How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, Grigb said:

RDK raids proved that, contrary to popular belief, RU is particularly weak in border regions. According to my sources inside RU, the word on the street the old man truly lost control of border regions, with both Prig and Kadyriv expressing a wish to travel there to help those regions. Furthermore, the UKR appears to be striking RU units harder with arty there than even in the Donetsk region, aggravating the RU situation (young conscripts started dying there which s very sensitive topic for Ru public)

Bakhmut is a walking time bomb. It appears to be quiet but it is not. Unlike what RU expected, UKR has not stopped pressing there, causing a major challenge for RU. RU must either transfer additional reserves or risk taking a massive moral and political blow if the situation explodes (there's a reason Prig fled so quickly from there).

UKR began pushing back at Avdivka. That worries RU since Avdiivka is so near to Donetsk, and any penetration, no matter how minor, may lead to not just military but also political disaster.

Another publicized assault on Maryinka village has failed. Who are these men defending Maryinka? This is above cyborg level of power.

Current UKR actions in the south has lately begun worrying RU since, on top of the present issues, a major UKR strike in the Volnovkha direction has the potential to collapse the whole RU front there.

Thanks for that summary.  And there's a few more:

1.  Prior to the dam being blown up Ukraine was regularly conducting raids into the islands and even left bank of the lower Dnepr.  Russia didn't seem able to do anything about it and it is very likely part of the reason they blew the dam (i.e. they expected even worse things they couldn't stop).

2.  Partisan activity appears to be on the increase and not just Ukraine, but also Russia proper.

3.  More than a year into Ukraine's Western deep strike capabilities have produced no solution other than to move stuff away and hope for the best.  Even the reports of Russia being able to scramble with GPS signals appears to be either overstated or at least not put into proper context.  We regullarly see big things go boom, including the first general of 2023.

1 hour ago, Grigb said:

UKR created a lot of problems for RU in a lot of different places without committing main forces yet. And all the fuss is about the loss of bunch of Bradley and Leo's that spooked RU craples.  

This is the most important point to keep returning to time and time again... Ukraine is making steady progress in lots of places MOSTLY with the forces it had available to it late last year and early this year.  Which is largely a capable light infantry force backed up by Soviet era AFVs and a significant portion of NATO artillery.

I think in a couple of weeks Ukraine could already claim this counter offensive a minimal success even if it does nothing more than maintain steady progress without committing significant new units into the fight.  Which should be very worrying to the Russian side

Things are going about as well as I had hoped at this point.  My primary concern is that Ukraine would have to chew up its new units just breaking through the lines.  That would proportionally reduce the exploitation phase's possibilities.  So far (fingers crossed) so good!

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Speaking of Russian blocking units... a video from SBU showing English translated interviews with a Storm-Z piece of meat and the guy tasked with making sure they didn't have an option to retreat:

 

Steve

[dan/california]

10 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Speaking of Russian blocking units... a video from SBU showing English translated interviews with a Storm-Z piece of meat and the guy tasked with making sure they didn't have an option to retreat:

https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarRoom/comments/148eoqr/translated_security_service_of_ukraine_questioned/

Steve

Well, you have to applaud the Ukrainian mortar crews for excellent work.

[Letter from Prague]

How does this "blocking units" thing even work? Like don't the blockers have to be really close to the front as well? Wouldn't they end up fighting themselves and get destroyed?

It just seems so ... needlessly idiotic.

(I am of course in no way disputing that the Russians are doing it - it being needlessly idiotic makes it more likely, not less)

[womble]

4 hours ago, The_Capt said:

I am talking about bottom attacking UGVs that simply wait for the bridgehead, or even follow on and then 12 hours later shift to close the safe lane.  [snip] You could have 1000 simple smart systems that can assess its own gaps and then fill them.

The ones that are waiting get rollered. Mine plows would be obsolete, cos displacing the mobile mine isn't very effective

After that, it's an EWAR problem. In order to self-heal, the mines outside the cleared lane need to know both that they need to move, and where to move to. So you need to jam or spoof whatever system the moving mines use for positioning, coordination and control. If it's a coherent single-blob minefield where every element starts out 'live', every element has to be "checking in" so that the minefield knows it's lost members (to a putative breach) that need covering. Even if you have silent reserves, at least a largish proportion have to be detectable via RF to some degree and at some point in time. Certainly doesn't have to be a continuous "I'm still alive" broadcast, but the suggestion of a 12 hour tick might suit a lot of operational situations. Could be adjusted by the minefield controller as their other ISR assets update them on the tactical situation. But they will be detectable. Any minefield that you breach will have to have some sort of EWAR element, just in case it's a hybrid "dumb" and "mobile" field, even if you've no evidence that there are mobile mines present.

Or you need some sort of sentry system to guard the flanks of the cleared lane from the sneaky li'l buggers closing it again.

Still, that sort of setup needs juice. It needs to operate its "intelligence", and its comms, and it needs to power its sneaking about. Such systems have a limited lifetime. Not trivial, for sure, but endurance becomes more of a consideration than it is for a plastic box and a passive fuse. We (that is, humans) have the capability to build static mines that are much more complicated and potentially even more effective than the ones the RU armed forces have deployed. But such complexity is too expensive to deploy "on spec" in the numbers required to provide the embuggerance that a simple dense belt of conventional anti-vehicle mines can.

[JonS]

1 hour ago, Artkin said:

This is all in addition to the reported ammunition problem.

Well, this is how Russia is solving their ammo shortage; fewer guns means less ammo required. QED.

Putin remains the master strategist.

[Beleg85]

T-80BWM reportedly shoting and hiting Ukrainian Bradley. One of first recorded encounters between donated heavy Western and Russian equipment. Could be finishing off abandoned vehicle, though.

 

Edited June 13, 2023 by Beleg85

[Vanir Ausf B]

Looks like two targets were hit.

Not sure how he determined they were Bradleys, given the crappy video quality.

Edited June 13, 2023 by Vanir Ausf B

[Beleg85]

6 minutes ago, Vanir Ausf B said:

Not sure how he determined they were Bradleys, given the crappy video quality.

Guy designs tanks, I would rather trust him in this respect. One could check frame after frame, for a second turret looks roughly like characteristic Bradley shape. But yeah, quality is not perfect.

[sburke]

Following the exposure in New Zealand, it seems Russian disinformation is facing additional challenges.

Large-scale disinformation campaign about Russia’s war in Ukraine exposed in France (yahoo.com)

 

Fake internet pages impersonating media and government sites, as well as hundreds of fake URLs on social networks are spreading Russian war propaganda, says a report by France’s Service for Surveillance and Protection Against Foreign Digital Interference (VIGINUM).

There were 355 active web domains publishing pro-Russian content or masquerading as publications from Europe, the USA, and the Middle East, from June 2022 to May 2023.

In France, 58 fake articles were discovered in four media, including the influential newspapers Le Monde and Figaro. In one case, a site resembling the French Foreign Ministry wrote about a fake “security tax” to help Ukraine.

[Offshoot]

4 hours ago, Grigb said:

Another publicized assault on Maryinka village has failed. Who are these men defending Maryinka? This is above cyborg level of power.

Just to add some info, it is the 79th Air Assault Brigade.

Ukrainian Armed Forces repel attack with armored vehicles in Marinka - https://mil.in.ua/en/news/ukrainian-armed-forces-repel-attack-with-armored-vehicles-in-marinka/

Unfortunately the English closed captions are not good in this video, but anyway

 

[The_Capt]

3 hours ago, womble said:

The ones that are waiting get rollered. Mine plows would be obsolete, cos displacing the mobile mine isn't very effective

After that, it's an EWAR problem. In order to self-heal, the mines outside the cleared lane need to know both that they need to move, and where to move to. So you need to jam or spoof whatever system the moving mines use for positioning, coordination and control. If it's a coherent single-blob minefield where every element starts out 'live', every element has to be "checking in" so that the minefield knows it's lost members (to a putative breach) that need covering. Even if you have silent reserves, at least a largish proportion have to be detectable via RF to some degree and at some point in time. Certainly doesn't have to be a continuous "I'm still alive" broadcast, but the suggestion of a 12 hour tick might suit a lot of operational situations. Could be adjusted by the minefield controller as their other ISR assets update them on the tactical situation. But they will be detectable. Any minefield that you breach will have to have some sort of EWAR element, just in case it's a hybrid "dumb" and "mobile" field, even if you've no evidence that there are mobile mines present.

Or you need some sort of sentry system to guard the flanks of the cleared lane from the sneaky li'l buggers closing it again.

Still, that sort of setup needs juice. It needs to operate its "intelligence", and its comms, and it needs to power its sneaking about. Such systems have a limited lifetime. Not trivial, for sure, but endurance becomes more of a consideration than it is for a plastic box and a passive fuse. We (that is, humans) have the capability to build static mines that are much more complicated and potentially even more effective than the ones the RU armed forces have deployed. But such complexity is too expensive to deploy "on spec" in the numbers required to provide the embuggerance that a simple dense belt of conventional anti-vehicle mines can.

Oh this would definitely drift into EW; however decoys and spoofs would drive EW detection crazy.  You could be receiving false signals and fake minefields all over the map from simple transponders.  You would need ISR and cover on safe lanes which would pull resources back to secure LOCs, even if they were automated.  And the you have combos with dumb, mobile passive and mobile active - so stand off with EFP.  These are not problems that can be solved with more EW without putting so much energy out that one becomes a priority target.

As to cost, well the question will be “how badly do you want to deny?”  Peripheral and lower pri approaches could be covered by dumb fields, just enough to slow down.  Hi priority routes and choke points would be tailor made for these sorts of unmanned mixes.  Cost is directly related to value. If a mixed unmanned mine field can deny major approach then the cost is worth it.  

Sure dumb mines work, the same way dumb arty still works but if you want to truly deny an area it will likely be a combination of unmanned networked systems backed up by a lot of noise makers.  By the time ones AI support can figure out which are mines and which are spoofs, you could very well have already repositioned the entire field.  We are talking about being able to spot 1000 shoebox sized UGVs in terrain, each one can kill a tank - that is how offence dies.  And this is before the UAS swarms who have been parked on the ground form up to create a kill box.

The bottom line is that processing has grown exponentially while miniaturization and cost reduction have kicked in.  The MG when it was mounted like a cannon could only do so much, once they miniaturized and mass produced at lower costs warfare changed forever.  We are staring down the barrel of another shift and unmanned and precision are at that forefront as they build the last mile of what information technology and processing started.

Edited June 14, 2023 by The_Capt

[Beleg85]

Btw. if somebody likes to check various insignia we often see in videos, here is a website that have them covered. May also be useful for potential futures scenarios.:

https://owlmaps.github.io/units/#/ua

[Vet 0369]

On 6/12/2023 at 8:09 PM, sross112 said:

The two main reasons that it sounded like a good change is for the body armor penetration and the paired optics. The article advised that Vortex was supplying the optics which are ballistically calibrated and are supposed to give the average rifleman the ability to consistently hit targets out to 800 meters. That is a significant advantage over most possible adversaries.

 

One of the main reasons that was given for adopting the 5.56mm M16 and CAR-4 was that combat was occurring at ranges that were much closer than previous conflicts. The USMC defines “max effective range” of a rifle as the range at which any Marine can be expected to inflict a casualty on the enemy. The M16 has a max effective range of about 340 meters, and if I remember correctly, the M14 (7.62x52mm) that was replaced by the M16 had a max effective of 460 meters. The M1 Garand (30-06) was the same as effective range as the M14. The reason for replacing was because combat was occurring at ranges of 100 to 200m (in addition to being lighter. Every year I was in the Marines, I qualified at 500 yards (460m) with the M14, and That was with open sights (aperture “peep” sights) not optics. If I can see it, I can hit it.

Edited June 14, 2023 by Vet 0369

[paxromana]

Some interesting comments on how to 'read' the available information on the counteroffensive (and combat operations in general) ... I think most posters on this thread already grasp this, but some might gain some benefit from reading and considering it.

https://www.smh.com.au/world/europe/why-ukraine-s-counteroffensive-is-the-toughest-military-path-to-victory-20230613-p5dg4f.html

It is behind a Paywall, but you get, IIRC, 10 free articles a month ... 

Mich Ryan is a respected Australian military commentator and (recently) retired General.

[dan/california]

The_Capt's little shop of horrors is moving right along.

[kevinkin]

1 hour ago, Vet 0369 said:

The reason for replacing was because combat was occurring at ranges of 100 to 200m (in addition to being lighter. Every year I was in the Marines, I qualified at 500 yards (460m) with the M14, and That was with open sights (aperture “peep” sights) not optics. If I can see it, I can hit it.

I very much honor your service. So I think you are in a great position to address my paragraph below:

Qualifying is under ideal conditions. Squads have marksmen that are held outside of close combat.  NATO squads are trained at fire and movement and the idea of entrenched warfare where sniper ranges might matter is frowned upon. These squads are armed for offensive operations. Once they are static their advantage over a poorly equipped and trained enemy is minimized aka fire bases in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq. So in a war of movement, squads armed with shotguns would be better off than squads armed long range rifles. The shock effect matters. Tactics place those shotguns in position against the enemy where after a few booms, the enemy gives up. 

 

 

[dan/california]

Sorry it comes out hard to read on the board, 51 Oryx confirmed Russian vehicle losses in 24 hours. I rather like the line with 8 tanks to blown up to further identify.

[Battlefront.com]

4 hours ago, Beleg85 said:

Guy designs tanks, I would rather trust him in this respect. One could check frame after frame, for a second turret looks roughly like characteristic Bradley shape. But yeah, quality is not perfect.

If I were Russia and I had a bunch of disabled Brads, I'd be doing everything I could to make sure they weren't recoverable.  Sneaking a tank up at night to finish them off would be a very good way to do that.  And after doing that, why waste an opportunity to pump out some good propaganda?

As one of the guys who constantly and consistently stated that heavy NATO armor was not the most important stuff to prioritize giving Ukraine (I'd rank MRAPs much higher!) I have to say that Russia has an unhealthy obsession with these things.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, Beleg85 said:

Btw. if somebody likes to check various insignia we often see in videos, here is a website that have them covered. May also be useful for potential futures scenarios.:

https://owlmaps.github.io/units/#/ua

That's excellent for getting a quick eyeball check against possibilities.  Wonderful to have them all in one place.

However, this is the best source I've found for detailed info on Ukrainian units, including insignia.  It is how I produced the list of new brigades a few weeks ago:

https://militaryland.net/ukraine/

But as you can see, you either have to know roughly where to look or spend time hunting/pecking to find what you need because the insignia are sub categorized.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

5 hours ago, Letter from Prague said:

How does this "blocking units" thing even work? Like don't the blockers have to be really close to the front as well? Wouldn't they end up fighting themselves and get destroyed?

The Russians seem to be using the same system that the Soviets did.

The blocking units are security forces (primarily, at least) and not combat troops.  They do have to be close to the front, which does expose them to danger (as evidenced in that interview I posted), but only when and where it seems they are needed.  Such enforcers are not expected to take part in combat.  Which means if the enemy advances, they are allowed to withdraw.  Ironic, eh?  Withdrawing the enforcers means they live to murder another day.

5 hours ago, Letter from Prague said:

It just seems so ... needlessly idiotic.

(I am of course in no way disputing that the Russians are doing it - it being needlessly idiotic makes it more likely, not less)

Having military forces that are so unreliable that you have to shoot them to keep them in defensive positions is, absolutely, idiotic.  This is what happens when barbarity is emphasized over brilliance.  Why spend all that money having high quality forces when you can just train a few guys to shoot the other guys if they run away?  Idiotic, indeed, but Russia tried and failed to break with historical tradition because it was too hard and expensive.  Plus, Putin didn't think it would come to this because he did such a great job convincing people Russia was invincible.  And we see how that worked out!

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Various interesting videos:

1.  An example of Russians being kept off kilter in the rear even before getting into frontline positions:

2. Russian support position not far behind the lines.   Note that this is being conducted by a TD brgiade in combo with a long standing artillery brigade.  Importance, again, is that these are NOT the new strike brigades smashing Russian targets in the counter offensive zone, but existing units.

3.  Ukrainian attack helicopters providing some very close in support fire with dumb rockets.  Shows why these things are so damned hard for AD to take out when used in this way:

https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1668808942170910721

 

4.  I don't know what these things were (tank chassis?), but a reminder of how Ukraine likes to use PGMs:

https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1668797483072323584

Steve

 

[kevinkin]

23 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

convincing people Russia was invincible. 

Nuclear blackmail is all Putin (and China) has and it's a better deterrent than any lame minefield he placed on the Ukrainian soil. So in a way Russia is invincible unless the west calls his bluff and ends the war via massive conventional firepower the likes of which we have never seen. Why didn't the US press an ultimatum on Putin months ago? Here we are watching Ukrainians die because we are afraid of going all in conventionally. 

[Battlefront.com]

Various discussions about the tactical situation:

11.  Discussion about the possibility that Russia has committed a big chunk of its ready reserves (though it starts out with a criticism that wasn't completely warranted):

2. Russia might be using artillery more in one sector of the south, but around Bakhmut it looks like Ukraine is closing in on two key settlements north and south of the city.  Berkhivka is particularly important because it is the main Russian supply line to the bulge east of Soledar.  Losing this area would be very bad for Russians holding Soledar and Krasna Hora because they are dominating heights to the east of both.

 

3.  Reports of deep strikes (multiple) in Tokmak, Mykhailiivka (west of Tokmak), Luhansk City, and this one in Krasnodar (Russia logistics point into Crimea):

https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1668490520513900545
 

4.  And a place we should not be surprised to see some Storm Shadows hitting very soon:

Steve

[dan/california]

 

Quote

 

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-13-2023

Putin confirmed that he is signing decrees to pardon convict recruits serving with Russian forces in Ukraine.[65] Putin ludicrously claimed that convict recruits have a recidivism rate of 0.4 percent as compared to the regular recidivism rate of 40 percent.

 

I think Putin's math neglects to mention that most of the recidivism reduction is due the vast percentage of them that wind up KIA. I would say KIA or badly wounded  but I don't think many badly wounded convicts survive, unless they are lucky enough to get captured by the Ukrainians. 

Edit: Today's whole ISW write up is worth your time.

Edited June 14, 2023 by dan/california