17. SS-panzer Grenadier-Division

[Narses]

This division which figures importantly versus the US and especially the US 101 Airborne Div mostly arrived near Carentan around 10 and 12 June 1944.

The unit history of this division by H. Stoeber pg 64 (Die Sturmflut und das Ende) claims the division had no Panzerfaeuste and only received that weapon in mid-July.

Another online site indicates it had many Germans from Romania serving.

In addition Zetterling in Normandy 1944 ( pgs 363- 369) shows the division's manpower and weapons and records that the unit while having a strength of over 17,000 men was very short of officers and noncoms (40%).

In addition, like many German units in France the 17th was critically short of trucks, prime movers and vehicles of all kinds. In a 15 May report it indicated it had only 257 trucks and towing vehicles this being short over 1600. It had no SPW (250 or 251).

Otherwise it was fairly well equipped with 42 Stugs and 12 Marders (on 1 June). It also had 44 2cm Flak guns and 7, 2 cm Flakvierling as well as 99, 8cm mortars and 12, 8.8cm Flak. It also had 22, 7.5cm Pak and 37 tubes of artillery in its arty rgt.

[akd]

And? (Don't mean to be rude, but this forum does have a purpose.)

[MikeyD]

All in good time.

[Franko]

I appreciate the geekery, Narses. Don't listen to akd. He's cranky.

[akd]

Just bear in mind we testers probably read every thread on the forum looking for questions or problems. Opening a thread to find it is just a bit of random spam is slightly annoying.

Or perhaps there was a point...

[JasonC]

An often overlooked additional item in their order of battle was 12 Grille - all of the 150mm infantry guns assigned to the regiments were self propelled on tracked chassis, not towed pieces.

Another important item to keep in mind, though, is that after their first tangle with the 101 and CCA 2nd Armored at Carentan, their running strength in AFVs was down to 24 vehicles, and never went back above that figure. (Some additional StuGs were in the repair shops and did fight again, but others were lost in the meantime, etc).

This means basically they entered combat with armor support equivalent to about one Allied tank battalion - all in SP gun form, none turreted - but had only half that level of support for the remainder of the campaign, from June 15 on.

[Boche]

Im happy to get any information on any german unit, and especially this one since it will help me in ma Carentan scenario

[sburke]

woohoo the patch and the first module on the same day!!! What? oh. never mind....

[Narses]

I truly enjoy this game and the great effort by Battlefront and yes, even akd. I realize that at this time in the games life the game and interface, problems, etc stand first.

When I get a great game like this (and thanks akd for all your hard work testing) I usually immediately start rereading about the events (and playing). When I relooked at 17th SS - one of the first large scale better units to engage (before 2ndSS Pz arrived) - I was amazed to see they had to no fausts and then saw the other problems so I thought I'd share. I choose the title as 17thSS thinking guys would realize it was about history not the game.

Thanks JasonC, yes 12, 15cm SP.

[sburke]

Just don't forget to repost this once we have the 1st module and are yammering on about OoB info for the battles for Carentan.

[Vark]

I seem to remember being pretty shocked at the paucity of equipment some of the German units had in Normandy, when playing a SPWAW campaign. My armoured support comprised of AG's and WWII French tanks, most of my soldiers had to tackle armour with grenade bundles and precious few LAD's and MAW's and my decent units were quickly ground down in desperate counter attacks to stop my second rate troops collapsing. It would be quite something to have an armoured counter attack led by Char B1's, in later versions of CMBN!

Although TOAW III is a bit iffy (platoon based combat to simulate divisional engagements, hmm) its TOE of units show initial allocation and runners, quite sobering how the Germans raided Peter (the Western front) to pay Paul (the Eastern front), or for Wacht am Rhine, the reverse.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

When I relooked at 17th SS - one of the first large scale better units to engage (before 2ndSS Pz arrived) - I was amazed to see they had to no fausts and then saw the other problems so I thought I'd share.

some other key German units for the module suffer from the same issues. for example 12th SS is also very understrength with officers & noncoms and also suffers the infantry AT issue initially.

in my eyes the forces covered by the module fought the more interesting battles of Normandy. it will be interesting to see if CMBN scales up enough to portray them. i don't know what scenarios the module will contain, but there's sure a plentitude of good historical battles to simulate.

[Nidan1]

Just bear in mind we testers probably read every thread on the forum looking for questions or problems. Opening a thread to find it is just a bit of random spam is slightly annoying.

Or perhaps there was a point...

What problem did you anticipate with a thread title of "17th SS Panzer-Grenadier Division"?

Had it been titled "CMbN, and all testers suck a big weenie" and I opened it to find a lot of mundane geekstuff, then I might have a reason to be annoyed.

You testers should lighten up, sometimes folks post things because they are interested in a topic and want to discuss it with other like minded folks.

[Nidan1]

some other key German units for the module suffer from the same issues. for example 12th SS is also very understrength with officers & noncoms and also suffers the infantry AT issue initially.

in my eyes the forces covered by the module fought the more interesting battles of Normandy. it will be interesting to see if CMBN scales up enough to portray them. i don't know what scenarios the module will contain, but there's sure a plentitude of good historical battles to simulate.

Thats for sure, all of Monty's tank heavy operations around Caen should make for some interesting encounters. Mostly against the SS I might add, and the Panzer Lehr, which in comparison to most other units in Normandy was fairly lavishly equipped.

[Vark]

Was it planned, or did it just pan out that the British, Canadian etc did most of the initial heavy work against the German armoured formations?

[YankeeDog]

Was it planned, or did it just pan out that the British, Canadian etc did most of the initial heavy work against the German armoured formations?

Somewhat planned. While this wasn't necessarily the way that the Allied planners anticipated the Normandy campaign going prior to the landings, as things developed on the ground in June and early July, the Allied planners set the objective of a breakout in the American Sector into Brittany, which eventually happened,of course (St. Lo). To support this, the Brits and Canadians were supposed to seize important objectives and keep up the pressure in their sector, largely to prevent the Germans from shifting the forces they had there and further East to contain any breakout in the American sector.

Which is, mostly, what happened.

[Blackcat]

That is quite a generous interpretation, YankeeDog.

[Vark]

That is quite a generous interpretation, YankeeDog.

Pray tell why, my good man? Leave us not in such suspense!

[Nidan1]

Please lets not start the "Who did more fighting in Normandy, the US or UK/Commonwealth" argument.

[Vark]

Did not even go there. My simple question was, was it by design or default that the Commonwealth forces initially tackled most of the significant German armoured assets? Blackcat suggested that YankeeDog's interpretation of events left something to be desired.

[Narses]

Was it planned, or did it just pan out that the British, Canadian etc did most of the initial heavy work against the German armoured formations?

The British and Canadians took the left flank of the invasion - Gold, Juno, Sword - and the Americans the right flank - Utah, Omaha - simply because of organizationl reasons. When US forces arrived in England they were placed in southwestern England and that directed they should come in on the right (Cherbourg to St Lo). Any movement of the US to the east of England and the British/Canadians west would have create transportation chaos.

Monty was the invasion's ground cdr (21st Army Grp) and did anticipate having to secure his left flank around Caen ( Dempsey's Second Army) against heavy German armored counterattacks ( 47th Pz Korps and 1st SS Pz Korps) while his subordiante army cdr Bradley (First US Army) took the Cotentin Peninsula and the port of Cherbourg establishing ports and a logistical base for the Allied forces.

( Reference: Decision in Normandy by Carlo D'Este, pg 72 - Why the US was on the right flank, etc.)

[YankeeDog]

That is quite a generous interpretation, YankeeDog.

I'm painting with a very broad brush, of course. And, as I briefly alluded, the Allied plan for how to get out of Normandy changed over time as the situation on the ground developed, some objectives were attained, and others were not (or were attained much later than anticipated). No plan survives contact with the enemy, yada yada.

But after a certain point, I think the record shows pretty clearly that, on a strategic scale, the Allies' overall goal from mid-campaign on was a breakout by American forces into Brittany, and that other operations were intended to support this. This is not to say that the efforts of the Eastern half of the Allied line were in any way secondary. In the endgame, sooner or later someone has to actually take the shot on goal while the rest of the team maneuvers to give the shooter the best chance possible, and in Normandy the shooter ended up being the Americans.

[Blackcat]

Did not even go there. My simple question was, was it by design or default that the Commonwealth forces initially tackled most of the significant German armoured assets? Blackcat suggested that YankeeDog's interpretation of events left something to be desired.

Vark, In my experience there aren't many people around who accept that the plan mostly worked, as YankeeDog seems to do. Indeed most modern commentators seem to reject that tieing down the German armour in the East was actually part of the original plan and insist that Montgomery invented that idea during the battle to cover for 21st AG's failure to take its early objectives and to make much progress.

That Caen was a day 1 objective surely cannot be disputed. Whether it ever should have been is another matter. However, it was and historians such D'Este make much of the fact when talking about the British/Canadian armies' failure to stage a breakout before mid-August, and then only because the Americans had done so in the West. Personally I think D'Este, Jarymowycz, Hastings and, the daddy of them all, Liddell Hart over-state their case.

Nonetheless, an opinion such as that expressed by YankeeDog, seems to me to be generous in the current day. I didn't say it left anything to be desired and I am not saying its wrong, just that it is, for modern commentators, uncommonly generous.

[Blackcat]

I'm painting with a very broad brush, of course. And, as I briefly alluded, the Allied plan for how to get out of Normandy changed over time as the situation on the ground developed, some objectives were attained, and others were not (or were attained much later than anticipated). No plan survives contact with the enemy, yada yada.

But after a certain point, I think the record shows pretty clearly that, on a strategic scale, the Allies' overall goal from mid-campaign on was a breakout by American forces into Brittany, and that other operations were intended to support this. This is not to say that the efforts of the Eastern half of the Allied line were in any way secondary. In the endgame, sooner or later someone has to actually take the shot on goal while the rest of the team maneuvers to give the shooter the best chance possible, and in Normandy the shooter ended up being the Americans.

I agree with you.

[Vark]

But, in the initial stages of the campaign the Commonwealth units were pitched up against the most combat effective German units, at least on paper, why was this? Was it the Allied plan that they fought the armour (they had more effective AT capabilities with the 17lber, experience etc, were these factors, not realities but factors in the initial planning?), or did the German response just mean they were the poor sods who suffered the attentions of the majority of armour?

I do feel some on this forum are overly sensitive to any suggestion that 'their side' did less at any particular time during an operation and seem to forget it was a joint effort. Robust debate should not needlessly antagonise, but surely it should not have to have every statement qualified. If offence is given and there was no malicious intent a swift apology or clarification should be all that's needed before resuming the main thrust of the debate.