Re-release ETA?

[Duckman]

When looking at what makes soldiers fight (or not) junior leadership and small group bonding rank highest while political goals and ideology tend to rank last, with mid-and high level leadership and confidence in equipment falling somewhere in the middle. The Italian army was, like many others, class-based with the officers receiving better food etc. This was not good for morale, and I suspect the NCO class was also kind of weak while equipment was at best so-so.

(One of the few positive aspects of national socialism from a military perspective was making the German army a bit more egalitarian. The clubby and snobbish nature of the officer class likely played a part in the morale collapse at the end of WWI, especially after the old school NCOs were all gone.)

So while lack of enthusiasm for fascism and "Germany's war" probably played a role, especially after the US where masses of Italians had family entered the war, there were more immediate reasons for low Italian morale (even if they fought better than German blame-gamers give them credit for in Africa and Russia). The total Italian collapse after the invasion of mainland Italy may have something to do with seeing the war as lost, wrong and fought for a dubious ally though. There are some indications of plummeting German morale in the West in the last part of the war for the same reasons.

[Michael Emrys]

12 hours ago, Duckman said:

The total Italian collapse after the invasion of mainland Italy...

Good analysis, except that I would say that Italy had collapsed aside from pro forma by the time that the Allies had taken Sicily. Mussolini had been removed from power and the new Italian government was already secretly negotiating surrender.

Michael

[CCIP]

Well, I'd even go a little farther and mention that as of late August, there was already an understanding reached that Italy would surrender the moment a full-scale invasion of the mainland went ahead, and they had indeed done so. Since Mussolini's overthrow, ending the war was the agenda for the Badoglio government, which had no illusions that the only way to do so was by surrendering. After Sicily, they weren't worried about the Allied invasion because that was a foregone conclusion, and were much more concerned about the inevitable German response. Though framed as an armistice, Italy's agreement with the Allies was effectively an unconditional surrender. And even before all that, perhaps since the collapse in North Africa and certainly once the Allies started strategic bombing of Italian cities, the leadership, even the Fascists (arguably including Mussolini) knew that they already lost the war against the Allies and were looking for a clean exit, with damage control being the order of the day. Same for the forces on the ground - though it's very hard making a clean exit or preventing collapse when you're in the middle of the whole mess and facing overwhelming Allied firepower, in person!

Anyway, we got a bit off topic

 

[BletchleyGeek]

11 hours ago, CCIP said:

Well, I'd even go a little farther and mention that as of late August, there was already an understanding reached that Italy would surrender the moment a full-scale invasion of the mainland went ahead, and they had indeed done so. Since Mussolini's overthrow, ending the war was the agenda for the Badoglio government, which had no illusions that the only way to do so was by surrendering. After Sicily, they weren't worried about the Allied invasion because that was a foregone conclusion, and were much more concerned about the inevitable German response. Though framed as an armistice, Italy's agreement with the Allies was effectively an unconditional surrender. And even before all that, perhaps since the collapse in North Africa and certainly once the Allies started strategic bombing of Italian cities, the leadership, even the Fascists (arguably including Mussolini) knew that they already lost the war against the Allies and were looking for a clean exit, with damage control being the order of the day. Same for the forces on the ground - though it's very hard making a clean exit or preventing collapse when you're in the middle of the whole mess and facing overwhelming Allied firepower, in person!

Anyway, we got a bit off topic

 

Just a bit, but was interesting to read. @Dutchman nails it identifying the some of the factors that are sometimes referred to as "cohesion" in the 1970s and 1980s, and "resilience" nowadays.

[dw]

Just checking in about the status of the release. Thanks

Edited January 29, 2017 by dw

[Kevin2k]

I figure there is another factor: in WW2 German soldier fighting spirit was affected by (Russian) treatment of prisoners and treatment of civilians in German territory etc. Or at least the perceived treatment.

[Macisle]

On 1/28/2017 at 0:11 AM, Duckman said:

When looking at what makes soldiers fight (or not) junior leadership and small group bonding rank highest while political goals and ideology tend to rank last, with mid-and high level leadership and confidence in equipment falling somewhere in the middle. The Italian army was, like many others, class-based with the officers receiving better food etc. This was not good for morale, and I suspect the NCO class was also kind of weak while equipment was at best so-so.

(One of the few positive aspects of national socialism from a military perspective was making the German army a bit more egalitarian. The clubby and snobbish nature of the officer class likely played a part in the morale collapse at the end of WWI, especially after the old school NCOs were all gone.)

So while lack of enthusiasm for fascism and "Germany's war" probably played a role, especially after the US where masses of Italians had family entered the war, there were more immediate reasons for low Italian morale (even if they fought better than German blame-gamers give them credit for in Africa and Russia). The total Italian collapse after the invasion of mainland Italy may have something to do with seeing the war as lost, wrong and fought for a dubious ally though. There are some indications of plummeting German morale in the West in the last part of the war for the same reasons.

I just finished the audiobook version of Beevor's Stalingrad. He points out that the Romanians suffered heavily from class-based bias and separation/pampering of their officers. German officers who witnessed it were scornful, claiming it resembled old-time aristocrats lording over their serfs. According to Beevor, that, in combination with the Romanian formations' woeful lack of AT assets, was their great weakness. He spends some time showing that Romanian soldiers could, and did, fight bravely and well, when some decent officers and equipment were on the field.

This kind of thing always makes me think of the French. Everybody likes to bash them, but if the French army had only had younger, modern-thinking top leadership in 1940, the war may have ended that year. Sure, many French formations had low morale, but many did not, and had they had good leadership, morale might have quickly risen with the fruits of a good operational showing.

[akd]

7 hours ago, Kevin2k said:

I figure there is another factor: in WW2 German soldier fighting spirit was affected by (Russian) treatment of prisoners and treatment of civilians in German territory etc. Or at least the perceived treatment.

This is a joke, right?

[Kevin2k]

12 hours ago, akd said:

This is a joke, right?

Eh no, maybe poor english? I am referring to the very last german eastern front offensive actions. Soldiers encountered evidence of atrocities (by russians towards the german civilians), which gave rise to the sentiment that surrendering to russians was no longer an option. I can't say how rare or widespread that was, the point is that such things matter for the decision to fight on or surrender, no matter which side one fights for.

[Sailor Malan2]

On 1/27/2017 at 3:11 PM, Duckman said:

 

(One of the few positive aspects of national socialism from a military perspective was making the German army a bit more egalitarian. The clubby and snobbish nature of the officer class likely played a part in the morale collapse at the end of WWI, especially after the old school NCOs were all gone.)

 

Funny you should say this, as I was talking to my Dad only yesterday on army attitudes. He joined the British army in 1950 or so, and was in Germany twice before the end of the 50's and again in the 1970's. He commented that in the British army, officers had to earn the respect of the troops - it was most definitely not given by right. What he saw of the German Army at that point  - must have been his second posting (post 1955 when the Bundeswehr was formed) was that Officers insisted on (and NCOs enforced) unconditional respect irrespective. The stories he told of British troops' (and NCOs') ways of showing disrespect in ways that could not be faulted are quite interesting. For example, the merest pause before putting the 'Sir' on the end of a sentence said everything, and any unpopular officer who tried to make a thing of it would likely end up before the Colonel being given a real dressing down for being a prat and causing it to happen. And there were many other ways. The NCOs at Sandhurst (officer school) could make 'Sir' sound like a term of abuse if they wanted to. In fact, there is a standing joke amongst NCOs even today - you call them 'Sir' at your peril, and they will respond with something like 'don't call me SIR! I work for a living!', and I have seen this done in front of an officer (although in a stage whisper!). I was a school boy cadet, and I think they were all having fun, but all the same...

So... the German army wasn't that egalitarian, and the 'class ridden' British Army did not have any truck with 'respect to officers by right'. This isn't definitive to WW2, but you only had to have been in the army for 7 years or so to have seen WW2 when my Dad joined. So  pretty much anyone at Captain and above... Also his was the first intake at Sandhurst not to take casualties in Korea...

Another example of careful what you believe concerning stereotypes

[CCIP]

20 hours ago, akd said:

This is a joke, right?

I think you missed the "perceived" part, and highlighted just one part as though that's the whole point of the sentence. Germans were absolutely motivated by both the real and perceived treatment of POWs and German civilians by Soviet troops. Some of it was based on actual fact. Some of it was happily picked up and amplified by Nazi propaganda. But in the last phases of war, there's no doubt that the German soldiers on all fronts were motivated by fear, then dread of the Soviet invasion of Germany - whether it was to fight harder on the Eastern front to protect their own country from what was expected to be a harsh Soviet revenge, or on the Western front/in Italy because hey, at least you're not on the Eastern front, right? Plus the continued illusion that somehow the Nazis could put themselves into a position of strength in the West, make a separate peace with the Allies, then convince them to fight against the "greater communist enemy" together.

Anyway, drifting way off topic here!

But yes - in terms of motivation, I think there's no doubt that despite the massive losses in the war, the Nazi state was able to keep the German military together both at a high level and low level, until very very late indeed. Italian morale was shaky to begin with, but by early 1943 it was ready to disintegrate. By the time Mussolini was removed from leadership, the Italian public and military had thoroughly understood that the Fascist regime was a farce. There was nothing left to be enthusiastic about or motivated by. Nor was there the level of hatred or fear of the actual enemy facing them that the Germans might've had. The Fascists themselves are partly responsible for that, since before the war they convinced themselves and the public that their Mediterranean empire would be tolerated and accepted by Britain and the US, because the Italians could always reach a deal with them somehow. So the Italian troops in the field and their commanders really just didn't have the motivation to fight too hard for any of this. I don't think that makes them in any way cowardly, just smart. But it's certainly not a mindset you go to war with, let alone a war as brutal as WWII.

As for Germany, for better or worse their narrative of "why we fight" stuck to the very end. There's little doubt that not many Germans (except for the hardcore Nazis) actually believed they were in any way "winning" the war even in 1943, let alone 44 or 45 - but they kept up convincing reasons for why fighting was better than not fighting. Ironically, one of the reasons for the difference was that the Italians believed (not unreasonably) that they would ultimately be "forgiven" by the Allies, while the Germans knew they would not be. Even for those in the German military opposed to Nazis, it was pretty clear that the Allies had not just overwhelming firepower but also an intense hatred for them, which I don't think the Italians (and indeed many other German allies) didn't see. So, the Germans didn't see any option except to fight, while the Italians saw fighting as maybe the 2nd worst of several options.

[BletchleyGeek]

36 minutes ago, CCIP said:

Italian morale was shaky to begin with, but by early 1943 it was ready to disintegrate. By the time Mussolini was removed from leadership, the Italian public and military had thoroughly understood that the Fascist regime was a farce. There was nothing left to be enthusiastic about or motivated by. Nor was there the level of hatred or fear of the actual enemy facing them that the Germans might've had. The Fascists themselves are partly responsible for that, since before the war they convinced themselves and the public that their Mediterranean empire would be tolerated and accepted by Britain and the US, because the Italians could always reach a deal with them somehow. So the Italian troops in the field and their commanders really just didn't have the motivation to fight too hard for any of this. I don't think that makes them in any way cowardly, just smart. But it's certainly not a mindset you go to war with, let alone a war as brutal as WWII.

As for Germany, for better or worse their narrative of "why we fight" stuck to the very end. There's little doubt that not many Germans (except for the hardcore Nazis) actually believed they were in any way "winning" the war even in 1943, let alone 44 or 45 - but they kept up convincing reasons for why fighting was better than not fighting. Ironically, one of the reasons for the difference was that the Italians believed (not unreasonably) that they would ultimately be "forgiven" by the Allies, while the Germans knew they would not be. Even for those in the German military opposed to Nazis, it was pretty clear that the Allies had not just overwhelming firepower but also an intense hatred for them, which I don't think the Italians (and indeed many other German allies) didn't see. So, the Germans didn't see any option except to fight, while the Italians saw fighting as maybe the 2nd worst of several options.

That is a pretty good summary - let me remind you all that Badoglio's government signed an armistice and not an unconditional surrender with the Allies. Those are two very different things. An armistice was almost a "get out of jail free" card, all things considered.

Maybe somebody with a closer knowledge of Italian politics and history may want to comment, but I think the post-Fascist government has not been judged kindly afterwards. First and foremost, because of maybe ineptitude, maybe cowardice, it failed to give clear instructions to the Italian Army... onto which the Wehrmacht fell swiftly and decisively. Many Italian soldiers paid with their lives that armistice, most of them summarily executed by the German Army as "partisans". Lest not forget that. Second, there was the wishful thinking around the notion of preserving the monarchy... which in the first place had been the sponsor of Mussolini accession to power, and by extension, of the war. I am not sure if it is still illegal for the members of the dynasty to set foot on Italian soil... Third, there was yet another kind of wishful thinking, that of entertaining the notion that their former allies (Germany) would just shrug as they stepped down the bandwagon and that the Western Allies would be welcoming them with open arms... neither of which actually happen. Fourth, the stage was set for a fierce civil war between the "partisans" - that is, the supporters of the pre-war, pre-fascist regime political parties, of all colours and kinds - and the "fascists" that remained loyal to the Germany and the war effort out of fear, idealism or opportunism who set up the very ironically named "Social Italian Republic". That was a rift that took decades to be sealed again, if ever.

The exit of Italy from WW2 is one of the most fascinating episodes of the conflict.

Edited January 31, 2017 by BletchleyGeek
This is totally off topic, but since I don't expect we're getting an answer to the OP, let's talk about something interesting :)

[Michael Emrys]

8 hours ago, CCIP said:

Italian morale was shaky to begin with, but by early 1943 it was ready to disintegrate. By the time Mussolini was removed from leadership, the Italian public and military had thoroughly understood that the Fascist regime was a farce. There was nothing left to be enthusiastic about or motivated by. Nor was there the level of hatred or fear of the actual enemy facing them that the Germans might've had. The Fascists themselves are partly responsible for that, since before the war they convinced themselves and the public that their Mediterranean empire would be tolerated and accepted by Britain and the US, because the Italians could always reach a deal with them somehow. So the Italian troops in the field and their commanders really just didn't have the motivation to fight too hard for any of this. I don't think that makes them in any way cowardly, just smart.

If I may be forgiven for moving this interesting discussion even further off-topic, I have a favorite what-if scenario for Italy.

To start with, let us suppose that the Italian government was less ideologically driven than the Fascists, was more pragmatic and perhaps more realistic. While I think it is too much to ask of any European government of the era to be far sighted enough to grasp that the age of colonial empires was drawing to a close, a pragmatic government might have realized that militarily expansion of the then existing Italian empire in Africa was not going to be worth the candle, still less one in the Balkans. So already by the middle to late 1930s we have a very different strategic situation with Italy having a much more manageable and defendable empire and more uncommitted military resources at its disposal.

Now let's take another counterfactual step. Being less ideologically and imperialistically driven, Italy now is far more cautious about joining Germany in an Axis. The effect that this might have on Germany I won't even try to speculate at the present time. But the effects on Italy are huge. For one thing, it does not enter the war in 1940. It does not join with Germany, even though it appears to be on a roll at that time and it is certainly in Italy's interest to maintain friendly if somewhat distant relations with the Nazi power. But neither is it ready to commit to the Allies, who do not appear to be doing very well at this time. Besides, the primary Ally after the fall of France is Great Britain with whom it has for some time had an uneasy relationship in Africa and the Mediterranean.

So basically Italy bides its time and tries to modernize its armed forces until it is clear which way the tides of war are going to flow. By 1943 it is becoming clear that Germany is not going to win the war. It might not necessarily lose the war, but it is pretty certain that it isn't going to win it. So throwing in Italy's lot with Germany isn't likely to do it any good and might just cost it a lot. On the other hand, Italy is now in a position to offer something substantial to the Allies, who are now the ones on a roll. Mostly what it has to offer that the Allies would be have is basing rights, a fairly modern navy that is still intact, considerable manufacturing facilities, a modest but not inconsiderable merchant marine, and an army that is not powerful but might be useful in at least defending its own territory.

But what has Italy to gain from all this? A seat at the table when the post-war spoils are divided up. Italy probably does not actually gain a lot of territory, but it does get firmer guarantees that it can hold onto what it already has. Since under this scenario it has not invaded Greece and the Balkans, it might win lucrative trade concessions there. It might also get a slice of occupied Axis territories until permanent peace treaties are signed with those countries, for whatever that might be worth. It probably also gets a more influential role in nascent NATO and the EEC. Probably what Italy mostly gets is avoidance of the devastation and death that were its harvest in the historical war.

But it couldn't it have gotten more or less that simply by remaining neutral up to the very end? Maybe, but without as much diplomatic clout.

All counterfactual scenarios are filled with imponderables and this one is no exception. Might Germany have decided to invade Italy before 1943? Perhaps, but that likely would have become another costly mistake. Absent a two and a half year war in North Africa, the UK might have had a larger army, but absent that trade school in modern warfare it would not have refined its techniques to the same degree, I don't think. The case for the US is somewhat similar. North Africa was an important training ground for the Allies. They did not take away as much from the experience as they might have, but neither did they waste it entirely.

Michael

[Malaspina]

Interesting thoughts and what-if scenario. Although Mussolini was a bloviating anti-communist, anti-capitalist revolutionaire bent on heroic conquests in imitation of Alexander the Great as if he were an ancient Roman emperor. He had to go out with a bang!

Check out this recently found footage that has baffled historians.

 

[Ghost of Charlemagne]

I would say that the early setbacks in North Africa against a British force that they ought to have been overrun must have left a lasting impression on many Italian soldiers as to the state of their equipment (basically being outdated, due to Italy's early rearmament and their industrial and design inefficiency) and woefully inadequate leadership. 

[DougPhresh]

I hope that a module down the line touches up the Italian troops. The mishmash of captured French equipment in Sicily alone was interesting. Heck, the Italian Navy was responsible for garrisoning the ports, it would be interesting to see their battalions available. 

[Ts4EVER]

I wonder if Operation Dragoon will be part of the next module. As far as I know, Southern France is pretty mediterranean, so it could be possible.

[Michael Emrys]

5 hours ago, Ts4EVER said:

I wonder if Operation Dragoon will be part of the next module.

I don't know, but it should be part of the system at some point, even if only as a battle pack.

Michael

[DougPhresh]

I have been thinking the same thing! A Task Force Butler campaign would be amazing. It's still taught in war college as an example of what ad hoc formations can accomplish.

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a475573.pdf

[rocketman]

Actually, @LiveNoMore and I have already discussed doing something around Task Force Butler and has begun preliminary research. Will wait until next FI module to see if Dragoon is included or not. If not, maybe a community made campaign can be put together? I'd be more than willing to do maps. @DougPhresh, will look at case study later on. Thanks  

[Cobetco]

On 2/13/2017 at 10:17 AM, rocketman said:

Actually, @LiveNoMore and I have already discussed doing something around Task Force Butler and has begun preliminary research. Will wait until next FI module to see if Dragoon is included or not. If not, maybe a community made campaign can be put together? I'd be more than willing to do maps. @DougPhresh, will look at case study later on. Thanks  

if Dragoon is not included and a community campaign or set of battles does go into the works, count me in. I am competent enough with the CM2 map tools (still figuring out the kinks of triggers and adv stuff like that though) and I can Contribute some 2D art and such for briefing screens and such 

[rocketman]

3 hours ago, Cobetco said:

if Dragoon is not included and a community campaign or set of battles does go into the works, count me in. I am competent enough with the CM2 map tools (still figuring out the kinks of triggers and adv stuff like that though) and I can Contribute some 2D art and such for briefing screens and such 

Cool, I'll keep you in mind if it comes to a community effort. It would be fun to do as a collaborative effort. Workload can be distributed: map team, research team, AI plans team and so on and of course if someone wants to do a whole scenario all the better.

Doing a campaign single handedly is a full time job. Kudos to those who do. 

[DougPhresh]

Osprey also has a great title on Dragoon, if that's any use!

... I wish I had more useful skills than "reading"

[Michael Emrys]

1 hour ago, DougPhresh said:

... I wish I had more useful skills than "reading"

If you do enough of it, and you keep well organized notes, you can be a researcher. Those are incredibly valuable.

Michael

[rocketman]

8 minutes ago, Michael Emrys said:

If you do enough of it, and you keep well organized notes, you can be a researcher. Those are incredibly valuable.

Michael

True dat. I was just going to suggest what Michael says. Researching a historic or even semi-historic scenario can take a long time. And for a campaign it is even more valuable. Locations, forces, conditions, period maps etc. all need to be "read". @DougPhresh you are more than welcome to participate if it comes to a community project.