How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, JonS said:

So, coming at this from an artillery perspective, it's apparent that 'mass' means different things to different people.

That's for sure.  I'm using it in the more traditional sense of numbers and generalized firepower.  Russia was superior in all aspects of both when this war started.  What Ukraine quickly showed us is that it had superiority of directing what firepower it had in a disproportionally effective way.  While Russia fired of 10,000 rounds into farmer Yuri's empty field, Ukraine was pumping well directed rounds right on top of concentrated Russian armored formations. 

And this is where we get into legitimate questions about mass as it was in 2022.  If all that Russian firepower had been handled competently (i.e. batteries not firing their rounds into an empty field and saying "we hit all our targets" then Russian forces moving forward to get mauled) I'm not sure Ukraine would have been able to keep things together.  Because at the same time it was running very low on ammo and in some areas manpower.  Thankfully, Russian traditional mass was poorly applied and Ukraine's dispersed mass (largely) was applied very well.

The Summer of 2022 started out with Russia on the attack and taking territory, but doing so in a way that was unsustainable.  Again, how much of this was due to gross incompetence and structural defects vs. how much of it was a cunning Ukraine using massed fires more effectively (thanks to ISR, better artillery doctrine, and increasingly Western artillery)? 

Kharkiv is another example of the difficulty in determining mass' capabilities.  Specifically, Russia incompetently wasted its forces in moronic and meaningless attacks to such an extent that it had to drain forces opposite Kharkiv.  This allowed Ukraine to have superiority of all forms of mass, which it used very effectively until it ran out of fresh forces to keep the counter offensive going.

Kherson was a precursor to what we saw in the winter and into the Summer of 2023.  Which is that a well prepared defender with sufficient mass can hold out for quite a long time against a well resourced attacker.  Russia lost this battle because it had exhausted itself strategically and operationally (in large part thanks to the Dnepr).

And now we have what appears to be defensive primacy where defensive mass (fires, mines, ISR, etc.) is sufficient on both sides to thwart the other side's offensive capacity.  On a positive note, I think, is that Russia's chosen strategy is still offensive biased, which is leading to large scale losses that are not militarily justifiable or sustainable.  It will be interesting to see how long they can keep it up before they are obligated to go fully defensive (i.e. partial collapse).  Providing Russia's strategy of drowning Ukraine in blood doesn't cause Ukraine to accept a peace deal first.

Steve

[Carolus]

Quite unfortunate. Faulty insulation is one of the most common causes of accidental electric fires. 

 

[JonS]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Kherson was a precursor to what we saw in the winter and into the Summer of 2023.  Which is that a well prepared defender with sufficient mass can hold out for quite a long time against a well resourced attacker.  Russia lost this battle because it had exhausted itself strategically and operationally (in large part thanks to the Dnepr).

Curiously, though, AIUI Russia has ended 2023 occupying several hundred more square kilometres than they did at the start. Which is a terrible ROI. But still - they went forward in 2023, not backward.

[Zeleban]

A new blockade of Ukraine, despite the fact that the Polish government agreed to the demands of the protesters. This is very similar to the blockade of Ukrainian aid in the US House of Representatives. As soon as the government agrees to previous demands, new demands will be put forward and the blockade will continue

[mosuri]

The gnome from hell threatens Chechen dissidents' relatives with government-executed vendetta (google translated article in the link):

https://www-hs-fi.translate.goog/ulkomaat/art-2000010094965.html?_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en&_x_tr_pto=wapp&_x_tr_hist=true

Seems like symptoms of a shaky throne to me, though I don't know how regular such threats are over there.

[Butschi]

11 hours ago, kimbosbread said:

The killer application for LLMs is the man-machine interface between increasingly complex systems. If you can order your loitering munitions and UGVs the same way you can other soldiers, and they can communicate back to you, that simplifies a lot of things. Imagine simplifying the targetting for a NLOS weapon: I hear there are some tanks on a road 10km north of here. Go kill them.

The nifty thing about this class of models is not precisely "just" natural language processing (which in itself is awesome, remember the chat bots we used to have just two years ago?). What really makes them interesting is that you don't train them to do a specific job like you usually do in machine learning.

It just trains to predict the next word  and from there it can be used to do many things by just giving it the proper prompts. Train it alongside some image processing model (such that it learns to associate images with words) and you can easily make an image classifier out of it by basically telling it "I give you an image of a human face and you tell me if the human is laughing, crying, etc."

Probably doesn't sound very dramatic to the uninitiated but normally you would train a model specifically to do just that (and then it can't really do anything else). Here, same model, just a different prompt and you predict whether a car is going to turn left or right (given, of course, that the corresponding examples were in the database). And so on.

 

[The_Capt]

9 hours ago, JonS said:

So, coming at this from an artillery perspective, it's apparent that 'mass' means different things to different people. A lot of  folks think of mass as something like the Old Guard forming up in columns trying to smash through the heights behind La Haye Sainte in the early evening of 18 June 1815 (which failed), or the tanks of VIII Corps trying to smash past Caen on 18 July 1944 (which kinda sorta worked). Which, sure, that is mass. But that kind of raw and naive mass has been increasingly unreliable for centuries.

The inexorable trend over the centuries has been for units to fight more and more dispersed - the current concentrations in the Ukraine would have been unthinkably thin in 1943.

As time has passed soldiers and their kit at the front line became more dispersed while at the same time firepower and other effects are becoming more concentrated - or massed - in both time and space. This trend is very obvious with artillery once indirect fire became the norm. The fire from of dozens and eventually hundreds of guns spread out over dozens or hundreds of square kilometres could be massed into a single area at about the same time, first winning WWI and then critically influencing the way WWII was fought. Note that this isn't strictly a function of range - the Paris gun had an absurdly long range, but didn't really affect the course of WWI. That said, increasing range definitely drove dispersion.

The ultimate (so far) development of massing effects is PGM (incl ATGM). In some ways that sort of seems counter intuitive - how can less guns/rounds = more mass? - but it really isn't. The effect you want can now be concentrated, or massed, at exactly where you want (to within a metre or two), exactly when you want it (to within a few seconds).

On a graph over time you get two crossing lines; massing of manpower and equipment is falling fast, while massing of effects is rising about as fast.

 

tl;dr: you should be skeptical of massed manpower and equipment. It's been dying for a long time. No pun intended.

 

Its is almost like:

Mass beats isolation, precision beats mass, massed precision beats everything.

If only someone had written that down somewhere…

[holoween]

On 1/2/2024 at 6:42 PM, The_Capt said:

I think the issue is that people equate military ground vehicles to cars.  This is not the case. They are closer to aircraft in complexity and sustainment.  An FCS tech takes years to train to be able to keep the gun components in motion.  We had a Leo crewman here and he pointed out that in Germany the entire system is designed around "plug and play".  Pull out the broken part and slam in a new one.  Well that works...in Germany...in peacetime.  After a year of fighting Germany is likely reaching into war stocks for some parts.  As an example, we had exactly two extra Leo power packs for an entire Brigade, back in the day...and that was before the reductions and budget slashing of the last ten years.  Germany had something like 200 Leo 2, so this is roughly ten percent of the fleet likely eating up 50% of any 3rd and 4tf line maintenance.

Its a good concept if you have enough spare parts and the logistic capacity to bring them where needed. But spare parts like ammunition stocks have been where the last 30 years of saving on the military have been applied.

Edited January 4 by holoween

[The_Capt]

6 hours ago, JonS said:

Curiously, though, AIUI Russia has ended 2023 occupying several hundred more square kilometres than they did at the start. Which is a terrible ROI. But still - they went forward in 2023, not backward.

And so did the UA.  Everyone is too busy freaking out that they are not dipping toes in the Azov but the UA took ground last summer, just not enough.

Now who had the most net gain or loss?  I honestly do not know but in the end gains/losses had no real operational effect so it really doesn’t matter that much.

In fact forward or backward is an incomplete metric.  At Bakhmut Wagner advanced but shattered themselves doing it (which was likely Putin’s plan all along).  Breakout and manoeuvre is the better metric.  

Edit:  Found it.  Comes to a grand total of 188 sq miles to Russias favour in 2023 - https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/09/28/world/europe/russia-ukraine-war-map-front-line.html

Would like to see what the cost breakdown was for each one of those sq miles.

Edited January 4 by The_Capt

[The_Capt]

1 minute ago, holoween said:

Its a good concept if you have enough spare parts and the logistic capacity to bring them where needed. But spare parts like ammunition stocks have been where the last 30 years of saving on the military have been applied.

Right?!  They are doing exactly this in the Canadian military right now.  Government wants to spend a few less billion to appear “more fiscally responsible” (or sustain policy drug deals with NDP) so they carve a couple billion out of defence.  Defence takes risk at back end because it needs a shiny looking fleet on the parade square.  Back end turns out to the be really important stuff like spare parts and ammunition.  

[OBJ]

Meanwhile, as the Ukrainians continue to try to restore their grain trade to pre-war levels...

https://news.usni.org/2024/01/03/turkey-to-block-u-k-minesweepers-on-loan-to-ukraine-from-black-sea

excerpt:

Turkey will not let minesweepers loaned to Ukraine by the United Kingdom into the Black Sea, the Turkish president’s directorate of communications said this week.

The United Kingdom announced in December that it would loan two minehunters to Ukraine to help Ukraine protect shipping lanes in the Black Sea that have come under attack from Russian forces. In particular, sea mines have been a concern in the Black Sea since the beginning of the war. Both Ukraine and Russia have deployed mines in the region.

However, Turkey is restricting any warships belonging to non-Black Sea nations from entering the Black Sea by invoking the Montreux Convention and closed the Bosphorus Strait to the loaned ships.

Under the 1936 treaty, Turkey has the right to close the Turkish straits to the Black Sea. While ships of non-belligerent countries, in this case any country that is not Ukraine or Russia, can sail into the Black Sea during war time, the Montreux Convention ultimately leaves the decision on if warships can pass through to Turkey, if the country fears it could be pulled into the war.

Turkey announced early on in the Russia invasion into Ukraine that it would not allow non-Black Sea nations to sail through the Turkish straits. In this case, Turkey can deny minesweepers if it deems them to be U.K. warships.

[TheVulture]

4 minutes ago, OBJ said:

Meanwhile, as the Ukrainians continue to try to restore their grain trade to pre-war levels...

https://news.usni.org/2024/01/03/turkey-to-block-u-k-minesweepers-on-loan-to-ukraine-from-black-sea

excerpt:

Turkey will not let minesweepers loaned to Ukraine by the United Kingdom into the Black Sea, the Turkish president’s directorate of communications said this week.

The United Kingdom announced in December that it would loan two minehunters to Ukraine to help Ukraine protect shipping lanes in the Black Sea that have come under attack from Russian forces. In particular, sea mines have been a concern in the Black Sea since the beginning of the war. Both Ukraine and Russia have deployed mines in the region.

However, Turkey is restricting any warships belonging to non-Black Sea nations from entering the Black Sea by invoking the Montreux Convention and closed the Bosphorus Strait to the loaned ships.

Under the 1936 treaty, Turkey has the right to close the Turkish straits to the Black Sea. While ships of non-belligerent countries, in this case any country that is not Ukraine or Russia, can sail into the Black Sea during war time, the Montreux Convention ultimately leaves the decision on if warships can pass through to Turkey, if the country fears it could be pulled into the war.

Turkey announced early on in the Russia invasion into Ukraine that it would not allow non-Black Sea nations to sail through the Turkish straits. In this case, Turkey can deny minesweepers if it deems them to be U.K. warships.

That seems kind of misleading. Turkey also has an obligation to prevent the warships of nations involved in war to pass through the straits (with an exception for ships returning to their base). Turkey has blocked a number of Russian warships from entering the Black Sea,  as per their obligation, and is applying the same rules to the minesweepers that the UK has given to Ukraine (given? Sold? Not sure which). All of which was entirely expected.

Not sure how much practical value two minesweepers would be to Ukraine right now: for all the hits the Black Sea Fleet has taken, they are still operating in the west of the Black Sea,  so its not like Ukraine could just deploy minesweepers to clear shipping lanes anyway. 

[OBJ]

True, @TheVulture

Turkey did decline to let Russian warships not based in the Black Sea into the Black Sea.

Only my opinion, only one I got, it is certainly a delicate situation. Minesweepers are typically considered warships. I am not aware of any minesweepers not considered warships. Certainly the argument a warship is a warship is valid.

On the other hand, I am not aware minesweepers have an offensive capability. I perceive there remains global concern about global food security, and the cost of food, as a result of the war. My impression is the Russians very much have targeted Ukraine's grain trade as a means to reduce Ukrainian economic strength, resulting in global concern for food security and cost.

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-destroyed-300000-tons-grain-since-july-port-ship-attacks-kyiv-2023-10-13/

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, OBJ said:

Meanwhile, as the Ukrainians continue to try to restore their grain trade to pre-war levels...

https://news.usni.org/2024/01/03/turkey-to-block-u-k-minesweepers-on-loan-to-ukraine-from-black-sea

excerpt:

Turkey will not let minesweepers loaned to Ukraine by the United Kingdom into the Black Sea, the Turkish president’s directorate of communications said this week.

The United Kingdom announced in December that it would loan two minehunters to Ukraine to help Ukraine protect shipping lanes in the Black Sea that have come under attack from Russian forces. In particular, sea mines have been a concern in the Black Sea since the beginning of the war. Both Ukraine and Russia have deployed mines in the region.

However, Turkey is restricting any warships belonging to non-Black Sea nations from entering the Black Sea by invoking the Montreux Convention and closed the Bosphorus Strait to the loaned ships.

Under the 1936 treaty, Turkey has the right to close the Turkish straits to the Black Sea. While ships of non-belligerent countries, in this case any country that is not Ukraine or Russia, can sail into the Black Sea during war time, the Montreux Convention ultimately leaves the decision on if warships can pass through to Turkey, if the country fears it could be pulled into the war.

Turkey announced early on in the Russia invasion into Ukraine that it would not allow non-Black Sea nations to sail through the Turkish straits. In this case, Turkey can deny minesweepers if it deems them to be U.K. warships.

Put ‘em on wheels and ship them overland.  Irony.

[Haiduk]

14 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Put ‘em on wheels and ship them overland.  Irony.

In theory it is possible through Rhine and Danube, But the way will pass through Serbia and Hungary. And these ships will be priority targets for Russian missiles if they are deployed in Ukraine. 

Russians already sank UKR inshore minesweeper "Henichesk" (NATO Yevgenia class) with aviation missile in 2022. Also by the unconfirmed rumors last relatively large UKR ship - medium landing ship "Yuriy Olefirenko" (NATO Polnocny-C class) was badly damaged or even sank during powerful Shakheds and missile strike on Odesa port on 29th of May 2023. Numerous Russian OSINT researches over satellite maps didn't give answer about destiny of this ship, but last reports about it activity was as far as in the February-March 2023.   

Edited January 4 by Haiduk

[The_Capt]

3 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

In theory it is possible through Rhine and Danube, But the way will pass through Serbia and Hungary. And these ships will be priority targets for Russian missiles if they are deployed in Ukraine. 

Russians already sank UKR inshore minesweeper "Henichesk" (NATO Yevgenia class) with aviation missile in 2022. Also by the unconfirmed rumors last relatively large UKR ship - medium landing ship "Yuriy Olefirenko" (NATO Polnocny-C class) was badly damaged or even sank during powerful Shakheds and missile strike on Odesa port on 29th of May 2023. Numerous Russian OSINT researches over satellite maps didn't give answer about destiny of this ship, but last reports about it activity was as far as in the February-March 2023.   

Long range UUVs might be a better way to go.

https://www.militaryaerospace.com/uncrewed/article/14285455/unmanned-underwater-longendurance

[Carolus]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

Now who had the most net gain or loss?  I honestly do not know but in the end gains/losses had no real operational effect so it really doesn’t matter that much.

In fact forward or backward is an incomplete metric.  At Bakhmut Wagner advanced but shattered themselves doing it (which was likely Putin’s plan all along).  Breakout and manoeuvre is the better metric.  

Edit:  Found it.  Comes to a grand total of 188 sq miles to Russias favour in 2023 - https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/09/28/world/europe/russia-ukraine-war-map-front-line.html

Would like to see what the cost breakdown was for each one of those sq miles.

A graphic available on X to illustrate the (paywalled) article.

Edited January 4 by Carolus

[Haiduk]

GUR agents performed diversion in deep Russian rear. Su-34 was set on fire on Shagol airfield near Cheliabinsk. 2nd mixed aviation regiment of 21st mixed aviation division is deployed here. 

The video, officially issued by GUR. It's unknown how much damages inflicts to the jet this diversion.

 

Edited January 4 by Haiduk

[Harmon Rabb]

1 hour ago, Haiduk said:

GUR agents performed diversion in deep Russian rear. Su-34 was set on fire on Shagol airfield near Cheliabinsk. 2nd mixed aviation regiment of 21st mixed aviation division is deployed here. 

The video, officially issued by GUR. It's unknown how much damages inflicts to the jet this diversion.

 

Even if RU Air Force mechanics will be able to get this SU-34 running again. The idea that a Ukrainian "James Bondko" is running around in Russia setting fires to RU aircraft in Chelyabinsk of all places, while giving out heavy metal salutes will not help morale inside the RU Air Force at all. This is priceless.

For the record I had to look up where this part of Russia is. Wow you were not kidding that is deep Russia.

 

Edited January 4 by Harmon Rabb

[The_Capt]

22 minutes ago, Harmon Rabb said:

Even if RU Air Force mechanics will be able to get this SU-34 running again. The idea that a Ukrainian "James Bondko" is running around in Russia setting fires to RU aircraft in Chelyabinsk of all places, while giving out heavy metal salutes will not help the RU air forces morale at all. This is priceless.

For the record I had to look up where this part of Russia is. Wow you were not kidding that is deep Russia.

 

Deep SOF actions are all about projecting uncertainty and creating negative decision pressures…and this is exactly what that looks like.

[Zeleban]

 

[Vet 0369]

3 hours ago, OBJ said:

True, @TheVulture

Turkey did decline to let Russian warships not based in the Black Sea into the Black Sea.

Only my opinion, only one I got, it is certainly a delicate situation. Minesweepers are typically considered warships. I am not aware of any minesweepers not considered warships. Certainly the argument a warship is a warship is valid.

On the other hand, I am not aware minesweepers have an offensive capability. I perceive there remains global concern about global food security, and the cost of food, as a result of the war. My impression is the Russians very much have targeted Ukraine's grain trade as a means to reduce Ukrainian economic strength, resulting in global concern for food security and cost.

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-destroyed-300000-tons-grain-since-july-port-ship-attacks-kyiv-2023-10-13/

If I”m not mistaken, a minesweeper can also be used to dispense mines.

[sburke]

From David Axe at Forbes

Avdiivka Eats Russian Tanks. The Kremlin Is About To Feed It More. (msn.com)

Quote

 

In 10 weeks of mostly failed assaults on the Ukrainian garrison in Avdiivka, just northwest of Donetsk in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region, the Russian army has lost or abandoned at least 143 tanks—while advancing just a mile or so north and south of the ruined city.

The Ukrainian army meanwhile has lost or abandoned 14 tanks defending Avdiivka.

The ongoing battle, one of the most intensive of Russia’s third annual winter offensive in its 23-month wider war on Ukraine, is a trap for Russian armor—and an opportunity for Ukraine to attrit Russian forces.

Taking into account new tank production, recovery of old tanks from long-term storage and the need to make good steep armor losses in 2022, the Kremlin can afford to write off 50 or so tanks a month without depleting its overall arsenal of around 3,000 front-line tanks.
Around Avdiivka alone, the Russians are losing 60 tanks a month. And that number could grow as the 239th Tank Regiment rolls into battle—and runs afoul of the same minefields and artillery and drone kill-zones that pulverized the tank units that came before it.

After taking heavy losses in October, the Russian field armies around Avdiivka—the 2nd and 41st Combined Arms Armies—held back their armor and sent in their infantry, on foot.

The infantry got massacred. Anyone who survived the mines, artillery and drones ran into the Ukrainian army’s 47th Mechanized Brigade with its American-made M-2 fighting vehicles, whose 25-millimeter autocannons cut like scythes through unprotected infantry.

Now it’s possible the 2nd and 41st CAAs plan to roll more tanks toward Avdiivka. “The concentration of the 239th Tank Regiment of the 90th Tank Division is ongoing southwest of Avdiivka,” the Center for Defense Strategies, a Ukrainian think-tank, reported on Wednesday.

The 239th is the third Russian tank regiment on the Avdiivka front, after the 80th and 10th. On paper, the 239th has a hundred or more tanks in several battalions altogether manned by a few thousand people.

In 2022, it was a T-72 regiment. But after taking a beating in Russia’s failed speed-run toward Kyiv in February and March 2022 and then getting further mauled trying and failing to halt Ukraine’s counteroffensive around Kharkiv in late 2022, the 239th at least partially reequipped with newer T-90s.

But today the regiment might be closer to a battalion in strength. As recently as early November, the Institute for the Study of War in Washington, D.C. described the 239th as “understrength.”

Don’t expect a weak regiment with a few new tanks to make much of a difference around Avdiivka. Ukrainian defenses are holding, and “the situation in Avdiivka remains relatively stable,” Ukrainian think-tank Frontelligence Insight reported on Wednesday.

Rather, it’s likely the 239th Tank Regiment will be the latest Russian regiment to feed its tanks and their three-person crews into Avdiivka’s hungry maw.

For the Russians, it’s a debacle—one that’s robbing their forces of the combat power they would need to make meaningful advances this winter.

For the Ukrainians, it’s stasis. Against all odds, Kyiv’s forces have held. They’re no longer advancing, as they were—slowly—last summer. But neither are they falling back.

Instead, they’re preserving their own forces while exacting an awful toll on the Russians for each attack the Russians attempt.

 

 

[sburke]

Seems that issue with Russian oil tankers off India went further south.

Russian oil tankers bound for India are turning around amid scuffle over payments to Moscow (yahoo.com)

Russian oil tankers are turning away from India amid disagreements over payment.

The tankers had been hovering near the shores of India and Sri Lanka for about a month.

India is paying for Russian oil in UAE currency, but one major supplier has been unable to accept payment.

Russian oil ships drifting near India's shores have begun to turn away amid unresolved payment disputes between the two countries.

According to ship-tracking data compiled by Bloomberg, five oil tankers carrying Sokol oil, which have been idling close to India and Sri Lanka for about a month, are now headed eastward toward the Malacca Straight.

Another Russian ship — the NS Century — is still drifting near the shores of Sri Lanka. The tanker has been idling for over a month as Indian officials mull over whether to let the ship unload its cargo, Bloomberg previously reported.

The turnaround comes as Indian refiners are paying for oil with Russia in dirhams, the currency of the United Arab Emirates, people familiar with the matter told Reuters last week. But a unit of Rosneft, one of Russia's state-run oil giants, hasn't been able to open a bank account in the UAE, meaning it's unable to accept payment, sources added.

As of October, India had at least seven oil shipments from Russia that hadn't been paid, Reuters originally reported.

India is also under pressure to remain on good terms with the US, which sanctioned the NS Century late in 2023 for trading oil with Russia above the $60 per barrel price cap. Those restrictions are part of the West's attempt to ramp up pressure on Russia's energy revenue that it is using to fund its war against Ukraine.

India has become one of Russia's largest oil customers since the invasion of Ukraine began in 2022. Russia now exports nearly all of its oil to China and India, Russia's deputy prime minister said last week – though shipments to India have recently stalled on payment issues. Russian oil exports in India cratered in December, with Indian refiners receiving no Sokol crude that month at all, according to Kpler data cited by Bloomberg.

[cesmonkey]

Quote

️On January 2, the Ministry of Lies of the Russian Federation reported that Russian rockets hit "a bunker with Deputy Commander-in-Chief Valery Zaluzhny and nine other generals of the Armed Forces."

Hello to the occupiers in Crimea!
I am waiting for the same epic report from Sevastopol and Yevpatoria on January 4th from enemy propaganda, and thank you again
Air Force pilots and all who planned the operation for impeccable combat work

Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleschuk

 

Edited January 4 by cesmonkey