Eddy

Autumn Approaches: Part 1 - Reports by The Lookout (substack.com)
A somewhat sobering analysis of the Ukrainian offensive. Worth a read even if you may not agree with it.

Autumn Approaches: Part 1 - Reports by The Lookout (substack.com)
A somewhat sobering analysis of the Ukrainian offensive. Worth a read even if you may not agree with it.

I agree with Haiduk and Steve that there won't be any pro-russian insurgency in Crimea in case of UKR troops going in hot. But, yes, it is going to be hard to govern, for sure. Something good to look forward to anyway. 
It is quite hard to predict how the events will unfold exactly from now on. That raid was definitely fun though, even if only symbolical.

Operation Biting - Wikipedia 
This one?

Yes, that is the one. One of the more significant commando operations of the whole war.

Interesting read: 
Russians See Ukrainian Progress Where Others Don’t - New Lines Magazine
Pretty major push back on the 'Counter offensive is failing/too slow" line pushed by some newspapers and others. 

New Lines is an interesting mag,  I've read it for a while. 

Interesting read: 
Russians See Ukrainian Progress Where Others Don’t - New Lines Magazine
Pretty major push back on the 'Counter offensive is failing/too slow" line pushed by some newspapers and others. 

Interesting read: 
Russians See Ukrainian Progress Where Others Don’t - New Lines Magazine
Pretty major push back on the 'Counter offensive is failing/too slow" line pushed by some newspapers and others. 

Interesting read: 
Russians See Ukrainian Progress Where Others Don’t - New Lines Magazine
Pretty major push back on the 'Counter offensive is failing/too slow" line pushed by some newspapers and others. 

Interesting read: 
Russians See Ukrainian Progress Where Others Don’t - New Lines Magazine
Pretty major push back on the 'Counter offensive is failing/too slow" line pushed by some newspapers and others. 

Interesting read: 
Russians See Ukrainian Progress Where Others Don’t - New Lines Magazine
Pretty major push back on the 'Counter offensive is failing/too slow" line pushed by some newspapers and others. 

Interesting read: 
Russians See Ukrainian Progress Where Others Don’t - New Lines Magazine
Pretty major push back on the 'Counter offensive is failing/too slow" line pushed by some newspapers and others. 

So this right here is where I argue that western militaries should have seen this coming.  Perhaps it is unfair and overly hindsight driven but the fundamental issue was the massing of fires was no longer with the riflemen.  It was with artillery and machine guns.  The firepower reality changed however military doctrine had not - and no small part of this was cultural bias.  The battlefield was no longer one of superiority but mutual denial.  Advantage went to who ever could deny the longest hardest.
I fully agree that European militaries were kind of half way there by WW1 but they had failed to make the critical leap to realizing that the fabric of warfare had changed.  We are possibly living through another version of it today.  Mass and control of firepower may no longer be with mechanized combined arms.  It may have shifted to PGM and unmanned.

I didn't have a chance to respond to one of @The_Capt's post in the How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get thread this weekend (too busy sleeping, visiting family, and playing video games). Since it took me so long to get around to it I figured my response didn't belong in that thread anymore, hence the new thread. But military history and tactical development are hobby subjects for me, so I did want to get around to responding. Though my opening post is on tactical lessons and development leading up to and during WW1, I'm going to make the topic of this thread generic to tactical development in any era. I think a discussion of tactical lessons learned, missed, or miss-learned in the past could be helpful for grounding our understanding of tactical trends in the present. Understanding that the tacticians of the past may have had good reason, based on the evidence and analytical tools available to them, for reaching conclusions that we now know were wrong may help us have humility in our own conclusions about tactical trends in modern warfare. And understanding that they actually got more right than they get credit for may prevent us from too hastily rejecting the received view on a subject, merely because it is the received view.
I think it's arguable just how obvious a shift to defensive primacy should have been. The Franco-Prussian war certainly wouldn't have signaled a shift to defensive primacy for any casual observer of the time. The Prussians overran French defenses with hasty (bordering on reckless) attacks in battle after battle. If anything the war repeatedly demonstrated offensive primacy until the French field army was defeated at Sedan and the Prussians settled in for the Siege of Paris. While the Prussians weren't able to storm Paris's defenses, that alone didn't prove defensive primacy since it couldn't set it apart from any other siege that had been conducted over the last several thousand years of warfare. For all of recorded history up to that point there were field battles and there were sieges. Field battles lasted from a few hours to a few days, while sieges were attritional slogs that lasted for weeks or months. In fact even the Siege of Petersburg would have looked just like any other siege. It and other months-long sieges in the American Civil War would not have alerted anyone to any sort of shift towards defensive primacy. In fact, far from the participants of the Siege of Petersburg noting some new form of warfare, reports and letters from 1915 refer to WW1 as if the entire war had become one giant siege.
It's fair to criticize the French, who went into the Franco-Prussian war believing in defensive primacy, for overcorrecting and assuming absolute offensive primacy. But it's clear that the overcorrection didn't come out of nowhere. I'll note that the French seem to have a habit of overcorrecting too hard, assuming defensive primacy in the Franco-Prussian War, overcorrecting to total offensive primacy in WW1, and overcorrecting to total defensive primacy in WW2. Another tragic downside of Prussia's reckless attacks during the Franco-Prussian War being met with repeated success is that it led the Germans in WW1 to think that reckless attacks were a good idea. I think the Franco-Prussian war may have a number of cautionary tales for how we derive lessons from wars.
Defensive or offensive primacy are useful as broad concepts. But each is brought about by specific factors, and soldiers in the field still need to adapt to them with specific tactics. The difference between close order and extended order formations is not trivial. Close order means fighting in a multi-rank formation (normally two or three ranks deep) with each file brushing shoulders with the files next to it. Extended order means fighting in a single rank (technically Napoleonic skirmish lines were multi-rank formations, with filemates forming small teams, but I'm focusing on the late 19th/early 20th century here), with several meters between each soldier (as few as one or two meters in the early 20th century, but 5 to 10 meters is more common today). A close order formation is the classic Napoleonic block of infantry. The dispersed formations of modern infantry are examples of extended order formations (even if no one thinks to call them "extended order" anymore).
With the invention of smokeless powder bullets had enough penetration to tear through multiple people, so no only is a close order formation a much easier target to hit, but each hit is sure to inflict multiple casualties. Add in artillery firing high explosive shells and a single shell could inflict dozens of casualties on a close order formation, where it may have only inflicted a handful of casualties on an extended order formation. For a worst case scenario, at the Battle of Magersfontein the 3rd Highland Brigade was caught in quarter column, the densest formation possible for British troops, by Boar riflemen and was virtually annihilated. The British suffered nearly a thousand casualties at Magersfontein, 700 of them were suffered by the 3rd Highland Brigade in the first few minutes of the battle. Over the course of the 2nd Boar War British infantry in extended order were frequently able to overcome Boar defenses, albeit with heavy casualties. But every single British unit that attacked in close order was massacred. Even the Japanese, at the Battle of the Yalu (1904) took such heavy casualties while crossing the river in close order that they stopped in the middle of the battle to extend their order.
The importance of extended order was not the only lesson drawn from the wars leading up to WW1. Mostly what I have are lessons learned by the British army (it seems that most English speaking historians have a preference for writing about the British (which is very annoying for me, since I'm interested in everyone)). The importance of snap-shooting, and the ineffectiveness of volley fire, was taken to heart by the British after the 2nd Boar war. Post-Boar War British marksmanship training is some of the earliest that I'm aware of to feature pop-up targets. The need for the cavalry to be armed with the same rifle as the infantry was learned through the frustrating experience of cavalry armed with carbines being repeatedly outranged by Boars armed with rifles. This was a lesson that was apparently only learned by the British, with the other cavalry forces in 1914 going to war with carbines. The need to conceal the artillery, rather than firing from the open, was a lesson that was theoretically learned, but not taken to heart by every artillery officer. In 1914 it seems that even trying to keep the guns in concealed positions wasn't good enough, and they needed to be pushed back to the rear where they could only provide indirect fire support. And of course that introduced the problem of infantry-artillery coordination which would plague armies for much of WW1 (it's a lot easier for the artillery to know what to shoot at when they can see what they are shooting at).
And unfortunately, defensive primacy doesn't mean you can get away with just defending. You can't win a war by sitting in your trenches forever. Sooner or later you need to figure out how to push the enemy out of theirs. You have to find ways to attack successfully despite the primacy of the defense. This means finding specific countermeasures for specific causes of defensive primacy. The most frequently cited cause of defensive primacy in WW1 was the firepower imbalance between the attacker and the defender. The machinegun, being relatively immobile at first, provided more firepower to the defender than to the attacker. It was easier for the defender to use artillery effectively, since they only needed to put up a screening blanket of artillery in front of their positions, while the attacker had to figure out how to get the artillery firing on the right targets at the right time as the infantry advanced, all at a time before man-portable radios had been invented. The solution that was found for the firepower imbalance essentially came in three parts. The first was to get better at creating an artillery fire plan to support the infantry as well as possible (WW1 artillery tactics could, and probably do, fill entire books). The second was to invent tanks, which could provide more flexible direct fire support, engage targets which had been missed by the artillery, and continue providing heavy fire support to the infantry after the artillery fire plan inevitably broke down. The third was to increase the organic firepower of the infantry by introducing light machine guns and rifle grenades. All of those were important, but that third point in particular is not to be underestimated. Imagine playing as Commonwealth forces in CMBN, but your infantry have no Bren guns, only SMLEs. Attacking with rifle-only infantry, with no automatic weapons of any kind, is unthinkable on any post-1917 battlefield.
Another cause of defensive primacy was that armies had gotten so much larger. That, plus the increased dispersion of troops necessary to survive modern firepower, meant that armies could hold an unbroken frontline along an entire border. So you can't attack the flank of an army the way you might in the Napoleonic wars, because there are no flanks. It's frontal attacks or nothing. The obvious solution is to create some flanks by breaking through the frontlines. Unfortunately railroads make it easy for the defender to bring up reserves to plug a breakthrough, or to prevent a break-in from becoming a breakthrough. And the lack of mechanization, and the difficulty of trying to bring a field telephone up to recently captured positions, makes it difficult for the attacker to push reserves through a breakthrough to exploit, or into a break-in to turn it into a breakthrough in the first place. Another difficulty is that the dispersed battlefield makes command and control far more difficult. The obvious adaptation to the difficulty (near-impossibility, prior to man-portable radios) of issuing new orders to a unit in the middle of a battle is to script out every step of the attack in advance. This makes the battleplan rigid. When things went according to plan, the initial stage of a battle could go very well (the first day of the Battle of Neuve Chapelle). But even if things went to plan, the script would inevitably run out, with the result that any attempt to exploit initial success would fail miserably (second day of the Battle of Neuve Chapelle). And of course, things didn't always go to plan (first day of the Battle of the Somme).
The solution to these problems came in two parts. The first was to stop the battle before the script runs out. Give up on trying to achieve a breakthrough, or indeed on achieving any single decisive battle, and instead focus on wearing down the enemy with a series limited objective attacks at different points along the line. The hundred-days offensives which broke the German army in 1918 were a relentless series of limited objective attacks up and down the line, never letting up the pressure on the German line, while being careful to never press any one battle past its culmination point. The second was to accept that complete, centralized control of a battle was no longer possible. A single commander could not issue timely orders to react to developments in every corner of a dispersed battlefield. The solution was to invent the modern concept of mission command. Delegate greater authority down to lower and lower levels. The basic tactical units got smaller (from company at the beginning of the war, to squad at the end), with leaders at each level empowered to make decisions based on their local situation without being expected to wait for orders from above.
The trend in WW1 scholarship over the last couple of decades has been to reject the "Lions led by Donkeys" narrative (see Blackadder's portrayal of British high command (great comedy, terrible history)). The emerging view is that the leadership of the major combatants of WW1 (with the possible exceptions of the Russians and the Austrians) were generally competent and did about as well as could reasonably be expected (they certainly made no shortage of mistakes, but I've played too many wargames to judge them too harshly for that). In any case, they invented modern warfare in the space of just four years, with a pseudo-Napoleonic system as their starting point, so they must have been doing something right.
PS: I definitely have to grant that you have a point about the Austrian cavalry. But I think it's worth pointing out that the Austro-Hungarian army was a train wreck even by the standards of the time. Even the Russian army was less dysfunctional than the Austro-Hungarian army. And the only respects in which the early 20th century Russian army was better than the modern Russian army were that it could raise more troops and produce more stuff.

Sometimes?  😁

Russian TG:
Now contact line near Rabotino [ukr. Robotyne] is along this white line. UKR need to overcome just one field to reach northern part of the village

The idea of dropping munitions from planes to clear minefields was always a nonstarter in the past, for a number of reasons. As a new combat engineer private in the US army I remember watching a video (VHS I think) of Iraqi positions before deploying and the DoD wanted recommendations on how to breach them. Afterward I told the lieutenant we should just do a B-52 strike to clear a path. He didn't respond. The airstrikes were always too inaccurate and the ground could be impassible to vehicles.
There are two different ideas here that should be clarified: breaching a minefield and clearing a minefield. Frankly both are scary.
The explosives in mines is very stable, and the fuse is the key to setting it off. (when fatigued and stupid we would toss explosives around in really unsafe ways, but here I still am) So to actually clear a mine explosive needs to be placed directly on/next to it or it needs to be physically removed. Both of these require the mine to have been discovered by the persons doing the clearing. And then you have to be in the minefield doing stuff like, pop and drops, ring mains and line mains.
To breach the minefield the mines simply need to be moved out of the way. This is where MICLICs and bangalore torpedoes come in, vehicles with plows, and maybe airstrikes if they can be precise and not destroy the ground rendering movement impossible. They are expected to blow the mines out of the way, and if they detonate them that's good. But not expected. So napalm could work if it was hot enough to ignite the fuses. Otherwise it would be very poor as it would not push the mines out of the way.
I appreciate these discussions about the more modern state of mines and mine clearing, especially drones. My heart breaks to see the density of the minefields that are being laid. This will takes many years to clear and the cost to the locals will likely be extraordinary. Perhaps more and better automated mine clearing is the key, I feel like we have neglected this like many things as we thought these wars were a thing of the past.

If you have a spare 1 and a half hours this is well worth a watch IMHO.
I'm not going to attempt to summarise it  It does include their take on the Prig thing but much more than that as you can probably guess from the title.

If you have a spare 1 and a half hours this is well worth a watch IMHO.
I'm not going to attempt to summarise it  It does include their take on the Prig thing but much more than that as you can probably guess from the title.

If you have a spare 1 and a half hours this is well worth a watch IMHO.
I'm not going to attempt to summarise it  It does include their take on the Prig thing but much more than that as you can probably guess from the title.

The first use was in 2017 in Afghanistan. I think it's a matter of delivery i.e. getting it to the target safely. There may be other constraints. Russians have their own version too. 
 

Yes.  Modern line charges have a FAE version - name escapes me.  They detonate or destroy a lane through over-pressure.  However it is very high risk to simply drive through without proving.
Now if we are talking airdropped, apparently someone already tried it and it did not work out too badly, with PGM this could be onto something.  However, I am willing to bet the system may be defeatable by simply adapting the fuses of the mines.
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA251392

A quick analysis from RUSI about the Prigozhin mutiny/coup/thing
Prigozhin’s Rebellion: What We Discovered, and What We Still Need to Know | Royal United Services Institute (rusi.org)
What Putin got right
stopped the situation getting out of control What Putin got wrong
failed to prevent the escalation between Prig and Shoigu made decisions without being fully informed i.e. surrounded by 'Yes' men misjudged the situation What do we know
No mass defections. As FSB/GRU/MOD are such top down organisations any successful future uprising will need the support of senior intelligence/MOD people Wagner is likely to be disbanded Official negotiations with Prig unlikely to be as appeared The role of Lukashenko has been much inflated Future
Shoigu's position is assured, for now Unsung people will be rewarded (mentions a number of people) There will be a shake up of sorts

Interesting read from Jack Watling at RUSI. Will only take a few minutes to read and well worth it
Wagner’s March on Moscow Left Unresolved Challenges in its Wake | Royal United Services Institute (rusi.org)