Strykers...and Why I thank god I am not Stryker Infantry

[Blackhorse]

Originally posted by travh20:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Blackhorse:

And for your information, the vast majority of 11Bs in STRYKER units, love the damn things.

That's because you don't have to walk </font>

[ChrisND]

The all important pogey bait.

[Salkin]

Originally posted by Sergei:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by JasonC:

Anyone seriously want to try to maintain that the medium force with them is better than the heavy force with Brads? As in, show me in game? Didn't think so.

There's an idea - blue vs. blue fight, one based on Strykers, the other on Bradleys. AAAND IN THE BRADLEY CORNER WE HAVE THE MOTHER OF ALL GROGS, <font size="5">JA-SON CEEE-E!!!!</font> AND AS THE CHAMPION OF ALL STRYKERS, WE HAVE... WE... we have... anyone? </font>

[Commissar]

Originally posted by Sergei:

Obviously Russian army would have no use for at least some of the finer points of Stryker. Which naturally doesn't mean that they wouldn't be valuable to the US military.

What a find interesting is that although the Russians are skeptical of the concept, they are still keeping a very close eye on it, according to the article. From what I understand, the Soviets didn't really believe in using lower caliber rounds for their assault rifles, but changed their minds once they saw how it performed when the US used it in Vietnam, etc. After that they switched to 5.45mm. Maybe the Strykker concept will be the same.

Considering the article was in 2004 (opps), I am wondering if the Russian military still feels the same (or even stronger) or have they reevaluated their opinion. Has anyone seen anything current? I'd look myself, but I can't read Russian.

[ August 04, 2007, 05:53 PM: Message edited by: Commissar ]

[rudel.dietrich]

For the types of wars America is fidning itself in, the Stryker concept is excellent.

And so far is getting high reviews

As for the Russians not liking it

Well I am sure all those poor souls incenerated in the charred wrecks of BMPs would have probably enjoyed the concept

[Sergei]

Originally posted by Commissar:

Considering the article was in 1994

1994? Rather 2004.

As the article points, in Kosovo Russians initially used the air deployable but cramped BMD's - but got BTR's later on. The article doesn't make clear whether the BMD's were replaced by BTR's or what exactly the role of those BTR's was meant to be, but it suggests that the more spacey BTR's were more useful for routine patrolling. Which isn't unlikely, BMD is after all an extremely specialised vehicle (and weighs half that of a BMP, Stryker or BTR-80).

Present day Russia cannot act in the same global police role that USA has assumed, so overall the air mobility is less of a point to them. There's a railway line to Chechnya, after all. Therefore it cannot be said that what US see as useful is useful for Russians (especially at such price), and vice versa. But it is very interesting, and revealing.

[ChrisND]

Since the article is from 1994, I don't really see how it has any relevance to today; a lot has changed since then. I would imagine that when ANY major change or ideas in a military organization comes out people will be skeptical at first.

[Sergei]

The referred article was in June 2004 issue of the Russian Foreign Military Review under the title "The Formation of the Mechanized 'Stryker' Brigade in the U.S. Army." The English article itself was originally in Infantry magazine November-December 2004.

http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/BearFacts.pdf

[ChrisND]

Oops...

[JasonC]

Blackhorse - first the preliminaries. You are behaving like a buffoon, trying to lecture men who know far more about the matter than you do, as though they are idiots. We aren't.

The reason to have actual light infantry is indeed strategic and tactical mobility, and what it really means is that light infantry get around in helicopters and go to any terrain, which Stryker brigades do not.

Every army in the world (outside of poverty stricken Africans or something) can pick whether to have actual light infantry and how much of it to have, and does so - the US included. Deciding to have less of it and more infantry in APCs does not mean the army has improved by being more armored - every army that matters can decide exactly how much of the true light stuff it wants, and has the rest under armor as a matter of course.

The actual innovation within the US army that Strykers represent is using wheeled APCs rather than tracked IFVs for a portion of the armored infantry force. This is something everyone else has been doing pretty much forever. The Russians have had their first line in BMP IFVs since they invented the IFV, and their second line in wheeled BTRs. It is not remotely an innovation in the wider world, in other words.

Nor are the Strykers conspicuous for their greater strategic mobility, since (1) they flunked all the tests in practice that led to their selection over other platforms at the theory stage, aren't C-130 deployable, we have a lot more airlift than C-130s, (2) we also are in endless wars that run on for years at low intensity and are preceeded by six months or more of diplomatic buildup, so everything goes by ship just to save money, except for the men themselves.

They were also supposed to be so much cheaper to maintain, the better POL footprint and such being the primary reason for wheels. Except it turns out in the field their operating costs exceed their specs by a factor of 5, and the maintenance overhead was pretty much fudged by just removing the maintenance people from the brigade team, but the brigade then still needs it from other units etc.

Kinda hard to see the savings really, or the point in an imaginary greater deployability than a standard heavy brigade. There were also a half dozen other ways to get a medium capability if that is what was wanted, that would not have cost over $5 billion up front and cancelled a few hundred other programs to make room.

The army also had a flexible and hard hitting medium mixed force on strength, along with an entire developed doctrine on their use, in the form of the ACRs. If I had to pick between an old ACR and a new BCT, I'd take the ACR every day and twice on Fridays. Sure some of their strength comes from M-1s, that is because M-1s are worth their weight. If those aren't there in 48 hours, the Apaches still can be, etc.

If one looks at the army force mix circa 1987 and now, the major development of the last 20 years is not conspicuously an increase in armor weight. On the contrary.

And the armor the Stryker brigade actually has is not of much use against serious threats (China Taiwan, North and South Korean e.g.) that you need to get someplace in 48 hours to meet, anyway. Light APCs with MG main armament are at their best in security missions or fights against light infantry, not against major heavy forces.

If javelins and FOs are the point, those fly more easily without the APCs. Nobody is going to disband the 82nd or the 101st or the Marines because there are Stryker brigades, and guess who will get the first call if it really is a matter of stopping an enemy in 48 hours? Guess who will instead show up late to police the aftermath?

The Stryker decision was stupid, a typical example of the "bribe-through" force structure decisions we have come to know so well. Spending billions benefits the friends of congressmen, after all, and what are mere armored infantrymen compared to that?

Would I rather be in a Stryker than a hummer, sure, but I'd rather be in a Brad than either, and I'd rather be behind an ACR with ruthless rules of engagment than any of the above. We are going backward because penny pinchers and pantywaists are in charge.

[Blackhorse]

LOL.. good one Jason.

Jason,

I'm not entirely familiar with your intimate knowledge of the Armed forces, To say that I'm a buffoon for lecturing "men who know far more about the matter than you do" is comical.

Look Jason. I've spent over 20 years in the Army, as an Armor Officer. I've commanded in the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. Don't lecture me on the merits of the ACR over the SBCT. Been there done that...Apples and Oranges. When were you in the Blackhorse Regiment? Maybe I'll remember you?

You are the one acting the idiot. You know not what you speak. Next time you want to come across as knowing what the heck you're talking about, do some real, un-biased research. and be damn sure you talk to the soldiers.

[ August 06, 2007, 10:10 PM: Message edited by: Blackhorse ]

[thewood]

OK, I'm staying up for this one...

[JasonC]

Ahh, so we discover the real reason Blackhorse is a fanboi spewing biased nonsense - it is his own nonsense...

And he thinks it improves his argument. Except he doesn't actually have one.

Fallacy of authority, ipse dixit fallacy. Next.

[JasonC]

Shall I explain to you why you are losing the war in Iraq? Or should we start with, "that" you are losing the war in Iraq? (Hint, you have an objectively inferior military doctrine).

How is that rapid victory in less than 3 weeks winning without fighting by baffling them with static on the command net, working out for you? Smashing success in all respects? Wouldn't change a thing?

How is the whole maneuver warfare theory proving as a grand strategy? (We all got the tactics stuff oh about 64 years ago). Are you von Manstein yet, or are you just approaching his long-run won-loss record?

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[Blackhorse]

Sure Jason, ignore the fact that I called you out on your saying, and I quote

You are behaving like a buffoon, trying to lecture men who know far more about the matter than you do, as though they are idiots. We aren't.

If you don't expect that to get a rise out of anyone, then what do you expect. Biased nonsense? Where and when. I've presented the doctrinal position and I've worked with STRYKER soldiers. How is that biased? It isn't and you know it.

Our doctrine, with regards to STRYKERs and the SBCTs states,

The Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) is a full-spectrum combat

force that provides division, corps, or joint task force commanders a

unique capability across the spectrum of conflict. The SBCT balances

lethality, mobility, and survivability against the requirements for rapid

strategic deployability. The SBCT’s cavalry squadron (reconnaissance,

surveillance, and target acquisition [RSTA]); robust intelligence,

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) integration capability; and

combined arms infantry battalions ensure its versatility across the full

range of operations (offense, defense, stability, and support). This chapter

highlights the capabilities and limitations of the SBCT, discusses likely

scenarios in which the SBCT may be employed, and provides an overview

of the SBCT’s organizational structure.

The SBCT’s operational

capabilities are

• Combined arms assault in the close fight.

• Mobility.

• Reach.

• Enhanced common operational picture (COP).

• Lethality.

• Force protection and survivability.

• Joint, multinational, or interagency operability.

• Full-spectrum flexibility and augmentation.

• Simultaneous operations.

Doctrine states for the Combined Arms Assault in the Close Fight that:

1-1. COMBINED ARMS ASSAULT IN THE CLOSE FIGHT

The SBCT achieves decisive action with combined arms at the infantry company level by

applying the effects of direct fires from the mobile gun system (MGS), indirect fires from

mortars and artillery, and joint effects of other services to support the infantry assault.

I can provide additional doctrine if necessary, but you get the point. Somewhere between the Light Infantry Divisions (82nd, 101st, 10th Mtn, 25th ID) and the heavy Divisions. Actually we should be talking BCT and HBCTs nowadays, lie the SBCTs.

The STRYKER is deployable on the C-130. It is not deployable with its add-on armor package installed. That requires time once landed.

You can say the decision was stupid all you want, but upon what do you base that? Your gut instincts? A personal preference you have to maybe the M113 or the ACR or whatever? That is bias. I urge you to get out and talk to the soldiers and commanders that use these things.

[Blackhorse]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Shall I explain to you why you are losing the war in Iraq? Or should we start with, "that" you are losing the war in Iraq? (Hint, you have an objectively inferior military doctrine).

How is that rapid victory in less than 3 weeks winning without fighting by baffling them with static on the command net, working out for you? Smashing success in all respects? Wouldn't change a thing?

How is the whole maneuver warfare theory proving as a grand strategy? (We all got the tactics stuff oh about 64 years ago). Are you von Manstein yet, or are you just approaching his long-run won-loss record?

For starters, nice, real nice. So your actual issue is with the Iraq War , not necessarily the STRYKER. Sorry, don't have my nice Latin fallacy sheet handy to impress.

1. I have about as much influence over this war as you do. Read Cobra II and Bush at War for more information on how our Nation goes about planning for wars and campaigns and the roles of current and past people whose names you'll recognize.

2. If the war is being lost in Iraq, it's not the Army that's losing it, it's the nation. There is so much more involved than Army units patrolling neighborhoods in Baghdad and Ramadi. State Department, USAID, NGOs etc, companies back here, all have a hand in this.

3. Maneuver Warfare Grand Strategy? What are you on about? That is not our doctrine. I'm not sure where you got that.

4. I don't believe you know what current Army doctrine is. If you do, then so be it, you do. Some of the things you say lead me to believe otherwise. I'm not even sure how Von Manstein comes into play. As an FYI, these days we're studying past insurgencies.

[lucero1148]

Going on why we are losing Iraq is getting way too political and off topic. I blame it on Rumsfield, end of story.

Troopers in the Stryker units I've talked to like the vehicles and the concept very much as it enhances their ability in regards to speed and calling in fireworks quickly.

That they are only fighting insurgents/terrorists gives them a firepower edge from the get go is obvious. If they had to go toe to toe against an armored or mechanized force they might not do so well out in the open desert but on foot in an urban area they'd probably outfight their foe. My guess that is.

all best

Patrick

[JasonC]

My issue is not with a war but with the stupid doctrine currently losing it. A stupid doctrine foisted on us over the last 20 years by the maneuver warfare, lighter faster more deployable, baffle 'em with static on the command net, win in 3 weeks without fighting by being inside their decision loop, crowd. In other words, the background you cite makes me see you as part of the problem, not an expert.

Of course I know current US doctrine. I also know many things wrong with it, something apparently inconceivable to you.

Stating that the nation is losing but the army is not shows a profound ignorance of the basic maxims of warfare.

Shall I start with the Russian way of making the point? "The basic condition of the vitality of military doctrine consists in its strong correspondence with the general goals of the state and those material and spiritual resources which it has at its disposal."

Or would you prefer the classic German formulation, which I presume you can recite in your sleep at the mere mention of his name? Hint, starts with Claus, rhymes with something notoriously missing in our present military direction.

As for the cut and paste from the BCT sales brochure, it is utter bromide and fails to say a blessed thing. I just love the part about decisiveness at the infantry company level, that is priceless.

As for deployability in C-130s, something one never actually does in any quantity is not much of an ability. We can deploy a Brad in a C-17, too. Whoopee. Meanwhile, no one has explained why it is important to get a police force level of light armor to a theater in 48 hours. Wars against light infantry opponents aren't over in a week, since light infantry opponents practice protracted warfare not blitzkrieg. And the guys that do practice blitzkrieg will run right over mere 50 cal armed tin cans, unless the usual air force and missiles stop them. Which the 101 can do a heck of a lot better.

A rapidly deployed force that can beat a tank army is useful. A slowly deployed force that is OK against protracted insurgencies is OK but hardly worth $10 billion, and we would design it very differently if we didn't think it had to get there in 48 hours.

But the mish mash that is light enough to lose to a tank army because it was once supposed to be deployable but isn't really, but is adequate against light militias though not quite as good as ordinary heavies - that sort of capability one pays 10 figures for, only because those on the other end of the paying think it a capital idea.

You still haven't explained how a BCT is better than an ACR at anything. Of course the ACR would also be up commo'ed and all that.

Since you disclaim all responsibility for the tangle that is present US doctrine, and barely seem to even recognize major features of it, or that they are debatable and forcefully debated, I'll spare you the actual strategy lesson.

Unless you ask are actually interested. (I assume this is a mere exercise in weapon-system apologetics for you, and you have no real professional interest in learning the military art, or noticing how the men around you are royally bolixing it up...)

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[JasonC]

Correct Adam. That is because there isn't anything wrong with maneuver *tactics* (they are valuable force multipliers), but maneuver *strategy* as presently conceived and preached (as a full substitute for annihilation battle), is fundamentally unsound. It directs all effort at an indecisive aim, which leaves the enemy the option to simply refuse to accept his momentary dislocation as "defeat", and to move to protracted war.

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[JasonC]

The main reason to move to smaller caliber ammunition is to allow larger ammo loads to be carried, tactically. You can carry roughly twice as much 5.56mm as you could full rifle ammo (308 or 30-06). Carbine caliber 30 is in between, though, and the Russians already made that move before Vietnam.

In more recent times, the development of body armor is pushing things the other way, making full rifle or MG caliber ammo more valuable and the carbine and lighter (SMG pistol ammo e.g.) less effective. But only the US has shown that in a big way so far, really. We haven't had to adapt to it ourselves because our enemies have mostly been too poorly equipped to have the stuff.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by lucero1148:

Going on why we are losing Iraq is getting way too political and off topic. I blame it on Rumsfield, end of story.

Troopers in the Stryker units I've talked to like the vehicles and the concept very much as it enhances their ability in regards to speed and calling in fireworks quickly.

That they are only fighting insurgents/terrorists gives them a firepower edge from the get go is obvious. If they had to go toe to toe against an armored or mechanized force they might not do so well out in the open desert but on foot in an urban area they'd probably outfight their foe. My guess that is.

all best

Patrick

All which is relevant to a counter-insurgency how? US forces in Vietnam lived in oasis-like base camps and sallied forth on occasion in a variety of vehicles to fight the enemy - helicopters, APCs, on foot - and won all the battles but lost the war. It isn't about firepower nor how they get to the fight. It hasn't been since MISSION ACCOMPLISHED was declared. If it is, then why isn't it over, over there?

[Commissar]

Originally posted by AdamL:

"the Soviets didn't really believe in using lower caliber rounds for their assault rifles, but changed their minds once they saw how it performed when the US used it in Vietnam"

In what way were they impressed? The only advantage I can think of is accuracy, but I don't know much about small arms.

The lower caliber produces a nastier wound. However, I wouldn't want to get hit with a 7.62mm either.