SeinfeldRules

I am always skeptical of people claiming certain equipment or contributions will be war changing, I've heard that since February 24th and yet to see any of it pan out. There's also a lot of best-case-scenario type situations being bandied about with MLRS, and it may be strictly factual but often doesn't take into account reality. I think HIMARS or the M270 will be a good asset for Ukraine and give them a useful capability, but I doubt it will be war changing and there is still a lot that is contingent on what they actually will receive, and how much. 

Some points I found relevant:
It seemed the commander was doing his own observing and calls for fire. This is contrary to a lot of Western Doctrine, where artillery units are a delivery service to support a maneuver unit’s request for fire. Here there doesn’t seem to be any “land owner” that’s dictating fire. 
They talk about their observation platforms, and that they can only use it when wind and Russian EW allow it. Wind and it’s ability to limit UAV operation is often overlooked. They also said it started to become unstable the higher they got in altitude, and was harder to observe fire. 
There didn’t seem to be a sense of danger or urgency when it came to moving or shooting the howitzers - must be a relatively quiet part of the front with limited counter battery. 

One of the crew chiefs talks about firing 150 rounds in a day and I got the impression that was a busy day for him. Can give an idea of the volume of fires executed by specific units. 

I mean the T-62 was considered terrible when they were expected to fight large scale, high tempo tank battles against NATO forces. In Ukraine, I don’t think any tank out there could be considered survivable against modern ATGMs and we aren’t exactly seeing tank on tank gunfights. If you’re going to throw a tank into an village to support infantry, it might as well be something you can afford to lose. The Stuart light tank wasn’t exactly survivable compared to even a Sherman but they still had their place. Something like an IFV would be preferred but if you’ve got a ton of T-62s you might as well use (lose) them. 

Wouldn’t be surprised if we only give them the shorter range, non-precision guided rockets that are around the 32-45km range. The longer range guided GMLRS was used heavily in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it’s contribution would signify a much greater risk to the US Army’s ability to project power. The HIMARS system was used at a level that basically makes it a strategic asset and I doubt we could supply a meaningful amount of the precision rockets without cutting into our own reserves. The unguided rockets have already been phased out of use however, and probably could be contributed with minimal impact from whatever war stock we had left. 
 
We’ll see how many of the systems we can even contribute however, my understanding is that a portion of the M777s came from the stockpile of Marine artillery units that were recently deactivated, and I don’t think we have dozens of these systems laying around. But I could be wrong. 

Well as I said the M270 is a tracked vehicle and those always come with a significant logistical cost in fuel, spare parts and support vehicles. HIMARS is air transportable a glorified truck chassis, so easier to operate and supply.
I don't believe I've heard of any Army units that had their M777s taken away for shipment to Ukraine. I believe it was all pre-positioned stocks and other reserves. Probably the biggest reason we gave them M777s over M198s is availability of parts in our supply chain.
I have never been in a rocket unit so I am unfamiliar with the firing procedures, but from what I understand it's a fairly automated system, so not hard to train on.

Some points I found relevant:
It seemed the commander was doing his own observing and calls for fire. This is contrary to a lot of Western Doctrine, where artillery units are a delivery service to support a maneuver unit’s request for fire. Here there doesn’t seem to be any “land owner” that’s dictating fire. 
They talk about their observation platforms, and that they can only use it when wind and Russian EW allow it. Wind and it’s ability to limit UAV operation is often overlooked. They also said it started to become unstable the higher they got in altitude, and was harder to observe fire. 
There didn’t seem to be a sense of danger or urgency when it came to moving or shooting the howitzers - must be a relatively quiet part of the front with limited counter battery. 

One of the crew chiefs talks about firing 150 rounds in a day and I got the impression that was a busy day for him. Can give an idea of the volume of fires executed by specific units. 

Some points I found relevant:
It seemed the commander was doing his own observing and calls for fire. This is contrary to a lot of Western Doctrine, where artillery units are a delivery service to support a maneuver unit’s request for fire. Here there doesn’t seem to be any “land owner” that’s dictating fire. 
They talk about their observation platforms, and that they can only use it when wind and Russian EW allow it. Wind and it’s ability to limit UAV operation is often overlooked. They also said it started to become unstable the higher they got in altitude, and was harder to observe fire. 
There didn’t seem to be a sense of danger or urgency when it came to moving or shooting the howitzers - must be a relatively quiet part of the front with limited counter battery. 

One of the crew chiefs talks about firing 150 rounds in a day and I got the impression that was a busy day for him. Can give an idea of the volume of fires executed by specific units. 

The ultimate problem you are trying to solve when defending against drones is to avoid being seen, whether that’s through the use of good camouflage or by a strong air defense that denies the UAV the “high ground”. Camouflage can still be effective if the UAV is forced to operate at distances that hinder it’s ability to locate targets due to the quality of its sensors. You won’t necessarily be able to hide if it’s right over your head, but hopefully you have ADA to counter that threat. What I suggested about Russian artillery is not that they are too incompetent to utilize camo, but instead that they are not being incentivized to do so. Perhaps in that portion of the line there is very little counter battery or UAV threat. Perhaps they have determined that it’s easier to leave the howitzers in the open and have personnel occupy hardened positions in the tree line, where they are able to hide better without howitzers. Ukrainians seems to have adopted a similar tactic, leaving the gun in place but displacing the personnel. Interestingly enough US Army towed howitzers crew train with their vehicles and crews collocated with the guns for the sake of simplicity, so I’m curious to see if we change our training to match lessons learned in Ukraine. Vehicle + howitzer makes for a juicy target. I think the US idea of constant displacement to avoid counter battery is unsustainable on the human level, as fatigue quickly starts to set in.
 
Anyways, I’ve seen Russian howitzers camouflaged so they know how to do it, I just don’t think they feel the need every time. 
 
In regards to complexity, such systems are usually feasible when you’re dealing with smaller armies that can have higher quality soldiers and mechanics, with relatively simple supply chains. Perfect for small scale, limited time span conflicts. When you start to get into large scale, attrition type conflicts, that complexity can quickly bite you in the butt. 
 
A note on smaller howitzers - I was an M119 battery commander at JRTC, which is heavily wooded with limited space for firing points and less then ideal roads. Compared to the larger M777 battery that we had in our battalion, I was able to occupy much more treacherous terrain and move around the battlefield much faster. The M777s were limited to only a few firing points and were ruthlessly targeted by OPFOR who knew their limitations exactly. There is absolutely something to be said for the lighter howitzers. Range isn’t the be-all end-all, because you will always be in range of something else. 

The ultimate problem you are trying to solve when defending against drones is to avoid being seen, whether that’s through the use of good camouflage or by a strong air defense that denies the UAV the “high ground”. Camouflage can still be effective if the UAV is forced to operate at distances that hinder it’s ability to locate targets due to the quality of its sensors. You won’t necessarily be able to hide if it’s right over your head, but hopefully you have ADA to counter that threat. What I suggested about Russian artillery is not that they are too incompetent to utilize camo, but instead that they are not being incentivized to do so. Perhaps in that portion of the line there is very little counter battery or UAV threat. Perhaps they have determined that it’s easier to leave the howitzers in the open and have personnel occupy hardened positions in the tree line, where they are able to hide better without howitzers. Ukrainians seems to have adopted a similar tactic, leaving the gun in place but displacing the personnel. Interestingly enough US Army towed howitzers crew train with their vehicles and crews collocated with the guns for the sake of simplicity, so I’m curious to see if we change our training to match lessons learned in Ukraine. Vehicle + howitzer makes for a juicy target. I think the US idea of constant displacement to avoid counter battery is unsustainable on the human level, as fatigue quickly starts to set in.
 
Anyways, I’ve seen Russian howitzers camouflaged so they know how to do it, I just don’t think they feel the need every time. 
 
In regards to complexity, such systems are usually feasible when you’re dealing with smaller armies that can have higher quality soldiers and mechanics, with relatively simple supply chains. Perfect for small scale, limited time span conflicts. When you start to get into large scale, attrition type conflicts, that complexity can quickly bite you in the butt. 
 
A note on smaller howitzers - I was an M119 battery commander at JRTC, which is heavily wooded with limited space for firing points and less then ideal roads. Compared to the larger M777 battery that we had in our battalion, I was able to occupy much more treacherous terrain and move around the battlefield much faster. The M777s were limited to only a few firing points and were ruthlessly targeted by OPFOR who knew their limitations exactly. There is absolutely something to be said for the lighter howitzers. Range isn’t the be-all end-all, because you will always be in range of something else. 

Those look to still be in western Europe, so there is still a chance that equipment will be removed before it crosses the border. 
 
Or it can be actual US military howitzers redeploying after an exercise. We often use civilian truckers to haul them around the states between training areas so it may be the same in Europe. I also see a generator on one of the flatbeds, which usually isn’t standard equipment for the howitzer, and may be from another unit that was training alongside the artillery unit. Edit: Also a HMMWV trailer. Have we seen Ukraine operating HMMWVs yet? Double Edit: The howitzers also seem to be named, due to the stencils on the front of the tubes. Very common for American artillery units to name their howitzers and I haven’t seen one in Ukraine that were named. Could still need to be repainted but a sign to me that these aren’t going straight to Ukraine.
Hopefully we’ll see them in country with that equipment but until then I’m doubtful. 

Our M777 needs a specific American system to be able to pass data for fire missions, but is still able to operate its self laying and self locating systems independently of any outside systems. I imagine there must be some classification issues with the inertial navigation system for those functions that resulted in us having to strip it out. 

There is certainly still a significant amount of benefit to having that self locating ability even if you can’t receive fire mission data. 
 

Those look to still be in western Europe, so there is still a chance that equipment will be removed before it crosses the border. 
 
Or it can be actual US military howitzers redeploying after an exercise. We often use civilian truckers to haul them around the states between training areas so it may be the same in Europe. I also see a generator on one of the flatbeds, which usually isn’t standard equipment for the howitzer, and may be from another unit that was training alongside the artillery unit. Edit: Also a HMMWV trailer. Have we seen Ukraine operating HMMWVs yet? Double Edit: The howitzers also seem to be named, due to the stencils on the front of the tubes. Very common for American artillery units to name their howitzers and I haven’t seen one in Ukraine that were named. Could still need to be repainted but a sign to me that these aren’t going straight to Ukraine.
Hopefully we’ll see them in country with that equipment but until then I’m doubtful. 

Our M777 needs a specific American system to be able to pass data for fire missions, but is still able to operate its self laying and self locating systems independently of any outside systems. I imagine there must be some classification issues with the inertial navigation system for those functions that resulted in us having to strip it out. 

There is certainly still a significant amount of benefit to having that self locating ability even if you can’t receive fire mission data. 
 

Our M777 needs a specific American system to be able to pass data for fire missions, but is still able to operate its self laying and self locating systems independently of any outside systems. I imagine there must be some classification issues with the inertial navigation system for those functions that resulted in us having to strip it out. 

There is certainly still a significant amount of benefit to having that self locating ability even if you can’t receive fire mission data. 
 

The ultimate problem you are trying to solve when defending against drones is to avoid being seen, whether that’s through the use of good camouflage or by a strong air defense that denies the UAV the “high ground”. Camouflage can still be effective if the UAV is forced to operate at distances that hinder it’s ability to locate targets due to the quality of its sensors. You won’t necessarily be able to hide if it’s right over your head, but hopefully you have ADA to counter that threat. What I suggested about Russian artillery is not that they are too incompetent to utilize camo, but instead that they are not being incentivized to do so. Perhaps in that portion of the line there is very little counter battery or UAV threat. Perhaps they have determined that it’s easier to leave the howitzers in the open and have personnel occupy hardened positions in the tree line, where they are able to hide better without howitzers. Ukrainians seems to have adopted a similar tactic, leaving the gun in place but displacing the personnel. Interestingly enough US Army towed howitzers crew train with their vehicles and crews collocated with the guns for the sake of simplicity, so I’m curious to see if we change our training to match lessons learned in Ukraine. Vehicle + howitzer makes for a juicy target. I think the US idea of constant displacement to avoid counter battery is unsustainable on the human level, as fatigue quickly starts to set in.
 
Anyways, I’ve seen Russian howitzers camouflaged so they know how to do it, I just don’t think they feel the need every time. 
 
In regards to complexity, such systems are usually feasible when you’re dealing with smaller armies that can have higher quality soldiers and mechanics, with relatively simple supply chains. Perfect for small scale, limited time span conflicts. When you start to get into large scale, attrition type conflicts, that complexity can quickly bite you in the butt. 
 
A note on smaller howitzers - I was an M119 battery commander at JRTC, which is heavily wooded with limited space for firing points and less then ideal roads. Compared to the larger M777 battery that we had in our battalion, I was able to occupy much more treacherous terrain and move around the battlefield much faster. The M777s were limited to only a few firing points and were ruthlessly targeted by OPFOR who knew their limitations exactly. There is absolutely something to be said for the lighter howitzers. Range isn’t the be-all end-all, because you will always be in range of something else. 

But Trent specifically mentions that Grey Eagle in relation to the Orlan-10, and how the US Army won’t have enough to fight the next war, when the two aren’t comparable in capabilities or roles. The Army wouldn’t be using it in situations where it stands to lose so many. This is what he posted:
“The US Army is too high on the price/capability curve versus modern air defenses & needs a drone 1/5 the cost, five times the numbers and about 70% the capability of a Grey Eagle”
That UAV literally exists. It is called the RQ-7 Shadow. 
So I understand your point, but we have to be careful when discussing future capability and force structure for future wars. The manufacturing capability and operational structure to produce and utilize thousands of cheap drone isn’t here yet. If we start re-designing our force structure and doctrine under the assumption that we will have these thousands of cheap drones, we are going to be in quite the predicament if the technology doesn’t exist when war comes. 
Prove to me the capability to manufacture, distribute, transport, operate and resupply thousands of cheap drones across a theater of operations. It doesn’t exist now, and I’m not saying it won’t in the future, but until that capability materializes we can’t claim that’s the future of warfare. We may never actually reach the point where it’s feasible. There’s costs associated with all this beyond physically making more UAVs. You can treat them like ammunition but they can’t just be loaded in a gun and fired. They can’t be stuck in a magazine in someone’s chest rig. We will need more pilots, more mechanics, more transport trucks, more launchers, more fuel trucks, more everything. Who runs all this? Is there now a UAV branch and do we expand the military with more personnel? That’s often times not financially feasible, so which branch foots the personnel bill? Infantryman? Tankers? Artilleryman? Logistics units? What does a UAV replace on a supply truck going to the front? Artillery ammo? Tank rounds? Food? Fuel? Medicine? What does a Switchblade replace in an infantryman’s rucksack? How many infantryman are now trying to control dozens of switchblades instead of pulling security?  What airfields are launching dozens of Grey Eagles and TB-2s? Do they have the capacity for all these new UAVs and are we now cutting spots for manned, high performance jets and their different capabilities? Do we now have to have construction units assigned that can build hasty UAV airfields? Where exactly can we afford to cut now that we have these drones? Those are decisions that can have profound effects on a militaries capabilities, so it’s hard to say that it’s the future of warfare when we haven’t even shown the capability to manufacture and support them in such large quantities. I’m not saying it won’t happen, but someone needs to show that it can be done before we start reorganizing our entire military and its doctrine to support them. Fielding drones in the thousands is asking for exactly that. 
 
 

The ultimate problem you are trying to solve when defending against drones is to avoid being seen, whether that’s through the use of good camouflage or by a strong air defense that denies the UAV the “high ground”. Camouflage can still be effective if the UAV is forced to operate at distances that hinder it’s ability to locate targets due to the quality of its sensors. You won’t necessarily be able to hide if it’s right over your head, but hopefully you have ADA to counter that threat. What I suggested about Russian artillery is not that they are too incompetent to utilize camo, but instead that they are not being incentivized to do so. Perhaps in that portion of the line there is very little counter battery or UAV threat. Perhaps they have determined that it’s easier to leave the howitzers in the open and have personnel occupy hardened positions in the tree line, where they are able to hide better without howitzers. Ukrainians seems to have adopted a similar tactic, leaving the gun in place but displacing the personnel. Interestingly enough US Army towed howitzers crew train with their vehicles and crews collocated with the guns for the sake of simplicity, so I’m curious to see if we change our training to match lessons learned in Ukraine. Vehicle + howitzer makes for a juicy target. I think the US idea of constant displacement to avoid counter battery is unsustainable on the human level, as fatigue quickly starts to set in.
 
Anyways, I’ve seen Russian howitzers camouflaged so they know how to do it, I just don’t think they feel the need every time. 
 
In regards to complexity, such systems are usually feasible when you’re dealing with smaller armies that can have higher quality soldiers and mechanics, with relatively simple supply chains. Perfect for small scale, limited time span conflicts. When you start to get into large scale, attrition type conflicts, that complexity can quickly bite you in the butt. 
 
A note on smaller howitzers - I was an M119 battery commander at JRTC, which is heavily wooded with limited space for firing points and less then ideal roads. Compared to the larger M777 battery that we had in our battalion, I was able to occupy much more treacherous terrain and move around the battlefield much faster. The M777s were limited to only a few firing points and were ruthlessly targeted by OPFOR who knew their limitations exactly. There is absolutely something to be said for the lighter howitzers. Range isn’t the be-all end-all, because you will always be in range of something else. 

The ultimate problem you are trying to solve when defending against drones is to avoid being seen, whether that’s through the use of good camouflage or by a strong air defense that denies the UAV the “high ground”. Camouflage can still be effective if the UAV is forced to operate at distances that hinder it’s ability to locate targets due to the quality of its sensors. You won’t necessarily be able to hide if it’s right over your head, but hopefully you have ADA to counter that threat. What I suggested about Russian artillery is not that they are too incompetent to utilize camo, but instead that they are not being incentivized to do so. Perhaps in that portion of the line there is very little counter battery or UAV threat. Perhaps they have determined that it’s easier to leave the howitzers in the open and have personnel occupy hardened positions in the tree line, where they are able to hide better without howitzers. Ukrainians seems to have adopted a similar tactic, leaving the gun in place but displacing the personnel. Interestingly enough US Army towed howitzers crew train with their vehicles and crews collocated with the guns for the sake of simplicity, so I’m curious to see if we change our training to match lessons learned in Ukraine. Vehicle + howitzer makes for a juicy target. I think the US idea of constant displacement to avoid counter battery is unsustainable on the human level, as fatigue quickly starts to set in.
 
Anyways, I’ve seen Russian howitzers camouflaged so they know how to do it, I just don’t think they feel the need every time. 
 
In regards to complexity, such systems are usually feasible when you’re dealing with smaller armies that can have higher quality soldiers and mechanics, with relatively simple supply chains. Perfect for small scale, limited time span conflicts. When you start to get into large scale, attrition type conflicts, that complexity can quickly bite you in the butt. 
 
A note on smaller howitzers - I was an M119 battery commander at JRTC, which is heavily wooded with limited space for firing points and less then ideal roads. Compared to the larger M777 battery that we had in our battalion, I was able to occupy much more treacherous terrain and move around the battlefield much faster. The M777s were limited to only a few firing points and were ruthlessly targeted by OPFOR who knew their limitations exactly. There is absolutely something to be said for the lighter howitzers. Range isn’t the be-all end-all, because you will always be in range of something else. 

The ultimate problem you are trying to solve when defending against drones is to avoid being seen, whether that’s through the use of good camouflage or by a strong air defense that denies the UAV the “high ground”. Camouflage can still be effective if the UAV is forced to operate at distances that hinder it’s ability to locate targets due to the quality of its sensors. You won’t necessarily be able to hide if it’s right over your head, but hopefully you have ADA to counter that threat. What I suggested about Russian artillery is not that they are too incompetent to utilize camo, but instead that they are not being incentivized to do so. Perhaps in that portion of the line there is very little counter battery or UAV threat. Perhaps they have determined that it’s easier to leave the howitzers in the open and have personnel occupy hardened positions in the tree line, where they are able to hide better without howitzers. Ukrainians seems to have adopted a similar tactic, leaving the gun in place but displacing the personnel. Interestingly enough US Army towed howitzers crew train with their vehicles and crews collocated with the guns for the sake of simplicity, so I’m curious to see if we change our training to match lessons learned in Ukraine. Vehicle + howitzer makes for a juicy target. I think the US idea of constant displacement to avoid counter battery is unsustainable on the human level, as fatigue quickly starts to set in.
 
Anyways, I’ve seen Russian howitzers camouflaged so they know how to do it, I just don’t think they feel the need every time. 
 
In regards to complexity, such systems are usually feasible when you’re dealing with smaller armies that can have higher quality soldiers and mechanics, with relatively simple supply chains. Perfect for small scale, limited time span conflicts. When you start to get into large scale, attrition type conflicts, that complexity can quickly bite you in the butt. 
 
A note on smaller howitzers - I was an M119 battery commander at JRTC, which is heavily wooded with limited space for firing points and less then ideal roads. Compared to the larger M777 battery that we had in our battalion, I was able to occupy much more treacherous terrain and move around the battlefield much faster. The M777s were limited to only a few firing points and were ruthlessly targeted by OPFOR who knew their limitations exactly. There is absolutely something to be said for the lighter howitzers. Range isn’t the be-all end-all, because you will always be in range of something else. 

But Trent specifically mentions that Grey Eagle in relation to the Orlan-10, and how the US Army won’t have enough to fight the next war, when the two aren’t comparable in capabilities or roles. The Army wouldn’t be using it in situations where it stands to lose so many. This is what he posted:
“The US Army is too high on the price/capability curve versus modern air defenses & needs a drone 1/5 the cost, five times the numbers and about 70% the capability of a Grey Eagle”
That UAV literally exists. It is called the RQ-7 Shadow. 
So I understand your point, but we have to be careful when discussing future capability and force structure for future wars. The manufacturing capability and operational structure to produce and utilize thousands of cheap drone isn’t here yet. If we start re-designing our force structure and doctrine under the assumption that we will have these thousands of cheap drones, we are going to be in quite the predicament if the technology doesn’t exist when war comes. 
Prove to me the capability to manufacture, distribute, transport, operate and resupply thousands of cheap drones across a theater of operations. It doesn’t exist now, and I’m not saying it won’t in the future, but until that capability materializes we can’t claim that’s the future of warfare. We may never actually reach the point where it’s feasible. There’s costs associated with all this beyond physically making more UAVs. You can treat them like ammunition but they can’t just be loaded in a gun and fired. They can’t be stuck in a magazine in someone’s chest rig. We will need more pilots, more mechanics, more transport trucks, more launchers, more fuel trucks, more everything. Who runs all this? Is there now a UAV branch and do we expand the military with more personnel? That’s often times not financially feasible, so which branch foots the personnel bill? Infantryman? Tankers? Artilleryman? Logistics units? What does a UAV replace on a supply truck going to the front? Artillery ammo? Tank rounds? Food? Fuel? Medicine? What does a Switchblade replace in an infantryman’s rucksack? How many infantryman are now trying to control dozens of switchblades instead of pulling security?  What airfields are launching dozens of Grey Eagles and TB-2s? Do they have the capacity for all these new UAVs and are we now cutting spots for manned, high performance jets and their different capabilities? Do we now have to have construction units assigned that can build hasty UAV airfields? Where exactly can we afford to cut now that we have these drones? Those are decisions that can have profound effects on a militaries capabilities, so it’s hard to say that it’s the future of warfare when we haven’t even shown the capability to manufacture and support them in such large quantities. I’m not saying it won’t happen, but someone needs to show that it can be done before we start reorganizing our entire military and its doctrine to support them. Fielding drones in the thousands is asking for exactly that. 
 
 

But Trent specifically mentions that Grey Eagle in relation to the Orlan-10, and how the US Army won’t have enough to fight the next war, when the two aren’t comparable in capabilities or roles. The Army wouldn’t be using it in situations where it stands to lose so many. This is what he posted:
“The US Army is too high on the price/capability curve versus modern air defenses & needs a drone 1/5 the cost, five times the numbers and about 70% the capability of a Grey Eagle”
That UAV literally exists. It is called the RQ-7 Shadow. 
So I understand your point, but we have to be careful when discussing future capability and force structure for future wars. The manufacturing capability and operational structure to produce and utilize thousands of cheap drone isn’t here yet. If we start re-designing our force structure and doctrine under the assumption that we will have these thousands of cheap drones, we are going to be in quite the predicament if the technology doesn’t exist when war comes. 
Prove to me the capability to manufacture, distribute, transport, operate and resupply thousands of cheap drones across a theater of operations. It doesn’t exist now, and I’m not saying it won’t in the future, but until that capability materializes we can’t claim that’s the future of warfare. We may never actually reach the point where it’s feasible. There’s costs associated with all this beyond physically making more UAVs. You can treat them like ammunition but they can’t just be loaded in a gun and fired. They can’t be stuck in a magazine in someone’s chest rig. We will need more pilots, more mechanics, more transport trucks, more launchers, more fuel trucks, more everything. Who runs all this? Is there now a UAV branch and do we expand the military with more personnel? That’s often times not financially feasible, so which branch foots the personnel bill? Infantryman? Tankers? Artilleryman? Logistics units? What does a UAV replace on a supply truck going to the front? Artillery ammo? Tank rounds? Food? Fuel? Medicine? What does a Switchblade replace in an infantryman’s rucksack? How many infantryman are now trying to control dozens of switchblades instead of pulling security?  What airfields are launching dozens of Grey Eagles and TB-2s? Do they have the capacity for all these new UAVs and are we now cutting spots for manned, high performance jets and their different capabilities? Do we now have to have construction units assigned that can build hasty UAV airfields? Where exactly can we afford to cut now that we have these drones? Those are decisions that can have profound effects on a militaries capabilities, so it’s hard to say that it’s the future of warfare when we haven’t even shown the capability to manufacture and support them in such large quantities. I’m not saying it won’t happen, but someone needs to show that it can be done before we start reorganizing our entire military and its doctrine to support them. Fielding drones in the thousands is asking for exactly that. 
 
 

But Trent specifically mentions that Grey Eagle in relation to the Orlan-10, and how the US Army won’t have enough to fight the next war, when the two aren’t comparable in capabilities or roles. The Army wouldn’t be using it in situations where it stands to lose so many. This is what he posted:
“The US Army is too high on the price/capability curve versus modern air defenses & needs a drone 1/5 the cost, five times the numbers and about 70% the capability of a Grey Eagle”
That UAV literally exists. It is called the RQ-7 Shadow. 
So I understand your point, but we have to be careful when discussing future capability and force structure for future wars. The manufacturing capability and operational structure to produce and utilize thousands of cheap drone isn’t here yet. If we start re-designing our force structure and doctrine under the assumption that we will have these thousands of cheap drones, we are going to be in quite the predicament if the technology doesn’t exist when war comes. 
Prove to me the capability to manufacture, distribute, transport, operate and resupply thousands of cheap drones across a theater of operations. It doesn’t exist now, and I’m not saying it won’t in the future, but until that capability materializes we can’t claim that’s the future of warfare. We may never actually reach the point where it’s feasible. There’s costs associated with all this beyond physically making more UAVs. You can treat them like ammunition but they can’t just be loaded in a gun and fired. They can’t be stuck in a magazine in someone’s chest rig. We will need more pilots, more mechanics, more transport trucks, more launchers, more fuel trucks, more everything. Who runs all this? Is there now a UAV branch and do we expand the military with more personnel? That’s often times not financially feasible, so which branch foots the personnel bill? Infantryman? Tankers? Artilleryman? Logistics units? What does a UAV replace on a supply truck going to the front? Artillery ammo? Tank rounds? Food? Fuel? Medicine? What does a Switchblade replace in an infantryman’s rucksack? How many infantryman are now trying to control dozens of switchblades instead of pulling security?  What airfields are launching dozens of Grey Eagles and TB-2s? Do they have the capacity for all these new UAVs and are we now cutting spots for manned, high performance jets and their different capabilities? Do we now have to have construction units assigned that can build hasty UAV airfields? Where exactly can we afford to cut now that we have these drones? Those are decisions that can have profound effects on a militaries capabilities, so it’s hard to say that it’s the future of warfare when we haven’t even shown the capability to manufacture and support them in such large quantities. I’m not saying it won’t happen, but someone needs to show that it can be done before we start reorganizing our entire military and its doctrine to support them. Fielding drones in the thousands is asking for exactly that. 
 
 

Trent conveniently leaves out the RQ-7 Shadow which is equivalent in capability of the Orlan-10, with 2-4 found in every active duty Brigade Combat Team in the US Army (and probably in the National Guard ones as well, I just can't say for sure), and there are even more in most Aviation units. It is used extensively for reconnaissance at the Brigade Level and is a cornerstone of intelligence collection and fires convergence... We literally have the platform he is saying we need.
AND we also have the RQ-11 Raven down to the company level, again in almost every BCT in the Army (probably about ~40 airframes in a Brigade). Now the actual system is underwhelming and desperately needs to be replaced by a more user friendly quadcopter, but you can hardly say the US Army doesn't have disposable UAV capability. He simply has no idea what he is talking about.

Thank you for posting this. It paints a very dire picture for the force level of Russian infantry in Ukraine. It reads like some of the German WW2 memoirs where the situation was desperate and unit sizes were in name only. I also think it’s raises the question of how desperate manning levels must be on the Ukrainian side of things as well, at least in this part of the front. Surely they have a good picture of Russian force levels by now, that they would be able to launch successful attacks of their own (on this part of the front, I know there are local counterattacks elsewhere). The battles described seem to be small groups of units punching at each other in the dark over villages, hoping to achieve local success, rather then any set piece operation. 

Very important, and bears repeating.
In much the same way, the Battle of Britain was much closer fought than was reported at the time, even though the Luftwaffe never had any real prospect of 'winning' (in terms of clearing the skies for an invasion).
I'm not very interested in propaganda, Minister. If we're right, they'll give up. If we're wrong, they'll be in London in a week.
...I too have the uneasy feeling that Ukrainian losses are quite heavy. The command level may also not yet be up to waging more complex offensive operations.
What we are still seeing today in the way of UA attacks is mainly battalion (CM) scale infantry operations Tito or Giap would have known how to fight. The primary evolution since March has been in the artillery arm.  Happy to be proven wrong on this, if anyone is aware of counterexamples...
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2.  Here's Strelkov's latest.
Both us and Ukrainians are entrenching. And... THIS IS VERY BAD! Why?
We will again need to wage fierce bloody fights for each village, every grove and every high-rise... pay with Russian blood for every few hundred meters conquered....
The "attrition battle" (as I have repeatedly noted - as a military decision, I rate it no higher than "idiotic") in the Donbas continues and the "strategic impasse" (for the RF Armed Forces, but not for the UAF, who are gaining time) is getting deeper....
Especially it's meaningless to hope for victory through attrition taking into account that almost all of Europe and North America are acting as a rear for UAF. Thus, it will be necessary to try and defeat the enemy in field battles. And, excuse me, with whom, and with what?! If so far not even the partial mobilisation has been carried out?
3.  Varyag Valkyrie.