JonS

*shhh*! We're having a fact-free nationalistic circle-jerk. Please do not intrude with your so-called "reality", or I'll set Kettler on you.

*shhh*! We're having a fact-free nationalistic circle-jerk. Please do not intrude with your so-called "reality", or I'll set Kettler on you.

Pnzrskrtwrfr,
If CM:BS were set in Montana following an invasion by Canada supported by North Korea, you might have a point. In that case, the US would probably throw everything including the kitchen sink into the fight, feeling they had no choice since they were about to be overwhelmed by crazed kimchi-wielding Canucks. Meanwhile, in this corner of the multi-verse, the US is not fighting for national survival, and can chose what assets to pitch into battle. And in this, or any other comparable optional fight against a first- or second-tier opponent, it is more than a little unlikely that they'd pitch in the A-10 when the USAF can instead use F-16s or -18s, or whatever, to deliver the same effects in safety.
 
The Ukraine and the USS.. er, Russia don't have the same choices.

No, it does not. It comes down to BOTH of those arguments. The airspace would be lethal for both the A-10 and the Su-25. Nevertheless it is likely that Russia would still be using the Su-25 and would pitch them into the battle in lieu of any better options. The US has better options and so would use them.
 
You are pigheadedly trying to apply reasoning that is only valid for one side as if it were equally valid for both. It isn't. Different nations have different motivations, assets, and options - go figure!
 
Local air superiority or just local air parity. Even the Germans in 1944 occasionally managed to create pockets of time and space in which their beaten airforce could conduct CAS missions.
 
Pnzr, one final point: whenever you find yourself in a position where Kettler is your most vocal support, you really, desperately need to re-examine your assumptions.

Pnzrskrtwrfr,
If CM:BS were set in Montana following an invasion by Canada supported by North Korea, you might have a point. In that case, the US would probably throw everything including the kitchen sink into the fight, feeling they had no choice since they were about to be overwhelmed by crazed kimchi-wielding Canucks. Meanwhile, in this corner of the multi-verse, the US is not fighting for national survival, and can chose what assets to pitch into battle. And in this, or any other comparable optional fight against a first- or second-tier opponent, it is more than a little unlikely that they'd pitch in the A-10 when the USAF can instead use F-16s or -18s, or whatever, to deliver the same effects in safety.
 
The Ukraine and the USS.. er, Russia don't have the same choices.

It’s always amusing when people play the ‘I’m younger than you, so you fuddy-duddys just listen to me and my idea which nobody has ever had before in the history of ideas!’ card. It’s almost as funny as the ‘I’m older than you, so you whippersnappers just settle back and listen to me and my perspective!’ card.   So, because this is my post, settle back now while I share a bit of perspective.   Way back in the day, when heyhellowhatsnew was still wearing short shorts and the intarwebs were being delivered over taut wet string at 2400 baud, there was a PC game by HPS called Panzer Campaigns : Normandy ’44. When first released it had a mode where the two AIs could be set one against the other. That feature had been built during alpha and beta testing to assist scenario designers and it was kinda sorta useful, although the longer the scenario ran, the less useful it was. And, of course, scenarios tended to be long to very long.   So, that was ok – a barely useful feature that a very few people did manage to get some limited utility out of. And it already existed, so they decided to include it as part of the public release. It couldn’t hurt, right?   Then one fine day some dude decided to run the longest scenario in CPU v CPU mode. Initially the game played fairly well and Dude was full of praise in his ongoing AAR. But predictably, and expectedly, after a fairly short period the AIs started floundering and the progression of the scenario became increasingly absurd. And the tone in the AARs became increasingly b!tchy and accusatory. Various people, including the developer, tried to explain that what Dude was seeing wasn’t unusual, and what he was trying to do really wasn’t what the mode was intended for. But still he pressed on, wasting more and more of his own time, and complaining with increasing bitterness about how the developer was ‘forcing’ him to waste his time with such a substandard implementation. People told him that it wasn’t going to magically change mid-game, and probably wouldn’t be patched anyway because the mode was barely useful, and making it more useful would take too much effort for basically no reward. But Dude wouldn’t listen, and pressed on becoming increasingly vitriolic and irrational in his blame of anyone and everyone for forcing him to waste his time. Eventually the developer got sick of it all, dropped the banhammer, and subsequently pulled the feature with the next patch release.   True story. I stumbled across it when I started doing some private modding and editing of Normandy ‘44 and thought that a CPU v CPU mode might be useful to me.   Fast forward to a time when heyhellowhatsnew gets to wear big boy pants. In CMx2 I regularly test scenarios in what is effectively CPU v CPU. I build the attacking AI, and then test it against an inert defence, by mashing the GO button as quickly as the Blue Bar™ will let me. This lets me see how the attack plan is synchronised in time and space, shows how the attacking AI copes with a basic defence, allows me to fine tune the defensive layout, and also suggests possible defensive AI movements. The point here is that while a full CPU v CPU might be somewhat useful than what I already do, I doubt that it’d be more useful enough to justify either the time spent on it, nor the likelihood of a Normandy ’44-style débâcle.   By the by, the way I recall ‘baked’ scenarios it was a CMx1 thing that had little to do with CPU v CPU. The way I remember it, a scenario could be ‘baked’ which meant that it could not be opened in the editor, which prevented unscrupulous players trying to gain an advantage by seeing exactly what was on the other side of the hill. This was really useful for tournies. You had to be careful, though, since once it was baked not even the original designer could get back in to the file. Maybe something like it will come back one day, but it – too – probably isn’t useful enough to bother with. I have no recollection of Mikey’s description of CMx2 baking, at all :confused:   Jon

The early-war GAF was efficient at close battlefield support, which is great, but they were utterly pants at the strategic mission of subduing the RAF during the Battle of Britain. And that was at least in part because they didn't have a strategic airforce and perhaps more importantly, the strategic mindset that goes with it. Failing to subdue the RAF cost them the war. It matters not a whit how 'inefficient' the solution is if the efficient alternative cannot produce the desired effect.

If the Western Allies hadn't conducted the CBO, then the GAF never would have been crushed in the first half of 1944, because they would always have had the option to 'pull back' and refuse the fight, which is exactly what the RAF had and did during the BoB. The super-long-ranged P-51 would never have been developed because there'd be no imperative to protect non-existent bombers on which weren't flying long-range raids into Germany. And with their home manufacturing base completely undamaged ... yeesh. It doesn't really bear thinking about what they could have turned out given a free hand at home.
 
There seems to be an idea that the German's late-war dispersion of production was a consequence-free decision that at a stroke negated all the effects of the CBO. Uh ... no. Aside from the massive effort (= consumption of scarce resources) to set up alternate sites, and the massive opportunity cost of actually halting production in one place and spreading it out to dozens of others ... even if we ignore all that, the dispersed production was itself highly inefficient and demanded a much higher overhead of management and coordination. There is a reason manufacturing undertakings tend towards massive centralisation.
  The Allies already had more tanks, aircraft and ships than they could use, and 50 batteries of 155mm hows parked in England would have done diddly squat to the transportation system in NWE. I also wonder how it is proposed to deliver nuclear weapons in the absence of, you know, any bombers.

Somewhere there's a village trying to find their missing Kettler.

Cost - features - time

That's why.

I fondly(?) recall a former member here ripping into SPR because the chin straps on the para's helmets were wrong for that time period
 
It was at that point that I realised that wargamers complaining about war movies usually aren't actually complaining about the movie, they're just using it as a strawman against which to display their own superior knowledge of 70-year-old arcana. Yay them, I guess.

I fondly(?) recall a former member here ripping into SPR because the chin straps on the para's helmets were wrong for that time period
 
It was at that point that I realised that wargamers complaining about war movies usually aren't actually complaining about the movie, they're just using it as a strawman against which to display their own superior knowledge of 70-year-old arcana. Yay them, I guess.

http://community.battlefront.com/topic/109190-the-sheriff-of-oosterbeek-%E2%80%93-a-scenario-design-daraar/page-7#entry1440462
 
http://community.battlefront.com/topic/109190-the-sheriff-of-oosterbeek-%E2%80%93-a-scenario-design-daraar/page-7#entry1441254
 
http://community.battlefront.com/topic/109190-the-sheriff-of-oosterbeek-%E2%80%93-a-scenario-design-daraar/page-8#entry1441938
 
http://community.battlefront.com/topic/109190-the-sheriff-of-oosterbeek-%E2%80%93-a-scenario-design-daraar/page-9#entry1442801
 
http://community.battlefront.com/topic/109190-the-sheriff-of-oosterbeek-%E2%80%93-a-scenario-design-daraar/page-10#entry1443370
 
http://community.battlefront.com/topic/109190-the-sheriff-of-oosterbeek-%E2%80%93-a-scenario-design-daraar/page-12#entry1446224

'Set-Piece' (or deliberate) attack is at the grand-tactical/operational level, not strategic - mainly because you don't bother about battles at the strategic level, you're worried about campaigns. Op COBRA and Op QUEEN were both set piece battles. Basically, the idea is to take the time to get all your ducks in a row before the battle starts. That means arranging the fire support, conducting battle-specific training, organising units into assault - 2nd echelon - reserve, and positioning them accordingly, preparing and delivering orders down to a very low level (ie, the corps commander prepares and presents orders to his divisional commanders, who then derive and prepare their own orders and present them to their regimental commanders, who then prepare and present their orders to the battalion commanders, who prepare and present their orders to the company commanders, who prepare and present their own orders to their platoon commanders, who prepare and present orders to their squad commanders, who brief/present orders to their squads), distribution of aerial photos and maps with intel overlays, stockpiling of ammunition, fuel, and specific stores that might be needed (such as bridging material), etc. Then the whole thing kicks off at a specific time according to the designated H-hour, with all the various parts moving in a coordinated fashion and thus maxmising the  leverage that combined arms brings to the battlefield, as well as any other specific advantages that the attacker might have (such as better training, or comms, or intel, or night vision gear, or fire support, etc.)
 
There are loads of examples of set piece battles from Korea, as well as some from Vietnam. The opening ground phase of Op DESERT STORM was a set piece too, especially the USMC assault straight up the guts into Kuwait. Crossings of major rivers are often set-piece, mainly because of the pronounced advantages the defender enjoys and the need to bring up bridging stores.
 
The downside of set-piece is that they can take a while to set up, and thus generally give the defender more time to prepare his defence and/or divine exactly where the boot is going to fall and prepare appropriately. Often once a front has settled down for a while, a set-piece is appropriate because the defender will have thoroughly prepared his defence, and the attacker is not required to press the tempo by attacking ASAP. Surpirse can be tricky to accomplish in a set-piece, but on the other hand the time taken to tee-up a set piece means that a comprehensive deception plan can be prepared and enacted, to generate a very high degree of surprise - Op DESERT STORM is a great example here. Saddam knew the Coalition forces were coming, and he knew down to the day when they'd be coming. But he had no idea where they'd be coming, and was soundly thrashed in part because of that surprise.
 
There isn't really a sharp split between meeting engagements, hasty attacks, and deliberate/set-piece attacks. The boundaries between them are quite fluid depending on the specific circumstances. An operation can also transition quickly between the three - Op COBRA, for example, started as a deliberate/set-piece and stayed that way for 2-3 days. After that there was a short period of hasty attacks, then it transitioned again to meeting engagements as the Americans made a clean break through the complete depth of the German's prepared defences. Sometime later it transitioned again to a hasty attack by the Germans at Mortain.

'Set-Piece' (or deliberate) attack is at the grand-tactical/operational level, not strategic - mainly because you don't bother about battles at the strategic level, you're worried about campaigns. Op COBRA and Op QUEEN were both set piece battles. Basically, the idea is to take the time to get all your ducks in a row before the battle starts. That means arranging the fire support, conducting battle-specific training, organising units into assault - 2nd echelon - reserve, and positioning them accordingly, preparing and delivering orders down to a very low level (ie, the corps commander prepares and presents orders to his divisional commanders, who then derive and prepare their own orders and present them to their regimental commanders, who then prepare and present their orders to the battalion commanders, who prepare and present their orders to the company commanders, who prepare and present their own orders to their platoon commanders, who prepare and present orders to their squad commanders, who brief/present orders to their squads), distribution of aerial photos and maps with intel overlays, stockpiling of ammunition, fuel, and specific stores that might be needed (such as bridging material), etc. Then the whole thing kicks off at a specific time according to the designated H-hour, with all the various parts moving in a coordinated fashion and thus maxmising the  leverage that combined arms brings to the battlefield, as well as any other specific advantages that the attacker might have (such as better training, or comms, or intel, or night vision gear, or fire support, etc.)
 
There are loads of examples of set piece battles from Korea, as well as some from Vietnam. The opening ground phase of Op DESERT STORM was a set piece too, especially the USMC assault straight up the guts into Kuwait. Crossings of major rivers are often set-piece, mainly because of the pronounced advantages the defender enjoys and the need to bring up bridging stores.
 
The downside of set-piece is that they can take a while to set up, and thus generally give the defender more time to prepare his defence and/or divine exactly where the boot is going to fall and prepare appropriately. Often once a front has settled down for a while, a set-piece is appropriate because the defender will have thoroughly prepared his defence, and the attacker is not required to press the tempo by attacking ASAP. Surpirse can be tricky to accomplish in a set-piece, but on the other hand the time taken to tee-up a set piece means that a comprehensive deception plan can be prepared and enacted, to generate a very high degree of surprise - Op DESERT STORM is a great example here. Saddam knew the Coalition forces were coming, and he knew down to the day when they'd be coming. But he had no idea where they'd be coming, and was soundly thrashed in part because of that surprise.
 
There isn't really a sharp split between meeting engagements, hasty attacks, and deliberate/set-piece attacks. The boundaries between them are quite fluid depending on the specific circumstances. An operation can also transition quickly between the three - Op COBRA, for example, started as a deliberate/set-piece and stayed that way for 2-3 days. After that there was a short period of hasty attacks, then it transitioned again to meeting engagements as the Americans made a clean break through the complete depth of the German's prepared defences. Sometime later it transitioned again to a hasty attack by the Germans at Mortain.

'Set-Piece' (or deliberate) attack is at the grand-tactical/operational level, not strategic - mainly because you don't bother about battles at the strategic level, you're worried about campaigns. Op COBRA and Op QUEEN were both set piece battles. Basically, the idea is to take the time to get all your ducks in a row before the battle starts. That means arranging the fire support, conducting battle-specific training, organising units into assault - 2nd echelon - reserve, and positioning them accordingly, preparing and delivering orders down to a very low level (ie, the corps commander prepares and presents orders to his divisional commanders, who then derive and prepare their own orders and present them to their regimental commanders, who then prepare and present their orders to the battalion commanders, who prepare and present their orders to the company commanders, who prepare and present their own orders to their platoon commanders, who prepare and present orders to their squad commanders, who brief/present orders to their squads), distribution of aerial photos and maps with intel overlays, stockpiling of ammunition, fuel, and specific stores that might be needed (such as bridging material), etc. Then the whole thing kicks off at a specific time according to the designated H-hour, with all the various parts moving in a coordinated fashion and thus maxmising the  leverage that combined arms brings to the battlefield, as well as any other specific advantages that the attacker might have (such as better training, or comms, or intel, or night vision gear, or fire support, etc.)
 
There are loads of examples of set piece battles from Korea, as well as some from Vietnam. The opening ground phase of Op DESERT STORM was a set piece too, especially the USMC assault straight up the guts into Kuwait. Crossings of major rivers are often set-piece, mainly because of the pronounced advantages the defender enjoys and the need to bring up bridging stores.
 
The downside of set-piece is that they can take a while to set up, and thus generally give the defender more time to prepare his defence and/or divine exactly where the boot is going to fall and prepare appropriately. Often once a front has settled down for a while, a set-piece is appropriate because the defender will have thoroughly prepared his defence, and the attacker is not required to press the tempo by attacking ASAP. Surpirse can be tricky to accomplish in a set-piece, but on the other hand the time taken to tee-up a set piece means that a comprehensive deception plan can be prepared and enacted, to generate a very high degree of surprise - Op DESERT STORM is a great example here. Saddam knew the Coalition forces were coming, and he knew down to the day when they'd be coming. But he had no idea where they'd be coming, and was soundly thrashed in part because of that surprise.
 
There isn't really a sharp split between meeting engagements, hasty attacks, and deliberate/set-piece attacks. The boundaries between them are quite fluid depending on the specific circumstances. An operation can also transition quickly between the three - Op COBRA, for example, started as a deliberate/set-piece and stayed that way for 2-3 days. After that there was a short period of hasty attacks, then it transitioned again to meeting engagements as the Americans made a clean break through the complete depth of the German's prepared defences. Sometime later it transitioned again to a hasty attack by the Germans at Mortain.

'Set-Piece' (or deliberate) attack is at the grand-tactical/operational level, not strategic - mainly because you don't bother about battles at the strategic level, you're worried about campaigns. Op COBRA and Op QUEEN were both set piece battles. Basically, the idea is to take the time to get all your ducks in a row before the battle starts. That means arranging the fire support, conducting battle-specific training, organising units into assault - 2nd echelon - reserve, and positioning them accordingly, preparing and delivering orders down to a very low level (ie, the corps commander prepares and presents orders to his divisional commanders, who then derive and prepare their own orders and present them to their regimental commanders, who then prepare and present their orders to the battalion commanders, who prepare and present their orders to the company commanders, who prepare and present their own orders to their platoon commanders, who prepare and present orders to their squad commanders, who brief/present orders to their squads), distribution of aerial photos and maps with intel overlays, stockpiling of ammunition, fuel, and specific stores that might be needed (such as bridging material), etc. Then the whole thing kicks off at a specific time according to the designated H-hour, with all the various parts moving in a coordinated fashion and thus maxmising the  leverage that combined arms brings to the battlefield, as well as any other specific advantages that the attacker might have (such as better training, or comms, or intel, or night vision gear, or fire support, etc.)
 
There are loads of examples of set piece battles from Korea, as well as some from Vietnam. The opening ground phase of Op DESERT STORM was a set piece too, especially the USMC assault straight up the guts into Kuwait. Crossings of major rivers are often set-piece, mainly because of the pronounced advantages the defender enjoys and the need to bring up bridging stores.
 
The downside of set-piece is that they can take a while to set up, and thus generally give the defender more time to prepare his defence and/or divine exactly where the boot is going to fall and prepare appropriately. Often once a front has settled down for a while, a set-piece is appropriate because the defender will have thoroughly prepared his defence, and the attacker is not required to press the tempo by attacking ASAP. Surpirse can be tricky to accomplish in a set-piece, but on the other hand the time taken to tee-up a set piece means that a comprehensive deception plan can be prepared and enacted, to generate a very high degree of surprise - Op DESERT STORM is a great example here. Saddam knew the Coalition forces were coming, and he knew down to the day when they'd be coming. But he had no idea where they'd be coming, and was soundly thrashed in part because of that surprise.
 
There isn't really a sharp split between meeting engagements, hasty attacks, and deliberate/set-piece attacks. The boundaries between them are quite fluid depending on the specific circumstances. An operation can also transition quickly between the three - Op COBRA, for example, started as a deliberate/set-piece and stayed that way for 2-3 days. After that there was a short period of hasty attacks, then it transitioned again to meeting engagements as the Americans made a clean break through the complete depth of the German's prepared defences. Sometime later it transitioned again to a hasty attack by the Germans at Mortain.

OrBat for 716 Inf Div on 6 Jun 1944

716. Inf.-Div. (bo) (7 K.V.A.-H1-K.V.A. Caen) [1]
Gefechtsstand – Caen

Kdr: Generalleutnant Wilhelm Richter
Ia: Major i.G. Bachus
Ib: Major Wolf
Ic: Major d.R. Wiegmann
IIa: Major Heintze

K.V.-Gr. Riva-Bella
* K.V.U.-Gr. Orne
K.V.U.-Gr. Lion-sur-Mer
K.V.-Gr. Courseulles
K.V.U.-Gr. Seulles
K.V.U.-Gr. Normandie

Inf.-Div.-Nachr.-Abtl. 716
* Kdr.: Major Werner Liedloff
Nachschub-Btl. 716
Verwaltungs-Btl. 716
Sanitäts-Btl. 716
Veterinär-Kp. 716

Gren.-Regt. 726 (attached to 352. Inf.-Div.)

Gren.-Regt. 736
* Gefechtsstand – Colleville-sur-Orne (WN 17)
* Kdr.: Oberst Ludwig Krug
* Adjutant: Josef Grüne
I. Btl.
* Gefechtsstand – Ouistreham (WN 14)
* 1. Kp. – Stützpunkt Franceville West (WN 05)
* 2. Kp. – Stützpunktgruppe 08 (Riva Bella)
* 3. Kp. – WN 03 and 04 (Franceville Plage)
* 4. Kp. – Ouistreham-Val WN 09 (Reserve)
II. Btl.
* Gefechtsstand – Tailleville (WN 23)
* Kdr.: Hauptmann Deptolla
* 5. Kp. – Bernières (WN 28, 28a) – St.-Aubin (WN 27)
* 6. Kp. – Stp. Courseulles (WN 29, 30, 31)
* 7. Kp. – Graye-sur-Mer, La Rivière
* 8. Kp. – Tailleville-Tombette (in reserve behind Bernières)
III. Btl.
Gefechtsstand – Cresserons
* Kdr.: Major Pipor
* 9. Kp. – Langrune-Luc (WN 24, 26)
* 10. Kp. – Lion-Hermanville (WN 18, 20, 20a, 21)
* 11. Kp. – in reserve behind Luc-sur-Mer (WN 25)
* 12. Kp. – in reserve at Douvres-la-Délivrande (WN 22)
IV./Gren.-Regt. 736 (Ost-Btl. 642) [2]
* Gefechtsstand – Amfreville
* Kdr.: Hauptmann Heinz Plate
* 1. Kp. – Stützpunkt Franceville (Ost WN 02)
* 3. Kp. – Hermanville (WN 19)
* 4. Kp. – Bavent
14. (Pz.Jg.) Kp. (six 5cm m.Pak and three 7.5cm s.Pak, static beach defenses)

Ost-Btl. 441 [3]
*Gefechtsstand – Crépon (northeast of Bayeux)
* 1. Kp. – Vaux (north of Bayeux)
* 2. Kp. – Reviers
* 3. Kp. – Meuvaines (northeast of Bayeux)
* 4. Kp. – Ver-sur-Mer (northeast of Bayeux)

Art.-Regt. 1716
* Gefechtsstand – Unknown
* Kdr.: Oberstleutnant Helmut Knüppe
I. Abtl.
* Gefechtsstand – Colomby
* 1. Bttr. – Merville (four 10cm le.F.H. 14/19 (t))
* 2. Bttr. – WN 16 (Colleville-sur-Orne) (four 10cm le.F.H. 14/19 (t))
* 3. Bttr. – Bréville (northeast of Caen) (four 7.5cm FK 16 n.A.) [4]
* 4. Bttr. – WN 12 (Ouistreham “Water Tower Battery”) (four 15cm s.F.H. 414 (f))
* 10. Bttr. – 4 kilometers northeast of Bayeux (four 15cm s.F.H. 414 (f))
II. Abtl.
* Gefechtsstand – Crépon
* 5. Bttr. – WN 35b (Crépon) (four 10cm le.F.H. 14/19 (t))
* 6. Bttr. – WN 32 (la Mare-Fontaine) (four 10cm le.F.H. 14/19 (t))
* 7. Bttr. – WN 28a (Bény-sur-Mer) (four 10cm le.F.H. 14/19 (t))
III. Abtl. (attached to 352. Inf.-Div.)

Pz.Jg.-Abtl. 716
* Gefechtsstand – Biéville
* Kdr.: Oberleutnant Kurt Kaergel
* 1. (Sfl.) Kp. – Biéville (ten 7.5cm s.Pak Sfl. Auf Lorraine Schlepper)
* 2. (Pz.Jg.-bo) Kp. – Reviers (nine 7.5cm and three 8.8cm s.Pak) [5]
* 3. (Flak) Kp. – Anisy (one Züg was east of the Orne 1 kilometer west of Sallenelles) [6]

s.Art.-Abtl. 989 (t-mot) (est. 400)
* Gefechtsstand – Reviers (east of Bayeux)
* 1. Bttr. – Basly (four 12.2cm s.F.H. 396 (r.))
* 2. Bttr. – Amblie (four 12.2cm s.F.H. 396 (r.))
* 3. Bttr. – Creully (four 12.2cm s.F.H. 396 (r.))

H.K.A.-Abtl. 1260
* Gefechtsstand – Ryes (south of Arromanches)
* 1. Bttr. – St. Aubin-d’Arquenay (Ouistreham) (six 15.5cm K 420 (f))
* 2. Bttr. – Pointe du Hoc (six 15.5cm K 420 (f))
* 3. Bttr. – WN 35a (Mont Fleury) (four 12.2cm K 390 (r.))

MKB Longues – WN 48 (four 15cm TbtsK C/36) (attached)

[1] Strength as of 1 May was 7,771, possibly not including HiWi. The division did not have a Feld-Ers.-Btl. or Füs.-Btl. organized. The division began to withdraw soon after the invasion and by 1 July began moving to join 19. Armee on the French Riviera. By 20 July it was assigned to IV L.W.-Feld-K. relieving 272 Inf.-Div.
[2] 2. Kp. was disbanded due to lack of strength on 30 May. It had been at Amfreville with the battalion headquarters and is occasionally shown there.
[3] Attached to Gren.-Regt. 736.
[4] Other sources indicate these were four 10cm le.F.H. 14/19 (t)).
[5] The guns were deployed on the low ridge overlooking the beaches from St. Aubin to La Riviere.
[6] The company had 12 2cm mobile guns, probably truck mounted self-propelled pieces. There were also 20 2cm and six 7.5cm (f) static antiaircraft guns in the division zone. The 2cm guns were scattered among the various WN, while the 7.5cm guns were south of Bernieres.

http://community.battlefront.com/topic/109190-the-sheriff-of-oosterbeek-%E2%80%93-a-scenario-design-daraar/page-7#entry1440462
 
http://community.battlefront.com/topic/109190-the-sheriff-of-oosterbeek-%E2%80%93-a-scenario-design-daraar/page-7#entry1441254
 
http://community.battlefront.com/topic/109190-the-sheriff-of-oosterbeek-%E2%80%93-a-scenario-design-daraar/page-8#entry1441938
 
http://community.battlefront.com/topic/109190-the-sheriff-of-oosterbeek-%E2%80%93-a-scenario-design-daraar/page-9#entry1442801
 
http://community.battlefront.com/topic/109190-the-sheriff-of-oosterbeek-%E2%80%93-a-scenario-design-daraar/page-10#entry1443370
 
http://community.battlefront.com/topic/109190-the-sheriff-of-oosterbeek-%E2%80%93-a-scenario-design-daraar/page-12#entry1446224

Nod to Gunner for the HHGTTG reference.

FWIW, IMO, narratives of actions are largely irrelevant. What you need are sources that allow you to create the map, and to get the respective forces in the right start and positions at the start point you chose. What happens after that - i.e., the conduct of the battle - is up to the players, NOT the scenario designer.

Will AeroGavins be in the base game or will we have to wait for an expansion?

But here in lies the problem: exposure to more people is not what Steve is objecting to. So, if people keep railing that BF is ignoring a large market they are missing the main point. It is the inability to control the way *his* product is sold the concerns *his* business. So, if he takes the leap and the loss of control hurts their profit margin and the magic of more exposure does not make up the difference then he loses *his* lively hood. As far as I can tell two things need to be satisfied for Steve to reconsider (of course that is up to him not me):
Some hard facts about how this larger number of gamers will actually result in more people who want to play CM. Remember just repeating things like "but its x million people", "more exposure means more sales", or anything else like that does not count. That is not an argument and it does not help your position. You can say totally unsupported things all you like but it does not make them true. Go find some actual evidentiary support for those statements (Hint probably need to conduct market research, including focus groups etc.) Some clarity that Valve does not behave like a retail store. Steve has said they were hurt by (or at least disappointed with) other retail partner's actions in the past. Valve looks just like an old retail store from what Steve can see (*). Valve makes its game developers sign NDA agreements so there is no way to find out things that might reassure Steve (or not). Sadly this is not something that you, Steam advocates, can do much about because it is Valve’s policies. I recommend you go and share your passion about getting CM onto Steam with Valve and tell them that this is a problem they should fix. * Note: this part makes me laugh. So many people keep saying senseless stuff like "BF should join the modern age" but it sure looks to me like Valve has a very 1980s retail store type business model. Sure it is dressed up with the latest tech but if the terms and conditions have not changed then I it seems to me Steam is the one stuck in the 1980s.