How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Battlefront.com]

6 hours ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

Last post by Tom Cooper in his Substack  is interesting.

In particular, he makes an interesting observation about the Zaporozhe offensive, that because of Russians' trying to defend all terrain  and constantly counterattacking, they are making their defence belts constructed further back essentially useless. If the Ukrainians are likely to breach the first defence belt only after Russians exhaust all units at their disposal, then at this point the Russians will not have the soldiers to man the subsequent belts. Makes sense.

https://xxtomcooperxx.substack.com/p/ukraine-war-9-july-2023

 

Well, I've been saying this from the start  

In theory if you have unlimited forces you'd defend all the lines equally hard and fall back only when soundly defeated, using your unlimited forces to hold the next line while building another new line to fall back to manned with unlimited forces.  This gets repeated until the enemy stops attacking.

The reality is forces are not unlimited and decisions have to be made about how much to risk in a particular line and at what point force preservation is more important than line retention.  At the point where it looks like the cost:benefit ratio for force retention is unfavorable, you pull your forward forces out and ideally put them two lines back.  Fresh forces should be in place to man what will become the new line.  If that line holds then rotations of forces from the rear line or strategic reserves keep it viable longer term.  When the cost:benefit ratio becomes unfavorable for that line, the whole process repeats itself.

Defensive lines are all about "let the enemy come to you on your terms, don't got to them on the enemy's terms".

The Ukrainians are masters of this form of warfare, generally staying in a difficult line just long enough to ensure there is a substantial new line ready to challenge the attackers.  The forward forces fall back, Russia then hits a fresh line, stalls out, and the war grinds on.  This is why Russia has had such difficulty doing anything in the old ATO area even to this day.  Ukraine knows when to hold 'em and when to fold 'em, as the song goes.

Russia is flirting with disaster in the south because they are violating core principles of positional warfare.  Namely, they are holding their most forward line, which isn't even the main line, with pretty much everything they have.  They should instead be fighting mostly with the same units that were originally there and withdrawing them when they're spent.  Reserves should be used sparingly and keeping in mind future needs.

Not only are they over investing in retaining their forward line they are using their reserves to mount counter attacks to retake lost positions and/or thwart Ukrainian attacks.  This is stupid!  The forward line is intended to wear out the attacker, not the defender!  Those reserves should be manning the 2nd line (in this case the main line) so that when the forward units are spent they can be withdrawn and force Ukraine to face fresh forces in the main line.

What Russia is doing is the sort of desperation you often seen when trying to maintain the LAST line of resistance, not the FIRST.  It's desperation where the defender's calculation changes to "if we don't hold these positions, we'll lose everything" sort of thing.

This is another reason the doomsayers should put a sock in it   The primary reason Ukraine is having so much difficulty advancing is because Russia is making major mistakes.  Never interrupt your enemy when they are making mistakes!  The Russian counter attacks might be slowing Ukraine's advances, but it's giving them an excellent opportunity to kill them under favorable conditions.  Much more favorable than trying to blow them out of their main line of defense.

Steve

[dan/california]

4 hours ago, cesmonkey said:

 

We are talking way too much about a DPICM decision that has already been made, and not nearly enough about the fact we don't have the faintest idea who is actually in charge in Russia, or what their long term plans is.

Erdogan is playing the hardest of hardball over Swedish membership in NATO.

Even as it provides something close to maximalist support for Ukraine. The diplomatic complications are simply mind boggling.

[Carolus]

 

Quote

Girkin commented on the news that Putin met with Prigozhin 5 days after the Wagner rebellion attempt: “I am waiting for news about how Vladimir Vladimirovich meets with the commanders of the Azov regiment and listens to their version of the battle for Mariupol.”

 

[DesertFox]

Tokmak axis - some Bradley and M249 impressions - 47th Brig

 

https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1678417918982250496?s=20

[dan/california]

3 minutes ago, Carolus said:

 

 

I suspect that meeting will happen in the Hague. The new regime in will Russia decide that between tens of billions in sanctions relief, and Putin's comfortable retirement, that they can't afford to like him that much.

[dan/california]

Reality always seems to dawn when about 75% of the unit is KIA...

[Battlefront.com]

Russia doing its part to help out with Ukraine's munitions and weapons shortages:

Steve

[DesertFox]

Something russian got deleted

 

https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1678425247228346368?s=20

[Battlefront.com]

Two more videos from CivDiv:

 

Steve

[Butschi]

14 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Erdogan is playing the hardest of hardball over Swedish membership in NATO.

Bad for Sweden. I hope someone tells Erdogan, in as clear words as diplomatically acceptable, that a) EU isn't NATO and b) Turkey's chances of getting into EU under a president Erdogan and with a political and judiciary system as it is now are very close to zero. We can't afford another Orban. While they are at it, they might also remind him that at some point we might feel tempted to decide whether we'd rather have Sweden in NATO than Turkey.

I know this won't sit well with some here but I think it is good that a decision to allow new members in has to be unanimously. It is literally a question of whether a country is willing to send soldiers to die for another country, after all. But doing it so obviously for ones own selfish political gains is... disturbing.

[hcrof]

31 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Well, I've been saying this from the start  

In theory if you have unlimited forces you'd defend all the lines equally hard and fall back only when soundly defeated, using your unlimited forces to hold the next line while building another new line to fall back to manned with unlimited forces.  This gets repeated until the enemy stops attacking.

The reality is forces are not unlimited and decisions have to be made about how much to risk in a particular line and at what point force preservation is more important than line retention.  At the point where it looks like the cost:benefit ratio for force retention is unfavorable, you pull your forward forces out and ideally put them two lines back.  Fresh forces should be in place to man what will become the new line.  If that line holds then rotations of forces from the rear line or strategic reserves keep it viable longer term.  When the cost:benefit ratio becomes unfavorable for that line, the whole process repeats itself.

Defensive lines are all about "let the enemy come to you on your terms, don't got to them on the enemy's terms".

The Ukrainians are masters of this form of warfare, generally staying in a difficult line just long enough to ensure there is a substantial new line ready to challenge the attackers.  The forward forces fall back, Russia then hits a fresh line, stalls out, and the war grinds on.  This is why Russia has had such difficulty doing anything in the old ATO area even to this day.  Ukraine knows when to hold 'em and when to fold 'em, as the song goes.

Russia is flirting with disaster in the south because they are violating core principles of positional warfare.  Namely, they are holding their most forward line, which isn't even the main line, with pretty much everything they have.  They should instead be fighting mostly with the same units that were originally there and withdrawing them when they're spent.  Reserves should be used sparingly and keeping in mind future needs.

Not only are they over investing in retaining their forward line they are using their reserves to mount counter attacks to retake lost positions and/or thwart Ukrainian attacks.  This is stupid!  The forward line is intended to wear out the attacker, not the defender!  Those reserves should be manning the 2nd line (in this case the main line) so that when the forward units are spent they can be withdrawn and force Ukraine to face fresh forces in the main line.

What Russia is doing is the sort of desperation you often seen when trying to maintain the LAST line of resistance, not the FIRST.  It's desperation where the defender's calculation changes to "if we don't hold these positions, we'll lose everything" sort of thing.

This is another reason the doomsayers should put a sock in it   The primary reason Ukraine is having so much difficulty advancing is because Russia is making major mistakes.  Never interrupt your enemy when they are making mistakes!  The Russian counter attacks might be slowing Ukraine's advances, but it's giving them an excellent opportunity to kill them under favorable conditions.  Much more favorable than trying to blow them out of their main line of defense.

Steve

Based on that analysis, I wonder if the Russians felt that if that gave an inch their entire backfield would be in himars range. In addition, falling back takes a level of competence not present in a sufficient percentage of their units. 

By that logic the best thing to do is to dig a lot of trenches to discourage attacks at your most vulnerable spots while putting all your mines in triple density on the front line and holding it with everything you have. The idea being that Ukraine gives up before they find out you have been bluffing and that your subsequent lines of defence are just a bare trench with no further defense such as mines, bunkers or field telephones. 

[Sarjen]

55 minutes ago, Butschi said:

 

Anyway, we (the West) shouldn't dismiss ethics when they are inconvenient. We often do and that is bad enough because the more we do this the more we give our favourite autocracies ammunition to justify throwing things like human rights over board.

That said, "ethics" doesn't mean being an angle. It can mean weighing all options and arriving at the conclusion that they are all bad and one is just the least bad.

Maybe my English was not good enough to keep the too rigid legal context. Ukraine has a moral and legal obligation to protect its own people from the Russian war of aggression, no matter what ethics say. Otherwise, they would not fulfill their obligation as a state and nation. Ethics can then only influence execution frameworks. Just as Ukraine has done.

[kimbosbread]

Yeah, Turkey won’t be getting into the EU, not with Erdogan and not with their economic “issues”. Their annualized inflation rate is still almost 40%, and all sorts of election promises about free natural gas. Also, it’s not like the US can’t just create another military alliance if it feels like it.

[DesertFox]

Maybe they should split into NATO and NATO Asia minor. Whoever wants to support Asia minor can do contracts with Turkey after the Cyprus question is resolved...(sorry couldnt help it)

[Carolus]

3 minutes ago, kimbosbread said:

Also, it’s not like the US can’t just create another military alliance if it feels like it.

[Billy Ringo]

39 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

What Russia is doing is the sort of desperation you often seen when trying to maintain the LAST line of resistance, not the FIRST.  It's desperation where the defender's calculation changes to "if we don't hold these positions, we'll lose everything" sort of thing.

 

Russia may not be quite there yet, but Putin and/or his top generals may be.  Their tenure and existence may be so tenuous that they realize they can't survive if Ukraine has any semblance of significant breakthrough. 

[dan/california]

I suspect something that looks quite a bit like this will be a big part of de-mining Ukraine after the shooting stops. 

[Battlefront.com]

14 minutes ago, hcrof said:

Based on that analysis, I wonder if the Russians felt that if that gave an inch their entire backfield would be in himars range. In addition, falling back takes a level of competence not present in a sufficient percentage of their units. 

Their backfield is already in range of HIMARS in some sectors (especially in the west) and Storm Shadow goes wherever it pleases already.  Losing 10km or so to Ukraine doesn't affect much, least of all Crimea.

Falling back does take a level of competence, but ironically it is the one form of maneuver that Russia has shown some aptitude for.  The main issue is, I think, they have put out an "don't give an inch" edict for political reasons.  Which wouldn't be surprising at all given that Russia's warplans have been heavily distorted by political concepts.

14 minutes ago, hcrof said:

By that logic the best thing to do is to dig a lot of trenches to discourage attacks at your most vulnerable spots while putting all your mines in triple density on the front line and holding it with everything you have. The idea being that Ukraine gives up before they find out you have been bluffing and that your subsequent lines of defence are just a bare trench with no further defense such as mines, bunkers or field telephones. 

Yes, there are either two possibilities.  One is that Russia is simply mindlessly following it's zombie routine of attack as the best form of defense, the other is that they don't think they can hold the more complex second line of defense.  The irony is that the more forces they blow through in the first line of defense, the less likely they will be able to hold the second effectively and consistently enough to matter.

Steve

[hcrof]

5 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Their backfield is already in range of HIMARS in some sectors (especially in the west) and Storm Shadow goes wherever it pleases already.  Losing 10km or so to Ukraine doesn't affect much, least of all Crimea.

Falling back does take a level of competence, but ironically it is the one form of maneuver that Russia has shown some aptitude for.  The main issue is, I think, they have put out an "don't give an inch" edict for political reasons.  Which wouldn't be surprising at all given that Russia's warplans have been heavily distorted by political concepts.

Yes, there are either two possibilities.  One is that Russia is simply mindlessly following it's zombie routine of attack as the best form of defense, the other is that they don't think they can hold the more complex second line of defense.  The irony is that the more forces they blow through in the first line of defense, the less likely they will be able to hold the second effectively and consistently enough to matter.

Steve

I think we agree with each other, but a few points: 

- the defensive scheme was designed before storm shadow (yes they should have anticipated it but Russia acts very short term at the moment).

- himars at extreme range is different to himars at easy range or even extended range tube artillery. They may have assessed that the current lines are bad but 10km further back is significantly worse.

- the Russian forces at Kherson were VDV, but now the line is largely mobiks so I am not sure you can directly compare how well they may withdraw. I think the force density is lower too, so less room for error. 

- or just politics, I am just looking for a militarily rational explanation here!

[kevinkin]

37 minutes ago, hcrof said:

- himars at extreme range is different to himars at easy range or even extended range tube artillery.

Another addition to the ongoing cluster discussion: The HIMARs system can also fire missiles with bomblets. The M26A2 ER rockets carrying 518 M77 submunitions. Range: 15–45 kilometres (9.3–28.0 mi). Not sure if the US is sending these, but why not? 

[billbindc]

2 hours ago, dan/california said:

We are talking way too much about a DPICM decision that has already been made, and not nearly enough about the fact we don't have the faintest idea who is actually in charge in Russia, or what their long term plans is.

Erdogan is playing the hardest of hardball over Swedish membership in NATO.

Even as it provides something close to maximalist support for Ukraine. The diplomatic complications are simply mind boggling.

On repeat: Igor Sushko is a fabricator. 

[danfrodo]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

The main issue is, I think, they have put out an "don't give an inch" edict for political reasons.  Which wouldn't be surprising at all given that Russia's warplans have been heavily distorted by political concepts.

Retreating invites defeatism!  (sarcasm) 

It does seem that Putler has taken on the hitler mantra of holding every inch of ground, no matter how stupid.  And also taking on the stalin mantra of attacking, endlessly, no matter how stupid.  So he's basically two 'great' men  in one. 

And now how long before the there's a significant crack in the dyke?  By significant I mean UKR advance of 6-10km in a day, causing panic and hopefully poorly thought out responses by RU.  I can picture mobile reserves being yanked from one area to  some other one without much thought about the actual consequences.

[Jr Buck Private]

2 hours ago, Billy Ringo said:

Russia may not be quite there yet, but Putin and/or his top generals may be.  Their tenure and existence may be so tenuous that they realize they can't survive if Ukraine has any semblance of significant breakthrough. 

Or even the capture of Bakhmut.   Everybody agrees the now destroyed city has no tactical value, but politically it's  a potential goldmine for Ukraine.   That will be a difficult even for the Russian propagandists to spin back home.   I'm looking forward to seeing how many Russian generals get axed when that happens.   That will show the people back home that they have no hope of winning this war.   Offensively they are spent.   It's like two arm wrestlers.  One has withstood everything thrown at it and now has started to move the other back.   Not hard to figure out which arm is going down.  

[kevinkin]

3 minutes ago, Jr Buck Private said:

Everybody agrees the now destroyed city has no tactical value,

I think much of eastern Ukraine has some tactical value in the ongoing war, but sadly little economic value for years. This is especially true of the more urbanized areas. 

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, hcrof said:

I think we agree with each other, but a few points: 

- the defensive scheme was designed before storm shadow (yes they should have anticipated it but Russia acts very short term at the moment).

- himars at extreme range is different to himars at easy range or even extended range tube artillery. They may have assessed that the current lines are bad but 10km further back is significantly worse.

- the Russian forces at Kherson were VDV, but now the line is largely mobiks so I am not sure you can directly compare how well they may withdraw. I think the force density is lower too, so less room for error. 

For sure the success that Russia had evacuating Kherson will be very, very difficult for them to pull off in the south.  Vastly greater distances in breadth and depth for starters, but the variety of force quality is a major issue.  When doing an organized, phased withdrawal you need to be able to count on everybody to do their part and do it reasonably well.  One unit panicking, not getting the message, etc. could open up a grand opportunity for Ukraine.  The more Russia wears out its units fighting for the 1st line, the more likely disaster will happen when trying to pull back.  Especially because mobile reserves that could be available to stabilize a problem spot won't be as plentiful or in the best shape.

1 hour ago, hcrof said:

- or just politics, I am just looking for a militarily rational explanation here!

Good luck with that

1 hour ago, kevinkin said:

Another addition to the ongoing cluster discussion: The HIMARs system can also fire missiles with bomblets. The M26A2 ER rockets carrying 518 M77 submunitions. Range: 15–45 kilometres (9.3–28.0 mi). Not sure if the US is sending these, but why not? 

For now it is limited to 155 rounds, not MLRS.  However, it seems that stocks of standard MLRS rockets are running down as well, so at some point the US might have to dip into cluster or ATACMS.

Note that Ukraine has been receiving M30A1 rockets since the start.  These are not cluster munitions, but are more akin to canister rounds.  There was a pretty humorous video uploaded by Russian rear service/salvage personnel last year that showed a Ural truck shredded by one of these.  They were bemoaning that their orders were to repair the truck, yet it was so punched through that it wasn't even good for salvaging parts.  Even the leaf springs were damaged.

Steve