How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[poesel]

About APS: the current generation of these systems is there to fight of incoming missiles or even grenades. Would an APS designed to combat incoming drones not be much easier? And why are we not seeing this?

I'm talking about drones that come AT you. That makes detection much easier. The range of that system needn't be that large. I can only guess here, but 20m would be enough to spoil any warhead.

That's a shotgun on a swivel mount paired with a bunch of sensors (acoustic, visual, short range radar).

Am I overlooking something, why we don't see such things?

[hcrof]

32 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Ok, the punchline - it is all connected and can be processed in real time.  Having a bunch of ISR systems in isolation of stovepiped is going to leave lags and gaps.  Having an integrated network all plugged into together gives us what we are seeing in Ukraine - no gaps and near real time, all the time.  Further one cannot simply take out one set of sensors because the others cover off.  “Well food and ammo is still arriving” well yes it is but Ukrainian soldiers are also disembarking and walking in the last 5kms because pushing vehicle too close is very dangerous.  Oryx shows the number of logistics vehicles the RA has lost.

We essentially have an illuminated battlefield right now and it is not going anywhere.  This has pushed forces to spread out and be highly distributed.  Every time a side concentrates forces they are spotted and engaged - we have seen this on both sides repeatedly.  Basically a side needs to either erode or remove an opponents ISR, or someone run out of munitions for anything to work.  Currently tanks are staying back kms and providing indirect fire support or pulling forward for sniping (and often dying doing so).

So I think we will have to disagree on that one. Watching videos of stuff getting blown up in Ukraine makes one think that everything is being watched all at once, and to an extent it is, but how much processing power is required to simultaneously watch thousands of km2 is a level of detail to pick up something within a few minutes? 

At the end of the day it is a numbers game, but if your vehicle is not exposed for very long it is less likely to be picked up until it is too late. And if you have pushed forward your drone bubble to suppress enemy ISR, combined with dazzling satellites and long ranged hits on your expensive long range drones then the enemy is left with a degraded picture of operations which you can exploit. 

And tell me how many tanks and IFVs the Ukrainians have lost from hit and run sniping operations? Enough to stop them from doing it? Hit and run works - speed and suppression of enemy ISR is key. 

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Well first of all using civilian traffic as cover for military operations is unethical and illegal.  Vehicles “getting stealthier” is hand waving.  You are talking about taking a 30 ton mass of metal that runs on small explosions - pushing exhaust out, with a high EM and acoustic signature on top of that. And we are talking ten years from now.  The new tank platoon would be challenged to survive now, let alone in ten more years of ISR development.  Your new tank platoon does not solve for the ISR problem.  It is focused on solving for the drone problem - which frankly I am not seeing either.  Adding “more armour where FPVs hit” is counterintuitive because FPVs can hit anywhere.  That would be why Russian are putting barns over their tanks. Regardless unless your new tank platoon is invisible it is still going to suffer the same issues the current tanks have - easily detectable once they are put into any concentration. 

What I am saying is to you run vehicles in ones and twos on normal roads, not run concentrated convoys. Like what both sides are doing in this war. Are you suggesting that you need to clear all civilian traffic off the roads for hundreds of km behind the front line just because military vehicles also use that space? 

And I used the word swarm a lot for a reason. I said any attack will also be in small dispersed groups with a lot of decoys to provide the same effect. The use of 105mm tanks, mobile mortars, long range ATGMs and drone carriers allows fires to be concentrated, not vehicles. 

And "adding more armour" means redistributing it away from the front arc to make vehicles more resistant to indirect fire and drones while maintaining mobility. Like what the Russians are doing, but in a way that actually works. And the hybrid electric system keeps it cold and quiet until the shooting starts. 

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I have heard this before and it still does not make sense to me.  If you are able to “sanitize” an area large enough and create a bubble able to stop enemy drone swarms, then what so we need tanks or heavy vehicles for?  Simply keep “sanitizing” and pushing this bubble.  Why introduce heavier forces?  Ah yes, choke point and hard points.  But you already have the resolution to find, fix and destroy down to individual ATGM teams and small bird sized UAS…what possible choke point and hard point can still remain with that level of superiority?

Now as you outrun your bubble or it begins to fail you will run directly into an opponents new bubble.  Your tanks will be detected and engaged over the horizon, and denied until you can create another bubble superiority.  So what was the point of the tanks?

Thinking that drones can clear 100% of enemies in an area is magical thinking. And every CM player knows that just an infantry squad with some javelins can wreck an attack. Which is why you need some weapons and sensors to take with you to deal with them. And drone carriers to recreate a drone bubble at the moment your main one collapses. 

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Your new tanks are really just the repackaged old ones.  And do not to appear to really address the environmental shifts that are impacting them. They are still highly visible to this new environment.  They are heavy and hot, even with a new fancy paint job and track configuration. They still need a long heavy logistics tail.  And their range for direct fires is too short.  The only contribution I can see is perhaps as support platforms to keep pushing that bubble but there may be other cheaper ways to deliver this.  I simply do not see you new tank platoon doing any better on an RA minefield problem than what we already have, unless we build an entirely new offensive system able to do a lot of what you are describing, but at that point we really do not need a tank anymore.

You are talking like the new tanks are not the most radical reinvention of the platform since the late 1930s? Like they dont swarm with platoons 20km apart but still providing mutually supportive fires? Like they are not bringing their own air support with them?

And millions of mines across thousands of km of territory is unlikely to be a problem in the opening moves of a future war. We need to solve that problem certainly, but that is a problem for year 2 of a war, not year 1. 

[photon]

35 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

when was the last time two warships had to board each other and cross swords on the quarter deck?

Not, perhaps, at all germaine to our present discussion here, but the story of the USS Borie's battle with U-405 is fantastic. It's about as close to crossed swords as you can get in the era of modern weapons. Morison reports that the crew of the Borie kept the Germans from their flak guns by, among other things, throwing knives and spent 5" shell casings at them and knocking them off of the sub.

[hcrof]

10 minutes ago, poesel said:

About APS: the current generation of these systems is there to fight of incoming missiles or even grenades. Would an APS designed to combat incoming drones not be much easier? And why are we not seeing this?

I'm talking about drones that come AT you. That makes detection much easier. The range of that system needn't be that large. I can only guess here, but 20m would be enough to spoil any warhead.

That's a shotgun on a swivel mount paired with a bunch of sensors (acoustic, visual, short range radar).

Am I overlooking something, why we don't see such things?

I think you can optimise for slow drones or fast missiles, but doing both at the same time across the whole hemisphere of the tank is incredibly complex. Its probably possible, but you would not have much space on the vehicle for anything else! To make it reliable you also need to have your radar switched on which is like shining a giant "shoot me" sign across the battlefield. 

I think APS is a dead end technology - far too much trouble for what it is worth. 

[poesel]

22 minutes ago, hcrof said:

I think APS is a dead end technology - far too much trouble for what it is worth. 

I guess the Ukis would be very, very happy if they could put a 'Shotgun-APS' on every SPG & HIMARS they have, even if that only worked 50% of the time.

Btw: you missed the 'low power radar' part. No point in reaching out for kms if your weapon range is two digit meters.

[Letter from Prague]

A wargame simulated a 2nd Trump presidency. It concluded NATO would collapse.

https://www.businessinsider.com/a-wargame-simulated-a-2nd-trump-presidency-it-found-nato-would-collapse-2024-5

 

 

[FancyCat]

It’s war, there’s tons of underlying information missing from our view. It’s certainly in neither Ukraine’s nor NATO’s view to showcase Ukrainian losses. Without knowing neither the remaining of Russian casualties vs Ukrainian in their advances, it’s hard to say if it’s worth it. And certainly while Russia has been bumbling, we are seeing increased ability, it would be wrong to automatically assume that these attacks are only helping Ukraine to grind down Russia and not vice versa. We do know that artillery rationing has been catastrophically low, as bad as the initial and following period of the invasion, and while Russian artillery is not as bad as its apex, artillery has been the main casualty cause in war in modern times, it’s not hard to reason that attrition has been tough on Ukraine.

[Letter from Prague]

New Perun that is for once very topical

 

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, poesel said:

I guess the Ukis would be very, very happy if they could put a 'Shotgun-APS' on every SPG & HIMARS they have, even if that only worked 50% of the time.

Btw: you missed the 'low power radar' part. No point in reaching out for kms if your weapon range is two digit meters.

A shotgun equivalent of the US Navy's Phalanx seems feasible.  The problem with this is like every other problem with AFVs these days... is there some combination of defensive systems that give a vehicle a reasonable chance of survival while still maintaining its ability to function?  Then the separate question which is it even worth trying to do it?

Steve

[The_Capt]

2 hours ago, hcrof said:

So I think we will have to disagree on that one. Watching videos of stuff getting blown up in Ukraine makes one think that everything is being watched all at once, and to an extent it is, but how much processing power is required to simultaneously watch thousands of km2 is a level of detail to pick up something within a few minutes?

I think this is the crux of the issue right here.  If you do not believe ISR is so ubiquitous that tanks still have space on the modern battlefield then any revisioning starts to make sense.  To my mind the evidence is too large to ignore that this is not the case.  Beyond RUSI and other academic assessments there is the simple fact that we are seeing essentially a deadlock on a frontage over 800km long.  Both sides are employing force-to-space levels unheard of...and yet nothing is able to move.  We should be seeing moves/c-moves and all sorts of manoeuvre given the levels of breathing room...but we are not.  Why?  Well military conservatives tend to fall back on "well Russian and Ukraine simply do not know how" which gets weaker and weaker everyday.

How?  ISR.  I have no idea how much processing power is required but both sides clearly have it, why else would they be unable to concentrate to manoeuvre? They forgot how? Same goes for airpower.  The RuAF is massively overmatching the UAAF yet cannot do much more than lob glide bombs 50+ kms back.  This is modern AD but it has to be plugged into something.

Finally, even if it isn't on the battlefield in this war...what about the next one?  What possible indication do we have that this trend has culminated and we are going to see less ISR on the battlefield of tomorrow?  It is not the steady stream of social media, it is the fact that neither side can move when according to all modern doctrine they should be able to.  While people are arguing over the tank I see the horrible reality that ground warfare (and air to an extent) is broken.

2 hours ago, hcrof said:

What I am saying is to you run vehicles in ones and twos on normal roads, not run concentrated convoys. Like what both sides are doing in this war. Are you suggesting that you need to clear all civilian traffic off the roads for hundreds of km behind the front line just because military vehicles also use that space? 

And I used the word swarm a lot for a reason. I said any attack will also be in small dispersed groups with a lot of decoys to provide the same effect. The use of 105mm tanks, mobile mortars, long range ATGMs and drone carriers allows fires to be concentrated, not vehicles. 

And "adding more armour" means redistributing it away from the front arc to make vehicles more resistant to indirect fire and drones while maintaining mobility. Like what the Russians are doing, but in a way that actually works. And the hybrid electric system keeps it cold and quiet until the shooting starts. 

I am saying you cannot mask military traffic by using civilian shields.  And yes, we might have to clear civilian traffic 100kms back because that is what the enemy can see and hit.

We seem to be agreeing on swarm, but you want to swarm with a multi-million dollar set of platforms.  How long can we sustain a swarm centered on a tank platoon that costs as much as a flight of F35s?  This is basically trying to stuff the tank into a swarming concept because we want tanks, not because we need them.

Again, I am not seeing what these new tanks are adding for the cost. I can get direct and indirect fires via other lighter faster platforms, indirect fires and unmanned already?

So you have a new tank that has "more amor" in different locations and now hybrid electric cold engines pushing a 30ton (how "more armor" and "less weight" works will be interesting).  You have thrown in a statement like "more resistant to indirect fires and drones while maintaining mobility" like it is simply a matter of design.  You are arguing with physics and on the losing end.  A small cheap drone can carry more chemical kinetic power the tank can handle everywhere. But the drone can strike anywhere and apply it to just about any location on the tank, including mines in front of the tank. You are trying to have massive survivability, mobility and low visibility here, and years of tank design have proven one cannot have all these factors maximized at the same time.

Finally, there is firepower.  If I need 105mm worth of HE - that is about 2kgs of HE wrapped in a shell to throw it out 2-3kms (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/105×617mmR) - then why don't I simply stick 2kgs of HE (or shaped HEAT) onto an FPV for a fraction of a fraction of the cost of a quad tracked, transparent hulled, hybrid electric, multi-spectral invisible 30 ton tank with some new amor that can be 50% lighter?  "But a tank gun can throw it at 700 m/s"  Well sure, but for the cost of this next gen F35 tank I can buy and employ a few hundred thousand drones.

2 hours ago, hcrof said:

Thinking that drones can clear 100% of enemies in an area is magical thinking. And every CM player knows that just an infantry squad with some javelins can wreck an attack. Which is why you need some weapons and sensors to take with you to deal with them. And drone carriers to recreate a drone bubble at the moment your main one collapses. 

Hey man, you said "sanitize".  And the threat from ATGM teams is against heavy vehicles, not other ATGM teams and drone swarms.  The easiest way to avoid getting ones tanks hit and "ruining an attack" is to not have tanks as the core of your tactical system. 

2 hours ago, hcrof said:

You are talking like the new tanks are not the most radical reinvention of the platform since the late 1930s? Like they dont swarm with platoons 20km apart but still providing mutually supportive fires? Like they are not bringing their own air support with them?

And millions of mines across thousands of km of territory is unlikely to be a problem in the opening moves of a future war. We need to solve that problem certainly, but that is a problem for year 2 of a war, not year 1. 

Well you clearly think pretty highly of your own idea if I am reading this right, there is that.  I think you have proven that we still need vehicles to carry C2 and support forward as a bubble pushes out.  Where we disagree is that it need to be this "radical reinvention" of what is going to be 1) extremely expensive, 2) a Rube Goldberg level of complexity to maintain (quad tracks...really?") and is 3) likely to be just as slow and visible as any tanks we have right now.  Why can I not put all of what you are proposing on light armor that is much faster and cheaper?  We already saw this in the Kharkiv break out. It was not tanks, it was infantry/SOF in MRAPs.  I want more of that and enough of them that I can sustain losses over time.

Minefields.  Yes, they will be a problem for Year 1, day 1 of the next war.  If Ukraine had several hundred thousand drones that could carry and drop mines on 22 Feb, do you honestly think they would not have used them?  In fact mines are likely to make a major comeback because when plugged into a C4ISR architecture and supported by....everyone say it together...indirect fires, PGMS, infantry and unmanned systems, they work so well that modern breaching doctrine fails and doctrinal force multiplication stops making any sense at all.

You asked for critiques and hole poking, you are getting it.  Your proposed system is really has the appearance of a hammer looking for a nail.  The core assumption that we even need a tank is already been established within your proposal, yet what you are proposing does not address the fundamental issues with that assumption that we are seeing everyday on the battlefield in Ukraine, and every indication we have points to accelerating trends in these directions (ISR, precision, lethality and reach). 

To summarize, your proposal, my critiques are:

- Does not demonstrably show how these new tanks/tank platoon will perform any better than what we already have.  You are far too vague on how mobility-survivability-visibility will be optimized for the future battlefield. It appears you are advocating a "free lunch" concept.  I am not seeing net competitive advantage here against an opponent that can deny terrain with todays technology let alone tomorrows.

- I see some very significant engineering challenges in: armor, engine/power pack and drive trains.  You also are proposing some very complex and advanced ISR and targeting equipment, but I think these are well developed elsewhere so porting them over is likely a lesser concern.

- Tactically, this system does not solve for the Denial Asymmetry we are seeing.  It is waiting for another system to solve that problem so it can then do what it is designed for. Problem is that whatever system can solve for Denial Asymmetry will also likely be able to do what these tanks can, so there is real risk of redundancy.

- It is a very expensive redundancy risk.  An F35 comes in at roughly $83 million per platform.  A modern M1A2 Sep 3 comes in at around $24 million.  What you are proposing will likely be in this league of costs.  And for this we get a 105mm HE gun, a 40mm gun, a drone platform and C-UAS platform that needs a significant C-ISR and C-UAS enterprise to survive, let alone thrive.  To my mind if we can build that C-ISR/C-UAS enterprise we can put this firepower and mobility on much cheaper extant platforms.

- Operational costs will also be very significant.  Maintenance of complex systems such as these will drive a much higher logistics load, at best it will likely be the same as the one we currently have, which we know is too heavy.  Your hybrid electric idea is actually being fielded (https://www.army.mil/article/254124/army_advancing_first_hybrid_electric_bradley) and on a 30 ton chassis.  This will reduce fuel requirements (by 20%) but these are still combustion engines with the heat and sound vulnerabilities.   I would shoot to get logistical burden down to that of an MRAP, at which point this tank platoon becomes competitive. Again though, I am not sure why I need a tank here when this engine on a high mobility light armor vehicle is already in reach.

- Offsets/Risk. An opponent could neutralize this entire system with existing cheap and readily available systems.  ATGMs, indirect fires, UAS/UGV and mines, carrying loads of stand-off EFP and/or smart submunitions are likely going to counter this proposed system at a small fraction of comparative costs. Given the low density of production of this new tank platoon, driven by costs, means an opponent can be wrong many times but our forces can only be wrong a few times, perhaps once. This system would likely be niche and used rarely, much like low density specialized engineering vehicles.  We could find ourselves in a scenario where they are on a critical path but this would not be the norm, nor should it be.

More bluntly put - too expensive, too visible, not enough benefit compared to other systems.  And too reliant on another system (C-ISR/C-UAS complex) to be able to do its job, to the point that the enabling system can likely do its job for it.

Finally, there is one wildcard out there, cyber.  Cyber has been tepid in this war, we know it is happening but neither side has been able to weaponize the domain to the point where enemy ISR is shut down, for example.  If cyber were able to re-set a battlefield by eliminating or highly degrading an opponents C4ISR then traditional manoeuvre could be back on the table.   Of course if we have complete C4ISR superiority, I still do not see why we cannot simply push our own bubbles with impunity but fast manoeuvre with a level of armor could make a re-emergence.  But we would have to see cyber actually perform as advertised - an operational/tactical tool as opposed to strategic shaping tool within conventional warfare.      

Edited May 12 by The_Capt

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

You know it is funny, the military conservative crowd really has basically the same three arguments:

- Ukraine War is an anomaly.  A “real” war with the US will be “different”.

- Someone will figure out this drone/ISR thing and we will be back to where we started.

- We will need to keep doing it the old way because there is no new better way.

And no matter how many times we show the fallacy of this thinking, it comes right back at us as if this debate hasn't already been done before.

It is healthy to question the "tank is dead" premise.  Very healthy.  However, it is very unhealthy to challenge the premise then cease defending the hypothesis when it gets backed into a corner.  It is extremely unhealthy to then subsequently challenge the "tank is dead" premise as if the previous poor showing in debate didn't happen.

But I understand why this is happening.  People love tanks and when they can't figure out a logical and reality based way to justify their existence, leaving the debate stage is really the only solution.

Steve

[The_Capt]

10 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

And no matter how many times we show the fallacy of this thinking, it comes right back at us as if this debate hasn't already been done before.

It is healthy to question the "tank is dead" premise.  Very healthy.  However, it is very unhealthy to challenge the premise then cease defending the hypothesis when it gets backed into a corner.  It is extremely unhealthy to then subsequently challenge the "tank is dead" premise as if the previous poor showing in debate didn't happen.

But I understand why this is happening.  People love tanks and when they can't figure out a logical and reality based way to justify their existence, leaving the debate stage is really the only solution.

Steve

I wish I could say that love of a platform or system is only an amateur wargamers disease.  I have already seen the reflexive signs of the upcoming arguments.  We will dress them up but in reality we have built identities around these platforms/systems.  Asking someone to change a strong identity, one designed to weather war, is a tall order.  We have generations of senior officers who grew up with the tank as the core of the land warfare tactical system.  Hell, we were still counting them as a metric of combat power in the lead up to this thing.  Even now, I think they are still a threat, but more like nukes...if conditions get to the point that they can be employed, this war is already over.  If the UA collapse and we see a ring of steel outside Kharikiv, or if the UA drives tank columns into Crimea, these are not a sign that "tanks work!" They are a symptom of a much larger collapse. A collapse that had little to do with the tank, or even mech itself. 

[Battlefront.com]

13 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

More bluntly put - too expensive, too visible, not enough benefit compared to other systems. 

This.

Since the start of this war we've been having the Tank Is Dead™ debate.  The #1 defense of the tank has been, and continues to be, "there isn't anything to replace the tank, therefore the tank is not dead".  Even at the beginning of this war that was a very weak argument that was mostly countered by "this is not a typical war" and "NATO wouldn't suffer the same deficiencies". 

Since the war has dragged on it's become clearer and clearer that the decimation of Russia's forces in Feb/March 2022 was not completely do to incompetence.  For the last year or so we've seen Russia employing a range of new tactics and equipment to counter the threat from ISR and UAS, and it's not worked in any way we Westerners would accept (i.e. massive losses for little gains).

When one picks apart why Russia's maneuver is failing, it is extremely difficult to blame it solely on things that are unique to Russia.  In fact, the Ukrainians have found that their vastly superior Western AFVs have many of the same limitations and vulnerabilities as the Russian's have and (IMPORTANTLY) for the same reasons.

For sure Ukraine's operating with far fewer resources than the US would have at its disposal, so I have always argued and will always argue that a US led NATO force would do better on this battlefield than either Russia or Ukraine.  But it might not be better enough to matter.

Steve

[hcrof]

So I think we are getting to the limits of this debate - which is good! At the end of the day we don't have a good way of testing out each others assumptions, which are not that far apart. I hope there is some section in the various NATO militaries which are having the same debate but actually have the resources to game it out properly. 

So to comment on your summary:

15 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

To summarize, your proposal, my critiques are:

- Does not demonstrably show how these new tanks/tank platoon will perform any better than what we already have.  You are far too vague on how mobility-survivability-visibility will be optimized for the future battlefield. It appears you are advocating a "free lunch" concept.  I am not seeing net competitive advantage here against an opponent that can deny terrain with todays technology let alone tomorrows.  

On this I will refer to Jack Watlings "Arms of the future". He does not emphasise drones nearly enough (the book might be different if written today), but I do largely agree with his concept of highly distributed operations with deception at its core for ground vehicles. But we agree that drones are everything - I just think the vehicles are also needed to mop up what the drones miss and enable you to get boots on the ground. 

Quote

- I see some very significant engineering challenges in: armor, engine/power pack and drive trains.  You also are proposing some very complex and advanced ISR and targeting equipment, but I think these are well developed elsewhere so porting them over is likely a lesser concern.

I think you overestimate how complex I am going for. I am looking for a state-of-the-art communications and networking system, built around hardware which is unexceptional. You scoff at 4 tracks but farmers have been using them for years - electric motors can easily drive them independently just like a 4WD Prius (or a tractor frankly). The rubber tracks also drastically reduces the maintenance requirements, and are very easy to change since they are so much lighter than regular track. The weapons are all 1970s tech with some modern ammunition. 

Quote

- Tactically, this system does not solve for the Denial Asymmetry we are seeing.  It is waiting for another system to solve that problem so it can then do what it is designed for. Problem is that whatever system can solve for Denial Asymmetry will also likely be able to do what these tanks can, so there is real risk of redundancy. 

I think the denial asymmetry will weaken somewhat with countermeasures such as anti-drone drones and better use of dazzlers on satellites etc. It won't go away to what it was before though, so the big armoured column is dead: distributed operations are king. 

Quote

- It is a very expensive redundancy risk.  An F35 comes in at roughly $83 million per platform.  A modern M1A2 Sep 3 comes in at around $24 million.  What you are proposing will likely be in this league of costs.  And for this we get a 105mm HE gun, a 40mm gun, a drone platform and C-UAS platform that needs a significant C-ISR and C-UAS enterprise to survive, let alone thrive.  To my mind if we can build that C-ISR/C-UAS enterprise we can put this firepower and mobility on much cheaper extant platforms.

- Operational costs will also be very significant.  Maintenance of complex systems such as these will drive a much higher logistics load, at best it will likely be the same as the one we currently have, which we know is too heavy.  Your hybrid electric idea is actually being fielded (https://www.army.mil/article/254124/army_advancing_first_hybrid_electric_bradley) and on a 30 ton chassis.  This will reduce fuel requirements (by 20%) but these are still combustion engines with the heat and sound vulnerabilities.   I would shoot to get logistical burden down to that of an MRAP, at which point this tank platoon becomes competitive. Again though, I am not sure why I need a tank here when this engine on a high mobility light armor vehicle is already in reach.

When you mentioned cost last time, I added a few thoughts to the other thread. If these platforms come in at $24M each then I agree my concept doesn't work. I think we both agree on the need for attritable land systems. 

See above on complexity too. I think all platforms should get simpler, but all-MRAPs limits your cross country options a lot. Getting bogged down while moving is a death sentence. MRAPs can be part of the mix for sure but mostly for reserve formations, but not your peacetime army IMO. 

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- Offsets/Risk. An opponent could neutralize this entire system with existing cheap and readily available systems.  ATGMs, indirect fires, UAS/UGV and mines, carrying loads of stand-off EFP and/or smart submunitions are likely going to counter this proposed system at a small fraction of comparative costs. Given the low density of production of this new tank platoon, driven by costs, means an opponent can be wrong many times but our forces can only be wrong a few times, perhaps once. This system would likely be niche and used rarely, much like low density specialized engineering vehicles.  We could find ourselves in a scenario where they are on a critical path but this would not be the norm, nor should it be.

Noted, but putting all your eggs in one drone-shaped basket also invites risk. I think we need to try and look beyond a "drones beat everything" concept for a few more years yet. We should heavily invest in drones as much or even more than the Ukrainians do, but they are still looking for armoured vehicles as well. 

[pintere]

Much as I hate to be "that guy", word from the Kharkiv front is not good. It seems there is not much in the way of minefields, fortifications and men to defend at all. The attached BBC article interviews a Ukrainian soldier who stated that the Russians had just "walked in".

 https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c72p0xx410xo

A Ukrainian telegram channel (which included a video of Russians marching in column) had this to say:

"Ukrainian defence is apparently not so robust in Kharkiv region after all. Ruzzian infantry is just marching. Our drone operators are also commenting about the poor defence.

I say like it is…

Vovchansk will be occupied very soon "

The impression I get is that, just as the Russians were complacent in Fall 2022 on this front, so too have the Ukrainians been complacent in preparing for the possibility of a serious attack in this area. I hope to be proven wrong, time will tell.

[poesel]

43 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

A shotgun equivalent of the US Navy's Phalanx seems feasible.  The problem with this is like every other problem with AFVs these days... is there some combination of defensive systems that give a vehicle a reasonable chance of survival while still maintaining its ability to function?  Then the separate question which is it even worth trying to do it?

Well, SPGs and rocket launchers have proven their worth in this war and will in the next, too. So protecting them seems worthwhile. At least against the current generation of drones, which can be made by any hobbyist.
But even if the next generation of military grade kamikaze drones are shielded against such a system, it would prevent the hobbyists in the next non-peer war from blowing up your expensive stuff.

What I'm really looking for is a scaled down version of Skynex.

https://www.rheinmetall.com/de/produkte/flugabwehr/flugabwehrsysteme/vernetzte-flugabwehr-skynex

[danfrodo]

7 minutes ago, pintere said:

Much as I hate to be "that guy", word from the Kharkiv front is not good. It seems there is not much in the way of minefields, fortifications and men to defend at all. The attached BBC article interviews a Ukrainian soldier who stated that the Russians had just "walked in".

 https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c72p0xx410xo

A Ukrainian telegram channel (which included a video of Russians marching in column) had this to say:

"Ukrainian defence is apparently not so robust in Kharkiv region after all. Ruzzian infantry is just marching. Our drone operators are also commenting about the poor defence.

I say like it is…

Vovchansk will be occupied very soon "

The impression I get is that, just as the Russians were complacent in Fall 2022 on this front, so too have the Ukrainians been complacent in preparing for the possibility of a serious attack in this area. I hope to be proven wrong, time will tell.

I sure hope it's not this bad, pintere, but maybe it is.  I am worried about how much territory RU will get and which UKR will have to fight to get back.  Maybe the main defense lines are farther back, but we'll see over the next week I guess.

[Battlefront.com]

13 minutes ago, poesel said:

Well, SPGs and rocket launchers have proven their worth in this war and will in the next, too. So protecting them seems worthwhile. At least against the current generation of drones, which can be made by any hobbyist.
But even if the next generation of military grade kamikaze drones are shielded against such a system, it would prevent the hobbyists in the next non-peer war from blowing up your expensive stuff.

What I'm really looking for is a scaled down version of Skynex.

https://www.rheinmetall.com/de/produkte/flugabwehr/flugabwehrsysteme/vernetzte-flugabwehr-skynex

This gets to the question of how to spend a nation's limited resources.  Choices have to be made and I think most of us here would agree that if you had to keep one system and cut another to free up resources, highly mobile artillery would be kept and tanks would be cut. 

There's so many arguments to support this choice it's not worth listing them out, but one of them is that it's a lot easier to pamper a few hundred systems than it is thousands of systems.  Another one is that the nature of artillery is that it operates far from the front, providing space, time, and area to degrade enemy drone activities whereas a tanks must be close to the front to be effective.

So on and so forth.

Note that my previous criticism of Skynex type systems is that they are supposed to protect large volumes of space.  I don't see that as being practical, especially against swarms.  But a small system designed to protect a single vehicle is far more practical (though swarms are still a major problem).

Steve

[kimbosbread]

I agree with the sentiment that APS is really hard, especially against a variety of threats (fast moving missiles, vs slow drones, or combinations of drones), and that it is likely to be too expensive to be economical.

Shotgun phalanx, that might be doable though, but I doubt it would cost less than $100k per unit. You need a little turret, you need something like a belt fed shotgun, you need sensors, you need software to detect the target.

[Battlefront.com]

19 minutes ago, pintere said:

Much as I hate to be "that guy", word from the Kharkiv front is not good. It seems there is not much in the way of minefields, fortifications and men to defend at all. The attached BBC article interviews a Ukrainian soldier who stated that the Russians had just "walked in".

 https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c72p0xx410xo

A Ukrainian telegram channel (which included a video of Russians marching in column) had this to say:

"Ukrainian defence is apparently not so robust in Kharkiv region after all. Ruzzian infantry is just marching. Our drone operators are also commenting about the poor defence.

I say like it is…

Vovchansk will be occupied very soon "

The impression I get is that, just as the Russians were complacent in Fall 2022 on this front, so too have the Ukrainians been complacent in preparing for the possibility of a serious attack in this area. I hope to be proven wrong, time will tell.

I am hoping this is similar to what we saw after Avdiivka fell where Ukrainian defenses were criticized as being under developed, but the Russians never-the-less had great difficulty advancing.

I think it's pretty clear that the defenses along the Ukrainian border have not been the focus of resources since late 2022.  Russia is definitely exploiting this fact.  How much they can gain from it, however, is unknown.  They very well might get a 10km buffer before being ground to a halt.

Steve

[chris talpas]

3 hours ago, hcrof said:

So I think we will have to disagree on that one. Watching videos of stuff getting blown up in Ukraine makes one think that everything is being watched all at once, and to an extent it is, but how much processing power is required to simultaneously watch thousands of km2 is a level of detail to pick up something within a few minutes? 

For some perspective on this consider this 10-15 year old technology that could track all vehicles and even people in a 36 sq mile (93 km2).  With increased computer power that  the passage of time brings, and dropping the resolution to pick up vehicle sized objects rather than people, this might not be insurmountable.

https://www.pbs.org/video/nova-drones-excerpt-1/

For those geographically restricted, here is a Wikipedia article about it:

https://w.wiki/A4GV

[kimbosbread]

14 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

This gets to the question of how to spend a nation's limited resources.  Choices have to be made and I think most of us here would agree that if you had to keep one system and cut another to free up resources, highly mobile artillery would be kept and tanks would be cut. 

Yeah, we gotta be realistic about what works, and what is delivering kills per total $ (inclusive training, logistics, medical issues due noise, blasts etc) while not being killed.

Dismounted infantry is definitely still in. Stick them in powered armor and combine with UGVs, and we have something that pack a lot of boom while being hard to kill en masse, and that can dig in.

Consolation for the tanks- mortars are may also be obsoleted in favor of more precise, longer ranged and more flexible weaponry.

[acrashb]

2 hours ago, Letter from Prague said:

A wargame simulated a 2nd Trump presidency. It concluded NATO would collapse.

https://www.businessinsider.com/a-wargame-simulated-a-2nd-trump-presidency-it-found-nato-would-collapse-2024-5

 

 

So how would you get Europe to spend more on its own defence in its own backyard, given that Europe taken as a whole has the world's second largest economy in nominal terms?

[The_Capt]

31 minutes ago, hcrof said:

So I think we are getting to the limits of this debate - which is good! At the end of the day we don't have a good way of testing out each others assumptions, which are not that far apart. I hope there is some section in the various NATO militaries which are having the same debate but actually have the resources to game it out properly. 

So to comment on your summary:

On this I will refer to Jack Watlings "Arms of the future". He does not emphasise drones nearly enough (the book might be different if written today), but I do largely agree with his concept of highly distributed operations with deception at its core for ground vehicles. But we agree that drones are everything - I just think the vehicles are also needed to mop up what the drones miss and enable you to get boots on the ground. 

I think you overestimate how complex I am going for. I am looking for a state-of-the-art communications and networking system, built around hardware which is unexceptional. You scoff at 4 tracks but farmers have been using them for years - electric motors can easily drive them independently just like a 4WD Prius (or a tractor frankly). The rubber tracks also drastically reduces the maintenance requirements, and are very easy to change since they are so much lighter than regular track. The weapons are all 1970s tech with some modern ammunition. 

I think the denial asymmetry will weaken somewhat with countermeasures such as anti-drone drones and better use of dazzlers on satellites etc. It won't go away to what it was before though, so the big armoured column is dead: distributed operations are king. 

When you mentioned cost last time, I added a few thoughts to the other thread. If these platforms come in at $24M each then I agree my concept doesn't work. I think we both agree on the need for attritable land systems. 

See above on complexity too. I think all platforms should get simpler, but all-MRAPs limits your cross country options a lot. Getting bogged down while moving is a death sentence. MRAPs can be part of the mix for sure but mostly for reserve formations, but not your peacetime army IMO. 

Noted, but putting all your eggs in one drone-shaped basket also invites risk. I think we need to try and look beyond a "drones beat everything" concept for a few more years yet. We should heavily invest in drones as much or even more than the Ukrainians do, but they are still looking for armoured vehicles as well. 

Well we can agree or at least agree to disagree in some places.  I am still not sure how you can get this new tank platoon down in costs so that it matches what we can do with light wheeled armor.  Tracks to give better cross country mobility but they always come at a significant maint and vulnerability costs of their own.  [Aside the quad tracks are a proven technology but they simply look and feel too fussy and too many points of failure for modern warfare to my eyes].

I did highlight that last para of yours.  I cannot stress how this is not all about drones or a drone basket.  Anymore than your proposal is "all about tanks."  It is about a land warfare tactical and operational systems.  And what we put at the core of that system.  I am arguing that it is tactically - light infantry, indirect fires, PGMs of all shapes and sizes and unmanned systems (surface and above surface). Operationally it is all about C4ISR and Air Denial.  Drones are a main component but cannot be the only component.  This is a new all arms team that has already demonstrated utility in this war.  The question is, can it carry it the rest of the way?

I think the need for armored vehicles is the anomaly, not a sign of a continuing trend.  Infantry need transport and protected transport, this much is true.  And we still see instances of direct fire support.  But looking forward, how fire support is provided is likely to change. PGM means infantry can clear a bunker without a tank gun. They can suppress with combination from the new arms team. 

This is an evolution toward something and we will see c-measures and c-c-measures introduced, but the fundamental truth is that miniaturization, processing power-to-weight, materials and data networking are all reshaping the battlefield. We will not go backwards from here. Large, heavy and expensive are endangered species in this war, they may very well be extinct for the next one - the Age of Needles has already begun.

I honestly think we need to start thinking about ground warfare in terms of naval warfare evolution.  And here is the thing, it looks like naval warfare needs to evolve too.  So maybe it is new naval warfare thinking.  Regardless, we shall just have to wait and see where this all lands in the end.  I have zero doubts that the military industrial complex will try and sell exactly what you are proposing, and western militaries will likely convince governments to pay for it.  But it won't work and eventually we will see the tank take its ranks in the museum - it is just the nature of things in warfare.

[Probus]

You guys are really starting to give me SkyNet vibes with all this talk about automated dronessss.