How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Centurian52]

2 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

From where?  That number sounds high.  Ukraine says 450k

https://kyivindependent.com/ukraine-war-latest-ukraine-to-focus-on-domestic-arms-production-in-2024/

I am inclined to believe them over Putin.

I'll have to dig around to see where I got that from. I was sure Ukrainian intelligence had corroborated the 600k figure. But if their statements are actually that it's closer to 450k then that's more likely to be correct.

[JonS]

22 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

"Whipped" = losers?    unemployed?

The original - бичи - is slang for the lowest class/caste of people so yes: 'losers' is a reasonable translation

Which is an "interesting" way for a mayor to talk about his own citizens

Edited February 15 by JonS

[Grigb]

17 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

"Whipped" = losers? unemployed?

The kind of total loser who is unable to cope with life often due to various health conditions. 

[Offshoot]

19 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

"Whipped" = losers? unemployed?

Looking at my dictionary it is more like scourges (pests/nuisances).

[Grigb]

41 minutes ago, Kraft said:

This is not generally true, I know mobiks who returned out of combat service and not because they are missing a leg.

Mobilized are not allowed to return. They will serve until the end of SMO (or death). Mobiks you are talking about most likely were not mobiks at all - certain contract soldiers and zeks had loopholes that allowed them to return. That loophole was closed some time ago (mobiks never had it).

Quote

Infamous RU military reporter Sladokov

Everyone is fighting till SMO is over. A number of families have asked me for my opinion on this situation. What should I say? I asked the President of Russia this question (demobilization and, if feasible, rotation of fighting units [out of warzone] and their return to their regular bases) during his most recent meeting with media. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief responded that a decision had been reached that mobilized will participate till conclusion of the SMO.

 

Currently, RU is sending even injured and crippled people to the warzone

Quote

Wounded soldiers began to be returned to the front without the permission of doctors

The [News] Agency learned that in Russia injured soldiers are often sent into battle zones without the military medical commission's (VVC) approval. Military personal are being returned to the front lines with shrapnel in their limbs and shot up lungs.

 

[Grigb]

25 minutes ago, Offshoot said:

Looking at my dictionary it is more like scourges (pests/nuisances).

That is the official meaning of the word. Total loser meaning is an old (soviet era) un-official meaning (the RU guy is old). 

[The_Capt]

58 minutes ago, Centurian52 said:

I'll have to dig around to see where I got that from. I was sure Ukrainian intelligence had corroborated the 600k figure. But if their statements are actually that it's closer to 450k then that's more likely to be correct.

Looks like a big number but at 450k along an 800 km front we are talking about 560 troops per km.  Of those half are likely combat the rest support and logistics tail (there were complaints about the UA being 10:1 - 1:1 in the RA is generous), so about 280, may 300.  Which matches some other estimates.  That is not a lot when one takes into account depth and rotations (or maybe the RA does not rotate).  Of course some terrain is impassable (lakes and rivers) but to create any mass the RA has to rob from somewhere - parts of that line has to be really thin.  And grinding losses are not helping.

[FancyCat]

Gah, imagine being Taiwan or South Korea or Japan or Vietnam and watching this absolute ****show. Or Europe. How the hell can any state that relies on American military deterrent be pleased that the Arsenal of Democracy is apparently slumbering?

Shameful. We have thousands of Bradleys piled in storage and we have sent according to wiki, about 200? It was acceptable to say at the beginning, "Ukraine needs to get the logistical pipeline set up" before shipping more, what the hell is the excuse now? This is bull****, expecting Ukraine to conduct offensives with what is virtually hand me downs and a sprinkling of equipment. (Sure, sure artillery shells)(humbug)

How is Taiwan supposed to be feeling good about facing the world's manufacturing giant and then comparing to this? This was supposed to be America's time to shine, to illustrate that time is indeed on our side, instead Xi and Putin are gambling time is on their side and our inability is costing the lives of Ukrainians.

[Rokko]

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

I think what is missing from your theory is the issue of actual UA losses.  As you note, the 110th has remained at Adiivka for  "1.5yrs of war and 4 months of sustained assaults." before they need to be reinforced or rotated out.  While at the same time, RA units on almost continual rotations would suggest very skewed lass ratios in UAs favour.

Without a real sense of Ukrainian losses it is very hard to make a force generation assessment.  And then there is a the qualitative aspect - something also missing from your theory.  Russia might be able to take 20k civilians and stick old rifles in their hands, but these are not trained infantry.  We do know that European and Western run Force generation continues and they are focused on solid basic infantry training.  So if the UA is producing 5k trained infantry, while the RA is pushing out 20k meat waves, we are back to losses and who those losses are made up of.

Well, we don't really know whether they needed to be rotated only at the time that they were. My hunch is, they were kept on the line well beyond the point of diminishing returns (of continued deployment), basically until the point of virtual destruction, which has all kinds of negative implications for later reconstituting that unit. Loss rates may be highly in favour of UKR, but from the way they seem to be deploying and relocating their brigades (and particularly, which brigades) I think we can gather that UKR seems to be unable to adequately replace these losses, regardless of how high they are.

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

I do not think we are in a position to be able to definitively point at either theory as right or wrong at this point.  What is odd is that even as the UA are running out of artillery, the RA has not suddenly made great advances at lower costs.  Now if the RA assembles a real manoeuvre formation and manages to punch through the UA line we could start making some deductions.  But last I heard, the UA can plant mines too.

At this point, maybe even the Russians are not betting on an operational level breakthrough, anymore. I think they likely have settled for a slow grind through Donbas on a 2-4 year time schedule while grinding their social underclass into red paste (a win-win from their view, I bet) sort of deal. At least currently, it looks to me like this might work out for them, especially if UKR can't keep up with replacing their own losses. Whether this gains them anything of value in the long run is a different question, entirely, of course. And yes, obviously, we also don't know for how long RU can keep this level of recruitment going.

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

That's because they don't.  They threw everything they had into the summer offensive.

This is most likely true, unfortunately. Which makes me scratch my head even harder that people keep arguing that keeping grinding forward all summer and fall was a good idea. It seems like this Summer offensive only brought the worst of all possible outcomes for UKR: Squandered reserves, stockpiles and winding down Western support. At the least they could be sitting on a comfy stockpile of DPICM, GMLRS and so forth and two corps (probably more like divisions) worth of somewhat uncommited troops to fight for whichever fortified Donbas town RU decides to bash agains next.

I guess the only upside is that UKR is at least not totally screwed as long as China keeps up its military assistence in the form of selling them cheap plastic RC toy helicopters.

[Grigb]

For the size of the RU grouping, I would take the December CIT estimate of 550 000 soldiers. This figure is fairly large since it includes up to 200 000 soldiers who are not badly wounded. They are not allowed to leave the warzone for recuperation or even for medical discharge and are forced to return to frontlines as soon as possible. Here's the story of a RU soldier who lost three fingers on his right hand and received a temporary unable to serve certificate. He is currently being brought back to the combat area.

[Beleg85]

Good summary from Tatariagmi.

Judging by various accounts aggregated here and there, it seems to be one of first Russian successes in coordinating airstrikes with infantry assaults. FABs were flying naturally before, in Severdonietsk, Soledar etc. but this time they indeed report of great concentration of hits by this type of weapon, supported by near-constant presence of Russian drones over city. Relatively crude tactics, but effective over time- muscovites definitelly were able to concentrate a lot of resources here.

[JonS]

24 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

t the Arsenal of Democracy is apparently slumbering

It's not slumbering.

It's swallowing fistsfull of pentobarbital, and washing them down with vodka.

[Battlefront.com]

15 minutes ago, Rokko said:

This is most likely true, unfortunately. Which makes me scratch my head even harder that people keep arguing that keeping grinding forward all summer and fall was a good idea. It seems like this Summer offensive only brought the worst of all possible outcomes for UKR: Squandered reserves, stockpiles and winding down Western support. At the least they could be sitting on a comfy stockpile of DPICM, GMLRS and so forth and two corps (probably more like divisions) worth of somewhat uncommited troops to fight for whichever fortified Donbas town RU decides to bash agains next.

I don't mean to be snide here, but this is the typical "let's only examine one half of a complex situation and presume the other half isn't relevant".  Some randomly ordered questions to show what I mean:

1.  How much combat power did Russia lose as a result of the counter offensive and what would it be doing with it now if it hadn't been lost?

2.  Would the Ukrainian population have accepted sitting around for a year on the defensive?

3.  If the Russians launched even larger counter attacks (see #1 above), would faith in Ukraine's ability to survive be better or worse?

4.  Would Western support have been as strong in 2023 if Ukraine said it wasn't going to do anything but sit in trenches?  Because your point assumes it would have been exactly the same.

5.  How close did Russia come to a local collapse?  The closer it came the more sensible the effort was.

6.  Would Wagner have launched the mutiny?  Would it still be intact?  If so, would that be good for Ukraine?

There's lots of questions like this, but it boils down to pointing out that it's not simple.  That and hindsight isn't really helpful because it's already happened.

Personally, I think Ukraine had to try something big in 2023.  I thought that in late 2022 and still do.  Whether the particular offensive they chose (which was the logical one) was the correct one or not, that's up for question.  Whether they should have called off the counter offensive sooner or not is also a question, which hinges heavily on #5 above.

15 minutes ago, Rokko said:

I guess the only upside is that UKR is at least not totally screwed as long as China keeps up its military assistence in the form of selling them cheap plastic RC toy helicopters.

There's far more upsides than this.  You just have to be willing to look past the disappointment to see them.

Steve

[Vanir Ausf B]

15 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Good summary from Tatariagmi.

Thanks! Interesting tidbit from Tatariagmi re: casualties in urban fighting.

Quote

4/ The situation improved for Russians upon entering the city in January, infiltrating residential areas with an element of surprise, seizing rear positions. Casualty ratios tend to equalize in urban areas.

https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1758206754767200691

 

[Beleg85]

1 minute ago, Vanir Ausf B said:

Thanks! Interesting tidbit from Tatariagmi re: casualties in urban fighting.

 

Yes, but this was probably just a generally remark in this context; casualty ratios in this war seems to be highly depending on operational and even strategic situation, like ammo supply. Troubling is also state of next Ukrainan defensive line; there were some Ukrainian journalists claiming in recent weeks that it's barely finished, qualitively much worse than main one and they started to reinforce it only lately.

After such effort it is unlikely Russians will soon push forward deeply in this place (they would probably prefer to move forces to other areas) but constant pressure due to political will cannot be excluded either. It's not tragedy in strategic sense, but AFU lost valuable defensive position without doubt. At least, unlike Bakhmut, it is clear why they hold to it so dodgedly.

[cesmonkey]

 

[cesmonkey]

3 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Heh... didn't take long for some GOP members to realize the "national security threat" statement by Turner was intended to tip the balance towards Ukraine funding:

https://thehill.com/homenews/house/4470100-turner-accused-of-reckless-disregard-as-gop-colleague-asks-for-formal-inquiry/

Steve

The intelligence chair defends himself:
 

 

[Grigb]

4 minutes ago, Vanir Ausf B said:

Thanks! Interesting tidbit from Tatariagmi re: casualties in urban fighting.

https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1758206754767200691

 

This particular quote: Casualty ratios tend to equalize in urban areas is highly suspicious. It is an exact quote from a less well-known RU military reporter aka propagandist. The RU military reporter used the phrase to cheer up his viewers after admitting that prior fighting outside of urban areas resulted in a 1:10 loss ratio in favor of UKR. So, basically, Tatarigami simply repeats somebody else opinion without sufficient diligence.

Now, could it be true? Well, it depends. "Residential areas" that RU used to breach UKR lines are not urban areas. They are all village-type areas. Look at the map

They breached the village-type area. But they were significantly slowed down in semi-urban areas, so they preferred to advance on to an open area instead. They have not reached real urban area and they failed miserable attacking Koksohim. 

So, proper way would be - in terrain not favorable for infantry infiltration (be it open fields or any terrain sufficiently prepared and manned against infiltration for a prolonged period of time) RU tactics of meat assaults mostly fail. In terrain favorable for infantry infiltration, they mostly succeed given enough time, bodies and glide bombs. 

Since Avdiivka is Putin order the local RU command gets priority in receiving bodies and glide bombs. Hence the success after several months of miserable failures.

[Maciej Zwolinski]

45 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

The suicide drone approach is much more reliable, smaller, easier to move on land and hide it, faster, networkable and can be expanded...?

Torpedo is of course the original suicide drone so all of the above characteristics could apply to it if someone takes the effort of designing a modern autonomous torpedo. The thing which would differentiate it from the off-the-shelf or even obsolete designs is the distance over which it is autonomous - a few miles, 50 miles or the entire run from your shore to the target at sea or enemy harbour. I referred to the soviet 650 type because it is already available and requires only the delivery vehicle to be built around it which does not have all the complexities of a manned submarine.

It is only worth the bother because going under the water which is a gamechanger. Once you are restricted to using sound as the main medium of detection everything becomes several orders of magnitude more difficult. Detection, defence, staying afloat after below-the-waterline or under-the-keel explosion. ASW is really a different kettle of fish. And to work, it requires a system. Which I bet the Russians let rot after the end of the Cold War. They would have to rebuild it, it is enormously costly and difficult to operate - one more strain on the Russian war economy/society. Or they would have to take submarine drone/autonomous long range torpedo attacks entirely on the chin, per 1916-1917 unrestricted submarine  or 1940 Atlantic War without even a hope for developing a better defence. Frankly, if the Ukrainians develop submarine attack drones I expect Russians just to put the Black Sea Fleet and all RUS civilian shipping in dry storage.

[Kinophile]

@Maciej Zwolinskigood point ref Rus letting ASW rot away. Definitely a possible operational and tactical weakness there. 

[Kinophile]

 

Hoping it's true. Avdiivka will fall shortly, buit it seems ZSU will manage the withdrawal decently. I hope. 

But there's another potential Rus offensive near Robotyne. Enough fires and eventually you run out of firemen... 

[Rokko]

I'd like to a bunch of back-of-the-envelope calculations and present them here for "public scrutiny". Lately I have been fascinated by this data set on confirmed RU KIA. Sadly, I can't embed the individual interactive plots, so I'll just use a screenshot or two, but I'd encourage everyone to take a look for themselves. Especially the breakdowns by branch of service and by time are really interesting.

So these people have been collectively gathering data on at least 43,460 killed RU soldiers from all branches (including PMCs and convicts), sampling from a variety of sources, ranging from social-media obituaries to on-site graveyard visits. I am not sure, if this data set includes L/DNR KIA figures or not, but it seems likely to me, since I found a couple of individual records of KIA high ranking officers that fought in (former) L/DNR formations. Now the total figure is obviously too low and one must also keep in mind that the degree of inaccuracy in the weekly KIA figures may also vary, but I think it is not totally unreasonable to assume a factor of roughly 7.2 for total casualties, overall (x3 for WIA/MIA, x2.4 for unreported losses). Note, the site makes a convincing argument, putting the probable WIA:KIA ratio in a range between 1.4:1 and 4:1. Using a 3:1 ratio would put the total figure at around 315,000, which matches with the CIA estimated as stated on this site (I didn't double check this figure or how recent it is). The UKR MOD currently claims just short of 400k for total personnel losses, btw.
Below the figure I am referencing here it says that only for 34,388 out of the total of 43,460 KIA (~79%) the exact date of death is known. I take that to mean the remainder is not included in this figure and, assuming an even distribution of these cases, will include a factor of ~1.26 in all subsequent calculations, i.e., x3.033 for probable KIA and x9.099 for probable total casualties, based on the number of (date) confirmed KIA.

 

If we now look, for example, at the weekly breakdown of all recorded KIA for the duration of the summer/fall 2023 offensive (roughly 01/06 through 4/10, or 18 weeks) we come up with a total of 5,591 confirmed KIA, with the intensity of the fighting seemingly steadily declining after June. So a probable total KIA count for this timeframe would be around 17,000 and 50,900 probable total casualties. On average and per week, this is 310 confirmed KIA, 940 probable KIA and 2,820 probable total casualties. These weekly averages are much lower, by a factor of ~2, than those during the two bloodiest months of the war (01/23 and 02/23) and lower by a factor of ~1.2 than weekly RU losses in 10/23 (right after cessation of the offensive, when the assault on Avdiivka began). Between 29/12/22 and 01/03/23 (9 weeks), which is somewhat arbitrary but roughly coincides with the deadliest fighting for Bakhmut and Vuhledar, the Russians suffered a total of 5,878 KIA, 17,800 probable KIA and 53,500 probable total casualties. On average and per week, this amounts to 653 confirmed KIA, 2000 probable KIA and 5,900 probable total casualties.

I am not totally sure what to make of these figures, maybe others can gather meaningful insight from them, though. I really hope I didn't miscalculate anything. If I did, please correct me. To me, they seem to underline that, considering a RU replacement rate of about 20k per month or 5,000 per week (although we don't know since when and for how long this rate has held or will hold), a strategy focused on personnel attrition is probably not a viable option. Not that anyone would have made that claim. Even in their worst time, this replacement rate would have been almost sufficient to absorb their casualties (at 5,900 weekly casualties only 84.5% over a period of 9 weeks). There are some further caveats to that, I think: Before the fall 2022 mobilization and through early 2023, the RU replacement rate seems to have been much more inadequate before they managed to reach the current high levels, that allow them to absorb even absurdly high casualty rates. So there would have been a serious backlog of unreplaced losses, that would only slowly have been filled by that time. This might serve to explain the RU unwilligness to demobilize (or even just rotate) the fall 2022 mobiks and to just keep them for the duration. These figures also seem to indicate that the 2023 summer/fall offensive was probably never adequate at inflicting debilitating losses to the Russians, at least from a global perspective. How serious these losses affected RU troops locally can not really be concluded from this, although my gut feeling tells me that it probably never got all that serious for them, given that they managed to absorb roughly the same number of casualties in half the time during the winter (while on the offensive).

Edited February 15 by Rokko

[Vanir Ausf B]

1 hour ago, Grigb said:

This particular quote: Casualty ratios tend to equalize in urban areas is highly suspicious. It is an exact quote from a less well-known RU military reporter aka propagandist. The RU military reporter used the phrase to cheer up his viewers after admitting that prior fighting outside of urban areas resulted in a 1:10 loss ratio in favor of UKR. So, basically, Tatarigami simply repeats somebody else opinion without sufficient diligence.

It was also the subject of a lengthy debate in this thread last week. Apparently the notion of urban combat equalizing casualties ratios is not unique to Russian propagandists.

 

[chuckdyke]

To mention this was unthinkable a generation ago. More and more people are thinking about this. EU as the fascists Russia and the US like WW2 the alliance against it. Real or imagined fascists doesn't matter.

 

Edited February 16 by chuckdyke

[Kinophile]

https://www.kyivpost.com/post/28112

‘Dead’ Black Sea Fleet Commander Reportedly Sacked After Latest Naval Loss