fireship4

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I grow tired, however... the meat of your first link:
contains in its second paragraph a claim regarding information collection bandwidth in monkeys, which is not present in the link it provides, and means nothing on the face of it, since my 802.11 is only 40Hz or so and I can fit the entirety of the internet down it.  Indeed the reference itself says:
Which is a little more interesting and nuanced.  In any case, the claim, together with the second paragraph (are we biologically incapable of denying $50 now instead of $100 in a month?  How is it determined that $100 in a month is better for the subjects, since biology seems to deny such a possibility, indeed how can the researchers even write the paragraph without the pen falling from their hand in a rush to the cash machine), mean precisely nothing when it comes to the conjecture 'humans are biologically tailored towards short term thinking' - even if they are right they are wrong. 
Human biology is good for running for a long time, throwing things at stuff, manipulating small objects, and being programmable with culture.
~Edited: Co-ordination problems are not biological problems, they are born in part from our models of the world and the technology at hand, including those of communication and economic systems. Edited~
It is a forte that we possess alone in the known universe.
To get to my general point on the subject - whether or not we are anecdotally prone to a behaviour in one situation or another is beside the point.  Human beings create explanatory knowledge which they can then use to change their behaviour.  We extend our mental machinery with things like pencils and keyboards, hard drives and paper.  We can conjecture things, and hold them to logic, by which they proceed, not by biological rules, but by their own attributes, to imagined consequences.  Whatever biological cages and predispositions we have, it seems to me we are ultimately free to escape them, to the extent that we are able to tie our behaviour to ideas about reality, and those aren't made out of neurons.
I shall not appraise your other links, "What can be asserted without evidence can also be dismissed without evidence": I apply a similar axiom when Google searches are used in place of arguments, placing the burden of disproof on the receiver of wisdom.
-Totalitarian and Authoritarian Government-
Government that brooks no alternative and no opposition is not necessarily bad at planning for the future, I disagree with you on that.  They can be more consistent, and with the knowledge that they are secure, plan far into the future.
In the case of Russia, 'ruining the economy' is somewhat subjective if you believe all your mates deserve a bunch of money and everyone else can eat a rock, or that might makes right, or that you are the real inheritors of Greek tradition because Catherine the Great captured Crimea...
The strength of the modern democracies is in good part to do with error-correction, and placing the levers for that in the hands of those they affect.  They are open to ideas which can change them fundamentally, ideas like human rights, property rights, etc. etc.  Their specific incarnations can be better or worse of course, the best of them can be updated without too much trouble...
Unlike CM

Without wishing to begin a discussion outside the topic, I will simply say I have not read anything thus far by Mr. Science on the subject and will have to get by refuting unsubstantiated theory on it's own merit.
In considering the conjecture 'Humans are biologically tailored towards short term thinking', on the basis of the supplied anecdote, I refute it thus:
#  I understand fMRI can be used to measure areas of the brain where oxygen is being consumed at a higher rate, with an approximate resolution of 1 second.  These images are I suspect compared with models of the brain which are averaged between different subjects to produce maps showing where similar inputs produce activity.
#  The brain is neither a tabula rasa nor can it accomplish anything much lacking long term interaction with environment and culture.  I believe we know very little about how the brain is programmed by these things.
#  The extent to which the planetwide and personal are more or less abstract seems a question of culture and complexity, not of biology (assuming you are programming something like a Turing complete machine, presumably linked with biological systems computing in more specialised and less reprogrammable ways).  Our distant ancestors, with the same equipment, would not have understood the question, were they able to communicate and have it translated for them.
Furthermore, short-term legislation by government, and the financial planning of people are systemic and cultural (even moral) subjects also, unless someone can point me toward the section of our DNA encoding pension funds.
The last point would depend on who you are in the system.  A totalitarian system may plan far into the future, and furthermore have that plan actualised more readily and directly than a democratic one. 
However, were you to post some screen-shots of a new CM3 engine I might agree to disagree.

Without wishing to begin a discussion outside the topic, I will simply say I have not read anything thus far by Mr. Science on the subject and will have to get by refuting unsubstantiated theory on it's own merit.
In considering the conjecture 'Humans are biologically tailored towards short term thinking', on the basis of the supplied anecdote, I refute it thus:
#  I understand fMRI can be used to measure areas of the brain where oxygen is being consumed at a higher rate, with an approximate resolution of 1 second.  These images are I suspect compared with models of the brain which are averaged between different subjects to produce maps showing where similar inputs produce activity.
#  The brain is neither a tabula rasa nor can it accomplish anything much lacking long term interaction with environment and culture.  I believe we know very little about how the brain is programmed by these things.
#  The extent to which the planetwide and personal are more or less abstract seems a question of culture and complexity, not of biology (assuming you are programming something like a Turing complete machine, presumably linked with biological systems computing in more specialised and less reprogrammable ways).  Our distant ancestors, with the same equipment, would not have understood the question, were they able to communicate and have it translated for them.
Furthermore, short-term legislation by government, and the financial planning of people are systemic and cultural (even moral) subjects also, unless someone can point me toward the section of our DNA encoding pension funds.
The last point would depend on who you are in the system.  A totalitarian system may plan far into the future, and furthermore have that plan actualised more readily and directly than a democratic one. 
However, were you to post some screen-shots of a new CM3 engine I might agree to disagree.

Without wishing to begin a discussion outside the topic, I will simply say I have not read anything thus far by Mr. Science on the subject and will have to get by refuting unsubstantiated theory on it's own merit.
In considering the conjecture 'Humans are biologically tailored towards short term thinking', on the basis of the supplied anecdote, I refute it thus:
#  I understand fMRI can be used to measure areas of the brain where oxygen is being consumed at a higher rate, with an approximate resolution of 1 second.  These images are I suspect compared with models of the brain which are averaged between different subjects to produce maps showing where similar inputs produce activity.
#  The brain is neither a tabula rasa nor can it accomplish anything much lacking long term interaction with environment and culture.  I believe we know very little about how the brain is programmed by these things.
#  The extent to which the planetwide and personal are more or less abstract seems a question of culture and complexity, not of biology (assuming you are programming something like a Turing complete machine, presumably linked with biological systems computing in more specialised and less reprogrammable ways).  Our distant ancestors, with the same equipment, would not have understood the question, were they able to communicate and have it translated for them.
Furthermore, short-term legislation by government, and the financial planning of people are systemic and cultural (even moral) subjects also, unless someone can point me toward the section of our DNA encoding pension funds.
The last point would depend on who you are in the system.  A totalitarian system may plan far into the future, and furthermore have that plan actualised more readily and directly than a democratic one. 
However, were you to post some screen-shots of a new CM3 engine I might agree to disagree.

I've seen it suggested it may encourage the movement of anti-missile systems away from the front, making it more vulnerable, and run down their supplies, so the RuAF can fly at higher altitudes.
 
I cannot agree with this.  People under duress may think on shorter time scales, with the aim of surviving day-to-day, when thinking further ahead and the effort required to sacrifice for tomorrow are too taxing on their limited resources.  Living further from the edge may allow for clearer thinking, and saving up for a decent pair of boots which will cost less in the long run.

I came across something extremely interesting - a transcript from the French National Defense
and Armed Forces Commission, from November 16th. It concerns various subjects, but let me paste here the most juicy bits (Google translated):
On the RU losses:
On the monetary value military support from US vs UE:
And a bit about training UA forces and their plans:
Full document is available here:
https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/16/comptes-rendus/cion_def/l16cion_def2223022_compte-rendu#

I think there is a coherent argument that the Russian military is in collapse, the rate of that collapse is really the outstanding question.  Personally I see collapse a "a failure to be able to sustain option spaces".  Collapses come in many flavors, the dramatic cascade failures get all the ink but I think history demonstrates that these are really just the punctuation marks on a longer process of systemic degradation.
Russia has seen its option spaces continually shrink in the prosecution of this war.  They had the most options on 24 Feb, and ever since then it has been a slow and steady compression.  Some has been forced by the UA and some by Russia itself.  Examples:
- On 23 Feb 22 Russia had pretty broad options, which included to not-invade.  Then on the 24th those options began to shrink.  They committed pretty much their entire ready-force on one Hail Mary plan: no Lviv cut-off back up, no strategic erosion campaign fall back.
- By the end of March, they had lost all viable options in the North around Kyiv and their main effort.  So they politically weaseled into new "real" objectives, which was simply accepting and re-selling the reduced options they already had.
 -  By the summer, they had run out of strategic options that relied on manoeuvre.  Recall those maps with sweeping red arrows drawn all over them - those were utter fiction.  The RA had lost an ability to sustain that sort of warfare over the Spring.  So they were down to attrition and mass based options at Severodonetsk, making incremental gains while simply trying to hold on everywhere else.
- Enter the HIMAR campaigns, along with other capability and by Aug/Sep 22 Russia no longer had viable offensive options at the operational level. 
- Then they lost any an all options around Kharkiv and Kherson over the Fall.
They are literally down to symbolic tactical grinding at Bakhmut and holding on by their fingernails everywhere else.  Their force generation capability is slumping downward and their last option of nuclear weapons is a dead end.
All the while the UA develops capability and a broader array of options in an expanding portfolio.  Simple equation that says a lot about this war:
Capability x Speed/Agility/Precision = Options.  Options x Cognitive Advantage (Information) = Outcomes.
A whole lot is trending towards zero  for Russia.  As to when the whole thing starts failing fast...l that is the big question.  My money is the next major move by the UA is flank pressure to pull the RA east and west simultaneously.  Lotta opportunity on that Eastern flank and keeping pressure up south of Kherson - in my dreams an amphib action is on the table, but that is likely asking way too much (now there is one interesting CM campaign).  And then when the the RA is stretched thin in the middle, they will try to cut that corridor and separate the two.  A drive to Melitopol is the most likely, but there are other...wait for it...options.
With the strategic corridor cut the two AOs are now connected by land only thru that bridge Ukraine already damaged, and air/sea but those are not optimal if the UA hold the North Coast of the Azov Sea.  All traffic basically has to go around the back across the Black Sea while that big bridge gets HIMARsed - Crimea basically becomes another larger Kherson pocket on the wrong side of a water obstacle.  The UA can then squeeze until things turn purple.
Will this be enough for the political house to come down - unknown, but I definitely think it has potential.  Someone in the Russian power mechanism, as ponzi as it is, has to realize that one 70 year old losing a major land war is simply not worth it at some point.  

Sustained. 
Councillor,  you seem to be arguing a different case... 

Putin says Russia wants end to war in Ukraine (yahoo.com)
 
What war?  Isn't this a special military operation?

You can solve the issue with on map mortars by setting mortar platoons to "dismounted" in the editor. Delete out the infantry and youll be given an ammo box full of everything that was inside of the mortar carriers vehicle. If you put all of these ammo boxes into a house they will turn into one when you start the scenario. 
You need to be on iron or elite to see the ammo boxes.
I like to incorporate ammo boxes into my scenarios regularly, especially with conscripts because they can seriously burn through their ammo

Please, for the love of god, do not embed reddit links

Aircraft in hour+ holding patterns over Kaliningrad Krabrovo airport again this morning, with one so far apparently on the way back to mainland Russia, presumably due to weather conditions.

Multiple flights from Moscow & St. Petersburg seemingly unable to land at Kaliningrad Krabrovo this morning.  It's a long way back!

It is not in the least.
There is one very big caveat to this that everyone is glossing over- who is developing the targeting packages, and with what?
The risk of escalation is not so much weak-kneed western resolve it is trying to avoid direct acts of war between the US and Russia. Of course Ukraine can hit legitimate military targets in Russia, particularly if they are part of this “special military operation”.  And the nuclear escalation equation is also part of all this but the spin here is that the US is avoiding direct involvement in this war because then it turns the war into something else.
For the same reason the US is not conducting airstrikes, they are pretty cautious with their ISR data. So Ukraine get ATACMS or whatever - whose data are they using to hit the right targets in Russia?  If the UA fires blind they could wind up hitting a civilian neighbourhood, which is going to harm their cause - and I get the unfairness as Russia pound civilians in Ukraine but as we discussed before one warcrime does not justify retaliation warcrimes.  And there is the risk that a Google Earth long range fire hits something Russia does take seriously enough to escalate over.  
For those in the “Russia is full of crap on escalation, always” camp - ok Tex, what is the Russian red line then?  Would a NATO ground invasion of Russia set them off?  If you answer is “yes” - ok, let’s walk it back from that and in your professional opinion tell me when to stop. A direct strike on Russian political leadership?  A strike on Russias nuclear arsenal?
 If your answer is “no” - please leave for a bit because you are no longer part of a rational conversation.
Regardless, we are back to “where is the ISR coming from?”  If the US or any other western nation is developing targeting data or packages for direct strikes on another nation it is an act of war.  Imagine if Russia or China was a third party in a conflict and was providing targeting data into a western nation…ya, that. I am pretty sure the US ISR architecture is tying itself in knots to avoid being pulled into Russia right now.  If the UA can use their own ISR - and I suspect HUMINT is being employed - good on them and please don’t do something dumb. However, Ukraine is a free independent nation defending itself with its own resources.  The US developing data and packages on Russian targets, in Russia, is an escalation on our end - a pretty serious one. It definitely shift to strategic offence which is a pretty severe line to cross just because we will feel better.  Further, it may not shorten this war, it may lengthen it.
The single biggest fear in the west is that Russia will widen the conflict and directly strike out at a NATO nation.  Why? Because we would have to respond, NATO is too big to fail.  If Russia calls our bluff and we do directly respond the whole thing gets crazy fast. Now Putin has justification for broader escalation and that is a train we might not be able to get off.  Further it may split resolve in the western world - I am not sure how keen the rest of Europe is on dying for Ukraine. The evil truth is that Ukraine may be more important to Russia than it is to the West when we get into that sort of calculus…maybe.
The US president was pretty clear and I agree with him - the second this conflict widens into the western sphere, pulling NATO in, we are talking about WW3. And that will involve strategic nuclear escalation because it is all Russia really has left in the bag for a conflict of that scale.  We might get lucky and Russia blinks and someone shoots Putin in the head before it comes to it - but that is a hope, not a plan.

I should have said that the author of the first video linked to the criticism himself in the comments section.

With the tanks used for indirect fire; with the awesome stabilization ability for shooting on the move, could that be translated to shoot indirect fires accurately on the move? That would render the enemy's contemporary counter battery completely ineffective.
Earlier in the thread a couple references were made to how naval forces had to totally rethink their operations due to the change in the nature of the battlespace on water with long range strike ability. Would there be any theories from our blue water friends that would translate over so there is limited re-inventing of the wheel? 

Link to a 30+ minute podcast interview with Rob Lee - The Naked Pravda podcast - Ukraine
 
Timestamps for this episode:
(2:38) What’s so special about HIMARS, or High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems? (10:22) What other advanced weapons could give Ukraine new advantages in the war? (14:57) What’s the military impact of Russia’s airstrikes against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure? (18:57) How far might Ukraine’s counteroffensive reach into occupied territory? Will Russian defenses hold at some point? (25:19) Is the Russian military regrouping or on the verge of collapse? (27:41) What happened with the missile(s) that recently killed two civilians in Poland? (30:26) Is Russia going to run out of rockets or ammunition?

Short but substantial clip about limits of small drones from US volunteer; it seems he fought before in YPG, so had unique (for Westerner) experience of being on the "wrong side of periscope" already before Ukraine. Note they needed to go on dangerous mission several times into enemy territory just to get back their mavics that were jammed behind Russian lines. That aligns well with other relations from this war: small drones are extremely useful, but still pretty rare and expensive tool.
 
Also Very worthy read from Galeev about bareness of political realism a la Machiavelli regarding Ukraine (rejoice the Twitter till it's still there, btw   )
 
 
 
 

Er, can we settle for liberation Cato?

Full translation of Dugin letter via @wartranslated, these do not seem to be words that can easily be taken back:
https://nitter.net/wartranslated/status/1591181876815106048#m
EDIT: Also, via @TpyxaNews:
“Iran has suspended the supply of weapons to the Russian Federation,” - Arestovych

Full translation of Dugin letter via @wartranslated, these do not seem to be words that can easily be taken back:
https://nitter.net/wartranslated/status/1591181876815106048#m
EDIT: Also, via @TpyxaNews:
“Iran has suspended the supply of weapons to the Russian Federation,” - Arestovych

Full translation of Dugin letter via @wartranslated, these do not seem to be words that can easily be taken back:
https://nitter.net/wartranslated/status/1591181876815106048#m
EDIT: Also, via @TpyxaNews:
“Iran has suspended the supply of weapons to the Russian Federation,” - Arestovych

Well guys, at last I got this!  Symbolically in the day of Kherson liberation ) 
Thank you @Kinophile for this initiative and enough "family diplomacy" in resolving of sudden obstacle on "last mile" 😀
Thank you @Battlefront.com - Steve, your "bribe" ) will be worked out ))))
Thank you all, who donated anonymously
Thank you, all other, who just have been reading and support our country - first two months were some nervous and psychologically hard, so this my 24/7 "marathone" here was giving me some emotional relief. 
 

First. The entire rear of the Russian troops in the operational-tactical mode is objectively tied to the railways. After all, the ENTIRE volume must be transported by echelons, because it is almost impossible to do this with trucks.
Second. Distribution and transshipment warehouses and storage facilities are needed. In this regard, the problem is that to accumulate those volumes of logistics items that the Russians really need, for example, in order to prepare for any more or less significant offensive (meaning the operational-tactical scale) only with the help of the Crimean railway trains and the Kerch bridge is also very difficult (long and expensive ...). This is also true for defense, if it is accompanied by active hostilities on a sufficiently wide front (and, apparently, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are unlikely to give the Russians the opportunity to “calmly” defend themselves this autumn and winter).
 
Third. In this sense, the Russians urgently need some kind of communication, which, if not an alternative, would at least significantly complement the “Crimean” one. And they have such communication with the given parameters ... this is a railway line connecting Debaltseve - Volnovakha - Kamysh-Zorya - Fedorovka - Kakhovka ... Now they are very actively restoring (including bridges and crossings), repairing and strengthening the railway track, joints, according to certain information, even they are trying to equip separate sections with electric traction.
Fourth... But there is one nuance that makes it very difficult for Russians to further use this communication. Yeah, you understood correctly… Ukrainian troops, which are just in the area of Ugledar and Pavlovka, as well as south of Novomikhailovka, are at such a distance from this communication that allows them to use a fairly wide range of weapons along it and at a number of its key points. For example, from the Dolya junction station to the forward positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Novomikhailovka area, less than 18 km, and from the forward positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Ugledar area to the Volnovakha railway station, approximately 25-26 km. Which, in turn, almost excludes its rhythmic and full-fledged functioning in the future...
That is why the Russian command was forced to plan, prepare and launch this offensive in the Ugledar direction in order to at least move the Armed Forces of Ukraine away from this railway line ... to such a distance that would be able to protect it from the fire impact of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, or reduce the list means of destruction of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, capable of reaching it in range.
As of this morning, the command of the enemy troops not only failed to complete this task, it is not even close to the beginning of its implementation. Both attack tactical groups of the enemy (quite heavily replenished with “chmobiks”), I mean Ugledarskaya and Novomikhailovskaya, simply “were erased”, trying to ram the defenses of two Ukrainian brigades (I won’t say which ones, but you already know who we are talking about). Even the introduction of an additional BTGr of the 40th Separate Marine Brigade on the far left flank of the Ugledar group in the direction of Prechistovka did not help ...
But I don't think it's going to end this way. Obviously, having in the tactical reserve another 2.5 BTGr (also "fresh", replenished mainly with the same "chmobiks"), the command of the enemy troops will try to bring them into battle in order to "increase efforts" in order to achieve the goal.
Although, of course, in terms of information ... the story of the "capture of Pavlovka" clearly does not smell good for the enemy.

Some levity...
It is interesting that the Russian military continues to hide losses and the population is beginning to realize the scale. I had started doubting that the Russian people could be revived to oppose the war but perhaps these massive losses will change that.