rocketman

Right back atchya Russia:
 

[From "elsewhere", apologize for repeat of some terms - I only have some many clever turns of phrase in the bank]
Can Russia win a war of attrition?  I think that is the question the Russians are asking themselves right now.  My assessment is "probably not" based on a couple dimensions:
- Quantitative - Russia is quickly coming up on 20% of declared invasion forces lost. As of this morning, Oryx is reporting 18 BTGs worth of tanks gone from the Russian side, they cannot sustain that indefinitely.  On paper Russia has 12500 tanks but some serious questions as to how much of that fleet is actually in any state of readiness need to be asked. Russian assessment is 200 BTGs in total or there abouts,  so they likely have between 2-3000 actual battle ready tanks or 25% of their total fleet.  I would think they may have another 2-3000 they can spool up, but from what we have seen about corruption I am willing to bet half that 12500 are basically wrecks maintainer-wise or museum pieces and will not be seen in this fight.  This extends well beyond tanks obviously and the Russian logistics losses are even worse, in what was already recognized as a weak system. 
   In the end it comes down to loss ratios, right now assessments are somewhere between 3:1 and 4:1 with Ukrainians being the "1".  In infantry numbers the Russians and Ukrainians are near parity in trained troops and Russia is upside down in manpower numbers once you take into account Ukraine has conducted general mobilization (listed as high as  900,000) while Russia has not.  Equipment wise, Russia has the recognized advantage but that is rapidly diminishing.  At those loss ratios Russia will likely lose it advantage as an offensive force (e.g. trying to keep 3:1 in their favour) fairly soon, the may already have.  Either way they need to reduce that loss ratio substantially to quantitatively have a hope of attriting the UA to the point of collapse. 
  Further if you look at the Oryx page an even more disturbing trend appears to have occurred, the Ukrainians have made a "net gain" in MBTs since this war started.  They have lost "46" tanks (and here we only have social media which is likely tightly skewed) while having captured "83".  So even if the Ukrainians have lost double what is being reported they are still at something like 9 tanks as a net loss.  This skews the loss ratios into crazy directions.  This is not just for MBTs, it carries over to just about every vehicle system.
- Qualitative - the Russians need to learn and "get better" faster than the Ukrainians and there is very little evidenced of this.  They will learn and adapt, war is Darwinian that way, however, the Ukrainians are producing veterans and evolving as well.  The question is what is the competitive equation?  The Ukrainians came in with a serious advantage (e.g. home ground, western backing) and appear to be learning very fast as we see integration of UAVs with ambushes etc.  Russia may be learning but it is much slower.  As late as yesterday we see complete cluster-f#$*s in Russian columns as they get hit, best thing for that one Russian unit on CNN was the commander getting killed.  In the logistics battle the Russians need to learn faster and better than the Ukrainians are learning how to kill Russian logistics, again not seeing it. 
Looking at those two pieces together, it is not looking good.  I mean Russia can keep conducting zombie muscle twitches for some time but tying those into some operational gains is a long shot.  As to "grinding", I think this is actually going the other way, Russian will can only be sustained off the power of one man for so long, especially one that does not have an ideology on his side.  Everyone keep wondering if Russia is willing to "double down" or "go all in", when in reality the Ukrainians are already there.  So when we get to attrition of will, the thing that really matters, time is also not on the Russian side.  Things are in balance, but I go by "follow the options" and right now Russian spaces are compressing while Ukraine is sustaining theirs, and in some places expanding.   The real battle of attrition is in that space and one of "how long can the Russians last?"

Well the first thing to remember when looking at UKR forces is that there are layers here.  Unlike the Russian forces who, for the most part, try to control where they are with LOCs back to Belarus or Russia, these are horizontal forces and relationships.
The Ukrainians have vertical forces and relationships in addition to horizontal ones.  So take any map of the conflict:

This one from wikipedia - So the interplay of red and yellow with tac signs is horizontal.  And from this it does look like the Russians are trying to do some operational pinching which would normally point to some trouble for the UA.  The reality is though that the map is really three dimensional.  Vertically there is a foundation of local and regional support and combat power in the form of an ever growing resistance (I hear a lot of western experts say "insurgency", I think I even used the term early once and this is inaccurate, a resistance is really something else from a lot of directions).  Further, for every day that the Russians bog down, that vertical resistance gets better armed, better organized and better prepared. 
So what?  Well from a Russian viewpoint that vertical layer underneath means two very bad things: support and friction.  Ukrainian force will be able to draw support from that layer in the form of manpower and logistics.  This means the Russians are now force to make those "pinches" air tight, which is extremely labour intensive.  For example, locals can push fuel and ammo into a pocket, through all the backroads and farmers fields, which they know very well, and continue to supply fighting power to seemingly cut off troops.  The level of control required for that is extreme, as the US learned in Vietnam.
Second is friction.  Having even low tech resistance everywhere is exhausting in terms of constant attrition and morale.  Every move you make is watched and reported on, every road move is like the freakin Memphis Bell mission over Germany - someone is going to get killed and we are all hoping it isn't us.  Logistical lines need to be iron-cladded.  And this will inevitably lead to over use of force on civilians which does nothing for the information war.   
So in this sense it is really hard to judge where the Ukrainians stand by using the pins on the mapboard.  They have already gone hybrid.  For example, how many major tank battles have we heard about?  There have no doubt been clashes but the Ukrainians are already fighting like Comanches with drones right now offensively and it is working for them.  Defensively, again layers, they can dig in and be very difficult to dig out, and even if you do, you still have a deeper resistance to deal with in the civilian population.
My assessment matches what we have been seeing all over mainstream.  The Russians have stalled...bad.  This was not a consolidation or re-org or clever trap, it was a significant stalling an a systemic level going all the way back through those LOCs.  The Ukrainians have created so much friction on the Russian advance that the war machine looks like it broke.  They are now staging local c-attacks and very visible attrition actions from what I can see. 
The question the remains is "can the Russians re-org/re-boot and somehow regain the operational offensive?" This, particularly around Kyiv.  Or are we going to see what I call "zombie muscle twitches" as formation commanders try and look busy to get the heat off them that is coming from Moscow?  These can even seem dramatic but they do not translate into any real operational gains.  Don't know, a lot of opinions out there for either side.
Few things I do notice:
- Russians are not even talking about Western Ukraine anymore.  If the aim was to take the whole perogy, Kyiv is more symbolic.  In order to do that "entire Ukraine" thing, one has to cut off support from the West.   Which really means that all this prom-night groping in the East - so sweaty but not really going nowhere - is missing the point entirely once we accept that Ukrainians will very likely keep on fighting both conventionally and unconventionally even after Kyiv falls.    Why there was not a very sharp attack from Western Belarus at what it the real strategic Center of Gravity in all this, Lviv, to seal up the western end of Ukraine, including the Carpathians, was the first sign that the Russians did not think this through.
- Operationally, the Russians have still not established pre-conditions and we are over two weeks in.  Air, info, electronic, cognitive/decision and logistical superiority have all been a hard fail.  For example, Russian Air Forces should be hitting logistical resupply from the west 24/7 - an air campaign for the history books- and they are largely tepid and absent.  They need to work on that or this grind is going to be much longer, to the point they very may well not be able to sustain.
- Operationally, the Ukrainians are not showing signs of buckling in all those pre-conditions areas. There is no doubt erosion but they still can find, fix and finish Russians and even do local offensive actions. All the while they coordinate and communicate effectively and are still able to push support in from the West as they get better and better prepared. 
So in summary, keep an eye on that vertical Ukrainian dimension because it is decisive and something needs to demonstrate the Russians are even able to set what should have been initial conditions and I may start to buy in on the "Russian Grind" strategy.  Until then we are at Balkan-No-Step, everyone digs in and tries to influence the negotiation table, or Death March to Moscow as the Russian military simply quits.  I mean the Russians do have the numbers for the Russian Grind but that is on paper and looking at the horizontal dimension only.  This is unfolding like a European version of that anecdote from Afghanistan, "Russians have all the fancy watches but the Ukrainians have all the time".      

No one expects the Spanish Instalanza.

@melm
Very respectfully disagree. There is a certain individual that has well documented affinity for Putin and a penchant for lucrative, unrequited real estate deals in Moscow and a general distaste for NATO that has been quite a topic in our country recently. //nuff said

My guess is if any sort of chemical attack in done. US/NATO will protest loudly and perhaps launch a few select cruise missile strikes against Russian targets in the Ukraine.
A no-fly zone would probably be highly unlikely but not completely out of the question, but would require a significant time to get necessary forces in place. It would also likely require going after targets in Belarus and Russia.
I wouldn't be surprised in China steps in and puts pressure on Russia. A general US/NATO-Russian conflict doesn't fit into their plans for domination. I believe Chinas game is the Sun Tzu dictum that the best general wins without fighting.
Speaking of China I'm even less convinced that before they can take Taiwan. Taking Taiwan would be a big ask for even the US, let alone China who has no experience in conducting an coordinated air-sea land amphibious operation.
If what we’re seeing now in the Ukraine is any indication, conducting a coordinated large scale military operation with a high chance of success against a competent opponent that is adequately supplied and willing to fight is only a luxury the west can afford.
It requires a professional force that can and is willing to spend lavishly on things like the NTC, Red Flag, Maple Flag and the numerous other training venues that will hone a force to the necessary level of competence and weed out those who are not fit. This costs money-lots of money.
I read that one of main issues for Russia and the modern Armada tank was the cost. The Russian economy couldn't afford to build them in sufficient numbers.
Then there are the structural issues in Russia and arguably Chinese society than hinder their ability to conduct a modern combined operation on a large scale.
Of course this is all subject to change, but until we get proof of significant changes being made I don't see Taiwan coming under the Chinese flag anytime soon.
Speaking of change I suspect there may be changes to armored forces and doctrine. The prospect of going against a force amply armed with the likes of a Javelin, NLAW and Stingers in large numbers is going to generate a lot of study, thought and push for innovation to counter the new reality.
DARPA and the DoD is likely busy sending out RFPs to defense contractors for possible solutions.
I've seen suggestions that tanks will probably un-manned in the future. I think lasers that shoot down incoming missiles is a possibility.
Drones is also another possible solution. A drone I bought years ago has the ability to lock onto a person or object and follow it. It wouldn't take much to program a drone to lock onto a person carrying a portable missile or the launch signature and then hunt them down.
As I mentioned before I suspect a lot of the shooters have been getting away and surviving to hunt again.
They post a few video clips and before long everyone wants to get in on the action.
If shooters start getting eliminated the equation will change. The Israelis after suffering heavy losses to infantry equipped with ATGMs and RPGs in 73, started mounting lots of machine guns and started spraying in the direction fire was coming from. Even if they didn't eliminate the shooter distracting them was just as effective. They re-learned the value of combined arms and infantry and artillery was no longer neglected.
Last thing of note-modern urban combat. Years ago, back in the days of NATO vs the Warsaw Pact I bought a board game-Cityfight. Never found anyone to play though, but the write up that came with it was interesting.
Over the years many have suggested that combat in urban centers was going to be the trend of the future. The demographics was shifting to urban areas and that's where the centers of power and wealth are concentrated. Being exposed in the open in the day and age of precision weapons was highly risky, but in an urban environment some of the advantages of precision weapons can be negated.
One of the mayors has promised to turn their city into another Stalingrad. Odessa is a fortified city. Kyiv has become a fortified city. I've heard estimates from experts that Kyiv could hold out up to a month, while other say longer. I've even hard one estimate of 9 months.
I'm hoping it doesn't come down to a brutal city fight and some sort of end of the fighting can be found, but it seems like both sides have dug their heels in and it’s a fight to the bitter end and regardless of the outcome, both sides will lose in some way or another.
and just like every other war in history its going to be the non-combatants who will bear the brunt of the suffering.
   
 

Me too. Just the mention of going full nuclear brought back childhood fears, nightmares and the looming threat of total annihilation. I can’t turn those emotions off even as an adult.

Me too. Just the mention of going full nuclear brought back childhood fears, nightmares and the looming threat of total annihilation. I can’t turn those emotions off even as an adult.

13th day of war, but our jets still flying. From where? We will know that after the war

I think the major difference between discussions here and what I have seen from a lot of the "experts" is that they seem to focusing on quantitative assessment, while we are largely focus on qualitative.  We can count up the losses and numbers as well as any right now but when linking that back to qualitative deductions one comes up with different conclusions.
I mean one can see that about 10% of the Russian invasion force of tanks has been attrited.  From a quantitative view that is not great but losses are to be expected in front line capability and it likely matches some other similar military actions.  Then if one takes the remaining 90% versus big red spaces on the map, I can see how people are coming to the conclusions that they are.  What is missing is all the weird stuff, like most of those tanks have been abandoned either out of gas or crews just left.  That is a qualitative observation on how or why those tanks were lost beyond what was lost.  
I am not surprised that a forum of avid wargamers and students of history are taking a broader qualitative system view, and frankly the real experts/analysist who work for government/military are doing the exact same thing (with better data).  In the end events will confirm or deny which viewpoint has been correct and the truth is probably somewhere in between.  What has been interesting is that we here have been about 24-48 hours ahead of mainstream in a lot of ways.  In the first couple of days we noted some odd signals and had pretty much decided that the "quick war" was a loss by the end of the first weekend.  Then experts caught up and complimented "Ukrainian resistance", when it was in fact a pretty convincing military defence, and were stating that Ukraine may hold out for a couple weeks but the end was going to be the same.  As things unfolded it became more apparent here that the Russian war machine had stalled hard - while mainstream media was pointing to the looming 64km convoy North of Kyiv - which turned out to be a parking lot and by now is likely turning into a graveyard.  We began to wonder if the Russians might even get to the siege phase.
Now most experts are still seeing a brutal siege phase and a long term guerilla war.  Here in our little bubble it is looking more likely that the Russians will have to be halting broad offensive action soon and we could see this turn into a stalemate scenario...all largely based on qualitative assessment of 1) Russian inability to establish what should have ben pre-conditions such as information and air superiority, 2) very poor Russian logistical performance, 3) Signs of eroding Russian morale, 4) Baffling Russian C2, and 5) The increasing/acceleration of Ukrainian will and capability to fight.  This is beyond the changes in strategic narrative from Russia, who went from "unconditional surrender" to "conditional surrender" in about 10 days.  As well as the growing impact of what has become the economic equivalent to a nuclear war against Russia. 
We will see how close everyone is as this thing unfolds, we could be wrong or too optimistic based on a steady stream of what may be fairly isolated events but when strung together on social media look like a trend.  The major shift I am looking for right now is signs of Russian defensive operations like minefields, major digging in and the like.  At the strategic level we might start seeing less of Putin and the identification of a new "spokesperson", this may be a sign of a shifting power dynamic at the top. 
I recall back in 2014 the Russian Foreign Minister saying "if Russia wanted to, we could be in Kyiv in two weeks" or words to that effect, well that is Thurs and so far they can't even seem to be able to cordon Kyiv, let alone control it; there are strange rattling and scraping sounds coming out of the Russian War Machine.  All the while Ukraine is waging an information war that is now the Gold Standard and a employing a hybrid operational approach that will be actively studied for a century at least. 
In another reality, if I were on the Russian Military Staff and had a golden Willie Wonka ticket to say whatever I wanted without repercussions, it would be "Get out, now.  They are not surrounded, we are." 

Rasputitza, b*t*hcez.
 

So been tracking this daily, now that we are in Day 9.  I do not post my resume, largely because most people would not believe it if I did, so take what I say -as with everything else these days- with a good dose of salt.  But in my professional opinion I would sum up the Russian performance thus far as:

I heard a russian speaking translator pronounce the Ruble "rubble". That was kinda appropriate by now.

I heard a russian speaking translator pronounce the Ruble "rubble". That was kinda appropriate by now.

First step, sealing of urban centres and countryside.  Russia would have to commit it entire professional ground force (208k) and then call up reserves and do conscription to even look at sustaining it - we are talking about a country the size of France.  Also what do you do about the other nations you are trying to menace?  Harsh language? Because everything is now tied up In this operation without full mobilization, which creates enormous domestic resentment.  But you are all in.
Second step. You dig into firebases/FOBs whatever to try and control the ground.  This is setting yourself for continuous attrition, now with reserves and conscripts as your professional forces can only go so far.  Now you start taking a steady stream of dead and wounded with spikes and horror stories, compounded by you own troops war crimes and massacres (see: sustaining resolve of the west for the long term).  Because you never really break the will of the nation to fight and in reality you only control the FOBs and about 1000m from them and insurgency has got all the room.  Your LOCs are the stuff of nightmares, ambushes and captured troops.  Troop morale is a total mess and discipline will follow.
Step 3 - Go on the Offensive, search and destroy and all that good stuff.  Here you even have fewer troops as this is very dangerous and specialized work.  But you are all in, you got all the sigint firing, you are working humint and even doing nasty infiltration stuff (you do speak the language), you get some wins but this takes a very long time and for most of it especially early on you are coming up empty and losing people…and ever time you screw up you deepen resentment and resolve of locals to fight. You never get enough intel to really swing things your way.  You bag some insurgency leaders but it doesn’t seem to make a difference. You kill the #2 insurgency leader, 17 times.
Step 4- Wasteland.  Ok, so you give up search and destroy and go all Rolling Thunder, start breaking things.  Short of nukes this will take a mountain of ordinance and money you no longer have, and this whole time you are still bleeding.  By this time you might even start seeing terror tactics in Russia itself.  But you are now starving people, so mass migration for many, for others nothing left to lose.  You also cannot stop all supplies, these cities and countryside are just too big, so there will be a network of Selensky trails over the parts you control better and pretty much freedom of movement where you don’t.   
Ok, so you have spent let’s say 18 months now, entrenched in FOBs barely controlling your own LOCs, bleeding daily so some really big numbers start adding up, focused on a single operation so other nations are getting cocky, you are really going broke, you have not broken the will of the Ukrainian people or at least enough of them and somehow you have not had a domestic revolution.  So let’s add up the bill for what you would need to make this work:
- a new economic system because this semi capitalist one Russia currently has will not survive the plan.  Something insular and self contained.
- a completely new and huge internal security mechanism to keep domestics in line backed by even more military to back them up.
- an ideology that somehow glues it together to try and win the hearts and minds of your own people.
Well we have just re-invented the Afghan War and the communist system to try and sustain it…and it still failed. Except this time the Ukrainians have the entire western world onside backing them with weapons and support, no yellow jugs of homemade crap, no we are talking EFPs and next gen autonomous stuff.
You say the Ukrainians should not base a strategy on domestic Russian pressure, why not?  It worked very well for Vietnamese and Afghans (twice) and is the strategic centre of gravity for the Russians.  By the approach above you have elevated “killing Russians” as a new Ukrainian religion so their will is solid, the domestic home front is where it always fails in these messes.
The fundamental change in calculus that needs to be made here is that light fragmented forces that 1) are armed with some very advanced western equipment and munitions, 2) can sense, connect, communicate and synchronize in near real time and 3) is motivated, desperate or just really pissed off, are not “light or fragmented”, they are distributed warfighting mass resting on a foundation of home field support.  They can, and have, won in the long term without #1 and #2, they really only need #3.  And Russia would need to go full Genghis in order to try to shoot their way through that, which neither their own population or the west could tolerate.
 

This gentleman, and I am sure he is scholar, is absolutely correct...if this was a conventional war.  He is talking about a war long gone and the calculus makes no sense here.  Conventional Ukrainian forces in this sort of war are difficult to "cut off" at all because everywhere that they wind up, they are in friendly terrain.  So lets take that example up in that thread.  Say the Russians manage to pinch off from that fat bit on the Dnieper and link up at Horlivka trapping that "pocket".  By conventional metrics the Russians should be able to wait 72-96 hours and any Ukrainian force should be out of supply, cut of from C2 and ready to surrender, brilliant.  Very slow...damn near glacial, but nice and Soviet. 
[Aside if you look at CMCW Soviet Campaign, the Soviet MRR is supposed to cover 50km in about 48 hours.  This is straight out of the manual for a breakthrough battle scenario.  In the original plans the Soviets wanted to be on the Rhine in seven days so in game terms they had 5 days to go down past Frankfurt and capture Rhine crossings at the end of the Soviet Campaign.  That is a distance of about 200km.  The deepest penetration I can see for the Russians (wikipedia) is about 150km along two very narrow corridors and we are heading into day 8, they have stalled...calling it]
But!  This is already not a conventional war, the widescale arming of civilians and all those Molotovs was our first hint.  So if the Russians do create that southern pocket, they are looking at roughly 20000 sq kms of hostile civilian country that now have Ukrainian force integrated within them...and no air superiority.   The UA will have any and all gas it needs from the locals for a lot longer than 72 hours (not every town had a gas station in 1941) but eventually it will run out but not before it really messes thing up with what armor it keeps.  Further it is not like this has been Pear Harbor, the Ukrainians have stockpiled caches and planned for this exact fight.  So local support in the form of food and gas, ammo caches, medical support and recruits...and 20000 sq kms to hide in.  Further, the Russians seem incapable of shutting down internet (and with star link they might not be able to at all) so these now hybrid forces are not only connected back to HQ, they are connected to each other.  That is a nightmare occupation scenario if there ever was one.  
One can draw red lines on the map all day long but they are just that, lines.  They do not represent the actual situation on the ground by a long shot.  If one uses WW2 metrics, sure it looks bad but we are very far from that.  Finally this is in the south east in what was supposed to be a "soft" area from a support point of view, so it may actually work here if the locals opt out and start turning in UA, maybe.  Once you get west of the Dnieper, forget it.  You can pinch and encircle all you want but you are lying to yourself...you are the one who is encircled, unless you are willing to create camps and do mass evictions, which just makes your strategic situation worse (see: domestic support issues).
I have watched a few experts drawing lines like this was the Gulf War and unless the will of the Ukrainian people breaks on a massive scale (and there are no indications it will, in fact it has gone the other way), encirclement is a really bad idea as you now stretch out your forces along very long LOCs, surrounded by hostiles.   In fact this whole 5-6 prong attack was dumb, it looks like one of those "power point" ideas that the political level loves:
"We will hit them along all those axis and create a shock that will break their will", brilliant, clapping. 
Old Afghan Veteran "Wait a minute.  You want 5-6 axis of advance, all having about 100-200 kms of hostile territory to cover in...sorry did he say 72 hours?  And then we have to hold those LOCs, right?  Oh, sorry, of course they will surrender their cities and not engage in urban warfare so we won't need those LOCs for more than 72 hours...hmm.  And how long was the air campaign?  Oh, about 24 days...well that makes sen...oh, you said 24 hours...wow, that is a little light, no?  And of course we will hit them with cyber attacks to cripple their C2, comms/internet instead...huh...ok, but what about social media...oh, right the total surrender thing.  Well for something this ambitious we must be leading with our best shock troops...oh, 3rd echelon who we aren't going to even tell what is going on...ok....well, good luck with that."
In short, if the Russian government worked as hard on this operational plan as they have on trying to hide their money this thing might have really been over in 3 days.
 
 

It is a snippet from the Utah Beach Master Map. The little house and barn in the distance is the 'Red House' that was used as the identifying landmark by the first US senior officers to land to determine they had landed in the wrong spot. The Master Map will extend north to the intended landing spots that were in front of additional German strongpoints that were cleared by 3/22 IR that morning.
True the Utah landings by the 4th ID were comparatively peaceful (though it could be argued the Airborne forces took the causalities instead), doesn't mean there aren't good tactical problems for players to solve. But then nothing stopping players using the master map for a little 'what if' for some bloody H2H battles.  
Omaha and the Commonwealth beaches are not part of this pack. Waffen SS and Fallschirmjager forces were missing at the time the base game was created that focused on the US vs German (Heer only) forces. The ability for CMBN to simulate the battles in this part of the theatre is now possible. So yes, players will require all modules and the Vehicle Pack to get the most out of this pack. (Like other Battle Pack releases).
Luckily this pack isn't a one man operation to get it out the door. A core group of experienced map makers are working away on this using BIGOT maps and aerial photography to get the most accurate mapping possible in game. Once the more formal announcement is made you'll see what it coming and I think any Normandy wargamer is going to be...

We just want to make sure we have geography sorted before providing more solid details. This little tease was more about answering some of the posts about a possible 'beach map'.

I think the .bmp need to be 24 bit and not more to work.

I got a request in another thread for this mod. All credits goes to Kieme for the ground texture that was a part of his Black Sea terrain mod. I have just added "mini" textures that matches the size of the FB stock ones as well as making one for the [cold] mod tag used in FB. Those textures are slightly desaturated and made a bit lighter to create a colder feel.
Download here for now: https://www.dropbox.com/s/x8l4xuykq3nad1t/FB Ploughed fields less moiré.zip?dl=0
@Bootie: please upload to CMMODS when you find the time. I'll keep it in my Dropbox for a couple of weeks at least.

I got a request in another thread for this mod. All credits goes to Kieme for the ground texture that was a part of his Black Sea terrain mod. I have just added "mini" textures that matches the size of the FB stock ones as well as making one for the [cold] mod tag used in FB. Those textures are slightly desaturated and made a bit lighter to create a colder feel.
Download here for now: https://www.dropbox.com/s/x8l4xuykq3nad1t/FB Ploughed fields less moiré.zip?dl=0
@Bootie: please upload to CMMODS when you find the time. I'll keep it in my Dropbox for a couple of weeks at least.

I got a request in another thread for this mod. All credits goes to Kieme for the ground texture that was a part of his Black Sea terrain mod. I have just added "mini" textures that matches the size of the FB stock ones as well as making one for the [cold] mod tag used in FB. Those textures are slightly desaturated and made a bit lighter to create a colder feel.
Download here for now: https://www.dropbox.com/s/x8l4xuykq3nad1t/FB Ploughed fields less moiré.zip?dl=0
@Bootie: please upload to CMMODS when you find the time. I'll keep it in my Dropbox for a couple of weeks at least.

I got a request in another thread for this mod. All credits goes to Kieme for the ground texture that was a part of his Black Sea terrain mod. I have just added "mini" textures that matches the size of the FB stock ones as well as making one for the [cold] mod tag used in FB. Those textures are slightly desaturated and made a bit lighter to create a colder feel.
Download here for now: https://www.dropbox.com/s/x8l4xuykq3nad1t/FB Ploughed fields less moiré.zip?dl=0
@Bootie: please upload to CMMODS when you find the time. I'll keep it in my Dropbox for a couple of weeks at least.

Had a look at it and I think it needs new "mini" files to look good from high up. When I find time I will adapt Kieme's ground texture for plowed fields to FB.