TheVulture

Does that mean that the main command center and reserve command center of the BSF have both been hit in a few days? (reserve on 20th, HQ today). Combined with the USV attack on russian ships and the dry docks, they are really turning up the pressure on the black sea fleet.
Well, if it's vulnerable, and expensive to replace, then why not. And it helps drive home the point (along with the increasing attacks on Russian infrastructure) that this isn't a war happening "somewhere else" as far as the Russians view it, but something that is having increasingly large effects in Russia that were obviously way beyond what was originally advertised.
Not that the Russians as a whole are going to be swayed by this, on current evidence...

Strikes me as a bit odd to reproach the Poles for getting rid of their old stuff, seeing as that old stuff was the same Soviet era stuff Ukraine was already using. A day after the invasion, if the Polish MoD offered Ukraine 200x Leo 2A6 OR 200x T-72, Ukraine would've been mad to take the Leos. Poland gave what was needed then and there. They also gave the Ukrainians Krabs, so it's not just old junk. Heck, their giving pattern isn't wholly dissimilar to the Dutch. I mean, old *** YPRs, second hand Leo 1A5s and PzH 2000.
So how about everyone calms their tits?
 

Wikipedia humour is quick off the mark:

Pretty intense, wallshaking bavovna after 0000. Massive and long. No sirens/alerts, no shelters opened. Informational vacuum in the dark of the night. Seems to be happening all over the place.
Here's to low CEP errors and reliable hardware. 

Enough accurate, though he skipped details of street clashes before pro-UKR forces came to Trade Union House. He also didn't tell pro-Russians not only threw Molotovs from the roof of House, but shot with firearms (pistol or hunting rifle), killing and wounding several pro-UKR activsts.  
Odesa, Zaporizhzia, Mykolaiv, Kherson oblasts were saved from Donbas/Crimea scenario due to active resistanse of more organized pro-Ukrainian citizens, when police either withdrew itself from own duties under the pretext "do not escalate" or secretly or directrly like in Odesa took pro-Russian side. Though, only in Odesa all was so violent, in other cities the level of pro-Russian uprising was very minor and all ended maximum with facebeating.  
Most originally separatism was suffocated in Zaporizhzhia. A handful of vatniks who dared to came on meeting for "Zaporizhzhia People Republic" under cover of police just was surrounded by pro-UKR people and they were pelted with eggs and flours.

This humilitation of "Russian world" lasted several hours, if pro-UKR activists would have also feathers, that pro-Rusian participants would became look like Guybrush Tripwood from Monkey Island 3 "Do you have a.... MADRE DE DIOS! El Polo Diablo!!!"
This action got the name "Egg Sunday" 

Wikipedia humour is quick off the mark:

Wikipedia humour is quick off the mark:

Wikipedia humour is quick off the mark:

Wikipedia humour is quick off the mark:

Wikipedia humour is quick off the mark:

Wikipedia humour is quick off the mark:

Confirmation of Samum listing and not underway under own power (edit: although being towed by tugs into this port is not unusual, still pretty clearly down by the stern):
 

I know I've argued before that using wargaming to predict the future - in the sense of "this is how this battle is going to play out" - is never going to give you good results, for all sorts of reasons.
What wargaming does very well is allowing you to run the same scenario many times, and possibly with slight variations. This lets you build up a picture of what is important and what isn't (and by extension, what it is important to simulate correctly in your wargame to improve its fidelity). 
You might find from your wargaming that the primary limiting factor on your ability to advance is the keeping the logistics flowing. Or you might conversely find that your logistics are fine, but your communications systems are too vulnerable and that 90% of your failed offensives are because key comms hubs got whacked too easily. Or that your doctrine greatly over/underestimates the density of troops needed to hold a defensive feature.
So maybe you learn that a) your doctrine needs to put more emphasis on protecting comms or having redundant capacity so that C3 is maintained for longer, and that simulations need to take care to model the effects of the presence or lack of effective C3,
For a specific battle you might end up identifying a key terrain feature that wasn't picked up by intelligence map preparation, but which control of often ends up playing an important role in the wargaming.
That kind of hypothesis testing and determining which are the critical inputs and which matter less, is what wargaming is great at. IMHO.

I know I've argued before that using wargaming to predict the future - in the sense of "this is how this battle is going to play out" - is never going to give you good results, for all sorts of reasons.
What wargaming does very well is allowing you to run the same scenario many times, and possibly with slight variations. This lets you build up a picture of what is important and what isn't (and by extension, what it is important to simulate correctly in your wargame to improve its fidelity). 
You might find from your wargaming that the primary limiting factor on your ability to advance is the keeping the logistics flowing. Or you might conversely find that your logistics are fine, but your communications systems are too vulnerable and that 90% of your failed offensives are because key comms hubs got whacked too easily. Or that your doctrine greatly over/underestimates the density of troops needed to hold a defensive feature.
So maybe you learn that a) your doctrine needs to put more emphasis on protecting comms or having redundant capacity so that C3 is maintained for longer, and that simulations need to take care to model the effects of the presence or lack of effective C3,
For a specific battle you might end up identifying a key terrain feature that wasn't picked up by intelligence map preparation, but which control of often ends up playing an important role in the wargaming.
That kind of hypothesis testing and determining which are the critical inputs and which matter less, is what wargaming is great at. IMHO.

I know I've argued before that using wargaming to predict the future - in the sense of "this is how this battle is going to play out" - is never going to give you good results, for all sorts of reasons.
What wargaming does very well is allowing you to run the same scenario many times, and possibly with slight variations. This lets you build up a picture of what is important and what isn't (and by extension, what it is important to simulate correctly in your wargame to improve its fidelity). 
You might find from your wargaming that the primary limiting factor on your ability to advance is the keeping the logistics flowing. Or you might conversely find that your logistics are fine, but your communications systems are too vulnerable and that 90% of your failed offensives are because key comms hubs got whacked too easily. Or that your doctrine greatly over/underestimates the density of troops needed to hold a defensive feature.
So maybe you learn that a) your doctrine needs to put more emphasis on protecting comms or having redundant capacity so that C3 is maintained for longer, and that simulations need to take care to model the effects of the presence or lack of effective C3,
For a specific battle you might end up identifying a key terrain feature that wasn't picked up by intelligence map preparation, but which control of often ends up playing an important role in the wargaming.
That kind of hypothesis testing and determining which are the critical inputs and which matter less, is what wargaming is great at. IMHO.

I know I've argued before that using wargaming to predict the future - in the sense of "this is how this battle is going to play out" - is never going to give you good results, for all sorts of reasons.
What wargaming does very well is allowing you to run the same scenario many times, and possibly with slight variations. This lets you build up a picture of what is important and what isn't (and by extension, what it is important to simulate correctly in your wargame to improve its fidelity). 
You might find from your wargaming that the primary limiting factor on your ability to advance is the keeping the logistics flowing. Or you might conversely find that your logistics are fine, but your communications systems are too vulnerable and that 90% of your failed offensives are because key comms hubs got whacked too easily. Or that your doctrine greatly over/underestimates the density of troops needed to hold a defensive feature.
So maybe you learn that a) your doctrine needs to put more emphasis on protecting comms or having redundant capacity so that C3 is maintained for longer, and that simulations need to take care to model the effects of the presence or lack of effective C3,
For a specific battle you might end up identifying a key terrain feature that wasn't picked up by intelligence map preparation, but which control of often ends up playing an important role in the wargaming.
That kind of hypothesis testing and determining which are the critical inputs and which matter less, is what wargaming is great at. IMHO.

An under-resourced and over-ambitious amphib operation is a great way to lose a lot of stuff really quickly.

A clear timeline, and explanation of the attacks on Crimea explaining success of Ukraine attacks 
Good footage as well
 

Not just Prussian (German by this point) regulations. This is how every army worked pre-WW1. And it's mainly about maintaining command and control. There are no radios or modern NCO corps yet, and no one can shout loud enough for orders to be heard along the entire length of a company or even platoon that has deployed into skirmish line (squads exist at this point in time, but they aren't independent maneuver elements yet). And it isn't really considered possible to change direction while in skirmish line (you can try to make a company sized skirmish line turn, but it's gonna be ugly (just imagine 200 men in an extended order line trying to conduct a 90 (or 45, or any number) degree turn, especially when no one on the flanks as even heard the order)). So you march to your start line for the attack in close order, get faced in the right direction, and then deploy into skirmish line to conduct the attack.
Once a unit has deployed into skirmish line they can only move forward. Once they have made contact with the enemy they are now the "firing line" and the higher level commander has effectively lost all command and control over that unit until it has finished its attack. So the only further influence the commander has over the battle is in committing reserves to the firing line. Those reserves may be held back behind the next terrain feature in close order, or following a few hundred meters behind (in close order if it is considered safe enough, or in extended order if enough fire is still reaching them). It is considered preferable to commit the reserves to the flank of the existing firing line, making it longer and preventing units from getting mixed up. But the limited frontages available for the attack usually meant that it was more practical to merge the reserves into the existing firing line from behind. The downside to merging the reserves in behind the existing firing line is that there is no way to prevent the units from getting mixed up.
After the attack is completed everyone needs to be called back into close order so they can be reorganized and reoriented for their next orders. I conceptualize it as being pretty similar to how we use mechanized infantry (can the order get any closer than being crowded into the back of an armored vehicle?). Only "move mounted and fight dismounted" becomes "move in close order and fight in extended order". But, while in theory you should always fight in extended order, in practice a unit moving in close order may get surprised, or a commander trying to keep his unit controllable "just that little bit longer" may misjudge how far it is safe to stay in close order. 
Everyone with any sense (and not everyone had any sense) has figured out by this point in time that units are extremely vulnerable to fire while they are in close order, so should always be shaken out into extended order before making contact. But no one has figured out a system of command and control that can entirely dispense with close order formations just yet. I think the problem was that existing maneuver elements were just too big to be controllable or maneuverable while in extended order. Light machineguns will give squads enough firepower to be a useful maneuver element (10 men with bolt action rifles can't really generate enough firepower on their own to be useful), and the forging of a modern NCO corps gives armies a high enough density of leaders to make squads useable maneuver elements. Once the squad has become a useable maneuver element you finally have a formation that is small enough to easily change direction and hear the shouted commands of its leader while in extended order.
But I digress. There is a whole other thread for this.

He's made some really good choices and saw where things were headed while others had head in sand.  But genius?
He drunk or mental illness binge bought twitter, tried to renege (even trying to wreck twitter stock value thinking it would help his case) and was forced to do the buy.  He paid $44B for a company worth maybe $20B.  And now it's worth what?  he then decided cost structure to high and binge fired over half the company w no plan or thinking.  That aint genius.  
He publicly wanted to fight his competitor, Zuckerburg of facebook.  And wanted to compare dicks.  That's not genius.
He thinks QAnon stuff actually makes sense.  That makes him an idiot, not a genius.  
He alienated the customer base for tesla cars (affluent libs) and had to dramatically cut prices.  The good news for tesla is that they are great cars and get the big tax break in US, so a lot of libs (some I know) held their nose and bought anyway, but he did serious damage.  So, not a genius.  
He thinks colonizing mars makes sense.  Except that it's insane.  Maybe he promotes this because he'll make fortune on the contracts for the stupidest endeavor in human history.  

I feel like I stepped in something and it just won't come off my shoe. 
@Battlefront.com can we please close the door on this silly immature nonsense?
Before @The_Capt starts posting AI pics visualizing their relationship... 
 

Meanwhile new war on Caucasus is coming.
Probably Azerbaijan will try to take whole territory of Nagornyi Karabakh and esatblish land corridor between Karabakh and Nakhichevan authonomy enclave.
Both Azerbaijanian and Armenian armies move troops to the border. Interesting that Azerbaijanian forces use Z and V symbols, but crossed out.

Also intersting that now Russia on background of cooling of relations with Armenia, will be likely unofficially support Azerbaijan. Armenian authorities, disappointed by reaction of Russia and ODKB alliance on Azerbaijanian offensive in Nagornyi Karabakh, now more and more turn to USA, claim intentions to leave ODKB. But more inetersting likely now Armenia has found new ally - Iran!
 
Iran and Turkey exchanged with sharp statements - Iran warned Turkey Azerbaijan and... Israel agaisnt invasion to Armenia. In own turn Turkey warned Iran that if their forces entere to Azerbaijan, Turkey armed foces will react immediately.
 

The Pentagon may finally be getting it.

you should delete this if you have any sense whatsoever, and hope it wasn't seen by the east coast forum admins who are probably asleep

I just wanted to take a moment to back up to the Challenger 2 discussion from Saturday, since there were a couple points I wanted to make.
The rifled gun does not make it more accurate. Modern tank rounds are fin stabilized, so they don't need to be spin stabilized. In fact, for wonky physics reasons that I don't fully understand, spinning apparently has a destabilizing effect on long rod projectiles (well, some spin still helps to stabilize it, but more than a tiny amount of spin will start destabilizing it again), which is why APFDSD rounds fired from rifled guns are actually designed to counteract the spinning. So the Challenger 2 isn't more accurate than any other modern western tank (in fact I believe it's actually less accurate than other western MBTs, though with a modern digital fire control system it's still pin-point accurate by Cold War standards). But it's easy enough to believe that it's more accurate than the T-64BVs, T-72Ms, and T-80BVs that most Ukrainian tankers would have had experience with before it arrived. The rifling also reduces the performance of kinetic energy rounds in penetrating armor relative to a smoothbore gun of the same size, though the Challenger 2 can still probably punch hard enough to deal with most Russian tanks easily enough.
The real advantage of the rifled gun is that it makes it possible to fire HESH effectively. Which is why it's puzzling that the Ukrainians apparently aren't receiving HESH ammunition. A Challenger 2 without HESH seems to be missing the point. Retaining a rifled gun into the modern day was a serious design compromise that the British army made specifically because they believed HESH was worth it. HESH (while not effective against modern MBTs) is a fantastic anti-personnel, anti-bunker, and anti-light vehicle round.