CAS in CM:N

[Cambronne]

First I was not talking about evidence from German side nor Soviet side. It is about a third party work,based not only on German sources.Second,aside whether you like Irving or not,it doesn,t change the mentioned diary.Third,speaking about both sides evidence,do you think you need more German evidence that the air raids at Bir Hacheim (ok not really a "pure" CAS as mentioned) really existed and they practically brought victory?! And last,there are a lot more examples of effective close air support but since you wouldn,t believe anyway,I let you find them by yourself(ves).

[Sergei]

Third,speaking about both sides evidence,do you think you need more German evidence that the air raids at Bir Hacheim (ok not really a "pure" CAS as mentioned) really existed and they practically brought victory?!

You don't need more evidence, you need better evidence. Someone's lamentations in his diary about "OH SO MANY DEAD!" is just subjective experience and there is very little in the way of objective information in your quote.

[ChrisND]

First I was not talking about evidence from German side nor Soviet side. It is about a third party work,based not only on German sources.Second,aside whether you like Irving or not,it doesn,t change the mentioned diary.Third,speaking about both sides evidence,do you think you need more German evidence that the air raids at Bir Hacheim (ok not really a "pure" CAS as mentioned) really existed and they practically brought victory?! And last,there are a lot more examples of effective close air support but since you wouldn,t believe anyway,I let you find them by yourself(ves).

Unless I'm confused and we are talking about two different things, what is needed is evidence that air support was being directed by local commanders on the ground on the spot and in a timely manner. Not "OMG SO MUCH BLOOD!!!11" (sorry couldn't help it). I'm pretty sure everyone here knows that aircraft attacked ground forces.

[Cambronne]

Unless I'm confused and we are talking about two different things, what is needed is evidence that air support was being directed by local commanders on the ground on the spot and in a timely manner. Not "OMG SO MUCH BLOOD!!!11" (sorry couldn't help it). I'm pretty sure everyone here knows that aircraft attacked ground forces.

if previous examples of CAS called by battalion or company commanders and executed almost by the book don't work...other examples won't work either since you don't believe they existed.If you need combat reports from the Russian 1st Tank Corps about losing 6 T34s in the morning of 22 February in the village of Petschanka exclusively due to Stuka attacks to match with the reports of SS Der Fuhrer saying exactly the same thing,you probably won't find any,since most likely no Russian tank commander(either dead or POW) could write such a report.And since most of us (I believe) track the informations more from historical works written by professionals and less from direct study of official archive papers I tend to believe what is written there as long as I don't find something contradictory and as long as there are other accounts about similar events.

[JonS]

if previous examples of CAS called by battalion or company commanders and executed almost by the book don't work...other examples won't work either since you don't believe they existed.If you need combat reports from the Russian 1st Tank Corps about losing 6 T34s in the morning of 22 February in the village of Petschanka exclusively due to Stuka attacks to match with the reports of SS Der Fuhrer saying exactly the same thing,you probably won't find any,since most likely no Russian tank commander(either dead or POW) could write such a report.

Nonsense. On EVERY battle where that has been done, the claims made for the flyboys have been shown to be wildly inaccurate - just like their aim. For starters, there are a couple of examples at The Dupuy Institute forums regarding German CAS claims during Citadel, and there are the British ORS reports dealing with the claims by British pilots that simply cannot be reconciled with the actual damage found during investigations on the ground (look in Gooderson's book on CAS, and/or the compiled No.2 ORS reports published by WLU with Copp as editor).

Furthermore, as has been pointed out to you repeatedly, even if we accept at face value the claims of wholesale damage and destruction the examples you are giving are simply not good enough to show that the air attacks are what could be considered rapid-response CAS.

[Cambronne]

Yeah,the inaccurate claims made by the pilots are notorious.Heh, I read somewere(don't remember where now) they even pretended to sink a carrier when the ship mentioned wasn't even hit,and it wasn't even a carrier but a cruiser.If that kind of error was possible, the correct estimation of an air strike against much smaller targets as tanks could seldom be done.

But it was an entire another matter when the story was narrated by the ground troops who called the air strike,they could see better the impact and afterward,resuming advance,encountered no opposition from the burning skeletons of what previously was holding them back.This kind of testimony from the ground is much reliable than the one from the sky,in my opinion.

[stikkypixie]

Yeah,the inaccurate claims made by the pilots are notorious.Heh, I read somewere(don't remember where now) they even pretended to sink a carrier when the ship mentioned wasn't even hit,and it wasn't even a carrier but a cruiser.If that kind of error was possible, the correct estimation of an air strike against much smaller targets as tanks could seldom be done.

But it was an entire another matter when the story was narrated by the ground troops who called the air strike,they could see better the impact and afterward,resuming advance,encountered no opposition from the burning skeletons of what previously was holding them back.This kind of testimony from the ground is much reliable than the one from the sky,in my opinion.

Your first example is of a pre-planned air raid and doesn't count as CAS. The second (the Kharkov one) is more convincing but is vague in terms of time span. In a matter of moments can mean a lot things depending on the situation.

[YankeeDog]

Ya, we all know there are devastating examples of the use of air power in support of tactical combat in WWII. Sometimes, the damage claims are inflated, but even accounting for the fish stories, there's enough left which can be verified to say that there were times when the bombs literally blew a hole in the enemy lines and allowed an attacking force to march right through.

For the purposes of CM, though, what we're really concerned about it the timeframes on which these attacks were planned and executed. If it's minutes, then it's potentially something that the player should be able to direct and control in-game. If it's hours or more, then it's something that CM players should be able to pre-plot prior to the start of the battle, at best.

You have to be very careful assuming too much about the meaning of words like "quickly" and "in a few moments" when reading WWII history, and especially when the source is a secondary or tertiary work.

To put things in context, if an advancing German armor column on the Ost Front ran into an unexpected enemy strongpoint, and needed heavy artillery support, it could take quite a while for the big guns (army and corps level stuff) to come on-line -- tens of minutes at least if the guns were already in place and in range, and quite a bit longer if the guns needed to be moved up (hours or days, even).

So, if an armored spearhead commander is able to call upon the "Flying Artillery" Stukas, which provide a level of support comparable to heavy artillery strike, and the Stukas are able to deliver their bombs, say, 1 hour after the initial call, this is a "quick" strike that came "in a few moments" as far as the ground commander is concerned. Without the Stukas, he'd have to wait for the big guns to catch up to his advance and get set up, delaying the advance for at least hours if not days.

But a 1-hour call time would be marginal for inclusion in CM other than as a pre-planned strike -- the scenario would have to be significantly longer than an hour for this to be really useful as an in-game plotted strike, and not many scenarios are.

It's difficult to get hard data in this area, so I'll freely admit that my opinion is mostly based on conjecture. But, at the best, (Allies late 1944 on, and MAYBE Germans in late 1942-1943 Ost Front), I could believe CAS response times of about a half hour. This speed of response required (a) pilots and spotters trained in CAS, and a system of C&C for this type of strike, ( spotters traveling with front-line troops with radios that could communicate directly with pilots overhead, and © CAS aircraft loitering over the attack column. It took a lot of resources to provide this level of support, so it was rare, but it did happen.

[Battlefront.com]

Correct. For the most part aircraft were not directly controlled by ground observers. The Germans had this capability very early on, but it was extremely limited. Usually what would happen is the column would run into problems, a controller would be brought forward, some aircraft launched, and the strike finally accomplished. Then they would double check to make sure whatever it was that held them up was out of the way, and only then go forward with the attack. This could take hours to accomplish.

As far as I know the concept of having aircraft "on station" wasn't established until after the war. Long after, I think. Someone might be able to correct me here. The reason this "on station" is important is because this is how ground commanders get quick responses to air support requests. And even then the aircraft can be 10-15 minutes distant.

And as always, we have to draw a hard line between CAS and operational/strategic air strikes. Just like we have to draw a hard line between tactical and operational/strategic artillery strikes. You can do operational/strategic support in CM now. Always could, always will. But there's no fun to be had in it because there's no accompanying tactical battle.

Steve

[YankeeDog]

Steve -- in re aircraft "on station" -- see JonS' notes regarding Cabrank etc. above.

Briefly, it was done in WWII, but only rarely as the logistics cost was huge. Definitely by the Allies in the ETO starting about August 1944. It was also done by the USMC in the PTO (arguably the ones who developed the most advanced CAS system of the War, out of necessity) and possibly by the Germans on the Ost Front, though my own information regarding the Germans is is limited and inconclusive.

[Vark]

I think there is also a problem with the unrealistic but understandably accelerated tempo of combat operations in CM1 (not sure about CM2) where 40 mins to take a town, or crack a defensive position is standard. Waiting an hour for a Stuka strike is unrealistic with those time frames so one could either increase the reaction times or abstract the effects. Finally, if these CAS missions were so ineffective why were they flown?

[Elmar Bijlsma]

They weren't, most of the time. Most commanders of the various air forces thought it was too difficult and a waste of time. IMHO they weren't wrong. Why would you attack a concealed enemy under cover and in close contact with your side if you can shoot up his supply columns?

[YankeeDog]

It's important to draw a distinction between Tactical/Interdictive airstrikes, and true CAS. There was a lot of the former in WWII, not much of the latter.

In general, it seems to me that CAS became desirable in WWII in situations where big gun artillery could not easily be brought to bear. If you've got the big guns in range, it's generally faster, easier to use them rather than an airstrike.

So, the USMC in the Pacific developed an early interest in CAS, especially when they were out of range of naval guns. And Allied armored columns used it in the ETO to keep up the pace of advance, when they had outpaced the heavy artillery.

Total air superiority and surplus airframes is also handy. By late 1944, the Luftwaffe had virtually been chased from the sky, and the Allies had fighter pilots looking for missions.

[Sequoia]

And this is where I ask if there will be anti-aircraft fire in the initial release.

[Michael Emrys]

...(arguably the ones who developed the most advanced CAS system of the War, out of necessity)...

This is a point that I wanted to raise as well. I think the USMC probably came the closest to what is considered to be recent CAS. Even five years later in Korea the GIs were saying that they were greatly preferred to the USAF, who had had the intervening time to study the problems and work out solutions by then. So although Allied CAS had made great leaps forward by the end of the Normandy period, it still had a long way to go.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Frieser makes an interesting point in his description of the breakthrough at Sedan. He states that the bulk of the entire Luftwaffe in the west attacked the French positions throughout the morning and a part of the afternoon, yet almost the only result they achieved was suppression. Not that wasn't a valuable contribution to the battle, but actual destruction of French bunkers and elimination of organized resistance was left to the troops on the ground. If this operation hadn't been viewed as absolutely critical to the whole campaign, it would have been a massive waste of resources, since it meant that for that day, almost the entire remainder of engaged forces had been stripped of air support.

Michael

[JonS]

This is a point that I wanted to raise as well. I think the USMC probably came the closest to what is considered to be recent CAS. Even five years later in Korea the GIs were saying that they were greatly preferred to the USAF, who had had the intervening time to study the problems and work out solutions by then. So although Allied CAS had made great leaps forward by the end of the Normandy period, it still had a long way to go.

It wouldn't surprise me in the least to discover that the USAAF/USAF went backwards in terms of CAS capability between 1945 and 1951, setting their lights instead by their self declared strategic/nuclear raison d'être.

[MikeyD]

Just today I was reading about the opening air assault that kicked off operation Cobra. 3,300 planes in 3 hours dropping 14,000 tons of bombs along a remarkable narrow front. With seven hundred P47s being used to defend the assault's flanks from the air. Add to that the equivalent of ninety artillery battlions in there too.

I can imagine building a scenario where allies get a company of riflemen plus 30+ fighters and 50+ artillery pieces! I don't think we could expect support like that in all our scenarios though.

[JonS]

Mike,

COBRA has about as much relevance to CAS and what's being discussed as your earlier example re: the butterfly bombs

Jon

[JonS]

Finally, if these CAS missions were so ineffective why were they flown?

* Because they were available.

* Because they were cutting edge technology.

* Because the kinds of delays that we find utterly ridiculous were - in the context of the time - quite workable. Conducting a battle is a slow process.

* Because the infantry intuitively understood that the morale effect (on both friendly and enemy forces) was valuable, even if the actual destruction was quite modest.

* Because the additional friction it imposed on the enemy was worth it.

* Because air was able to deliver a massive amount of ordnance in a very short period of time, even though artillery was able to deliver more, more reliably.

* Because the Army pretty much demanded the capability be made available.

* Because the military isn't in nearly the same rush, nor nearly so ruthless with their own forces, as wargamers are.

* Because they were effective, just not in the ways wargamers tend to think of.

* etc.

[akd]

Just today I was reading about the opening air assault that kicked off operation Cobra. 3,300 planes in 3 hours dropping 14,000 tons of bombs along a remarkable narrow front. With seven hundred P47s being used to defend the assault's flanks from the air. Add to that the equivalent of ninety artillery battlions in there too.

I can imagine building a scenario where allies get a company of riflemen plus 30+ fighters and 50+ artillery pieces! I don't think we could expect support like that in all our scenarios though.

And your company gets wiped out by friendly air in the first minute of the scenario. Fun!

[MikeyD]

Back in CMBO days I actually did build a Cobra kickoff scenario where Red 'friendly' fighters blasted the bejezus out of the attacking Blue force in the opening move. Great fun, haven't played that scenario in at least 4 years.

[Michael Emrys]

It wouldn't surprise me in the least to discover that the USAAF/USAF went backwards in terms of CAS capability between 1945 and 1951, setting their lights instead by their self declared strategic/nuclear raison d'être.

Yes, I think there is a lot of evidence in support of that. After the world war, the A-bomb was viewed as the unanswerable ne plus ultra. If anybody started a war with us, we'd just nuke them out of existence. Conventional armies (and navies) with all their operational paraphernalia were no longer required.

Michael

[Battlefront.com]

This reminds me of an issue we ran into when doing Civil War Generals 2 with the Siege of Vicksburg. The Union put over 22,000 shells into the city, virtually destroying it. But damage to the forces there (and even the civilians) was hardly anything. But the effect on the defender's health and morale was great indeed. The constant shelling, purposefully erratic, robbed the defenders of suitable amounts of sleep and freedom of movement.

This is relevant because the actual shelling wasn't something that happened during the subsequent assaults. It happened prior. In game terms this means there would be hardly any artillery activity during the battle, but the effects of previous artillery would reduce the defender's statistics (Fitness, Morale, etc.) down considerably. Which means, in game terms, you only see the affect of the siege on the defender and not the guns popping off rounds.

Steve

[AslakH]

You are making sense, Aslakh, I just didn't understand the first time. Perhaps you're right. I just think that air power would be great to simulate in CM but, if it is simulated, it must be unpredictable in every way, otherwise it won't be realistic and will ruin immersion rather than enhance it.

Perhaps Yankeedog has the best idea - players could buy CAS strikes as just another form of off-map artillery, but one which must be used during the setup phase on a pre-registered target. The time of the strike should be random and no indication given to the user as to when it would arrive.

Better?

Much better.

Can't one have both random CAS and predetermined attrition?

That way we could choose.

Everyone forgot about the awesome FliVo in the early stages of the war?

Screw the "pop smoke and pray" ETO CAS, this was luftwaffe on the ground talking to those with wings! Not your regular FOs either. From all I've heard and read, they were really, really good FOs. Could be wrong, though.

When will we have CM:P (or CM:'39)? Would be cool invading poland.