  “Here is something for house fighting and the difficulty of maintaining command and control during MOUT operations.”  My response said:  “MOUT is certainly not the appropriate descriptor here.”
Taking my argument that the Australian Army lacks the capability to do offensive operations against a well-prepared enemy in anything larger than a village let’s go back to LWP-G 3-9-6, Operations in Urban Environments.  Its Combined Arms Scenarios section (Chapter 8 refers) shows a Company Team attack in the context of a Battlegroup.  The example imagery map for that scenario has the Battlegroup boundary covering three streets and 22 buildings.  Hold that thought …
The Australian Army is basically capable of deploying a division of three combat brigades.  This would be war of national survival stuff as its more recent deployments where the usual premise of ‘to deploy one, you need three’ comes into effect has been to deploy nothing bigger than a brigade.  Australian Army brigades sit in the three to four battalion range.  Being generous let’s say four battalions which gives you four battlegroups.  Keeping one in reserve, because it is good practice to have one then according to the example in the Australian Army’s official doctrine on urban operations, a brigade can conduct an offensive operation comprising nine streets with 66 buildings.  If we go for the war of national survival then, assuming one brigade is the divisional commander’s reserve, then that is 18 streets and 132 buildings.
Here is a map of Hue where some of the calculations above have been applied to illustrate the point:

The image below is the zoomed area that I have marked as a green rectangle in the overall city map.

So in simple terms, according to the Australian Army's own doctrine, a brigade can conduct an attack on a small corner of a city.
My point about the capabilities of the Australian Army is based on having served in it and knowing what it can and cannot do which I think the argument presented above demonstrates.  It is no more an insult than saying the Australian Army cannot deploy a parachute battalion.  Why?  It doesn’t have one.  Facing up to reality and knowing your strengths and weaknesses is an important discussion to have.  Nations/militaries that overestimate their own capabilities and don’t challenge them generally end up coming second in wars.  I recall that the British Army claimed (and bored everyone to death) that they were the masters of limited war/COIN because of Borneo, Malaya, Northern Ireland and the killer tactic of wearing berets/soft hats only to end up having to eat humble pie in Basra.  There are few people in British military circles and veterans who served there who disagree with the assertion that Basra was an utterly miserable performance on the part of the British Army.  One of my friends was killed there by the way so I have little interest in denigrating the sacrifice of those whose lives were changed there.
On then to impugning the courage and sacrifice of veterans … Recalling that ChuckDyke said that my comments would not be welcome in an RSL (Returned Services League – a veteran’s association) I pointed out that I have been a member of it for 10 years.  Later ChuckDyke changes his position on the RSL and decides that it is not such a good thing after all because of the way it treated Vietnam Veterans.  A claim I don’t dispute, it is well documented, and it was not the organization’s finest hour.  Anyway – I think we can agree that his position on the RSL is inconsistent.  Whatever the argument, my membership subs help Australian veterans and while serving in the Australian Army I collected in Brisbane and Sydney for Legacy ... a veteran’s charity.
For my part, I have been and continue to be a member of the RSL.  I am also a member of the Royal British Legion … you’ve guessed it … another veteran’s association.  This month I have given the equivalent of three full working days (in addition to my day job and my hobby ‘job’ for Battlefront) collecting for the Poppy Appeal plus assisting with the organization of, and attending, a cross laying ceremony at the town church as well of course as attending Remembrance Day itself and participated in the RBL committee meeting at which this most important appeal and other issues affecting veterans were discussed.
One of those issues was our disgust that the County level RBL have decided that organizing the ANZAC service at the Commonwealth War Graves Cemetery on Cannock Chase is ‘too difficult.’  My branch is now taking it on and I am one of the lead members in this initiative.  The majority of the Commonwealth dead there are New Zealanders.  A country whose army I have never served in but the people commemorated there are fellow ANZACs.  Most of them died of Spanish Flu which the more ungenerous might say wasn’t a war death.  However, the Commonwealth War Graves Commission rightly designates them as war deaths and, incidentally, many of them had fought some hard actions on the Western Front before being brought back to the UK.  Hardly the behaviour of someone with no respect for the fallen.
Nowhere in the phrase "this was a skirmish over a non-descript village which didn't even fill a grid square in Vietnam involving no more than 500 combatants on both sides and 100 casualties," do I denigrate veterans.  Non-descript village is a fact is the number of casualties and participants on both sides. 
Anyway, I think I’ve made my point.

So here are the draft orders ...
Situation
Amid a background of tensions on the Russian and Belarusian borders with the Baltic states, Russia announced its Zapad exercise, which traditionally takes place in September, early causing alarm to NATO governments.  This saw Russian forces move to border regions and the reinforcement of the Kaliningrad Oblast with airborne formations.  The exercises finished a week ago, but these forward deployments are unchanged leading NATO intelligence analysts to assess that Russia and its Belarusian ally planned to attack the Suwalki Gap.  In response NATO has started to move reinforcements into the area including the 1st Infantry Brigade Combat Team (1 IBCT)/82nd Airborne Division which started to arrive in Vilkaviskis, Lithuania last night.  A Troop 3rd Squadron/73rd Cavalry Regiment (A/3/73 Cav) was one of the first units to arrive and has been rushed west to deal with any Russian supporting eastward attack from the Kaliningrad Oblast.  It is now 1100hrs on June 01, 2017, and the Russians crossed the border 30 minutes ago.  It is warm, clear and there is a gentle west to east wind.
Mission
A/3/73 Cav guards in the vicinity of Maldenai until 1200hrs, 01 June in order to delay the enemy assault on Vilkaviskis.
Tasks:
Destroy enemy reconnaissance.
Disrupt the enemy first echelon battalion.
Deny enemy penetration in greater than platoon strength of the Battle Handover Line.
Maintain 60% combat effectiveness.
Withdraw no later than 1230hrs, 01 June.
Friendly Forces
A/3/73 Cav complete comprising 1st, 2nd and 3rd Platoons each with 2 x M1151 HUMMWV M2, 2 x M1151 HUMMWV Mk19, 2 x M1167 HUMMWV TOW and an LMTV truck.  Also organic to A Troop are 2 x M120 120mm mortars and 1 x RQ11B UAV.  Other support available comes mainly from 3rd Battalion/319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment (3/319 AFAR) comprising Battery A (6 x 105mm M119A3), Battery B (6 x 105mm M119A3) and Battery C (6 x 155mm M777A2).  An additional RQ11B UAV has been assigned to A Troop from 3/73 Cav.
Enemy Forces
Intelligence assesses that either 7th Guards Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment (7 GMRR) or 79th Guards Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (79 GMRB), both of 11th Army Corps normally based in the Kaliningrad Oblast will lead the attack.  The S2 assesses that 7 GMRR is the most likely of the two.  Both are equipped with T-72 tanks, 7 GMRR is BMP-2 equipped while 79 GMRB is MTLB equipped.  Whichever formation leads, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) indicates that the enemy unit will be a battalion-sized force tactically deployed to conduct a meeting engagement.  Its likely mission is to defeat the friendly covering force and secure a jump off point for subsequent echelons to assault Vilkaviskis 7km east of the Battle Handover Line.  There is no threat from enemy air assets.
Plan
It is your choice commander but be aware that you have been given a tough mission which will stretch the capabilities of your light and small force given that you will be facing a mechanized force that outnumbers you by approximately three to one and your force is not optimized for this kind of mission.
Your plan will need to make best use of ground and your key assets which are your long-range anti-tank and indirect fire weapons.
You must exit the eastern edge of the map (Battle Handover Line) before the mission ends.
Conceptually this is a simple mission that requires a trade-off between inflicting casualties on the enemy, slowing enemy progress across the map while minimizing your own casualties and picking the right time to withdraw and exit the map.  The enemy gets points for advancing across the map, exiting units from the eastern edge of the map and for inflicting blue casualties while minimizing red casualties.  You lack the combat power to destroy every single vehicle, so you need to track your kills and enemy progress in order to choose the right moment to withdraw.  Once you have withdrawn, you should ceasefire.
Notes
This mission was going to be part of a campaign depicting a ‘what if’ Russian attack on Lithuania which I never really progressed with.  The Russian and US units have been researched and the map is as good as the Combat Mission editor can reproduce of the area depicted.  I spent a lot of time in Street View in Google Earth while making it and I hope you appreciate the result.  If you want to check yourself, the middle of the lake on the map is at Grid 34U FF 2386 5620.  This mission has four Russian AI plans so if at first you don’t succeed, try, try again.
I hope you enjoy playing the mission.
Combatintman

So here are the draft orders ...
Situation
Amid a background of tensions on the Russian and Belarusian borders with the Baltic states, Russia announced its Zapad exercise, which traditionally takes place in September, early causing alarm to NATO governments.  This saw Russian forces move to border regions and the reinforcement of the Kaliningrad Oblast with airborne formations.  The exercises finished a week ago, but these forward deployments are unchanged leading NATO intelligence analysts to assess that Russia and its Belarusian ally planned to attack the Suwalki Gap.  In response NATO has started to move reinforcements into the area including the 1st Infantry Brigade Combat Team (1 IBCT)/82nd Airborne Division which started to arrive in Vilkaviskis, Lithuania last night.  A Troop 3rd Squadron/73rd Cavalry Regiment (A/3/73 Cav) was one of the first units to arrive and has been rushed west to deal with any Russian supporting eastward attack from the Kaliningrad Oblast.  It is now 1100hrs on June 01, 2017, and the Russians crossed the border 30 minutes ago.  It is warm, clear and there is a gentle west to east wind.
Mission
A/3/73 Cav guards in the vicinity of Maldenai until 1200hrs, 01 June in order to delay the enemy assault on Vilkaviskis.
Tasks:
Destroy enemy reconnaissance.
Disrupt the enemy first echelon battalion.
Deny enemy penetration in greater than platoon strength of the Battle Handover Line.
Maintain 60% combat effectiveness.
Withdraw no later than 1230hrs, 01 June.
Friendly Forces
A/3/73 Cav complete comprising 1st, 2nd and 3rd Platoons each with 2 x M1151 HUMMWV M2, 2 x M1151 HUMMWV Mk19, 2 x M1167 HUMMWV TOW and an LMTV truck.  Also organic to A Troop are 2 x M120 120mm mortars and 1 x RQ11B UAV.  Other support available comes mainly from 3rd Battalion/319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment (3/319 AFAR) comprising Battery A (6 x 105mm M119A3), Battery B (6 x 105mm M119A3) and Battery C (6 x 155mm M777A2).  An additional RQ11B UAV has been assigned to A Troop from 3/73 Cav.
Enemy Forces
Intelligence assesses that either 7th Guards Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment (7 GMRR) or 79th Guards Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (79 GMRB), both of 11th Army Corps normally based in the Kaliningrad Oblast will lead the attack.  The S2 assesses that 7 GMRR is the most likely of the two.  Both are equipped with T-72 tanks, 7 GMRR is BMP-2 equipped while 79 GMRB is MTLB equipped.  Whichever formation leads, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) indicates that the enemy unit will be a battalion-sized force tactically deployed to conduct a meeting engagement.  Its likely mission is to defeat the friendly covering force and secure a jump off point for subsequent echelons to assault Vilkaviskis 7km east of the Battle Handover Line.  There is no threat from enemy air assets.
Plan
It is your choice commander but be aware that you have been given a tough mission which will stretch the capabilities of your light and small force given that you will be facing a mechanized force that outnumbers you by approximately three to one and your force is not optimized for this kind of mission.
Your plan will need to make best use of ground and your key assets which are your long-range anti-tank and indirect fire weapons.
You must exit the eastern edge of the map (Battle Handover Line) before the mission ends.
Conceptually this is a simple mission that requires a trade-off between inflicting casualties on the enemy, slowing enemy progress across the map while minimizing your own casualties and picking the right time to withdraw and exit the map.  The enemy gets points for advancing across the map, exiting units from the eastern edge of the map and for inflicting blue casualties while minimizing red casualties.  You lack the combat power to destroy every single vehicle, so you need to track your kills and enemy progress in order to choose the right moment to withdraw.  Once you have withdrawn, you should ceasefire.
Notes
This mission was going to be part of a campaign depicting a ‘what if’ Russian attack on Lithuania which I never really progressed with.  The Russian and US units have been researched and the map is as good as the Combat Mission editor can reproduce of the area depicted.  I spent a lot of time in Street View in Google Earth while making it and I hope you appreciate the result.  If you want to check yourself, the middle of the lake on the map is at Grid 34U FF 2386 5620.  This mission has four Russian AI plans so if at first you don’t succeed, try, try again.
I hope you enjoy playing the mission.
Combatintman

So here are the draft orders ...
Situation
Amid a background of tensions on the Russian and Belarusian borders with the Baltic states, Russia announced its Zapad exercise, which traditionally takes place in September, early causing alarm to NATO governments.  This saw Russian forces move to border regions and the reinforcement of the Kaliningrad Oblast with airborne formations.  The exercises finished a week ago, but these forward deployments are unchanged leading NATO intelligence analysts to assess that Russia and its Belarusian ally planned to attack the Suwalki Gap.  In response NATO has started to move reinforcements into the area including the 1st Infantry Brigade Combat Team (1 IBCT)/82nd Airborne Division which started to arrive in Vilkaviskis, Lithuania last night.  A Troop 3rd Squadron/73rd Cavalry Regiment (A/3/73 Cav) was one of the first units to arrive and has been rushed west to deal with any Russian supporting eastward attack from the Kaliningrad Oblast.  It is now 1100hrs on June 01, 2017, and the Russians crossed the border 30 minutes ago.  It is warm, clear and there is a gentle west to east wind.
Mission
A/3/73 Cav guards in the vicinity of Maldenai until 1200hrs, 01 June in order to delay the enemy assault on Vilkaviskis.
Tasks:
Destroy enemy reconnaissance.
Disrupt the enemy first echelon battalion.
Deny enemy penetration in greater than platoon strength of the Battle Handover Line.
Maintain 60% combat effectiveness.
Withdraw no later than 1230hrs, 01 June.
Friendly Forces
A/3/73 Cav complete comprising 1st, 2nd and 3rd Platoons each with 2 x M1151 HUMMWV M2, 2 x M1151 HUMMWV Mk19, 2 x M1167 HUMMWV TOW and an LMTV truck.  Also organic to A Troop are 2 x M120 120mm mortars and 1 x RQ11B UAV.  Other support available comes mainly from 3rd Battalion/319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment (3/319 AFAR) comprising Battery A (6 x 105mm M119A3), Battery B (6 x 105mm M119A3) and Battery C (6 x 155mm M777A2).  An additional RQ11B UAV has been assigned to A Troop from 3/73 Cav.
Enemy Forces
Intelligence assesses that either 7th Guards Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment (7 GMRR) or 79th Guards Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (79 GMRB), both of 11th Army Corps normally based in the Kaliningrad Oblast will lead the attack.  The S2 assesses that 7 GMRR is the most likely of the two.  Both are equipped with T-72 tanks, 7 GMRR is BMP-2 equipped while 79 GMRB is MTLB equipped.  Whichever formation leads, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) indicates that the enemy unit will be a battalion-sized force tactically deployed to conduct a meeting engagement.  Its likely mission is to defeat the friendly covering force and secure a jump off point for subsequent echelons to assault Vilkaviskis 7km east of the Battle Handover Line.  There is no threat from enemy air assets.
Plan
It is your choice commander but be aware that you have been given a tough mission which will stretch the capabilities of your light and small force given that you will be facing a mechanized force that outnumbers you by approximately three to one and your force is not optimized for this kind of mission.
Your plan will need to make best use of ground and your key assets which are your long-range anti-tank and indirect fire weapons.
You must exit the eastern edge of the map (Battle Handover Line) before the mission ends.
Conceptually this is a simple mission that requires a trade-off between inflicting casualties on the enemy, slowing enemy progress across the map while minimizing your own casualties and picking the right time to withdraw and exit the map.  The enemy gets points for advancing across the map, exiting units from the eastern edge of the map and for inflicting blue casualties while minimizing red casualties.  You lack the combat power to destroy every single vehicle, so you need to track your kills and enemy progress in order to choose the right moment to withdraw.  Once you have withdrawn, you should ceasefire.
Notes
This mission was going to be part of a campaign depicting a ‘what if’ Russian attack on Lithuania which I never really progressed with.  The Russian and US units have been researched and the map is as good as the Combat Mission editor can reproduce of the area depicted.  I spent a lot of time in Street View in Google Earth while making it and I hope you appreciate the result.  If you want to check yourself, the middle of the lake on the map is at Grid 34U FF 2386 5620.  This mission has four Russian AI plans so if at first you don’t succeed, try, try again.
I hope you enjoy playing the mission.
Combatintman

So here are the draft orders ...
Situation
Amid a background of tensions on the Russian and Belarusian borders with the Baltic states, Russia announced its Zapad exercise, which traditionally takes place in September, early causing alarm to NATO governments.  This saw Russian forces move to border regions and the reinforcement of the Kaliningrad Oblast with airborne formations.  The exercises finished a week ago, but these forward deployments are unchanged leading NATO intelligence analysts to assess that Russia and its Belarusian ally planned to attack the Suwalki Gap.  In response NATO has started to move reinforcements into the area including the 1st Infantry Brigade Combat Team (1 IBCT)/82nd Airborne Division which started to arrive in Vilkaviskis, Lithuania last night.  A Troop 3rd Squadron/73rd Cavalry Regiment (A/3/73 Cav) was one of the first units to arrive and has been rushed west to deal with any Russian supporting eastward attack from the Kaliningrad Oblast.  It is now 1100hrs on June 01, 2017, and the Russians crossed the border 30 minutes ago.  It is warm, clear and there is a gentle west to east wind.
Mission
A/3/73 Cav guards in the vicinity of Maldenai until 1200hrs, 01 June in order to delay the enemy assault on Vilkaviskis.
Tasks:
Destroy enemy reconnaissance.
Disrupt the enemy first echelon battalion.
Deny enemy penetration in greater than platoon strength of the Battle Handover Line.
Maintain 60% combat effectiveness.
Withdraw no later than 1230hrs, 01 June.
Friendly Forces
A/3/73 Cav complete comprising 1st, 2nd and 3rd Platoons each with 2 x M1151 HUMMWV M2, 2 x M1151 HUMMWV Mk19, 2 x M1167 HUMMWV TOW and an LMTV truck.  Also organic to A Troop are 2 x M120 120mm mortars and 1 x RQ11B UAV.  Other support available comes mainly from 3rd Battalion/319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment (3/319 AFAR) comprising Battery A (6 x 105mm M119A3), Battery B (6 x 105mm M119A3) and Battery C (6 x 155mm M777A2).  An additional RQ11B UAV has been assigned to A Troop from 3/73 Cav.
Enemy Forces
Intelligence assesses that either 7th Guards Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment (7 GMRR) or 79th Guards Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (79 GMRB), both of 11th Army Corps normally based in the Kaliningrad Oblast will lead the attack.  The S2 assesses that 7 GMRR is the most likely of the two.  Both are equipped with T-72 tanks, 7 GMRR is BMP-2 equipped while 79 GMRB is MTLB equipped.  Whichever formation leads, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) indicates that the enemy unit will be a battalion-sized force tactically deployed to conduct a meeting engagement.  Its likely mission is to defeat the friendly covering force and secure a jump off point for subsequent echelons to assault Vilkaviskis 7km east of the Battle Handover Line.  There is no threat from enemy air assets.
Plan
It is your choice commander but be aware that you have been given a tough mission which will stretch the capabilities of your light and small force given that you will be facing a mechanized force that outnumbers you by approximately three to one and your force is not optimized for this kind of mission.
Your plan will need to make best use of ground and your key assets which are your long-range anti-tank and indirect fire weapons.
You must exit the eastern edge of the map (Battle Handover Line) before the mission ends.
Conceptually this is a simple mission that requires a trade-off between inflicting casualties on the enemy, slowing enemy progress across the map while minimizing your own casualties and picking the right time to withdraw and exit the map.  The enemy gets points for advancing across the map, exiting units from the eastern edge of the map and for inflicting blue casualties while minimizing red casualties.  You lack the combat power to destroy every single vehicle, so you need to track your kills and enemy progress in order to choose the right moment to withdraw.  Once you have withdrawn, you should ceasefire.
Notes
This mission was going to be part of a campaign depicting a ‘what if’ Russian attack on Lithuania which I never really progressed with.  The Russian and US units have been researched and the map is as good as the Combat Mission editor can reproduce of the area depicted.  I spent a lot of time in Street View in Google Earth while making it and I hope you appreciate the result.  If you want to check yourself, the middle of the lake on the map is at Grid 34U FF 2386 5620.  This mission has four Russian AI plans so if at first you don’t succeed, try, try again.
I hope you enjoy playing the mission.
Combatintman

This has been sat on my hard drive in an 'almost finished' state for a couple of years now.  Prompted by this thread:
I decided to finish it off.
Some tasters ...
Scenario Image:

Strategic Map:

Operational Map:

Tactical Map:

Overhead Comparison CM and Google Earth

Eye Level Comparison CM and Google Earth:

The basic premise is that Russia attacks the Suwalki Gap after a period of tension on the Russian and Belarusian borders with NATO (sound familiar anyone ...).  This mission is set in Lithuania's western border with the Kaliningrad Oblast where a US force has hurriedly deployed in response to a threat of a thrust east out of Kaliningrad in support of the Suwalki Gap attack.
The map is 3,328m x 1,920m ...
Watch this space ...

And the mic drops...
So what we have here from my point of view is free professional military advice offered to people who don't want to hear it, largely because it makes them uncomfortable.  This discomfort comes largely from wanting to believe myths as opposed to reality.  
The reality is that no 5EYEs nation is built for sustained heavy urban operations.  Even the US would be stressed in a serious fight to control a city of any metropolitan size.  This is not an insult to any nation, or its war dead, it is a fiscal reality.  https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/USA/united-states/military-spending-defense-budget
[Edit, had to slip this one in as it really puts in perspective ]
Defence spending as a % of GDP crashed after the Cold War, with a blip for GWOT and all these little side hustles over the last 20 years, but all western nations have largely scaled down dramatically since the late 80s.
My own military, Canada, cannot even come close to fighting heavy at a Battlegroup level, let alone sustain it in an urban fight against anything remotely near peer.  Why, well funding is a big one and the fact that we have largely spent the last 30 years "peacekeeping" or "hunting humans" (putting those two terms in a single sentence shows just how weird things have gotten).  And you know what...that is fine.  I am sure a lot of important social programs got a boost and taxes fell, whatever. 
The moral of the story is that you fight with the military you bought, not the one that you remember one day a year.
Now let's back to the gaming world where everything is better...