Combatintman

The number of BMP-1s is interesting but what most interested me was the BMP-1KSh ... that's an HQ of some description gone ...

 

The number of BMP-1s is interesting but what most interested me was the BMP-1KSh ... that's an HQ of some description gone ...

 

French analyst has the same read on our old friend Dovhenke as you did a month ago, @Combatintman.  Perhaps he reads here lol.
The stubborn 'cork in the bottle' for the Izyum-Sloviansk highway.
 
 
 

What's wrong with the war we've already got ... in terms of scenarios, campaigns and stuff - this is being reported in enough detail for any budding scenario maker to make a whole bunch of stuff or contemplate what-ifs and alternate scenarios with CMBS.  If Battlefront makes Korea or whatever - you're only going to see it through a less detailed prism than what you're getting now - all those iterations of Barkmann's corner or Wittman knocking over 7 Armd Bde in WW2 are all interpretations by a scenario designer of information with far less granularity than what's available now.  If you're truly interested in warfare, wargaming and/or simulating warfare then hoover up what you're seeing now, buy CMBS and hook into it.  It has been interesting to note from recent events that maybe 'T-72 spotting is nerfed' and 'Troops running from hard cover is unrealistic' have been proved to be fallacies due to the coverage that is emerging from the tragic events in Ukraine.
 

Very nice maps here showing the unit positions in the noted fronts, as well as the various crossroads and bridges.
 

@Rinaldi - good AAR both entertaining and instructive ... plus pictures - doesn't get any better than that.

Recently revisited "Recipe for Disaster", this time from the Syrian side. Wanted to test a hunch I had way back in 2019 when I was playing as the UK defenders. Decided to make a compare-and-contrast AAR of it too. I really like the scenario, it is a tidy little package that knows what it wants to do, and can be played in one sitting even if you're taking your time. 
Some of my favourite screens from both sides of the wire (see what I did there?):






If you'd like to read me pounding the podium on the scenario (and why the Javelin deserves your respect, but not your total paralysis): Both sides of the Wire (rinaldiaars.blogspot.com)
 
 

This would be better ... with the inscription on the 'munition' on the outboard pylon image foreground - 'work out how to use it.'

 

This would be better ... with the inscription on the 'munition' on the outboard pylon image foreground - 'work out how to use it.'

 

3 bloody weeks later and the Russians finally seem to hold Dovhenke, which @Combatintman flagged back on 23 April as a tough nut to crack on the road to Sloviansk.
... I am a little skeptical though that the Russians are going to be doing any broken-field running at this point though, still less pocketing anything.
...DefMon seems to think that's a southern limit for the Izyum bridgehead.
 

Personally I think this is an overly platform-focused viewpoint.
How many 203s are out there - or more importantly where they need to be to have the desired effect? Are the ISR assets able to find the targets that need to be engaged to achieve the desired effect? What is the shooter to sensor link like? What effect do you want your gunnery to have? How is that effect coordinated with manoeuvre and other elements? etc ...

It is an interesting discussion piece for sure.
I recall my Introduction to Maritime Warfare Course at HMS Dryad in 2002ish where the training audience (predictably) was mostly naval types and the exercise scenario involved resolving some unpleasantness in Libya.  Off the top of my head there were three Task Groups (TGs) - the amphib force, the carrier group (UK version so Invincible class rather than a proper one) and a logistics TG.  The discussion over the verbiage of the set of orders to be issued to the logisticians took something like 30 minutes to resolve.  In essence the intent was for both of the fighty TGs (amphib and carrier) to be resupplied to allow them maximum 'poise' (an in vogue phrase then) off the coast of Libya to execute the shaping and amphib operation outside the most likely enemy engagement envelopes.  My suggestion that rather than discuss it at length to come up with some arcane phraseology and to avoid any chance of misinterpretation by the TGs it would be easier to make 'conduct a RAS (replenishment at sea)' a specified task in a designated ops box was dismissively responded by the statement that I was limiting the freedom of action of the TGs.  Such are the joys of open discussion from a group of cleverish (not me obviously) people brought up in a system that encourages debate which certainly can be the enemy of tempo during a planning process.
It was a thoroughly amusing course after that as I decided that I should act as the scribe during planning from that moment on ... until we did course of action (COA) selection where I had a robust discussion with a naval OF4 that by the group's own deductions and scoring, the COA he decided on was not the most favourable.  An argument I didn't win inevitably in that forum but clearly I did if the scoring was robust (which it was) - anyway - I digress.
The point; therefore, is that there is certainly merit in a more command directed and automated approach to planning in order to increase tempo but, it relies on a commander that knows what they're doing, good situational awareness and competent subordinates to execute the orders.  From what we're seeing all three are absent.  Additionally, the glacial pace of Russian advances shows that the approach taken is not working if the intent is tempo.  My sense is that it is not happening at all - pretty much every tactical operation that we've been analysing and picking apart since about day two of this 'special military operation' has uncovered issues in both planning and execution.  If the goal is to compress/beat an eight hour planning cycle and arrive at a six-hour cycle - why are we seeing so many bite and hold advances with three to four day gaps between the next iteration of bite and hold?  At that rate, perhaps sitting down and taking more time, because it clearly is available, to plan in detail might pay a dividend or two.

It is an interesting discussion piece for sure.
I recall my Introduction to Maritime Warfare Course at HMS Dryad in 2002ish where the training audience (predictably) was mostly naval types and the exercise scenario involved resolving some unpleasantness in Libya.  Off the top of my head there were three Task Groups (TGs) - the amphib force, the carrier group (UK version so Invincible class rather than a proper one) and a logistics TG.  The discussion over the verbiage of the set of orders to be issued to the logisticians took something like 30 minutes to resolve.  In essence the intent was for both of the fighty TGs (amphib and carrier) to be resupplied to allow them maximum 'poise' (an in vogue phrase then) off the coast of Libya to execute the shaping and amphib operation outside the most likely enemy engagement envelopes.  My suggestion that rather than discuss it at length to come up with some arcane phraseology and to avoid any chance of misinterpretation by the TGs it would be easier to make 'conduct a RAS (replenishment at sea)' a specified task in a designated ops box was dismissively responded by the statement that I was limiting the freedom of action of the TGs.  Such are the joys of open discussion from a group of cleverish (not me obviously) people brought up in a system that encourages debate which certainly can be the enemy of tempo during a planning process.
It was a thoroughly amusing course after that as I decided that I should act as the scribe during planning from that moment on ... until we did course of action (COA) selection where I had a robust discussion with a naval OF4 that by the group's own deductions and scoring, the COA he decided on was not the most favourable.  An argument I didn't win inevitably in that forum but clearly I did if the scoring was robust (which it was) - anyway - I digress.
The point; therefore, is that there is certainly merit in a more command directed and automated approach to planning in order to increase tempo but, it relies on a commander that knows what they're doing, good situational awareness and competent subordinates to execute the orders.  From what we're seeing all three are absent.  Additionally, the glacial pace of Russian advances shows that the approach taken is not working if the intent is tempo.  My sense is that it is not happening at all - pretty much every tactical operation that we've been analysing and picking apart since about day two of this 'special military operation' has uncovered issues in both planning and execution.  If the goal is to compress/beat an eight hour planning cycle and arrive at a six-hour cycle - why are we seeing so many bite and hold advances with three to four day gaps between the next iteration of bite and hold?  At that rate, perhaps sitting down and taking more time, because it clearly is available, to plan in detail might pay a dividend or two.

Ah yes that old chestnut which the Americans in particular were, quite rightly, thoroughly bored to death of.  For some reason the British Army decided it was the master of counter-insurgency in the early 2000s because of the master tactic of wearing berets/soft hats in Northern Ireland.  Funny old thing was that in my two tours there (1989-1990 and 1992-1995), every time I left a patrol base I was required to wear a helmet.
There is a lot more to it clearly, the security force footprint in Northern Ireland was massive compared to the deployments in Basra and Helmand.  Off the top of my head there were at least eight regular battalions, about six or seven Ulster Defence Regiment Battalions, and god knows how many RUC of various hues at any one time.  Then of course the opposition was smaller than anything faced in either Basra or Helmand, was less liberally armed and not prone to employing suicide bombers.
Add to that the environment in Northern Ireland was familiar and well-known with handy things like accurate census records, vehicle licensing offices, property/land ownership records, telephone books and no massive linguistic, religious or cultural differences on the scale of those seen in Basra and Helmand.
Then there is the border - while there was certainly quite rightly a lot of sympathy in the Republic of Ireland for the nationalist cause, the Gards (Gardai - RoI Police Force) and Irish Defence Force were helpful in their dealings with us and the Republic of Ireland was a benign neighbour compared to Pakistan or Iran in the Afghan and Basra contexts.  The border was; therefore, relatively secure, particularly when compared to Afghanistan and Iraq.
I remember running pre-deployment training for both theatres and the number of people who looked at me blankly when I talked about 'Charlie 1s' (a form that was filled out by patrols in NI every time a vehicle stop was made with details such as make colour model VRN driver details, location of the stop etc).
Masters of COIN indeed - although coming second in Basra and Helmand was personally disappointing for me, I hope that the particular COIN competence trope has been thoroughly killed off in grown up circles in the British military and that lessons have been learned.

Not necessarily regarding indirect fire assets - it all depends on the mission and task.  Granted FIND is one of the core functions in combat and anything that that you can do to degrade the enemy's ability to execute that function always helps but indirect fire/gunnery/boom boom boom/whoosh-bang is not necessarily the be all and end all.  I recall an exercise where I was the enemy commander and was able to slam a company-sized flanking attack unnoticed into the forward left battalion of a brigade because:
There weren't enough ISR assets to provide redundancy on the cover all of the identified avenues of approach from the flank. The gunners controlling the UAVs were jerking around trying to locate a 120mm mortar battery that I kept displacing every time it fired. Granted that this was a simulation and I knew where all the moving parts were but I wanted to, and did, make the point that ISR needs to be focused and the people that are controlling key assets like UAVs need to be supporting the ISR plan ... which they weren't.  BTW I did not take advantage of my god's eye view to use an avenue of approach that had not been identified during IPB or deliberately dodge the assets that should have been covering the NAI's in the Decision Support Matrix.

Exactly - the point I wanted to highlight, given my particular trade, is the use of IPB.  It is an effective tool, particularly when you can draw on the expertise of SMEs - in this case a combat engineer who knows the detail on the river and bank conditions.  From there, as an analyst, once you narrow down the likely crossing sites you can start refining your NAIs and TAIs.  He also discusses the likely enemy assets needed to cross that gap and that allows you to work out the echelon you're facing and where that equipment might come from and how it will get to where it needs to be.  This allows you to add more NAIs to locate them and TAIs to strike them.  By knowing the equipment that is likely to be used you can then give clearer direction to your ISR assets - in this instance look for boats.  If deemed a High Payoff Target (HPT) then you are looking to strike that/those asset(s).  There was also some good detail about timings as well as time estimates.
A lot of people outside the intelligence trade seem to think that good tactical intelligence is enabled by super secret technical whizzbangery.  In fact it isn't - it is essentially a speed-time-distance problem that you are solving based on a knowledge of the enemy's orbat/likely orbat and the area of operations.  This is almost a classic case study of how to do this and how, if done competently (as in this case), tactical intelligence provides the decision support to get inside the enemy's OODA loop and to defeat him.

He just confirmed it.

Personally I think this is an overly platform-focused viewpoint.
How many 203s are out there - or more importantly where they need to be to have the desired effect? Are the ISR assets able to find the targets that need to be engaged to achieve the desired effect? What is the shooter to sensor link like? What effect do you want your gunnery to have? How is that effect coordinated with manoeuvre and other elements? etc ...

Not necessarily regarding indirect fire assets - it all depends on the mission and task.  Granted FIND is one of the core functions in combat and anything that that you can do to degrade the enemy's ability to execute that function always helps but indirect fire/gunnery/boom boom boom/whoosh-bang is not necessarily the be all and end all.  I recall an exercise where I was the enemy commander and was able to slam a company-sized flanking attack unnoticed into the forward left battalion of a brigade because:
There weren't enough ISR assets to provide redundancy on the cover all of the identified avenues of approach from the flank. The gunners controlling the UAVs were jerking around trying to locate a 120mm mortar battery that I kept displacing every time it fired. Granted that this was a simulation and I knew where all the moving parts were but I wanted to, and did, make the point that ISR needs to be focused and the people that are controlling key assets like UAVs need to be supporting the ISR plan ... which they weren't.  BTW I did not take advantage of my god's eye view to use an avenue of approach that had not been identified during IPB or deliberately dodge the assets that should have been covering the NAI's in the Decision Support Matrix.

Ah yes that old chestnut which the Americans in particular were, quite rightly, thoroughly bored to death of.  For some reason the British Army decided it was the master of counter-insurgency in the early 2000s because of the master tactic of wearing berets/soft hats in Northern Ireland.  Funny old thing was that in my two tours there (1989-1990 and 1992-1995), every time I left a patrol base I was required to wear a helmet.
There is a lot more to it clearly, the security force footprint in Northern Ireland was massive compared to the deployments in Basra and Helmand.  Off the top of my head there were at least eight regular battalions, about six or seven Ulster Defence Regiment Battalions, and god knows how many RUC of various hues at any one time.  Then of course the opposition was smaller than anything faced in either Basra or Helmand, was less liberally armed and not prone to employing suicide bombers.
Add to that the environment in Northern Ireland was familiar and well-known with handy things like accurate census records, vehicle licensing offices, property/land ownership records, telephone books and no massive linguistic, religious or cultural differences on the scale of those seen in Basra and Helmand.
Then there is the border - while there was certainly quite rightly a lot of sympathy in the Republic of Ireland for the nationalist cause, the Gards (Gardai - RoI Police Force) and Irish Defence Force were helpful in their dealings with us and the Republic of Ireland was a benign neighbour compared to Pakistan or Iran in the Afghan and Basra contexts.  The border was; therefore, relatively secure, particularly when compared to Afghanistan and Iraq.
I remember running pre-deployment training for both theatres and the number of people who looked at me blankly when I talked about 'Charlie 1s' (a form that was filled out by patrols in NI every time a vehicle stop was made with details such as make colour model VRN driver details, location of the stop etc).
Masters of COIN indeed - although coming second in Basra and Helmand was personally disappointing for me, I hope that the particular COIN competence trope has been thoroughly killed off in grown up circles in the British military and that lessons have been learned.

Ah yes that old chestnut which the Americans in particular were, quite rightly, thoroughly bored to death of.  For some reason the British Army decided it was the master of counter-insurgency in the early 2000s because of the master tactic of wearing berets/soft hats in Northern Ireland.  Funny old thing was that in my two tours there (1989-1990 and 1992-1995), every time I left a patrol base I was required to wear a helmet.
There is a lot more to it clearly, the security force footprint in Northern Ireland was massive compared to the deployments in Basra and Helmand.  Off the top of my head there were at least eight regular battalions, about six or seven Ulster Defence Regiment Battalions, and god knows how many RUC of various hues at any one time.  Then of course the opposition was smaller than anything faced in either Basra or Helmand, was less liberally armed and not prone to employing suicide bombers.
Add to that the environment in Northern Ireland was familiar and well-known with handy things like accurate census records, vehicle licensing offices, property/land ownership records, telephone books and no massive linguistic, religious or cultural differences on the scale of those seen in Basra and Helmand.
Then there is the border - while there was certainly quite rightly a lot of sympathy in the Republic of Ireland for the nationalist cause, the Gards (Gardai - RoI Police Force) and Irish Defence Force were helpful in their dealings with us and the Republic of Ireland was a benign neighbour compared to Pakistan or Iran in the Afghan and Basra contexts.  The border was; therefore, relatively secure, particularly when compared to Afghanistan and Iraq.
I remember running pre-deployment training for both theatres and the number of people who looked at me blankly when I talked about 'Charlie 1s' (a form that was filled out by patrols in NI every time a vehicle stop was made with details such as make colour model VRN driver details, location of the stop etc).
Masters of COIN indeed - although coming second in Basra and Helmand was personally disappointing for me, I hope that the particular COIN competence trope has been thoroughly killed off in grown up circles in the British military and that lessons have been learned.

Ah yes that old chestnut which the Americans in particular were, quite rightly, thoroughly bored to death of.  For some reason the British Army decided it was the master of counter-insurgency in the early 2000s because of the master tactic of wearing berets/soft hats in Northern Ireland.  Funny old thing was that in my two tours there (1989-1990 and 1992-1995), every time I left a patrol base I was required to wear a helmet.
There is a lot more to it clearly, the security force footprint in Northern Ireland was massive compared to the deployments in Basra and Helmand.  Off the top of my head there were at least eight regular battalions, about six or seven Ulster Defence Regiment Battalions, and god knows how many RUC of various hues at any one time.  Then of course the opposition was smaller than anything faced in either Basra or Helmand, was less liberally armed and not prone to employing suicide bombers.
Add to that the environment in Northern Ireland was familiar and well-known with handy things like accurate census records, vehicle licensing offices, property/land ownership records, telephone books and no massive linguistic, religious or cultural differences on the scale of those seen in Basra and Helmand.
Then there is the border - while there was certainly quite rightly a lot of sympathy in the Republic of Ireland for the nationalist cause, the Gards (Gardai - RoI Police Force) and Irish Defence Force were helpful in their dealings with us and the Republic of Ireland was a benign neighbour compared to Pakistan or Iran in the Afghan and Basra contexts.  The border was; therefore, relatively secure, particularly when compared to Afghanistan and Iraq.
I remember running pre-deployment training for both theatres and the number of people who looked at me blankly when I talked about 'Charlie 1s' (a form that was filled out by patrols in NI every time a vehicle stop was made with details such as make colour model VRN driver details, location of the stop etc).
Masters of COIN indeed - although coming second in Basra and Helmand was personally disappointing for me, I hope that the particular COIN competence trope has been thoroughly killed off in grown up circles in the British military and that lessons have been learned.

Ah yes that old chestnut which the Americans in particular were, quite rightly, thoroughly bored to death of.  For some reason the British Army decided it was the master of counter-insurgency in the early 2000s because of the master tactic of wearing berets/soft hats in Northern Ireland.  Funny old thing was that in my two tours there (1989-1990 and 1992-1995), every time I left a patrol base I was required to wear a helmet.
There is a lot more to it clearly, the security force footprint in Northern Ireland was massive compared to the deployments in Basra and Helmand.  Off the top of my head there were at least eight regular battalions, about six or seven Ulster Defence Regiment Battalions, and god knows how many RUC of various hues at any one time.  Then of course the opposition was smaller than anything faced in either Basra or Helmand, was less liberally armed and not prone to employing suicide bombers.
Add to that the environment in Northern Ireland was familiar and well-known with handy things like accurate census records, vehicle licensing offices, property/land ownership records, telephone books and no massive linguistic, religious or cultural differences on the scale of those seen in Basra and Helmand.
Then there is the border - while there was certainly quite rightly a lot of sympathy in the Republic of Ireland for the nationalist cause, the Gards (Gardai - RoI Police Force) and Irish Defence Force were helpful in their dealings with us and the Republic of Ireland was a benign neighbour compared to Pakistan or Iran in the Afghan and Basra contexts.  The border was; therefore, relatively secure, particularly when compared to Afghanistan and Iraq.
I remember running pre-deployment training for both theatres and the number of people who looked at me blankly when I talked about 'Charlie 1s' (a form that was filled out by patrols in NI every time a vehicle stop was made with details such as make colour model VRN driver details, location of the stop etc).
Masters of COIN indeed - although coming second in Basra and Helmand was personally disappointing for me, I hope that the particular COIN competence trope has been thoroughly killed off in grown up circles in the British military and that lessons have been learned.

Ah yes that old chestnut which the Americans in particular were, quite rightly, thoroughly bored to death of.  For some reason the British Army decided it was the master of counter-insurgency in the early 2000s because of the master tactic of wearing berets/soft hats in Northern Ireland.  Funny old thing was that in my two tours there (1989-1990 and 1992-1995), every time I left a patrol base I was required to wear a helmet.
There is a lot more to it clearly, the security force footprint in Northern Ireland was massive compared to the deployments in Basra and Helmand.  Off the top of my head there were at least eight regular battalions, about six or seven Ulster Defence Regiment Battalions, and god knows how many RUC of various hues at any one time.  Then of course the opposition was smaller than anything faced in either Basra or Helmand, was less liberally armed and not prone to employing suicide bombers.
Add to that the environment in Northern Ireland was familiar and well-known with handy things like accurate census records, vehicle licensing offices, property/land ownership records, telephone books and no massive linguistic, religious or cultural differences on the scale of those seen in Basra and Helmand.
Then there is the border - while there was certainly quite rightly a lot of sympathy in the Republic of Ireland for the nationalist cause, the Gards (Gardai - RoI Police Force) and Irish Defence Force were helpful in their dealings with us and the Republic of Ireland was a benign neighbour compared to Pakistan or Iran in the Afghan and Basra contexts.  The border was; therefore, relatively secure, particularly when compared to Afghanistan and Iraq.
I remember running pre-deployment training for both theatres and the number of people who looked at me blankly when I talked about 'Charlie 1s' (a form that was filled out by patrols in NI every time a vehicle stop was made with details such as make colour model VRN driver details, location of the stop etc).
Masters of COIN indeed - although coming second in Basra and Helmand was personally disappointing for me, I hope that the particular COIN competence trope has been thoroughly killed off in grown up circles in the British military and that lessons have been learned.

Way ahead of you ...

Had to reorient the map to get the roads to sit better.