How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[akd]

43 minutes ago, GAZ NZ said:

https://rumble.com/v10dit9-scott-ritter-twitter-ban-update-ukraine-military-expert-.html
Scott Ritter: Twitter ban update - ( UKRAINE MILITARY EXPERT )

This is very interesting Scott Ritter UN weapons expert, intelligence analyst he's the guy who said no wmd in Iraq

Is this guy legit? 

A legit pedophile (also idiot and Russian tool).

Edited April 11, 2022 by akd

[billbindc]

 

Jomini has some thoughts tonight: 

 

[LongLeftFlank]

Thanks, and Jomini also links via Osint to this short but important thread (albeit reconfirming what CM thread readers already know)

EDIT: Ya know what? this is just too on the nose not to quote in full here, given its concision, plus the very high cred of the source: 

(1) BTGs are simply battalion-sized, task organized combined arms teams. All major armies have done this since WWII.

(2) The Russian Army's current emphasis on BTGs (vice regiments/brigades) is due to a lack of available manpower - they were used an as expedient during the Chechen war that the Ministry of Defense adopted wholesale in 2013 as a manpower hedge.

(3) Russian Army BTGs and doctrine are built around firepower and mobility, at the expense of manpower.

(4) Western analysts believed that Russian BTGs were capable of networking long-range fires in real time (or near real time) i.e. the 2014 Zelenopillya strike

(5) It turns out the BTGs can't actually do this. They cannot even communicate via secure means, much less target and strike quickly and effectively at long range. This negates much of their supposed combat power advantage.

(6) The Russian BTGs appear unable to execute competent combined arms tactics. This is a fundamental failure as combined arms have been the sine qua non of modern fire and movement tactics since WWI.

(7) This shows up big in the lack of effective infantry support. BTG infantry cannot prevent Ukrainian mechanized and light infantry anti-tank hunter/killer teams from attriting their AFV, IFV, and SP artillery. This is the primary job of infantry in tank units.

(8) It is not clear if this is due to ineffective infantry forces or insufficient numbers of them in the BTGs; probably both are true.

(9) The net result is that the BTGs lack the mass (i.e. infantry) necessary to take defended urban terrain by assault. At least, not at a reasonable cost in combat losses.

(10) The leanness of the BTG manning (~ 1,000 troops) means that they cannot sustain much attrition without suffering a marked decline in combat power and effectiveness.

(11) It will take a thorough analysis to determine if the performance of the BTGs is due to inherent flaws in Russian Army personnel and training or flaws in their doctrinal approach. Again, both are probably culpable.

(12) In any case, these problems are not likely to be remedied in the short term. Fixing them will take a major reform effort.

....

My hot take:

So if I wuz the Russians, clutching at straws right now, I would be attaching a company of VDV paratroopers or naval infantry to beef up each BTG.  Operating on foot like the Ukes, with their own tracks tasked to run supplies/medevac (as much as they can). NOT as gun platforms, save in self-defence. That dog don't hunt no more.

....Except that those very formations have been heavily ground down in the early fights for Kiev, Cherniev, Nikolaev and the ongoing Stalingrad at Mariupol; witness the very heavy officer losses!

And that doesn't even come close to solving all the fire coordination problems, but right now I'm reading the above as BTGs are combat ineffective sitting ducks, being picked off at will by UA forces. They have to staunch the bleeding before they can even think about proper find+fix+kill offensive operations against the UA, as distinct from thrusting yet more all-hat-and-no-cattle mech columns down various roads....

I know 'macro guy' @JasonC has many nonfans on this board, but he is quite correct in this IMHO -- the Blitzkrieg stereotype of 'hit em where they ain't' maneuvering only takes you so far.  Sooner rather than later you have got to engage and kill the enemy forces, at a higher rate than they are killing you. Get a clue: they don't just curl up and die because you're 'behind them'.

Or, what damned good is a cauldron if you can't light the fire under it?

Edited April 11, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[chrisl]

1 hour ago, G.I. Joe said:

Also, this is "arson, murder and jaywalking," as they say on TV Tropes, but the claim about old Stingers not working at night makes no sense. If anything, an IR seeker should work better at night (cooler background, no sun to be "distracted" by...)

I did some digging on the stinger claim and only found a few things - a 1984 NYTimes article (may be paywalled, I have a sub) that refers to recommendations that a night sight be developed to make them more effective at night, but without explanation.  The best documentation I found was an  FAS document (probably old-ish) describing them and also describing the NV add-on sight.  So it sounds like it's just the lack of a night-vision system for initial acquisition by the operator, which is/was done optically in the visible spectrum (which is obviously more difficult at night), and that it's been corrected in the ~38 years since it was introduced.  I doubt there are any stingers that old being shipped to Ukraine.

[Battlefront.com]

Now that the fighting has largely taken a pause (Mariupol the big exception), I thought it would be good to assess where things are at.  Apparently a lot of people are doing that now, so why not join the crowd?

Various analytical sources I follow, and have been doing a good job of tracking the war's progress, seem to be convinced of the following things:

1. Russia's offensive military power is largely exhausted at this point, yet none of its strategic objectives have been achieved.
2. It appears that a couple of weeks ago Russia finally acknowledged the military reality and started to belatedly deal with it.  This lead to the retreat from Kiev and the cessation of large scale offensive activities everywhere other than Mariupol.  The attacks that are still ongoing are more tactical than operational or strategic in nature.
3. Despite the obvious military reversals, Russia is still striving to achieve its primary strategic goals while seemingly abandoning a lot of minor ones.  The strategic goals boil down to:
   1. Demilitarization
   2. Denazification (nobody really understands this one)
   3. Neutrality of Ukraine (i.e. no NATO)
   4. Acceptance of Russia’s control of Crimea and the entire area of Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts
4. Russia seems to understand that its strategic goals can not be achieved as originally envisioned, so it is seeking to create enough changes on the ground to claim it has achieved them.
5. It is now regrouping and reorganizing for an attack to gain the rest of Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts.  A successful operation would provide Russia with a better negotiating position to get its strategic war aims.

It seems pretty obvious how Russia thinks it can achieve it’s strategic goals:

1. When retreating from the northern areas Russia made the claim that it was doing so because it only went there to destroy Ukraine’s military and that it had done so.  “Mission Accomplished” is the messaging they want Russians to believe.
2. Taking of Mariupol is critical for their “Denazification” claim as Azov is their primary propaganda target and it is largely in Mariupol.  Therefore, it will spare no effort to get that job done and done as quickly as it can.
3. Neutrality of Ukraine is something that has to be negotiated since the attempt to overthrow the legitimate government of Ukraine and replace it with a puppet to do its bidding totally failed.  Russia may be willing to compromise on the mechanism and specifics of neutrality to some extent, but it has to at least appear that Russia is getting its way.
4. The one that seems furthest away from reality is Ukraine giving Crimea and Donbas to Russia.  There is potential for some compromise here on the Ukrainian side, but those conditions would unlikely give Russia what it views are its minimum threshold for considering this a success.

The two question now is can Russia achieve military victories in Mariupol and Donbas sufficient enough to pressure Ukraine into giving it the rest of what it needs to claim this war was a success?  It is possible, though not probable.  And again, we’re talking about enough to claim victory, not actually achieve it.  Real victory is not possible for Russia.

It is likely that Mariupol will fall fairly soon.  They’ve taken most of the city and there’s no chance of Ukraine coming to its rescue.  Fantasy talk about NATO involvement is just that, so no help there.

The other analysts out there, including the ones who have called this war wrong more than right, agree that Russia is likely to strike south from Izyum and ultimately link up with forces coming northward from below Donetsk city.  Even if it makes it halfway there it creates a large pocket of Ukrainian forces in northern Donetsk and most of the territory they need to secure.

The next big question is WHEN will this attack start?  It seems the consensus is no earlier than 1-2 weeks for a really badly rushed offensive, 1-2 months for a stronger offensive.  The choice Russia makes will tell us if they have learned anything from the last 6 weeks or not.  In any case, I don’t think either will succeed because of larger factors at work.

On balance, Ukraine seems to be in better shape to defend than Russia is to attack.  So much so that a rushed attack (1-2 weeks) will likely mean a decisive defeat for Russia and end its prospects of continuing the war without a very large mobilization (see point further below).

Waiting 1-2 months to attack gives Russia an opportunity to improve it’s ability to attack in both absolute terms (i.e. reconstitution of forces) and relative terms (i.e. narrowing the disparity between Ukraine’s ability to defend and Russia’s ability to attack).  Unfortunately for Russia, it also means it gives Ukraine 1-2 months to prepare for what is to come.  This is especially problematic because there are only a few things Russia can do militarily to achieve its revised goals and the lack of OPSEC means whatever strategic choices Russia makes won’t be a secret.  That gives Ukraine the ability to tailor its defensive activities to challenge whatever attack Russia might dream up.

The other problem with waiting is that in 1-2 months the first of Ukraine’s newly constituted units should be getting to the front, NATO armaments will be that further along, and it might be able to score some significant successes elsewhere along the front (e.g. Kherson region) that may prove distracting.  On the Russian side another 1-2 months means additional economic hurt, the potential for domestic unrest (especially in the Caucuses), potential for a palace coup, large scale military mutiny, and an unexpected battlefield reversal that has to be dealt with.  And even if it waits, Russia will continue to experience great difficulties rebuilding its shattered forces in terms of men and material.

The biggest problem for Russia is that if it launches in 1-2 months the battle will likely be very costly for itself and victory is far from assured.  The most likely scenario is something akin to Operationa Zitadelle where the Russians initially show some gains, but the losses are too high and the attack stalls out short of achieving its goals.  And even if it does manage to sever the Ukrainian LOCs and pocket a large number of Ukrainians, it is going to be a tough fight to wipe them.  Exposed flanks while conducing an elimination are going to be very difficult to hold.

Summary… Russia has shown no real sense of how to win this war so far.  Its options have been radically reduced because of that.  I do not see Russia managing to pull this off.  If the is indeed what happens, then things will get even more interesting because Russia will either have to (effectively) surrender or it will be forced into large scale conscription and associated lengthy force building costs at a time when it is not in good financial shape.

Russia has already lost the war in real terms.  Now we have to wait and see if it loses it even on its fantasy terms.

Steve

[LongLeftFlank]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Now that the fighting has largely taken a pause (Mariupol the big exception), I thought it would be good to assess where things are at....

Russia is likely to strike south from Izyum.... It seems the consensus is no earlier than 1-2 weeks for a really badly rushed offensive, 1-2 months for a stronger offensive....

A.  On balance, Ukraine seems to be in better shape to defend than Russia is to attack.  So much so that a rushed attack (1-2 weeks) will likely mean a decisive defeat for Russia and end its prospects of continuing the war without a very large mobilization....

B.  Waiting 1-2 months to attack gives Russia an opportunity to improve it’s ability to attack in both absolute terms (i.e. reconstitution of forces) and relative terms.

So if I'm Ukraine, which of these battles would *I* rather fight?

1. Because I entirely agree with you that short of Russians escalating to WMD, outside intervention is nae gwinna happen. So it's up to the Ukrainians to carve out victory on their terms, forget how Putin spins it.

2. Because a cease fire followed by a rematch later on won't be so easy. Don't bet your children's future on us, Ukes. Sadly, Putin was correct when he said 'the USA [and the West] is not agreement capable.'  Ask the poor bloody Kurds.

 

So, Sun Tzu, again....

VI.4. If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him; if well supplied with food, he can starve him out; if quietly encamped, he can force him to move.

VI.5. Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march swiftly to places where you are not expected....

VI.11. If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch. All we need do is attack some other place that he will be obliged to relieve....

VI.19. Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we may concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight....

VI.30. So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is weak....

VII.29. A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when its spirit is keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined to return. This is the art of studying moods.

VII.30. Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of disorder and hubbub amongst the enemy:--this is the art of retaining self-possession....

XI.18. If asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy in orderly array and on the point of marching to the attack, I should say: "Begin by seizing something which your opponent holds dear; then he will be amenable to your will."

XI.19. Rapidity is the essence of war: take advantage of the enemy's unreadiness, make your way by unexpected routes, and attack unguarded spots....

Risky? Hell yes!

But what kind of crisis might the UA be able to force upon the Russians to force them to launch their next offensive early and half-baked?

Edited April 11, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[Ts4EVER]

6 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

But what kind of crisis might the UA be able to force upon the Russians to force them to launch their next offensive early and half-baked?

Advancing towards Kherson, the one city they were able to take.

[LongLeftFlank]

26 minutes ago, Ts4EVER said:

Advancing towards Kherson, the one city they were able to take.

Already happening, I think. But the Dniepr is in the way.

...I had thought about a bold grab for Melitopol (not Mariupol, the next Azov port city west), which would threaten Crimea, the jewel in their irredentist crown and cut off a huge chunk of RA forces to the east. It would absolutely require a response. But it requires mobility [and perhaps mass] that the UA does not presently have at a scale beyond raiding. And Russian airpower becomes a serious threat there.

IMHO, the UA offensive strong suit right now is really the same as their defensive one:  highly motivated leg infantry who can envelop and maul Russian BTGs at will. So what could be accomplished in that 'suit'?

Edited April 11, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[MikeyD]

Hapless, in a Youtube video playing Russians in a CMRT scenario, made the joking comment that Russian infantry tactics appear to be 'Throw men at the enemy until they drown in your own blood" (or words to that effect). Its starting took like that description may be more right than wrong. It appears to me that Putin is banking long term on Ukraine running out of artillery shells, bullets and anti-tank rockets before Russia runs out of men. That, in Putin's mind, would give Russia the field by default. Its a cruel and bloody calculation on his part. It worked in 2014 (more of less), Ukraine at the time had been compelled to ration its use of ATGMs on the front for fear of running out entirely.

[chrisl]

25 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Already happening, I think. But the Dniepr is in the way.

...I had thought about a bold grab for Melitopol (not Mariupol, the next Azov port city west), which would threaten Crimea, the jewel in their irridentist crown and cut off a huge chunk of RA forces to the east. It would absolutely require a response. But it requires mobility that the UA does not presently have at a scale beyond raiding. And Russian airpower becomes a serious threat there.

IMHO, the UA offensive strong suit right now is really the same as their defensive one:  highly motivated leg infantry who can envelop and maul Russian BTGs at will. So what could be accomplished in that 'suit'?

Finding a way to destroy the Kerch bridge, or at least damage it badly enough that it's useless for a few months, would force Russia to attack early to solidify the land bridge.  Without the bridge, Crimea has to be supplied by sea and air and would be less able to support the southern forces out of Crimea.  I don't see a way to do it though - they don't have enough freedom in the air and don't have PGMs that are big enough with long enough range to take out four decks.  Given Russia's truck problems, maybe hitting the rail lanes would be enough to hurt.  

edit: more realistic is to make sure every Russian is in constant fear of mortar rounds while they're bringing in supplies and setting up the attack.  Between local observations, radio intercepts from both their own capabilities and the fleet of NATO SIGINT aircraft cruising the area every night, and the western satellite imaging capability that probably lets them track every vehicle hourly, they can bring down a lot of accurate pain at relatively low risk.

Edited April 11, 2022 by chrisl

[dan/california]

Most of Kherson is on the west side of the Dnipro River. If the Ukrainians could drop what looks like the one bridge that connects Kherson to the east side it seems to me that several Russian battle groups would be in a world of hurt very quickly.

At the same time I would mass whatever I free up now that the pressure is off Kyiv, and just try roll up the Russian line from the north.

Edited April 11, 2022 by dan/california
added second paragraph

[LongLeftFlank]

.... Disembowel those Russian forces sitting idle outside Kharkiv lobbing heavy shells into it. Menace the Belgorod oblast, the Rodina. Threaten to cut the rail line.

UA doesn't have to win everything here, or restore the frontiers.  But they might. The eastern environs of Kharkiv are quite built up clear to the frontier; it isn't pure open steppe. Lots of villages, good terrain for an infantry fight.  Hard for Russian air power to find them, or their supplies, or to identify their axes of attack. There are lots. Probably more mass graves and rape camps too 

Again, the 'Sun Tzu' operational point here is to provoke the Russians into attacking again, now, while they're still reeling and bloody from the last go round.

Ukraine holds the initiative at the moment. Handing it back to an implacable enemy 4x your size and hoping he still can't make anything of it in 60 days is not a decision to be taken lightly....

Edited April 11, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[chrisl]

3 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Most of Kherson is on the west side of the Dnipro River. If the Ukrainians could drop what looks like the one bridge that connects Kherson to the east side it seems to me that several Russian battle groups would be in a world of hurt very quickly.

It looks like two bridges - the big one for motor vehicles and a smaller one to the east for trains.  But a lot easier than the Kerch bridge- probably within reach of what they can do.

[LongLeftFlank]

4 minutes ago, chrisl said:

It looks like two bridges - the big one for motor vehicles and a smaller one to the east for trains.  But a lot easier than the Kerch bridge- probably within reach of what they can do.

Problem is IMHO, blowing a bridge or a rail line or whatever doesn't force an existential crisis on a large enough chunk of Russian forces to be a game changer.  There's plenty of stuff sitting in Crimea already, no doubt. And the Azov ports are available.  I mean, sure, go ahead and do it if you can, but....

Edited April 11, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[chrisl]

2 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Problem is IMHO, blowing a bridge or a rail line or whatever doesn't force an existential crisis on a large enough chunk of Russian forces to be a game changer.  I mean, sure, go ahead and do it if you can, but....

Kerch would be existential for Crimea.  Given how much Russia seems to care about its soldiers, they could very well be indifferent to leaving a few BTGs hung out to dry on the wrong side of the Dnipro in Kherson.

[kraze]

Good russians oppressed by evil putin, wish us peaceful dreams.

 

[Strykr45]

Has anyone researched the US BioWeapon/Lab connection to this situation ???

 

[LongLeftFlank]

8 minutes ago, Strykr45 said:

Has anyone researched the US BioWeapon/Lab connection to this situation ???

 

Hi Mum!

Edited April 11, 2022 by LongLeftFlank
[MoonofAlabama is right over there, dirtbag]

[TheVulture]

11 minutes ago, Strykr45 said:

Has anyone researched the US BioWeapon/Lab connection to this situation ???

There isn't a connection. 

[Strykr45]

Really ...

How do you know this ???

Research.

 

Edited April 11, 2022 by Strykr45

[LongLeftFlank]

Just now, Strykr45 said:

Really ...

How do you know this ???

 

Oh goody, now @BFCElvis has an entire subthread to rip out.

[Strykr45]

Discussion is prohibited ???

[LongLeftFlank]

Just now, Strykr45 said:

Discussion is prohibited ???

я слышу голос от параши

[Ts4EVER]

8 minutes ago, Strykr45 said:

Discussion is prohibited ???

Imagine a group of scientists discussing some of the finer points of cladistic analysis of dinosaurs when suddenly the most inbred, subhuman redneck you can imagine bursts in and says "God made the earth in 7 days though!". That is basically what you just did.

[LongLeftFlank]

1 minute ago, Ts4EVER said:

Imagine a group of scientists discussing some of the finer points of cladistic analysis of dinosaurs when suddenly the most inbred, subhuman redneck you can imagine bursts in and says "God made the earth in 7 days though!". That is basically what you just did.

... and then waits for some well meaning 'scientist' to attempt to reason with him before pulling down his overalls and taking a giant fart-filled wet dump that he was planning to unload on us to begin with, claiming that well, we asked.....