Erwin

We've had interesting discussion here re the sim vs game issue and the possible uses of CMSF as a training tool and how valid that is etc. Here is an interesting discussion between a couple guys I had the pleasure of working with some time ago: http://www.tsjonline.com/story.php?F=4995893 The gaming debate November 24, 2010 Michael Peck’s article “Less is more” in August/September TSJ prompted a spirited debate among experts on the usefulness of games as an education tool in military academies and the standards applied to them versus those applied to traditional, large-scale simulations such as OneSAF. Col. John R. “Buck” Surdu, military deputy director at the U.S. Army Communications & Electronics Research Development and Engineering Center in Maryland, argues that games-based systems should meet the same verification standards as conventional simulations. James Sterrett, deputy lead, simulations at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College’s Digital Leader Development Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., counters that comparing big sims with small games is an apples-to-oranges exercise: Each has a different role and set of requirements. And Jim Lunsford, president of Kansas City-based games maker Decisive-Point, makes the point that any debate on games should focus on the end goal and the quality of training, not the tool. Col. John R. “Buck” Surdu The article “Less is more,” like most articles I have read about “serious games,” misses a number of important points. First, the article misses the difference between the user interface and what is under the hood. Decisive-Point President Jim Lunsford is quoted as saying that his games must be learnable in 10 minutes and then compares his games to simulations like Corps Battle Simulation (CBS) and One Semi-Automated Forces (OneSAF). I agree that our simulations (and in fact our battle command systems) could use simpler, more intuitive interfaces. But let’s not confuse the fact that the user interface is independent of the quality of the simulation “under the hood.” Could intuitive, gamelike interfaces be applied to OneSAF or its ilk? Absolutely! Will the requirements developers for these simulations allow the product managers to spend money on better interfaces? Usually not! The requirements developers often insist on packing more functionality into Army simulations and refuse to let the program managers spend time and money improving the interfaces (e.g., user interface, editing tools, scenario creation tools). Does it make sense to spend $100,000 on a new game or to spend $30,000 to add a gamelike interface to OneSAF, which has already had what is under its hood verified and validated (V&V)? The irony is that, in most cases, the same people who are demanding more functionality (rather than usability) and high levels of verification and validation (rather than an engaging experience) from a WarSim or a OneSAF are the same ones who are willing to sacrifice that functionality and V&V if you call the software a “game.” Second, I’m unaware that anyone has taken the time to conduct V&V on these “games.” Do we understand where there might be negative learning because the combat effects are incorrect? In the article, Lunsford admits that 70 percent of the solution is the instructor. I concur, but do we understand how much of that 70 percent is related to the underlying models within the game and how much is related to pedagogy? If V&V in our games is unnecessary -— although I believe it is necessary — then let’s relax the requirement for all our simulations. Otherwise, we should enforce the requirement for all of them. These comparisons of Army simulations built as programs of record, versus quickly developed games, are apples-to-oranges comparisons. They are not held to the same standards of V&V, functionality, entity counts, detailed interaction with battle command systems, per-seat cost (The Army only pays for OneSAF once; how many licenses of several games have we bought instead of building customized interfaces to OneSAF for specific uses?), or accountability. I have yet to see a true apples-to-apples comparison or scholarly analysis that looks at all these factors. The community is rushing to develop many one-off games. Have we forgotten the landscape in the ’70s and ’80s when none of our simulations could talk to each other or real battle command systems. Are we rushing to re-create that same environment? James Sterrett Regarding Col. John Surdu’s concerns about serious games, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) use simulations to create low-overhead, execution-centric learning environments, often running tens or hundreds of simultaneous, completely independent exercises. Warsim and OneSAF can provide great execution-centric learning environments, but the overhead they require doesn’t support the majority of the education executed by CGSC. This is simply recognition of what the tools can and cannot do. There are limitations to large simulations, just as our low-overhead classroom simulations cannot support large live-virtual-constructive exercises. Addressing Surdu’s points more directly, would CBS/OneSAF/ Joint Land Component Constructive Training Capability (JLCCTC) serve CGSC better? The answer is no; where their capabilities overlap with our objectives, the big Army simulations cost too much to run and they often don’t support the educational objectives. We need to run many concurrent independent exercises (every February we have 17 division exercises running) to create a similar educational experiences for all our students. From experience, we know that the overhead of conducting even one of these exercises with a more detailed simulation than Jim Lunsford’s Decisive Action is prohibitive, and that merely adding a “game interface” to a major Army simulation does not make it simpler to manage, due to the level of detail that still must be managed. Big simulations also do not address all the required scenarios. There is no other capability to address years of force management and budgeting, as Future Force does. Likewise for long-term stability operations, where we use Elusive Victory and UrbanSim — two different simulations in order to deliver economical support to both staff group exercises and individual/small group exercises. Forward into Battle and Fueling the Force provide highly accessible introductions to the logistical problems they present. Again, there is no economical replacement. Elusive Victory is being built to serve in up to 88 simultaneous, completely independent, 16-student exercises; the other games I mentioned are intended to provide simultaneous, completely independent exercises to groups of two to four students totaling more than 350 exercises at once. Big simulations are useful under the right circumstances. We use OneSAF at CGSC to train Functional Area 57 Simulation Operations students, who use it in an eight-hour simulation-stimlation-C4I practical exercise during an elective course. For that purpose, OneSAF suits our educational objectives admirably. As for Surdu’s concerns about the validation process for games, ours is driven by instructors, who validate the tools we offer against their educational objectives. The instructors we support are happy that the tools we provide are suitable for their purpose: We meet their educational objectives while using the minimum possible time on teaching students to learn the tools. I agree that because they have different objectives, the comparison between the big program of record simulations, and our simulations, is often an apples-to-oranges comparison. The big simulations are intended to support large collective training events, while ours are supposed to support individual leader development and education. The apples-to-apples comparison should run on the basis of intended learning outcomes and constraints on overhead. Different tools serve different tasks. Jim Lunsford Serious games are here to stay. When properly developed, fielded, and used, they are a very effective and relatively low-cost way to educate and train. It is as ludicrous to think that serious games will replace larger military simulations as it is to think that simulations, of any kind, will ever replace the need for most live training. Serious games should be viewed as a set of simple, effective, individual cognitive skills or team training devices used routinely at home, in the classroom or the unit area. When employed properly, serious games can better prepare individuals and units for live training or larger military simulation-supported training exercises. Rather than wasting time and energy comparing apple and oranges, what we, as a military and a society, really need is a strong vision for the future use of serious games and a viable strategy for their acquisition and integration into our education and training programs. Why even use serious games? The simple answer is that most of what we learn as leaders is actually more complex than is readily apparent. To truly understand 90 percent of what we teach and train such as doctrine, tactics, weapons employment, leadership, etc., requires more than just reading and discussion. Until we have observed someone performing the task, or better yet done it ourselves, and then had a chance to reflect on what happened and why, we only have a rudimentary understanding of the subject. We might be able to score an A+ on the written test, but at the practical level, we are still essentially ignorant. However, once we experience the “ah-hah” moment in the field or within a suitable and acceptable simulated experience, particularly if the learning is shaped by an excellent facilitator, we start the process of learning not just the science, but the art of our profession. Well-designed games, integrated within sound instructional strategies, provide a strong foundation to not only experience the revelations associated with intellectual discovery, but a means to repeatedly practice the newly learned knowledge almost anytime and anywhere. Serious games can also address a vast set of requirements for which no traditional military simulation exists. During the last year, one of the games we developed for the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College supports instruction on Army force management. Using “Future Force,” students practice managing the Army budget during a 20-year period while creating and maintaining the proper force structure to effectively respond to any contingency. This requirement, and many like them, cannot be met with existing military simulations. Serious games should and often do undergo a form of VV&A (verification, validation and accreditation); VV&A is not rocket science. It is merely a structured methodology to ensure the models within the game perform as claimed by the developer (verification), correctly model the intended behavior (validation) and are acceptable to the instructors for their intended use in the training program (accreditation). For serious games, a continuous, informal VV&A can be conducted during the spiral development process by the organization or institution responsible for the courseware the game is being developed to support. Serious games do not constitute a revolution in training and education. They are just a new form of simulation-supported training. Knowing when and how to use them is as important as knowing when and how to use any other existing training tool. In order to effectively take full advantage of their capabilities while recognizing their limitations, we should train our leaders and instructors in their use as part of their professional development. For no matter how good the game may appear to be, the quality of training will always depend on the instructor’s ability to shape learning. In the very near future, serious games will be as prolific as textbooks. Students everywhere will actively use simple, focused, games to enhance their educational experience in just about every course of instruction. They will use these games to practice the art of their craft as well as better understand the science prior to conducting the task for the first time as a live event. Will we be ready as a nation to take full advantage of this capability?

I really do appreciate the dilemma of time delays and it certainly affects many peoples' enjoyment of the game. It's the rationale behind getting rid of them that doesn't convince me. The innovative introduction of Delays in CMBO was brilliant as it enormously helped depict how different nationalities and units with different levels of experience functioned. It helped make the CM1 games "feel" more realistic and provided a greater sense of immersion than any other comparable game I can recall. It wasn't the concept of delays that was a problem, it was the enormous exponential increase in delays that became frustrating. Waiting 90 secs for a unit to move may actually have been quite realistic or even unrealistically fast(!) in some instances. But, it wasn't FUN. I was hoping that all BF needed to do was REDUCE the delays - especially when one builds up 10+ waypoints. Just because it's a compromise and not a perfect solution doesn't mean that the "delay concept" isn't still a really innovative, useful and clever device to add an extra dimension of verisimilitude to the CM series. What I am saying is that there is a real danger of the "baby being thrown out with the bathwater." I imagine it's too late to change minds for CM:BN. But, please, please keep an open mind on the delay concept for future releases.

Another thing I noticed... If you are lucky enuff to get a kill from a hull-down ATGM vehicle, don't do a 2nd pop-up at the same location to try and get a 2nd kill. The AI seems quite good at getting the enemy to focus attention at that position and there's a higher chance they'll kill you if you repeat.

I loved Dinas and Hasrabit, (well still am loving em) for exactly the reasons you outline PT. However, I hope all designers appreciate that it's great to have a MIXTURE of hard and less hard scenarios, otherwise playing can turn into work, and I have literally gotten headaches from some scenarios. Variety is the spice...

PT: Thanks... I'm glad that you considered all this in your Campaign. It makes sense. However, I have played many standalone scenarios that would benefit from the enemy fighting on a bit longer. So, it's just my personal plea to all designers to at least consider this.

I would like to see hookers and leather-clad bikers lounging outside bars. But, I have a sinking feeling...

So Dietrich, are you saying that it is not possible to know what load-out remains after an aircraft has used up all ammo in a particular bar? (ie: In the game, ammo seems to be allocated randomly/unsystematically in the vertical bars?)

Thanks for the info Juan. Useful.

Often it is impossible to find 2000+m distances in which to use these guys. So, please designers, bear that in mind if you want to include these units, otherwise they die very quickly.

One comment re your default set-up is that my personal preference is that you simply place all the (rescue column) units in a large set-up zone and while leaving the smaller zones where you currently have small formations set up on the flanks, allow the player to make the decision whether to place units in those flank set-up areas. The fact that you have already place units on the R and L flanks gives the player a quandary. Are you hinting that units MUST be placed there and do something or the game could be problematic? Can I "safely" remove all those units and do something completely different with them? So, why do that part of the set-up for the player? Can you allow us to do that, or does that create game problems?

One of my favorite scenarios: UK Royal Mud Marines (Brits) I think there may be a US or Marine version as well. On the first objective (a fort on a hill) are a couple of bunkers in woods that one cannot see until one is almost on top of them. That means one has to use only inf and their inf support weapons. I probably played and reloaded the "assault those bunkers turns" more than any other in all the time I played CMSF as I wanted to see how to deal with bunkers with only inf support weapons. (I found that one needed to gang up on each bunker with 3-6 squads using TARGET and firing the Brit Light Anti Structure Munitions (LASM's?) or whatever they are called. One has to quickly suppress the crews and then it takes a few turns of TARGET to kill em all or force an abandonment.)

No worries. I am sure we all saw that bug and gave you the benefit of the doubt.

Ok thanks. I am addicted to covering arcs in all situations. But, to me, "hiding" means lying down and keeping quiet so the enemy doesn't detect you. But, I guess it's another example of the intuitive/common sense tactic of hiding when conducting an ambush not functioning in the game as (my) common sense would predict. Now the add-on question is that when in a daylight ambush I used HIDE (but my guys were able to see the enemy approaching...) However, the enemy was surprisingly able to detect my hiding guys at 100+ meters and commenced shooting at them. Again, this doesn't seem "realistic" but is this just another feature of the game that has to be taken into account? I recall that it took an awful long 10+ minutes for any enemy to appear, so maybe, in the first minute, one is supposed to immediately move away from the default ambush area to positions that are more like 200-300 meters away and then hide to await the enemy. Is that what you guys do?? Thanks for all the helpful replies btw. I like to get to really understand a game.

Thanks for supporting CMA... It's been a bit thin over there.

I have always rationalized command delays as a part of trying to stay alive. All units are close to the enemy in the CM games so if I were the tank CO, I would slow down/stop a lot at those corners just to be sure I didn't get an 88mm welcome basket. And just because one orders someone to move to a location one would expect there would be a few secs thought/discussion on how best to do that, plus picking up weapons, checking everything etc. Agreed that when one had a lot - say a dozen or more waypoints, the amount of time delay started to go up exponentially - and that seemed to be the primary source of complaints. If one or two orders had only a few seconds delay, and the delays didn't go up exponentially the more waypoints one used, I suspect there wouldn't be so much concern or controversy about this. It's also what level of command does the player imagine himself to be at. Since the units have pretty good game AI I always saw the player role as Battalion or Company CO, so one would expect delays in execution of orders. And taking that command chain into account was part of the fun. I have been quite surprised to find that other CM players want to take on the role of every single NCO in the game and therefore it's ok for all units to move immediately in perfect concert like clockwork. Nothing wrong with either approach, just different strokes... Obviously, one camp is going to be disappointed.

Yes, however, once you've used up a certain column of ammo you need to know what is in the remaining columns so you know what sort of strike Light/Medium/Heavy to order. I mean, someone somewhere must know what the 5 columns represent munitions-wise.

I want CM:BN to be successful as much as you and everyone else here does. Just beware saying that it's "better than CM1" as you will raise expectations that cannot be met. I predict a "less than optimal response" from the CM1 community just as there was with CMSF if they hear that CM:BN is supposed to be an improvement over, or successor to CM1. The CM2 game system is a different game to CM1 and (personally) I play it and enjoy it for different reasons than why I still play CM1.

Anyone who claims that they can order someone to simply drive down the road and take a few simple turns with no time delay please come and demonstrate that with my (two degrees and senior executive) wife. Please...

Thank goodness he survived! Will make a great movie lol.

Once you get to playing the Brit forces I highly recommend Royal Mud Marines as it uses all the weird soft vehicles the Brits have (and no AFV's of any kind). It teaches ammo resupply for support weapons and use of demo charges and LASM's as well. It's a large scenario, but if you can master it, you basically can accomplish anything with the Brits after that.

Ooops. Am familiar with the Germans' PzFaust problem, but I thought the satchel charges issue was fixed (at least for the Canadians). You saying that now the Dutch don't have charges?

The "early surrender" issue is pretty common. I understand the easy fix is to design enemy reinforcements that would appear only AFTER the clock has run out - but since the AI considers those never arriving reinforcements as part of the overall points calculation, it won't surrender so fast. Is that correct? If so, why don't we see more scenarios using this "trick." It's so much more satisfying to win by getting all the objectives even if it's easier/a walkover at the end. It's like a reward for being successful imo.

Looking forward to seeing/experiencing the evil juicy surprises you design with the IED/Bunker/Vehicle combo.

Well, aircraft have: guns/bullets rockets ATGM's dumb bombs smart bombs Anyone know if that accounts for the 5 columns? (You'd think this info would be easy to find in the manual.)

Thanks for the comments but the scenario I tried was urban, and immediately after a 3-4min bombardment with 3x150mm arty I cease fired to see the effect, and it was virtually nil, no suppression, just a few wounded and one KIA. (Maybe I spread out the barrage too long a linear line.) But, I see other threads here that say that arty has been downgraded in effectiveness in the latest patch(es). Do you find Area fire better, or is the Russian arty inaccurate enuff to get that effect thru Point fire? (And yes, I use "General.") I wonder if using "Armor" vs buildings would be more effective? In the several night and day ambush scenarios I have played, it seems much easier for the Muj to surprise the Russians who are lying in wait. But, I will try and not HIDE my inf at night and see if that is more effective. I just don't understand how hiding units at night can be surprised by a moving unit. Note that in a DAY ambush scenario in which my guys were hiding with small arcs, the Muj spotted them over a hundred meters away and started firing at my guys. This required me to prematurely unhide and return fire as I would have taken casualties otherwise, but my ambush was ruined.