17. SS-panzer Grenadier-Division

[Narses]

I read that SS Armored formations in the East, namely Viking and Totenkopf were filling out their tank battalions with StuGs because of a shortage of actual tanks in 1943-44. Also SS formations were being transfered from East to West in anticipation of the invasion, and taking most of their tanks with them.

If you look at German tank production throughout the war, for the most part German industry maintained a reasonable production rate, even under air bombardment. So Waffen SS formations in the West did not initially suffer from lack of armor, they were really short of qualified infantry.

17 Pz Grd Div had a pz abteilung but it was only equipped with Stugs. It received only 3 PzIV Befehlswagen and no Stug or Marder replacements during Normandy. Both 9 and 10 SS Pz Div had some companies in their Panzer Rgt equipped with Stugs. 21 Pz Div had only Pz IV, no Panthers and some captured French tanks. 116 Pz Div had 76 Panthers and 86 Pz IV but received no replacements during the summer ( but the Pzjaeger Abt did receive 21 Jagdpanzer IV in July).

Actually panzer production was low compared to their enemies and was overwhelmed by Soviet and US production. Very roughly 50,000 each of Shermans and T34 (76 and 85) alon not even counting M10, 18, 36 and all the Sov SU types. Many pz divisions in Normandy didn't receive replacements for losses and/or had on hand less than authorized. Some of this was because the one thing Allied air supremacy did well was to tie-up, dislocate, hinder and slow down German rail movement.

[JasonC]

"Some of this was because the one thing Allied air supremacy did well was to tie-up, dislocate, hinder and slow down German rail movement."

Yes Tac Air was good at that task, and it slowed the movement of some formations to the front in Normandy - though so did simple command decisions to leave reserves in the Pas de Calais area. But it wasn't the cause of replacements not reaching Normandy.

The tank production of the summer months went east, because the Russians were destroying army group center. Existing full formations went to the front, but not new factory output.

This reversed again after Cobra, when France was lost. Then the recent production was pooled into new Panzer brigades and sent west, trying to hold in Lorraine and around Aachen.

If large gobs of armor sent to either front had remained in existence for long periods, used defensively, they might have accumulated some. But it wasn't. It was thrown into action in offensive stances and half or more rapidly lost. The rest was allowed to waste away, while new production went to some other crisis area. And around it went.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

I have a report showing during June, July, August the US lost 895 tanks (all types) and the British/Canadians 1535. Cannot verify this but it would seem legit that the Brit/Can lost more faced as they were around Caen by the main German armor. I'm assumig these are total write-offs - maybe but report doesn't say.

the subject is a bit complicated. while you can get US tank & SP losses up till the US definition of Normandy (e.g. anything starting with the break-out is not part of it -- so up to 20th August US loss reports), which is about 1200 IIRC, it's quite impossible to get the numbers for the other Allied armies and Germans.

if one would use the US definition, and blindly accept available loss reports of various sides, the German losses would be ridiculously low, around 500 tanks & SP. it's simply not credible and it's senseless regarding the true effect of Normandy battles on the German tank fleet (destruction of). likewise the British army losses for the period are not credible (obviously lagging).

my 3300 (IIRC) number was one based on the end of August or possibly even partly September (because some German and non-US allied reports for August or September simply do not exist, and they contain obvious lagging from the previous periods). it would also better fit my interests on evaluating the effects of the Normandy battles, as for example Falaise would be included, and the loss reports for various sides would match better. i strongly suspect Zetterling's number is based on similar time period and IIRC it was just some hundreds above my number (perhaps 3700, i can't remember).

anyway, the actual period chosen does not really change anything. Allies can lose thousands of tanks and it doesn't matter. no matter what sector the Germans would send their armor, they will never defeat the Allied armor arm in Normany.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Unfortunately the back hand blow isn't going to work against an opponent more mobile than you with command of the air. The German advantage in the East in mobile warfare did not apply in the West. You also have to be able to trade space for maneuver room. If Germany allowed the Allies to breakout of the lodgement area there was no way of putting the genie back in the bottle.

the first part of back hand blow was done with leg infantry. the idea isn't so much your own mobility, but to force your opponent to over-commit their mobile units and thus cause logistical nightmare.

in France Allied air, naval and artillery had such an effect because Germans were packed up in a very small area.

i'm not suggesting Germans could re-create a full-brown back hand blow in France. i'm not suggesting they could push Allies back to the beaches. i'm thinking something like the first part of back hand blow (e.g. delaying battles that cause heavy drain on opponent's mobile units and logistics), with only tactical German counter-attacks, which might lead to a stalemate in France and buy Germans 6 extra months.

the only real problem in doing back hand blow would be troubles in coordinating actions. Germans failed in it in Normandy, though it mostly happened on army/corps level and with attacks.

the reasons why i think back hand blow might be good in France 1944, is basicly as follows:

- Allies prefer rigid deliberate assaults, maximizing the effect of their support arms. this means small combined arms rear-guards can stop pursuing Allied elements.

- Allies are active mostly during daylight. this is good for allowing leg infantry to hike back to the next defensive line.

- Allies are slightly shy on taking casualties. this would make German ambushes by small combined arms rear-guards effective.

- Allies are weak logistically. if they were forced to move their heavy full body out of Normandy earlier, they would suffer the logistical shortfalls a lot sooner and of course would suffer greater non-combat attrition as well.

- Germans had serious logistical problems in Normandy. much less so if they do back hand blow.

- tactical German counter-attacks have better chances for being succesful, as they don't face such massive concentrations of force.

German front would of course be a lot thinner than it was in Normandy, but Allies didn't make any use of it even in historical scenario once Germans were pushed back. the concentration in Normandy also played to Allied hands, as they were able to utilize their strong support arms to greater effects.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

There is an interesting quote from a 17th SS Staff Officer in the book, "The Germans in Normandy" by Richard Hargreaves, that describes air attacks by US fighter bombers on a 17th SS column moving into the Normandy area.

Apparently they were not that used to being harassed like that from the air, and they finally halted their move and pulled all serviceable vehicles off the road. All the men stayed under cover. This was their first expossure to their new opponents.

Allied command of the air certainly prevented adequate movement and manuever by German forces throughout the Normandy campaign.

yes, but not so much on the actual battlegrounds and my impression is that the effect mostly that of caused delays. as an example of a counter-quote:

Maj.Gen. Stadler of 9th SS PD: "the use of artillery by the British was definitely much more powerful and oppressive than enemy air superiority".

[Nidan1]

Actually panzer production was low compared to their enemies and was overwhelmed by Soviet and US production. Very roughly 50,000 each of Shermans and T34 (76 and 85) alon not even counting M10, 18, 36 and all the Sov SU types. Many pz divisions in Normandy didn't receive replacements for losses and/or had on hand less than authorized. Some of this was because the one thing Allied air supremacy did well was to tie-up, dislocate, hinder and slow down German rail movement.

I didn't intend to compare German panzer production rates against the allies, which they could never achieve. What I was trying to point out was that the Germans maintained a reasonable production rate (for them) throughout the war. Due to the bombing, production became decentralized but still effective.

If you look at the OOB for "Wacht am Rhein" which was six months after the Normandy battles, most SS formations were completely reconstituted.

A failure of Strategic Bombing by the allies, or something else?

[Nidan1]

yes, but not so much on the actual battlegrounds and my impression is that the effect mostly that of caused delays. as an example of a counter-quote:

Maj.Gen. Stadler of 9th SS PD: "the use of artillery by the British was definitely much more powerful and oppressive than enemy air superiority".

That's right, the Germans consistently point to the lavish use of artillery by the allies as a reqason for their defeats on the battlefield.

The unimpeded production of war materiel certainly was a force multiplier for the allies.

[Narses]

the subject is a bit complicated. while you can get US tank & SP losses up till the US definition of Normandy (e.g. anything starting with the break-out is not part of it -- so up to 20th August US loss reports), which is about 1200 IIRC, it's quite impossible to get the numbers for the other Allied armies and Germans.

if one would use the US definition, and blindly accept available loss reports of various sides, the German losses would be ridiculously low, around 500 tanks & SP. it's simply not credible and it's senseless regarding the true effect of Normandy battles on the German tank fleet (destruction of). likewise the British army losses for the period are not credible (obviously lagging).

my 3300 (IIRC) number was one based on the end of August or possibly even partly September (because some German and non-US allied reports for August or September simply do not exist, and they contain obvious lagging from the previous periods). it would also better fit my interests on evaluating the effects of the Normandy battles, as for example Falaise would be included, and the loss reports for various sides would match better. i strongly suspect Zetterling's number is based on similar time period and IIRC it was just some hundreds above my number (perhaps 3700, i can't remember).

anyway, the actual period chosen does not really change anything. Allies can lose thousands of tanks and it doesn't matter. no matter what sector the Germans would send their armor, they will never defeat the Allied armor arm in Normany.

I agree and almost didn't post those numbers. Claims of tank kills are even more suspect like bomber crews reports of fighters shot down.

One of the interesting things about several Allied examinations of German panzer losses in Normandy and France reflects the highest numbers, if I recall correctly (I think Zetterling for one quotes them), came from abandoned vehicles either destroyed or otherwise left by their crews - possibly a result of lack of fuel or breakdowns. Of course these kinds of losses happen when you don't control the battlefield and fall back. Then even minor damage or breakdowns can cause a loss that should not happen. So ion most cases the allies would be able to recover lightly damaged bu nonmobile armor.

[dieseltaylor]

I always think that the battle in Normandy actually was probaly more beneficial to the Allies than one might think. But then I like to see if their are any positives.

The Axis fighting pretty much as far as they could get from Germany. The Allies with pretty short supply lines and controlling the air and sea. Some serious on the job training before more open/mobile battles.

Whether unleashing the genie from the bottle much earlier would have been more dangerous to the Allies in getting bloody noses with the use of far less battle savvy troops and the increased supply consumption is an interesting what-if.

[Narses]

I didn't intend to compare German panzer production rates against the allies, which they could never achieve. What I was trying to point out was that the Germans maintained a reasonable production rate (for them) throughout the war. Due to the bombing, production became decentralized but still effective.

If you look at the OOB for "Wacht am Rhein" which was six months after the Normandy battles, most SS formations were completely reconstituted.

A failure of Strategic Bombing by the allies, or something else?

You are certainly right about panzer production in 1944.

My point is for a country attempting to conquer all of Europe and GB the panzer production (tanks, assault guns, SP guns) figures for 1939 thru 1941 are shocking ( roughly 247, 1643,3790, 6180). In fact the UK alone outproduced Germany through 1942. For 1943 and 44 you are correct, they are very respectable at 12,063 and 19,002. The figures are from The United States Strategic Bombing Survey of Sept 1945.

Another factor was industrial capacity. Expansion was very difficult and workers were in short supply. Recall in 1943 Guderian as Inspector General of Armored Troops stepped in to stop the halt in production of the PzIV in favor of the Panther. Yes, he would've rather had the Panther but to stop production in PzIV plants to retool for the Panther would mean the loss of 4-6 mos production of Pz IV by industry's own projections - a loss the panzer divisions could not afford even for more Panthers. Hence the PzIV soldiered on.

Not sure I want to open a discussion on Strategic Bombing here but the SB Survey I quoted does say (pg 66) "Only a few sporadic attacks upon the panzer industry were made before August 1944." Most of those were RAF strikes: Oct 43 at Henschel ( only Tiger producer) at Kassel, April 44 on the ZF gear box factory and the Mayback engine plant, etc. This Survey calculates from interviews with the Germans that the attacks of 1944 cost a loss of about 2200 panzers.

[sburke]

I always think that the battle in Normandy actually was probaly more beneficial to the Allies than one might think. But then I like to see if their are any positives.

The Axis fighting pretty much as far as they could get from Germany. The Allies with pretty short supply lines and controlling the air and sea. Some serious on the job training before more open/mobile battles.

Whether unleashing the genie from the bottle much earlier would have been more dangerous to the Allies in getting bloody noses with the use of far less battle savvy troops and the increased supply consumption is an interesting what-if.

How far are you thinking the Germans could have withdrawn from the coast?

I just can't see that Germany had very many viable options in the West. Strategic issues had by this point determined operational capabilities to the detriment of the Wehrmacht.

The Allies through Enigma generally had very good intelligence for large scale German maneuvers. The Bocage at least limited the Allies to fighting in ideal defensive terrain. Giving that up for an elastic defense just wasn't a better option for an Army which was actually the less mobile of the two and was essentially blind.

[Broken]

But, in the initial stages of the campaign the Commonwealth units were pitched up against the most combat effective German units, at least on paper, why was this? Was it the Allied plan that they fought the armour (they had more effective AT capabilities with the 17lber, experience etc, were these factors, not realities but factors in the initial planning?), or did the German response just mean they were the poor sods who suffered the attentions of the majority of armour?

A major reason the 1, 2, 9, and 10 SS Panzer ended up in front of the Commonwealth forces was that the only good roads in Normandy at the time all led to Caen. This worked out reasonably well for the Allies, as the German armour was therefore within range of the Allied naval guns.

[Nidan1]

You are certainly right about panzer production in 1944.

My point is for a country attempting to conquer all of Europe and GB the panzer production (tanks, assault guns, SP guns) figures for 1939 thru 1941 are shocking ( roughly 247, 1643,3790, 6180). In fact the UK alone outproduced Germany through 1942. For 1943 and 44 you are correct, they are very respectable at 12,063 and 19,002. The figures are from The United States Strategic Bombing Survey of Sept 1945.

Another factor was industrial capacity. Expansion was very difficult and workers were in short supply. Recall in 1943 Guderian as Inspector General of Armored Troops stepped in to stop the halt in production of the PzIV in favor of the Panther. Yes, he would've rather had the Panther but to stop production in PzIV plants to retool for the Panther would mean the loss of 4-6 mos production of Pz IV by industry's own projections - a loss the panzer divisions could not afford even for more Panthers. Hence the PzIV soldiered on.

Not sure I want to open a discussion on Strategic Bombing here but the SB Survey I quoted does say (pg 66) "Only a few sporadic attacks upon the panzer industry were made before August 1944." Most of those were RAF strikes: Oct 43 at Henschel ( only Tiger producer) at Kassel, April 44 on the ZF gear box factory and the Mayback engine plant, etc. This Survey calculates from interviews with the Germans that the attacks of 1944 cost a loss of about 2200 panzers.

With the Blitzkrieg successes during the early war years, I imagine German strategic planners...namely Grofaz figured that Germany wouldn't need to outproduce its rivals in armor. Also producing several different tank designs at once, and maintaining critical engineering tolerances on vehicles that were getting blown up after a few weeks in the field, the Germans made it additionaly hard on themselves.

After the war the French did some studies on the final drives of Panther tanks and estimated that they had a field life of approximately 150km. The Germans were building luxury tanks while the allies were pumping out model Ts. A war of attrition was something the Germans had no chance of winning.

[Narses]

You certainly have a point about Grofaz even in the summer of 41 you will recall he refused to release newly manufactured tanks in Germany for the panzer units fighting in Russia so he could build further new panzer divisions. Guderian had to plead for engines for his 2nd Pz Group and received 300 but actually needed more.

But after the bad winter of 41 the writing was on the wall. In order to make the 42 offensive in southern Russia effective the Wehrmacht had to strip the units of Center and North especially the armor in order to fit out the units in the south. The second pz bm of most pz divs in Center and North were withdrawn to South (actually Army Groups A and .

But another issue was Gofaz's strategic planning as you will certainly recall. The Barbarossa campaign was to be over in the fall of 1941 and Hitler's strategic planning had already put in place a reduction in army forces, ammunition and material (all which was felt by fall and winter) to switch Germany's industry to a build up of the other services (Luftwaffe and Navy).

[JasonC]

URD wrote "anything starting with the break-out is not part of it -- so up to 20th August" - err, the breakout starts on 25 July, a full month earlier. Through 20 August includes the entire breakout, the entire Mortain counterattack, and closing the gap at Falaise. The only thing it excludes is the road march to the westwall against air.

As for the comments about Zetterling, yes he is completely hopeless on the subject, because he takes literally the timing of the QM corps dotting the i's in the returns for units that ceased to exist a month or more earlier. The proper way to account for the timing of AFV losses is - the moment a tank leaves "running" status and never thereafter returns to running status, is the moment it was actually lost. And whatever cause put it out of running status for the last time, is its actual cause of loss.

By that simple standard, fewer than 300 German tanks of the 2200 sent to Normandy got out alive. Which puts the exchange ratio around 5 to 4 in armor, slight German favor. It was more than 2 to 1 against them in manpower, due to huge surrenders once the front gave way.

As for sburke's questions about what the Germans could have done differently, they didn't have to throw away their armor in reckless counterattacks that had no chance of operational success. Such actions wasted about half of 21st Panzer soon after the invasion, about a third of 12SS armor within a week, more than half of 2nd Panzer's Panthers and half of the AFV strength of the newly arriving 9th and 10th SS in Epsom, half of Lehr's remaining armor strength within one day of being committed to the US sector, and well over half of the strength committed to Mortain (only a modest amount of that immediately, but the rest deep in a sack from which they could not withdraw alive).

These mistakes of overaggressive tactical use of armor threw away easily half of German tank strength in Normandy, when all added up.

When instead used in an operational "linebacker" role, sliding in front of a penetration and fighting to hold ground so that slower arms could maneuver, German armor was significantly more successful. It showed this at Villiers Bocage, in Goodwood, holding open the Falaise jaws, etc.

Realism and attritional efficiency in the long run go together. Desperate attempts to deny operational realities are extremely inefficient and expensive. This repeated at the westwall, specifically in Lorraine, where the armor of the new Panzer brigades was wasted in less than 2 weeks in action in overly aggressive tactical roles.

What Germany in the west needed above all was a doctrine of *defense*, especially for its best equipped mobile formations. Institutionally it acted as though defense rhymes with defeat. Its infantry formations fought well, and the mobile ones did occasionally with the half or less of their forces left in being after higher ups gave up on the fantasy stuff. But pretending it was an efficiently conducted defense without screw ups is pretending. They could have fought the campaign *much* better than they did.

[Narses]

Some really good points here. Yes, an active defense which was von Manstein's choice on the Eastern Front for which he was fired.

Rommel was wrong. A study of Italy would have shown the difficulty of destroying an Allied beach assault in the face of a huge naval and air advantage. Not just superiority but supremacy.

Probably nothing would've worked, certainly not von Schweppenburg idea for a major armor counterattack from units held deep inland and waiting to determine the Allied main thrust. The German units were no longer completely mobile. Yes tank strength was impressive and qualitatively very good but trucks and SPWs were lacking and could not move because of Allied air supremacy. And qualitatively the infantry was a mixed bag in 1944 with many units in France being restored from the East Front losses while the permanent units based in Franch were in many cases not well trained, equipped or mobile ( no transport and often in the static divisions no towing vehicles to reposition PAK's or artillery).

Perhaps instead of all that wasted concrete and rebar on the beach making impressive Wochenschau newsreels of the 14" guns a 100km deep successive defensive positions ala the Soviets at Kursk would've worked better along with small mobile all-arms brigades.

[Cuirassier]

Rundstedt certainly had the best strategy. "Make peace you fools!"

[JasonC]

Cuirassier - seconded. He usually did...

[Narses]

Rundstedt certainly had the best strategy. "Make peace you fools!"

Great response. Didn't the old gentleman also say something to the effect that he couldn't even change the guard outside his door without OKW (Fuehrer) permission.

[ASL Veteran]

What Germany in the west needed above all was a doctrine of *defense*, especially for its best equipped mobile formations. Institutionally it acted as though defense rhymes with defeat. Its infantry formations fought well, and the mobile ones did occasionally with the half or less of their forces left in being after higher ups gave up on the fantasy stuff. But pretending it was an efficiently conducted defense without screw ups is pretending. They could have fought the campaign *much* better than they did.

I have read that Hitler felt that the Western Allies invasion was the moment of victory for Germany and that he couldn't wait for the Allies to land. The reason being that if Germany smashed the invasion it was felt that the Western Allies wouldn't be able to mount another cross channel invasion for many years. This would allow the Germans to pull all their forces out of the west and then smash the Soviets. Apparently this is the reason why so many SS units were concentrated in the west and why attack was so prominent on their minds.

I have also read that air supremacy of the allies was just one of many factors that hampered German operations. Apparently American and British superiority in artillery was a factor as well. I have read many accounts of how German soldiers felt that the Allies fired artillery almost non stop in quantities that were unheard of by the German army - something on the order of 10 Allied shells for every German shell fired in return. It's been said that the area around Caen had almost as much artillery activity as WW1. Although with fewer guns overall than in WW1, the guns were modern relative to the WW1 pieces and apparently the British and Americans never lacked for ammunition.

[Nidan1]

Great response. Didn't the old gentleman also say something to the effect that he couldn't even change the guard outside his door without OKW (Fuehrer) permission.

After the attempted assassination of Hitler in July in '44. Heinz Guderian was forced to abandon decades of non-politicizing of the German Army by agreeing to Hitler's edict that all General Staff Officers become "National Socialist Leadership Officers". They would henceforth have to emulate all of Hitler's ideals, both military and political.

Hitler said;" I expect every General Staff officer to accept and convert to my views immediately...and to do so publicly. Anyone who cannot do so should ask to leave the General Staff."

Hitler then instituted the Sippenhaftung which rounded up not only those suspected of conspiracy against National Solicialism, but their families, all their possesions, their titles etc.

Imagine what this must have done to initiative in the field by high ranking officers.

[Boche]

apparently the British and Americans never lacked for ammunition.

well that doesnt show ingame jajaja

[JasonC]

Nidan - well at least a few German officers showed enough initiative to try to kill the bloody bugger and end the damn war. Unfortunately they missed.

[Nidan1]

Yes indeed Jason, but they never really tried again after that July attempt....nearly ten more months of bloody fighting before the end came.

[Michael Emrys]

Didn't the old gentleman also say something to the effect that he couldn't even change the guard outside his door without OKW (Fuehrer) permission.

Not quite. I think he said that was the only thing he could do without permission.

Michael