How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Haiduk]

9 minutes ago, Combatintman said:

I've just had a quick hunt.  The only easy identifier is the fact that this was 40 Artillery Brigade - a Southern Command Unit according to Wikipedia - so probably Kherson or points east of it which doesn't narrow it down much.  I've not had a decent pick into this but this video doesn't appear to have any geolocation data in its metadata so it will be tough to pin down without more context.

For those that have the time to hunt around for videos - this is a great tool for finding geo-tagged videos:

Location Search - Discover Geo-tagged Videos - YouTube Geofind (mattw.io)

Easy peasy to use - click location search - drag the green pin to where you want to look, add filters as required such as date-time ranges, search radius etc, scroll down a bit and click submit.

The link below is a search I did around Sieverodonetsk for the last seven days

https://mattw.io/youtube-geofind/location?location=48.90486748996277,38.316726806640645&timeframe=day-7&doSearch=true

Have a look at ones that interest you - click the Open in Map option or View Metadata and go to geo location and copy and past the geo coords in the box to your mapping application of choice.

 

@Battlefront.com

This is near Synychyne village, Kahrkiv oblast, 9 km SE from Izium. Reportedly position of full Grad battery (6 launchers) and 7 ammo trucks were completely destroyed. 

40th artillery brigade like and other artillery brigades operates by separate batteries along all front. So, some units can be in Kherson oblast, some in Zaporizhzhaia oblast, some in Kharkiv oblast. 

[sross112]

27 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Enemy artillery destroyed a section of the second bridge to Siverodonetsk. Their artillery tried to do this more than a week, could hit bridge several times, but only slightly damaged it. And now they have success. The last bridge remained, but it was in bad conditions already before a war. This puts again a question of city defense expediency. 

The defense of Siverodonetsk is obviously political decision, so in society there is many criticism about this and demands to Armed Forces Command "don't listen Zelenskyi and to withdraw our guys to Lysychansk immediately". Though, looks like Siverodonetsk like and Rubizhe previuosly now playing a role of "meat grinder". Main forces, that ae storming the city and villages around are not Russians, but 2nd and 7th motor-rifle brigades of LPR + some battalions of conscripts rifle regiments. Russians probably represented with Kadyrov's forces and 31st air-assault brigade. 

Inside the city our troops hold industrial zone and quarters around it. LPR/Russians occupies NE and E parts of the city. All other space is just a place of artilery and airstrikes and deadly "counter-strike" games, as told commander of "Legion of Freedom" - one of the unit, holding the city. This is volunteer unit under Nationmal Guard comamnd, mostly of members of political moderate nationalist party "Svoboda" ("Freedom")

 

This should be a good test for theories. Watch this bridge and see how fast the UA makes it usable for at least light wheeled traffic. If it is quick then it shows that their command was prepared, they intend to keep fighting on the far bank and they had engineering assets prepared for just such an occasion. All point to the theories of the UA being on top of things and wanting to keep a killing ground going on the far side. 

If we don't see quick action then they either already have alternate crossings in place that their OPSEC hasn't divulged or they aren't as locked on as we want to think. Should also act as a good logistical comparison to the RA engineering. 

[Huba]

18 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

This can be just an element of psychological pressure to the West and signal "you are too slow in weapon supply". Though, intencity of clashes from Kherson to Kharkiv now extremaly hight, so both sides have bif, but comparable losses.

This is my impression exactly, and it seems to be working. Discarding RU bots, commentaries about anything Ukraine related consist almost exclusively of calls for more guns, or scolding politicians for not doing enough and letting UA lose. It might be just my bubble though...

Edited June 12, 2022 by Huba

[danfrodo]

So let's assume for second that UKR is planning bigger operational moves -- like maybe what Huba mentioned above to cut off the Izyum salient.  Maybe the alleged low artillery fire rate for UKR in the donbas sector is because they want to spend those shells elsewhere. 

If I am looking to collapse an area then a sector, I want to be able to pound the local low quality troops, hopefully starting a stampede.  I want arty that can keep punching as my units advance, so either long range or mobile.  So maybe UKR actually has a lot of its assets elsewhere than in the 'honeypot' (as per The Capt).

[Huba]

6 minutes ago, sross112 said:

This should be a good test for theories. Watch this bridge and see how fast the UA makes it usable for at least light wheeled traffic. If it is quick then it shows that their command was prepared, they intend to keep fighting on the far bank and they had engineering assets prepared for just such an occasion. All point to the theories of the UA being on top of things and wanting to keep a killing ground going on the far side. 

If we don't see quick action then they either already have alternate crossings in place that their OPSEC hasn't divulged or they aren't as locked on as we want to think. Should also act as a good logistical comparison to the RA engineering. 

I'd assume they have some pontoon bridges ( perhaps of the submerged type?) already in place. 

I also read in few sources that river there is shallow enough to ford, in some spots at least. 

Edited June 12, 2022 by Huba

[danfrodo]

10 minutes ago, Huba said:

I'd assume they have some pontoon bridges ( perhaps of the submerged type?) already in place. 

I also read in few sources that river there is shallow enough to ford, in some spots at least. 

yeah, exactly a fear I have had last couple days.  Easily fordable rivers. 

Meanwhile I am on the edge of my seat about Huba's post on alleged UKR Izyum attack.  I am check here every 5 minutes hoping for something solid.

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, holoween said:

Thats not how this works at least in english. The US or the UK seem to disagree with this idea for example.

Then again, I heard Pink Floyd introduced as "The Pink Floyd" at the V&A Hall.  And that's a British band that clearly did not have "The" as part of their name.

Just say'n...

Steve

[Vet 0369]

3 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

yeah, exactly a fear I have had last couple days.  Easily fordable rivers. 

Meanwhile I am on the edge of my seat about Huba's post on alleged UKR Izyum attack.  I am check here every 5 minutes hoping for something solid.

“Easily forded rivers and streams” are pretty deadly areas. If I know where the fording points are, I’m going to have arty preregistered at those points and have them under constant surveillance.

[danfrodo]

2 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Then again, I heard Pink Floyd introduced as "The Pink Floyd" at the V&A Hall.  And that's a British band that clearly did not have "The" as part of their name.

Just say'n...

Steve

Which one's Pink?

Meanwhile, not to promote the video, but Task&Purpose has a video up saying how militarily vulnerable Estonia is.  Uhhhhhhh, that's part of NATO, Dude.  He has great videos on weapons but I am continually shocked at how utterly clueless he continues to be on anything above the most basic tactical level.  I bring this up because there's lots of this stuff on the interwebs and I am just not understanding how these folks don't seem to live in an evidence based reality.  Like "Russia could attack Poland!" -- with what?  Or the ongoing 'Great Russian Hordes' stuff.

[Huba]

10 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

yeah, exactly a fear I have had last couple days.  Easily fordable rivers. 

Meanwhile I am on the edge of my seat about Huba's post on alleged UKR Izyum attack.  I am check here every 5 minutes hoping for something solid.

Not much more so far. UA might have re-taken some locations west of Izium. I'm waiting for other sources, but this particular guy is usually on the money, maybe a tad too enthusiastic. 

 

Edited June 12, 2022 by Huba

[danfrodo]

1 minute ago, Huba said:

Not much more so far. UA might have re-taken some locations west of Iziim. I'm waiting for other sourxes, but this particular guy is ususuall on the money, maybe a tad too enthusiastic. 

 

I guess I should just keep calm until we see evidence that UKR has advanced to the main highway running N out of Izyum.  I really would like some kind of victory dance opportunity. 

[Huba]

5 minutes ago, Vet 0369 said:

“Easily forded rivers and streams” are pretty deadly areas. If I know where the fording points are, I’m going to have arty preregistered at those points and have them under constant surveillance.

And mined. OTOH uncontested crossing to supply Severodonetsk should be easy even without the "big" bridge. 

[Battlefront.com]

52 minutes ago, Suleyman said:

Am I the only one who thinks things aren't looking good for UAF in Donbas?

Speaking for myself, I also don't think it looks "good" for Ukraine in the Donbas.  Collectively, the pressure from the flanks (Izyum and Popasna) and the assaults against the eastern most positions (Severodonetsk and Toshkivka/Bilohorva) are certainly cumulatively reducing Ukraine's ability to hold the salient.  However, there are two big caveats to that worry:

1. Russia has shown that once it makes a breakthrough it quickly bogs down, thus giving Ukraine ample opportunity to reinforce or withdraw
2. Ukraine doesn't need to hold this area because Russia gains nothing real by taking it

I wrote this sector off as a Russia win around the first week or two of the war.  The fact that Russia has been unable to take this area despite two solid months of concentrated effort is extremely positive.  Especially in light of Russia focusing all of its efforts on taking it as their primary strategic goal.

Think about it this way.  If Russian forces were streaming westward through Odessa and to Moldova, this would be a total sideshow for both countries.  But Russia has been defeated there, defeated around Kharkiv, and defeated around Kyiv.  So even if Russia should take this area, strategically it doesn't matter for either nations.  Ukraine isn't defeated and Russia doesn't have a victory it can end the war with.

Steve

[rocketman]

New video up by Perun, interesting as always:

I wonder what the morale is like in the ”new republics” after watching this. Is their Russian nationalism waning?

[Calamine Waffles]

Ukrainian defense outlet Defense Express on the artillery situation:

https://en.defence-ua.com/analysis/how_much_the_russian_artillery_outnumbers_ukraines_in_density_and_amount_of_systems-3260.html

 

Quote

Taking the data from Military Balance, the situation will be as follows. By 2021, the Russian army had at its disposal 2,433 large-caliber artillery systems (excluding mortars):

- 122-mm artillery systems: 245 units;

- 152-mm artillery systems: 2,028 units;

- 203-mm artillery systems: 160 units.

 

Quote

Military Balance provides data on the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the amount of 1176 units, divided as follows:

- 122-mm artillery systems: 421 units;

- 152-mm artillery systems: 742 units;

- 203-mm artillery systems: 13 units.

 

Quote

To be fair, we need to consider the much greater number of Russian self-propelled guns: 2119 against 637 units. But in any case, it is difficult to talk about the advantage of 10-20 times. But the issue is in ammunition, as it does not matter how many guns you have, if they do not have ammunition. Talking bout multiple rocket launchers of all calibers comparison: Russia’s 3547 versus Ukraine’s 1680.

 

Quote

Due to the fact that until May all artillery in Ukraine was of Soviet standards, the question of where to get ammunition remains extremely important.

In order to understand the situation, the Minister of Defense of Ukraine Oleksiy Reznikov said that the stockpile of 155-mm shells is already 10% higher than the stockpiles of large-caliber Soviet-type ammunition as of February 24.

 

Quote

The United States supplied Ukraine with 220,000 shells for 108 M777 howitzers, ie about 2,000 rounds of ammunition per gun. If the same formula applies to other foreign artillery supplies, it means that about 300 thousand 155-mm ammunition have been delivered to Ukraine.

At that time, approximately the same number of Soviet artillery ammunition was in Ukraine at the beginning of 2022, that is 300 thousand shells. To this figure should be added another 75%, which were delivered after February 24, according to Oleksiy Reznikov.

Overall, there are at least 525 thousand shells of Soviet caliber in Ukraine. That is, about 10 days of fire at the pace currently held by the russian army. It is quite possible to make a mistake in these calculations, but even if it is a mistake several times, it does not make the weather.

 

Quote

So, despite the presence of Soviet guns and SPGs, they simply have nothing to fire. Because the stocks of 122- and 152-mm shells in Ukraine and even the countries of the former Warsaw Pact are already openly "showing the bottom".

In this situation, the main burden is really borne by 155-mm artillery systems, which is used by more than 150 artillery platforms, according to Oleksiy Reznikov.

Taking into account the number of russian systems, it is not surprising that we can easily talk about 10-15 times advantage of the enemy.

And this is without taking into account losses, counter-battery fight, density of radar and drone coverage for adjustment, mobility, accuracy, and range. And that is why the transfer of 155-mm artillery systems remains one of the most important.

 

[Calamine Waffles]

9 minutes ago, rocketman said:

New video up by Perun, interesting as always:

I wonder what the morale is like in the ”new republics” after watching this. Is their Russian nationalism waning?

Anybody familiar with Russian demographics over the past 20 years should not be surprised by this.

[Haiduk]

9 minutes ago, Calamine Waffles said:

But in any case, it is difficult to talk about the advantage of 10-20 times.

Zaluzhnyi has told today that 10:1 is exactly on Donbas and especially on the north of Luhansk oblast, so this is not total 10:1 advantage. 

[Hister]

20 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

I will say that Russia is surprising me to some degree.  As Grigb said, any normal nation would have long since taken a major change of approach to the war, but Russia continues on without much change other than scaling down the scope of offensive activities.  Russia has also continued to come up with new and even more creative ways to get replacement manpower (ISW June 10th report outlined a scheme that tricked yet other bunch of Russians).  Yet it is pretty clear that each passing day means Russia's capacity to fight in Ukraine is worsening.  Even "victories" in the Donbas won't change that dynamic.

And this gets us into the tricky bit about predicting the WHEN.  The elements necessary for a Russian military collapse have been in place for quite a while.  The fundamentals have not changed for the better from Russia's perspective, but in fact have gotten decidedly worse.  Determining the exact point at which "this much is too much" for the forces at the front is impossible until after it happens.  In other words, we do not have an accurate count of how many pieces of straw it takes to break this particular camel's back, therefore we can count all the pieces falling on its back and still not know when its back will break.

So, to some extent I am not as confident of Russian collapse by the end of June as I was last month.  Russia has managed to bring more forces into the fight (one-time tricks) and Ukraine has held back on its reserves more than I expected.  As I stated above, this doesn't change where this is all headed, it only changes the timeline.

This is why people don't like to make predictions about WHEN something might happen.  For the most part I've been avoiding doing it as well.  The "by the end of June" (or however I phrased it) was perhaps a little optimistic.  I'll revise that and say "the soonest it is likely to happen is the end of June".

I don't know that this war can continue into the Fall or Winter.  Both sides are exhausted, but Russia is worse off than Ukraine from what I can see.  Now and into the near future.  Morale is one of the key factors in this war and Ukraine still has plenty of it and Russia does not.

Steve

Thank you very much, as always. Loving this thread when finding the time to read it.

[Haiduk]

@sburke @Kinophile

Mayor Artyom Lazarenko, chief of operative department of 439th Guard reactive artillery brigade (MLRS "Tornado-S"), Southern military district. Killed 15th of March in Kherson oblast (next Chornobaivka victim?)

 

 

 

Edited June 12, 2022 by Haiduk

[Calamine Waffles]

The number of 203 mm systems quoted by DE doesn't seem to match up with Wikipedia (99 2S7s), but I assume they just mean 13 in active service in 2021 with the rest in reserve. Because so far Ukraine has lost 4 of them, visually confirmed, which would be 1/3rd of the active force.

[Haiduk]

26 minutes ago, Calamine Waffles said:

The number of 203 mm systems quoted by DE doesn't seem to match up with Wikipedia (99 2S7s), but I assume they just mean 13 in active service in 2021 with the rest in reserve. Because so far Ukraine has lost 4 of them, visually confirmed, which would be 1/3rd of the active force.

43rd high power artillery brigade has 4 battalions per 3 batteries per 4 guns. So, only "shtat" number of 2S7 should be at least 48, not 13. 

[Huba]

According to the most prominent Polish military news site, 100 BATT UMG armoured cars are heading to Ukraine, with deliveries starting in June. 

War in Ukraine seems to be proving that various MRAPs are quite useful in conventional conflicts and not only in counter-insurgency actions. Quite a change from conventional wisdom from occupation of Iraq times. Is motorized infantry in close to original meaning of the term becoming a thing again? I guess for many applications fully mechanized, IFV equipped infantry is really not cost effective, if it is to fight in locations where direct support by the vehicles is not possible. 

https://defence24.pl/sily-zbrojne/amerykanskie-samochody-pancerne-jada-do-wschodniej-europy-trafia-na-ukraine

Edited June 12, 2022 by Huba

[Beleg85]

3 hours ago, Haiduk said:

Enemy artillery destroyed a section of the second bridge to Siverodonetsk. Their artillery tried to do this more than a week, could hit bridge several times, but only slightly damaged it. And now they have success. The last bridge remained, but it was in bad conditions already before a war. This puts again a question of city defense expediency. 

The defense of Siverodonetsk is obviously political decision, so in society there is many criticism about this and demands to Armed Forces Command "don't listen Zelenskyi and to withdraw our guys to Lysychansk immediately". Though, looks like Siverodonetsk like and Rubizhe previuosly now playing a role of "meat grinder". Main forces, that ae storming the city and villages around are not Russians, but 2nd and 7th motor-rifle brigades of LPR + some battalions of conscripts rifle regiments. Russians probably represented with Kadyrov's forces and 31st air-assault brigade. 

Inside the city our troops hold industrial zone and quarters around it. LPR/Russians occupies NE and E parts of the city. All other space is just a place of artilery and airstrikes and deadly "counter-strike" games, as told commander of "Legion of Freedom" - one of the unit, holding the city. This is volunteer unit under Nationmal Guard comamnd, mostly of members of political moderate nationalist party "Svoboda" ("Freedom")

Very interesting about the identity of forces storming the city. Do you know how much of DPR and LPR forces are still operable? There was a post from LostArmour several pages ago that gave very specific threshold of lossess for DPR: alone it lost 2400+ KIA and 8000+ WIA thus far. And LPR contingent seemed to be smaller.

We all know Russians treat Separs as cannon meat anyway, so if regular Russians are just in supporting roles one wonder if this tactic of "bleeding them out" in the city fights is worth it in the end. Right now it seems Ukrianians are fighting (theoretically at least) other Ukrainians. Grim.

 

Also interesting if somewhat ancedotal thread about TD guys:

 

Edited June 12, 2022 by Beleg85

[Battlefront.com]

11 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Also interesting if somewhat ancedotal tread about TD guys:

This I don't get.  Ukraine has had three months to assemble units and give them proper training.  As for equipment, one of the reasons there was supposedly so much stuff sitting in western Ukraine is they were holding it to stock new units that hadn't yet been moved to the front.

I don't know how to reconcile what I just said with the reports of TD units being both under trained and under equipped.

Steve

[Calamine Waffles]

It takes more than that to assemble and train units (well). It took the US the better part of 6 months before it started deploying Army units during WW2.