CAS in CM:N

[Steiner14]

One of the key features of Blitzkrieg is the combination of land and air forces in a combined tactical attack. Have you never heard about "Fliegerleitoffiziere" placed within tanks engaged in tactical combat? They were directing Stukageschwader for close tactical support from within the battlefield. What else is CAS?

[Elmar Bijlsma]

Those guys were, especially during the Blitzkrieg period, liaisons to handle strike requests from the Heer. They were not some early type of FAC. Look at Rotterdam to see how capable the Germans really were of CAS.

Strike in direct support of the army? Yes. CAS? No.

[JonS]

Cue misguided comments about how wonderful Rudel was

[JonS]

I agree with Elmar. One need only look at how long it took to arrange the already planned airstrikes in support of the Meuse crossings to get a pretty good grasp of what the Germans were and weren't capable of in terms of CAS.

Most of what the GAF did was attacking targets of opportunity (including refugee columns, as a matter of policy) in the general area of the frontline, NOT attacking specific targets to aid ground forces moving forward. There are exceptions, of course - the Meuse crossings, and the hold up on the Prussia/Poland border back in Sept 1939, are both good examples. But they took hours or days to arrange, and even then the German FACs weren't directly talking the pilots on to targets.

[Dietrich]

So after three pages the consensus is... no CAS in the typical sense in CM:N? Just one fighter or fighter-bomber (maybe two) -- if any at all -- passing overhead at random and engaging pretty much at will, with avoidance of "friendly fire" corresponding to a/c skill?

I'm okay with that. I'm inclined to suspect that modern perceptions/impressions of communication capability have bled back through the decades, leading to the misperception that because the German blitzkrieg doctrine called for fighter-bombers/dive-bombers to act as "flying artillery" and because the Allies had lots of radios, troops in contact must have been able to call on planes for support.

But no doubt someone far more grog-y will correct me on that. =P

[YankeeDog]

So after three pages the consensus is... no CAS in the typical sense in CM:N? Just one fighter or fighter-bomber (maybe two) -- if any at all -- passing overhead at random and engaging pretty much at will, with avoidance of "friendly fire" corresponding to a/c skill?

I'm okay with that. I'm inclined to suspect that modern perceptions/impressions of communication capability have bled back through the decades, leading to the misperception that because the German blitzkrieg doctrine called for fighter-bombers/dive-bombers to act as "flying artillery" and because the Allies had lots of radios, troops in contact must have been able to call on planes for support.

But no doubt someone far more grog-y will correct me on that. =P

Yes; if you're talking about the ETO up to the St. Lo breakout, I think that's pretty much correct. Maybe a P-47 or Typhoon pilot happens to pass over the battle area after an unsuccessful search for targets on the roads behind German lines, spots a tank, and decides to drop his unused ordnance on the target of opportunity (which, if he's good, is actually a German tank, and not an Allied one...)

While tactical airstrikes were very important in restricting German movement and resupply, the Allies didn't have a CAS system that could quickly respond to requests from front-line troops in Normandy. If an American Company Commander wanted to get the attention of a P-47 flying overhead, his only hope was to wave a flag or pop smoke or something like that -- there was no protocol for directly linking to the pilot via radio.

And, in Normandy anyway, the whole issue is irrelevant for the Germans, since they were never able to put any significant number of planes into the air over Normandy in 1944 during the daytime -- nighttime harassment bombing raids are really out of the scope of CM.

But, looking beyond the initial game release, it's important to keep in mind that the Allies' CAS capability evolves very quickly in 1944 -- see JonS' remarks above. So ideally we should see improvements to the Allies' CAS capabilities as new ETO Modules/Games are released.

Later in 1944, the Allies get better at arranging 'pre-planned' airstrikes. Usually, this would be a CAS request put in the previous day, in support of a planned assault. In CM terms, I don't see this kind of thing being functionally much different than a pre-planned heavy artillery strike.

Then, eventually, the Allies get something approaching modern CAS, where a Forward Air Controller can actually react to a developing situation, and call in F/Bs who are already in the air and who respond in perhaps a few tens of minutes, rather than hours. Still a far cry from the precision and reaction time of modern CAS, but nevertheless a vast improvement over what could be done in June 1944.

Cheers,

YD

[Steiner14]

Those guys were, especially during the Blitzkrieg period, liaisons to handle strike requests from the Heer. They were not some early type of FAC. Look at Rotterdam to see how capable the Germans really were of CAS.

Yes and therefore Fliegerleitoffiziere drove with tanks on the battlefield.

You even confuse a preplanned attack on a big city, that was guided from the LW-HQ behind the lines, with an supportive ground attack guided from a Fliegerleitoffizier on the battlefield. Incredible.

[Elmar Bijlsma]

The Rotterdam bombing started out as a direct support request from troops. That it grew in to what it became is a sign how many hands such requests passed through. They were NOT talking to Ju87's, guiding them on target. It was still very unwieldy. It got better later in the war, but to call it CAS is still a misnomer.

[Cambronne]

There is evidence of effective CAS and there is evidence of ineffective CAS.Yes indeed,there are examples in France 40 and Africa where dive bombers called for CAS did more psychological than material damage.But I recall,for instance, a book about Kharkov 43 where Stukas literally "cleared" the ground before SS regiments more than once(for example on 22 february the recon battalion of SS Der Fuhrer encountered a reinforced Russian position at the village of Petschanka with several T34 and elements of a Guards Div. Stukas ,flying above, were called by radio and shortly afterward all Russian tanks were destroyed and the battalion passed by without casualities.The same day a platoon of halftracks run into a few T34s near Sinelnikovo;in a matter of moments Stukas arrived and destroyed the tanks allowing the platoon to continue the advance).

[Cambronne]

To be noted;in some cases the bombers were flying along with the advance guard,being thus able to answer to the situation within minutes.

[Alchenar]

To be noted;in some cases the bombers were flying along with the advance guard,being thus able to answer to the situation within minutes.

None of that changes the fact that that in Normandy the Allies didn't do this and the Germans couldn't do it.

[JonS]

But I recall,for instance, a book about Kharkov 43 where Stukas literally "cleared" the ground before SS regiments more than once (for example on 22 February the recon battalion of SS Der Fuhrer encountered a reinforced Russian position at the village of Petschanka with several T34 and elements of a Guards Div. Stukas, flying above, were called by radio and shortly afterwards all Russian tanks were destroyed and the battalion passed by without casualties. The same day a platoon of halftracks run into a few T34s near Sinelnikovo; in a matter of moments Stukas arrived and destroyed the tanks allowing the platoon to continue the advance).

Yeah ... you know what? I have no faith in your recall.

Both incidents you 'recall' sound remarkably like any number of fish tales told about the efficacy of CAS in WWII, which upon investigation always fall apart. So, I'm going to need to see some pretty solid evidence that these incidents happened the way described, evidence which doesn't rely on Charles Whiting, Agte, Kurowski, Rudel, or the like. I'm also going to need to see evidence from both sides, since friendly claims for enemy casualties are notoriously useless.

In other words, perhaps more familiar to the yoof of today: pix, or it didn't happen.

[JonS]

None of that changes the fact that that in Normandy the Allies didn't do this and the Germans couldn't do it.

Actually, late in the Normandy campaign the Allies did do this. The Americans called it Armoured Column Cover (ACC), and the British called in Cabrank. It was horribly expensive in that providing a single ACC or Cabrank kept a vast number of a/c tied up, but it did ensure that there were always ~4 a/c available over the leading ground elements.

That's what I'm talking about with the 'August' functionality in a previous post.

[Dietrich]

Ok, so the Allies' ability to employ something at least resembling CAS improved dramatically over the period covered by CM:N and its modules.

Now what about the Germans? Surely there are certain "principles" which can be agreed upon: CAS much rarer than Allies, no Stukas, etc.

[YankeeDog]

Ok, so the Allies' ability to employ something at least resembling CAS improved dramatically over the period covered by CM:N and its modules.

Now what about the Germans? Surely there are certain "principles" which can be agreed upon: CAS much rarer than Allies, no Stukas, etc.

In the ETO, the Germans had no CAS. The Allies owned the daytime sky, and most of the nighttime sky as well. What planes the Germans had left in 1944 were mostly busy trying to shoot down B-17s and B-24s. You can find occasions where a brave Luftwaffe pilot dodges allied fighter patrols and manages slip in for a strafing run or something like that, but I am not aware of a single coordinated German air strike done in close conjunction with ground action in Normandy.

As for the rest of the war, the best German CAS would probably be in 1942-1943, Ost Front. By this time, the Germans have learned a lot from their experiences in the first two years of the war, and still have enough aircraft and trained crews to dedicate some to tactical strike missions. In 1943, the Germans also have a limited number of dedicated air liasons in specialized tanks equipped with UHF radios, who can talk to aircrews overhead directly. I'm not saying that the Germans could call in airstrikes at the snap of a finger in 1943, but they're definitely far ahead of anyone else at this time. In CM terms, I'd say the Germans on the Ost Front in 1943 can definitely do "pre-planned" CAS. I guess you can make an argument for "on-the-fly" strikes occasionally as a part of high priority assaults, if you're willing to accept a fairly long wait. Exactly how long a wait his hard to quantify... I'd definitely be skeptical of anything less than a half hour, even in ideal conditions.

It is my understanding that German CAS never shows up much at all in North Africa or Italy, mostly because the Luftwaffe never dedicates much in the way of resources to these theatres.

[dan/california]

The only major Luftwaffe effort I am aware of in the Mediterranean, involved Malta, which was a major threat to German supply lines to North Africa. No relevance to CM scale to speak of though, it was an air/sea battle. And way before Normandy anyway.

You can debate the effectiveness of the WW2 strategic bombing campaign on many levels, but by the summer of 44 what Luftwaffe was left was solely focused on reducing the rate that German cites were being rubbled.

[Dietrich]

In the ETO, the Germans had no CAS.

Inadvertent inaccurate terminology on my part. In hindsight I realize that when I wrote "CAS", I meant "aircraft operating in the vicinity of troops in contact". Agreed, the Allies had air superiority, and most of the Luftwaffe's resources were devoted to fighting the heavy bombers; also, the Germans simply had few radios, such that the typical Heer rifle company had only one, for the company HQ (whereas the typical US Army rifle company had enough radios for each platoon as well as the company HQ).

That said, would it be more reasonable to infer that the Germans should be effectively be disallowed aircraft operating in the vicinity of troops in contact (similar to how in CM:SF Red has no air assets) or that any sort of German air support ought to be extremely rare? Donald L. Caldwell's JG 26: Top Guns of the Luftwaffe notes:

The three Gruppen of Jagdgeschwader 26 reached the battle zone on the afternoon of 6 June and they accounted for a fair proportion of the 172 combat sorties flown on D-Day by Fliegerkorps II and the 5th Jagddivision in opposition to the 14,000 sorties of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force. [italics his]

So the Luftwaffe wasn't entirely (or as near to it as makes no odds) a non-factor. However, any German aircraft which weren't knocked out by medium-/heavy-bomber attacks on their airfields would have to slip through squadron-strength Allied fighter sweeps at any given time to even reach the vicinity of troops in contact, where they would as likely as not draw the attention of other wide-roving enemy fighters and probably be driven off or embroiled into low-level dogfights before they could do as little as deliver a few strafing runs. Thus I suppose it's reasonable to reckon that any German air assets would be definitely few and far between, with only one aircraft per scenario (if that).

by the summer of 44 what Luftwaffe was left was solely focused on reducing the rate that German cites were being rubbled.

Yet, according to Caldwell: "By the evening of 7 June, there were only six Gruppen of single-engined fighters left in Germany; sixteen Gruppen were in France." However, Caldwell does clarify that thus:

At full strength this would have amounted to a force of 1,100 aircraft. However, most units were at half strength or less, and owing to the disorganization resulting from the rapid move and the chaotic state of most French airfields, only 289 were reported operational in the return strength radioed to the RLM on the night of 7 June.

[good-natured sarcasm, not directed at anyone in particular] Wait, don't tell me... Caldwell's book has long since been debunked as yet another load of Germans-lauding rot, even though he, unlike the sort of author that some would disregard as a matter of course, correlates Allied and German records to elucidate actual losses vis-à-vis the various claims of both sides. [/good-natured sarcasm, not directed at anyone in particular] =P

[JonS]

As for the rest of the war, the best German CAS would probably be in 1942-1943, Ost Front. By this time, the Germans have learned a lot from their experiences in the first two years of the war, and still have enough aircraft and trained crews to dedicate some to tactical strike missions. In 1943, the Germans also have a limited number of dedicated air liasons in specialized tanks equipped with UHF radios, who can talk to aircrews overhead directly. I'm not saying that the Germans could call in airstrikes at the snap of a finger in 1943, but they're definitely far ahead of anyone else at this time. In CM terms, I'd say the Germans on the Ost Front in 1943 can definitely do "pre-planned" CAS. I guess you can make an argument for "on-the-fly" strikes occasionally as a part of high priority assaults, if you're willing to accept a fairly long wait. Exactly how long a wait his hard to quantify... I'd definitely be skeptical of anything less than a half hour, even in ideal conditions.

Interestingly, during Op CRUSADER in Nov/Dec 1941 the Commonwealth forces managed to arrange an impromptu airstrike within 30 mins, from initial call from the infantry to bombs on the ground.

Yes; that incident was exceptional. No; I don't have a BDA. Yes; the RAF* still managed to 'blue-on-blue' with depressing regularity, both during CRUSADER, and throughout the rest of the war. Still, 30 mins from initial call to bombs on the ground. In 1941. By the British, of all people. Amazing. They caught up to the Germans very rapidly after the debacle in France. Also, 8th Army and the DAF was far ahead, doctrinally, of anything the RAF and Army in Britian were able to acheive at the time.

Jon

* as did all other air forces, be it noted

[JonS]

... that any sort of German air support ought to be extremely rare?

'Rare' is a somewhat meaningless term in the context of CM. Either the scen designer decides to make something available, or he doesn't. In terms of capability, though - yeah, the Germans should be restricted to something like the 'June' functionality outlined before.

... German aircraft which weren't knocked out by medium-/heavy-bomber attacks on their airfields would have to slip through squadron-strength Allied fighter sweeps at any given time to even reach the vicinity of troops in contact, where they would as likely as not draw the attention of other wide-roving enemy fighters and probably be driven off or embroiled into low-level dogfights before they could do as little as deliver a few strafing runs.

More or less, except the Allied airforces were working to a definite plan, not just 'wide-roving' or conducting aimless 'sweeps'. The USAAF and RAF worked together to set up layers of fighter screens, starting sevel hundred miles beyond the battlefront. Inevitably there were leakers, right through to July and August IIRC, but they were only ever able to partake of tip-and-run raids, rather than any kind of organised and focussed offensive.

Yet, according to Caldwell: "By the evening of 7 June, there were only six Gruppen of single-engined fighters left in Germany; sixteen Gruppen were in France." However, Caldwell does clarify that thus:

That'd be Drohende Gefahr West (Immediate Alert West, or something like that). It was a fiasco. The plan was that all (well, most) of the air defence fighters in Germany would rapidly decamp to France and defeat the Allied airforces of the invasion. Unfortunately for them, the Allied airforces had done such a through job wrecking airfields within a couple of hundred miles of Normandy that they - the German fighters - had to stage forward to airfields and strips that were too far away, and weren't really prepared to handle them. Among other issues, there was no fuel, no ammunition, and no communications. There was also a very high incidence of accidents due to operating from rough and damaged fields. Instead of a massive display of strength, what remainded of the GAF day-fighter force bled itself white in a string of uncoordinated minor raids that acheived practically nothing. See, for example, Williamson Murray "Strategy for Defeat", pages 280-283 (it's available legitemately online from the US Air Force University website)

[good-natured sarcasm, not directed at anyone in particular] Wait, don't tell me... Caldwell's book has long since been debunked

No, not debunked at all. You just need to understand what he's talking about

[Cambronne]

I'm also going to need to see evidence from both sides, since friendly claims for enemy casualties are notoriously useless.

From the diary of a British soldier subject to CAS called by Rommel at Bir Hacheim 7-10 June : "Only God can help!All of my friends look like madman.All of us keep looking involuntarily to the sky.I'd never had believed that air raids COULD KILL SO MANY MEN.The stink of corpses is unbearable.

[ChrisND]

From the diary of a British soldier subject to CAS called by Rommel at Bir Hacheim 7-10 June : "Only God can help!All of my friends look like madman.All of us keep looking involuntarily to the sky.I'd never had believed that air raids COULD KILL SO MANY MEN.The stink of corpses is unbearable.

That's not proper evidence. It needs a source so that it may be examined. The quote, taken without any context, also does not necessarily have anything to do with CAS as JonS is describing it.

[Cambronne]

David Irving : "On the trail of the Fox"

[Michael Emrys]

From the diary of a British soldier subject to CAS called by Rommel at Bir Hacheim 7-10 June...

This was a strike (or actually a series of them) planned at least the evening before they went in, and against a static and fairly easily identified target. In other words, a very different affair from a mobile force encountering unexpected resistance and calling up an airstrike that arrives in less than an hour of being requested, which is what is being discussed in this thread.

Oh, and I would think the soldier would more likely have been French than English, although I suppose there were some Englishmen at Bir Hacheim.

Michael

[Cambronne]

The Kharkov examples: Nipe Jr. "Last victory in Russia"

[JonS]

From the diary of a British soldier subject to CAS called by Rommel at Bir Hacheim 7-10 June : "Only God can help!All of my friends look like madman.All of us keep looking involuntarily to the sky.I'd never had believed that air raids COULD KILL SO MANY MEN.The stink of corpses is unbearable.

Uh, yeah. Irving? Are you serious?

Aside from what Emrys and ND have already noted, it should have been obvious that I was talking about evidence from both sides of the same battle.