TheVulture

They are going to need Scuba gear.💪💪💪💪💪 Glory to Ukraine!

Just look at this!
160 strikes on Feb 24.
40 on April 12
A quarter of the offensive power.  Even more, look at the increasing gaps between the strikes - from weekend duration of 2 days to 3-4 days. This can only increase. It implies that the factories manufacturing the PGMs are unable to keep up with demand (durrr) but because this very, very quickly became an issue it also implies that the initial stockpile was even less than might have been expected.
On average about 20+ are delivered each monday.
If RUS fire off 160 (Feb 24th, a Thursday)+40 (Fri)+50 (Sat)+70 (Sun)+60 (Feb 28th, a Monday) but on April 1st, a Tuesday, RUS fire off 20 PGMs then it suggests that they've fired off a significant portion of your initial combat stockpile. 
RUS then pull in a bunch from their operational reserve (giving them a surge on March 7th), and giving their factories time to accumulate another large amount.
So RUS  attempt to keep up the fires tempo but annoyingly, the Ukies are still kicking and now RUS are burning through the operational reserve at an unnerving rate.
So now.. RUS must reach back into their strategic reserve to give their factories breathing space. But those factories have not ramped up production in any manner that actually matters. A slight increase sure, but not enough. So RUS delay deliveries so that when they do get delivery it's of an actually usable amount.
The trouble is, now RUS are not striking UKR infrastructure or VIP units for day after day after day. They went 5 days in the first week of April with no PGM strikes at all.
They could easily be stockpiling for the supposedly coming Donbass campaign, which is not great - UKR would get hit by a serious surge, possibly double the Wk 1 numbers, which is bad. But after that, if UKR can weather than initial storm, then RUS PGMs will be virtually non-existent.
TL/DR: Rus PGM pipeline is garbage, cannot keep up with demand with existing lines and is unable to expand production. They're stockpiling now for an offensive but will burn through that in the first week. After that, they're empty.

https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1514498197489659909.html
Initial analysis of the sinking of the mosck

Bridge destroyed near Izyum with a few Russian vehicles taken out in the process:
https://t.me/verkhovnaradaukrainy/16654
 

True.  And if I can channel the absent JasonC for a moment,  most of Zhukov's successes came when he was working with Vasiliev. Without Vasiliev, Zhukov gave us such gems as operation Mars which was such a disaster that it was expunged from the Soviet histories. 

Here's a few paragraphs on the subject of Dvornikov from a context-setting essay from Geopolitical Futures:
Alexander Dvornikov isn’t exactly a household name, but it could be soon. He’s the Russian general President Vladimir Putin has put in charge of the war in Ukraine after what can generously be described as a disappointing start for Moscow. Dvornikov is credited with saving the Russian campaign in Syria, and the Kremlin hopes he can replicate his successes in Europe.
In Syria, Dvornikov understood that Russia was fighting a diffused infantry force with deep ties to the populations of the areas they were fighting in, so he launched a war on those populations focusing his resources not on the fighters themselves but on their friends and families. He meant to terrify them and thus instill a deep desire to end the war. Put less clinically, Dvornikov carried out mass murder, a calculated measure intended to save Russian lives and to intimidate other populations into staying out of the fight. Putin appointed him because of his reputation and his ability to command and massacre.
NATO members have made clear they would not intervene directly, but as the atrocities mount, so would the pressure to act. The publics of most NATO countries oppose intervention, but it only takes a few Buchas to change their attitudes. And the U.S. itself is never far away.
Appointing Dvornikov to save the day is a Hail Mary. But this misses the point. Even if Dvornikov’s brutality can somehow pacify Ukraine, it will convince the rest of the world to keep sanctions in place, thereby institutionalizing their crippling economic effects. Economic warfare is being waged by a massive global coalition. Russia was hardly economically robust before the war, but there are some claims that Russia’s gross domestic product is contracting by 50 percent. That may be overstated, but there is no question that things are bad. For Russia to “win” in Ukraine would not solve this problem. If anything, it could compound it.

That twitter thread also has photos of several new Russian miles-long convoys / traffic jams just to show that their logistics traffic management hasn't radically improved in the last 6 weeks. 

That might be a function of who has them though. We're not seeing very much footage from regular Ukraine army: it's mostly territorial defence units units putting videos up. So maybe it's just that the javelins have been sent to army units (who might be expected to take better care of the CLUs, whike TD units have received more of the one shot AT weapons. 

Obviously the Greek government is corrupt and inefficient, but the whole did not cost the Germans any money at all, considering the devaluing of the Euro is massively beneficial to the German economy.
And none of their measures improved things, really. They could easily have said: Look, we will give you the bailout money on the condition that you overhaul your tax code, find out what the oligarchs own and tax / nationalize it, root out corruption etc. That is not what happened though: Instead they fought "evil" government spending by cutting programs like healthcare, education, unemployment benefits and left the whole system untouched, because that is more in line with their capitalist ideology, as well as their preconceived notions about "lazy southerners".

Gents any chance of keeping the thread on track?
Ukraine...

I think it is worth considering how the Russia performance differs between being on the attack versus defence.
Look at the Kherson region. In the first weeks, the Russian behaviour there was much the same as elsewhere - lots of road-bound BTGs advancing more or less independently of each other, past Mikolaiv and towards Kryvyi Rih, and coming to a halt in a matter of 2 weeks or so. Then those BTGs with strung out and unsecured LOCs were pushed back up to 100km in another week or two to the villages and towns more immediately around Kherson.
What has happened in the two weeks since since then? Ukraine have made multiple attacks on at least 4 or 5 different axes. They've gained some villages here and there. Others have been gained and then lost again. Attempts to threaten the airport or the crossing point on the dam at Kozatske haven't produced any noticeable movement. To all appearances, there have been localised attacks and counterattacks with varying degrees of success, but Russia has managed to maintain a consistent perimeter around Kherson. Whatever deficiencies they may have had on the attack, the BTGs in the area, dug in to villages with their limited manpower but copious heavy weapons support, and with a relatively secure rear area and LOC (helped by the fact that the UA aren't about to start indiscriminately shelling Kherson city to hit Russian rear units) have apparently managed to create a stable situation of sorts.
Now it may be that this is a stalemate for now, or it may be that one side or the other is getting attrited to the point of being unable to function. Which would lead to either a Russia collapse on the west bank, if the Russians are getting the worst of it. Or a lessening in offensive action and Russia slowly pushing the perimeter a bit further out again if the UA is coming off worse when its trying to attack prepared Russian positions.
But this is looking like a situation where the the Ukraininan advantages that have served them well so far in, terms of information superiority and copious reliable anti-tank weapons, don't provide much useful leverage. And some of the big Russian weaknesses (lack of information and insecure rear areas) are, in this situation, not present.

I think it is worth considering how the Russia performance differs between being on the attack versus defence.
Look at the Kherson region. In the first weeks, the Russian behaviour there was much the same as elsewhere - lots of road-bound BTGs advancing more or less independently of each other, past Mikolaiv and towards Kryvyi Rih, and coming to a halt in a matter of 2 weeks or so. Then those BTGs with strung out and unsecured LOCs were pushed back up to 100km in another week or two to the villages and towns more immediately around Kherson.
What has happened in the two weeks since since then? Ukraine have made multiple attacks on at least 4 or 5 different axes. They've gained some villages here and there. Others have been gained and then lost again. Attempts to threaten the airport or the crossing point on the dam at Kozatske haven't produced any noticeable movement. To all appearances, there have been localised attacks and counterattacks with varying degrees of success, but Russia has managed to maintain a consistent perimeter around Kherson. Whatever deficiencies they may have had on the attack, the BTGs in the area, dug in to villages with their limited manpower but copious heavy weapons support, and with a relatively secure rear area and LOC (helped by the fact that the UA aren't about to start indiscriminately shelling Kherson city to hit Russian rear units) have apparently managed to create a stable situation of sorts.
Now it may be that this is a stalemate for now, or it may be that one side or the other is getting attrited to the point of being unable to function. Which would lead to either a Russia collapse on the west bank, if the Russians are getting the worst of it. Or a lessening in offensive action and Russia slowly pushing the perimeter a bit further out again if the UA is coming off worse when its trying to attack prepared Russian positions.
But this is looking like a situation where the the Ukraininan advantages that have served them well so far in, terms of information superiority and copious reliable anti-tank weapons, don't provide much useful leverage. And some of the big Russian weaknesses (lack of information and insecure rear areas) are, in this situation, not present.

If you think this war is just about Ukraine you are mistaken. 
Listen to Putins hour long ramble about the West and old USSR before he gave the Invasion order.
This is not some smart geopolitical game to strenghen Russia that went a little too far.
This is about restoring old borders, regardless of the cost, militarily or economically to Russia. Most Analyist thought Putin would not attack, because it makes no sense - from their POV.
Putin sees the world from a different lense of the last century and in his mind this mad decision was the way to go and has been planned for a long time. 

If true, this could be the Russian version of "boiling the frog". 
Dropping nerve agents in the middle of Kyiv on civilians would obviously get a response. 
Doing it in what's left of Mariupol, on the rather dubious Azov, in a fight that Russia has essentially won already (so it's not going to materially affect the outcome), in circumstances where outside verification is impossible? This is Russia saying "are you willing to risk Armageddon over this?"

If true, this could be the Russian version of "boiling the frog". 
Dropping nerve agents in the middle of Kyiv on civilians would obviously get a response. 
Doing it in what's left of Mariupol, on the rather dubious Azov, in a fight that Russia has essentially won already (so it's not going to materially affect the outcome), in circumstances where outside verification is impossible? This is Russia saying "are you willing to risk Armageddon over this?"

Yeah, it really does look like they just parked a platoon or two's worth of vehicles there and just wandered off for lunch and an afternoon down the pub.

Very interesting article here, explaining the development of military culture in Russia and Ukraine, and how it influenced their battlefield performance in this war.
https://www.thebulwark.com/i-commanded-u-s-army-europe-heres-what-i-saw-in-the-russian-and-ukrainian-armies/

While I do not disagree with Steve's assessment, I think we need to drop these as the "stated Russian strategic goals".  These are a list of BS that is starting to really reek and none of them hold up to serious analysis:
1. Demilitarization.  Nothing in the Russian strategy beyond "let's try to grab it all" points to this as a real strategic goal.  Further, I am sure Russia has no problem with Ukraine having weapons, so long as it is their people in power, all those weapons are bought from Russia, and they are all pointing westward.
2. Denazification.  So this is a bit like Counter Violent Extreme Organizations (C-VEO) that the west bit off during the big ISIL push.  Beyond not making any sense, BTGs and cruise missile strikes are not how one does it.  This is stuff like counter-self-radicalization programs, which in Russian terms is lining people up and shooting them, apparently.  Nope, I call BS.
3.  "Neutrality of Ukraine", again, nonsense.  Ukraine is in Russia's "near abroad" and they don't want Ukraine "neutral" they want them "anti-NATO/West", and they want the rest of Russia's near abroad to get in line with that.
4.  Acceptance of Russian control of...  This was never about Crimea and Luhansk/Donetsk, they already had defacto control of these areas, that was a stalemate right up until Putin pooped all over it.  Russia was looking for global acceptance of its control over the entire Ukraine, its Near Abroad and Whatever It Sets Its Mind To.
So these are garbage, bordering on propaganda that we should put in the bin next to "Black Bioweapon Sites" and "Ukrainian Alien Mind Waves Making Russian Men Droopy".
Remembering that all war is communication, I offer the real political goals of this war were:
1.  Demonstrate and re-assert Russian global power, effectively undeciding the outcome of the Cold War.
2.  Pull all of Ukraine back into its sphere of control as a lesson/signal to a fracturing global order.
3.  Send a message to the entirety of its near abroad that "this is what stepping out of line looks like for you"
4.  Show NATO/EU/UN and especially the US as 1) divided, 2) weak and dithering, and 3) not the pony to bet on.  
Probably not a bad start but I think this is a more accurate view of the Russian Vision on 24 Feb 2022.  Now that whole edifice has crumbled, so frankly I don't think Russia has any real coherent political goals left other than the worst "choose-your-own-adventure-of-survival" book in a long time.

This is Maxar photos of 8th of April. Reportedly, this conoy was hit with artilelry this night in Izium area. Maybe some videos will apeear soon.

This is an argument I keep having with friends and acquaintances in the UK - it probably applies in much of the west to be honest. People keep talking about 'international law' and the legality or illegality of various things. This has been used a lot as justification for various stuff in the last 40+ years, but it seems like the majority of people seem to actually believe that international law means something. That the decisions of the UN  security council are in some way binding.  That international relations are governed by some rules-based authority.
I keep trying to point out that the only way to force a country to comply with 'international law' is military or economic pressure. The 'law' is nothing more than a voluntary code of conduct of countries agreeing to abide by some rules in exchange for other countries agreeing the same, on the basis that we all benefit in the end by resolving differences by non-military means - even if it may work against one countries interests in individual cases.
But it is purely voluntary. If a country like Russia decides it is willing to live with the consequences, it can ignore whatever 'rules' are imagined by international law. Which has worked pretty well for it up until 2022, as the west seemed to think that Russia was willing to be part of the rules based international order. It isn't. It's just willing to make enough of a pretense at it (whilst doing what it wants) to paralyze the political actions who of countries who do believe that stuff.
So yeah, I think there is going to be a rapid shift to people understanding that this rules based system is unenforceable on countries that don't want to play that game, and that a power based reality is going to become more prevalent.

Wow, hard to believe that was only 40 days ago.  I would caveat that this is a descriptive theory, not a prescriptive one.  Descriptive theories assist in orientation and allow us to better understand "what we are seeing", while prescriptive ones offer "rules for successful execution" and offer some predictive qualities (e.g. Clausewitzian attacking centers of gravity).  I have never really bought off on prescriptive military theory to be honest as it either has to be so broad as to be nearly inapplicable (see Clausewitz), or it is narrow and misses large pieces of the picture.  Descriptive theories provide a better observation reference but are not designed to predict or prescribe, we are left to figure that out on our own.
So 40 days later and what have we seen?  Well obviously both sides have been communicating across multiple mediums and in many ways.  Violence is the most obvious but we can see there are many forms of communication beyond violence in this war, narratives for example.  Even the atrocities committed by the Russian forces is a form of communication, one that I think the world has heard and understood very clearly; this will not be a clean war, because clean wars do not exist.  I think we forgot that fighting in far flung parts of the world but this one is hammering it home very clearly.  
What is interesting is the negotiation.  This is more than between the parties engaged in the war.  It is between a party and itself, and the reality it perceives in front of it; we negotiate with the future in war, an extremely uncertain future.  In the last 40 days the level of negotiation by all parties has been fascinating. 
We have watch the Russians have to renegotiate their entire envisioned end-state as the northern operational axis have collapsed.  We have watched the Russian political level negotiate with its own people by building a pretty weak argument resting on a ever increasing lattice work of falsehoods and lies.  Putin had better hope that Stalin was right about the size of the lie because even though the "first casualty of war..." and all that, the reality is that there is constant negotiation between the political and the people (Clausewitz nailed that one) but it is a highly bounded one.  As has been mentioned, culture plays no small part in framing that ongoing negotiation; however, in Russia's case the framework of lies keeps getting larger and larger, it is  matter of time before a counter-narrative starts gaining traction, much like it did during the Soviet-Afghan War.  So while Putin has had to re-negotiate his reality, he now has to try and re-negotiate that reality with an entire nation as more and more Russian soldiers "go missing" or come home in boxes.  Again, descriptive theory but where I come from this is not a particularly strong strategic position, particularly when you might need to mobilize your nation in order to pull off a weak draw by this point.
The Ukrainian negotiations have been no less startling.  I think there was a level of shock in those first four days and I would not be surprised if the Ukrainian government had a much more open position to ending this thing.  Now they have completely re-negotiated their reality and envisioned end-state:
From ISW: "Ukraine will not resume negotiations with Russia until Ukrainian and guarantor state negotiators finalize meaningful security guarantees for Ukraine. Russian atrocities in Ukraine and Kremlin efforts to falsely blame Ukraine for these atrocities have reduced the willingness of the Ukrainian government and society to reach a peace agreement less than total Russian defeat"
This is not the negotiation position of warring party that is worried about losing that certainty I spoke of initially, in fact it has been reinforced.  Further, the Ukrainian government is not negotiating with its people from a position of weakness, it is one of extreme strength.  The Ukrainian people are galvanized more now, than they were back on Feb 28th.  They have sacrificed thousands and now the Russian atrocities are coming to better light they know that they are "all in" for the next decade if need be.  Further, based on what I have seen on social media, this resistance has taken root at a cultural level and I cannot describe how powerful (and dangerous for the Russians) that is.  The fact that killing Russians is being elevated to a near religious calling that will likely be taught to grandchildren is about as bad as it can get for an invader, trust me we found that out the hard way in Afghanistan.  
So what?  Well the communication will continue, now in context of re-negotiated end-states.  Negotiation is continuous and is constantly in contact with the other four elements.  What I am looking for are more signals of what that negotiation looks like.  I will say that it is never simple, it has twists and turns the longer this thing carries on.  Signals of negotiation on all levels, the texture and nature of those negotiations, what influences negotiation?  These are all things I will be tracking.
Finally on sacrifice.  Both sides have sacrificed and will continue to do so, the real question of Will comes down to "how much?"  Here Ukraine clearly has got miles of depth before they will accept "too much", particularly as more civilian massacres turn up; what is the point of "tapping out" when they are going to kill you anyway?  The Russians nearly the opposite position: "how close to the edge are they?"  I do not believe for a second that Russia has signed up for a total war but they really close to an unintended one.  The level of sacrifice to win it could soar to the hundreds of thousands as this rate, is Russia willing to pay that blood price?  The economic damage and diplomatic damage are heading to total but it will take months for them to see that in full, let alone believe it.  But the continued bleeding for a few meters of dirt in Ukraine, all projected across social media and on the internet forever is a growing cost that I am not sure the Russian government can negotiate its way out of.
Finally the West.  Well we also have to come to terms with the future and it is not the one we thought it was going to be.  We continue to communicate through proxy means, and negotiate militarily through proxy, while directly through economic and diplomacy means; however, we still are not "getting it":
https://www.reuters.com/world/un-vote-suspending-russia-human-rights-council-over-ukraine-2022-04-07/
These mechanism matter to us, not Russia or other powers like China that want to re-write the rules.  This is a laughable gesture by a creaking global order that has its head so far up its own...well you get the idea.  I have said it before, this war is terrible and costly, they all are and I don't want to downplay that, but it is the beginning of an era of "power being power" we are entering into, a Season of Mars (not Venus) that has been a long time coming.  That is bigger than this war, it has implications for the next ones.  This elevates this whole thing beyond "a local border disagreement" -as some have posited- and towards a strategic "black swan" or shock.  The implications span from the tactical through to the geopolitical, that kind of thing is rare.

Hmm well.... the only minister that has proved effective for the UK Govt (and instrumental with delivery of weapons systems) is Ben Wallace, Defence Secretary, very competent and ex military himself, which almost certainly has helped with his grasp, understanding and approach of the UK on these matters. If anyone deserves credit in this shambolic Govt it's him, and when the history books are written I think his performance will shine through only.

I doubt it, more a distraction to help Johnson back home rather than to help Ukraine.
I hope the #ucking lack of visas to Ukrainian refugees was on the table, people in UK want to help but the Government is asking for paperwork even for cat's being brought into the UK. 
I am glad we have sent weapons but we could be doing more to help the refugees. 

The front lines seem to be getting very confused in Kherson Oblast, both here in the south and north in the Kryvyi Rih direction. On this map, I've put in blue Okeksandria which Ukraine definitely holds, then three villages in red that Ukraine says it withdrew from in the last day or two. Yellow is Bilozerka, where there is fighting (and where there was fighting reported 3-4 days ago I believe). And for reference, purple is the frequenly on fire Kherson airport.
If all these reports are still accurate, some of the Russians along the T1501 road are in danger - there would be no way out of there without swimming.
Note, once again, the if those reports are still accurate though.

With 36 years' employment in the field I can reassure you that any such biography in 20 years time will be a work of fiction from someone bigging themselves up.  The US, having recently and with popular assent somewhat untidily extricated itself from one conflict last year is in no rush to become involved in another one directly. 
Enablers such as providing situational awareness, intelligence sharing plus lethal and non-lethal aid are of course being provided.  The old adage of 'if it ain't broke, don't fix it" will certainly be uppermost in the calculus of the US and its NATO allies which again makes direct intervention or other capers like officially sanctioned 'American Legions' highly unlikely.  History proves that 'deniable ops' simply aren't and that is particularly so in the current information environment.
'Almost perfect situational awareness' resulting in stuff mysteriously blowing up is also in the realm of 'doesn't happen.'  People are quick to tell me that "the int was rubbish" - "we weren't warned" etc, which is frequently an excuse to hide their own failings (not reading the intelligence or ignoring it (Mr Putin refers) being fairly common) or their misperception about the art of the achievable by the intelligence cell, unit or agency.
The factors for Ukrainian success are well-documented, roadbound columns, little or no attempt to enforce tactical spacings, little or no attempt at camouflage and concealment and the use of insecure communications on the part of the Russians.  On the part of the Ukrainians, once the limited axes of advance have been identified a combination of mark one eyeball, UAVs and tactical SIGINT provide sufficient means to develop a tactical picture of sufficient granularity to strike.   That they have been able to do so is because they have developed a command and control architecture which has allowed this information to be shared and acted upon quickly.  Some of it is very unsophisticated as explained on some of the videos we have seen:  UAV team goes out, launches from a wood near one of the identified road, flies the UAV until a target is seen and passes the target grid over VHF direct to a mortar unit.  BDA sent over same means, rinse and repeat as necessary.  Combat or tactical intelligence isn't particularly hard if you have a tactically incompetent and undisciplined opponent moving along easily identified axes of advance.