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How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?


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facts... ukr armor is now on the left bank 3 of the 5 troops that took this picture are reportedly dead now the UKR forces have a drone blocker on the river now and the russians are saying they cant use FPV drones to block the ukr forces. facing the UKR marines are mobics without vehicles or proper gear russians are in a state of panic around the area. ukraine has 10-20 vehicles like this that can bring vehicles over.

I really like David D aka secret squirrel.

I hope this is all accurate.

 

Edited by Harmon Rabb
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1 minute ago, The_Capt said:

A medium density mixed minefield 400 deep will disable or kill about 70 percent of a hard ball bull-rush.  That is the mines alone.  Once you add in arty and ATGMs - all supported by ISR it is a suicide mission.  Kinda like what we have been watching the RA do.  I am pretty sure emulating them is a bad strategy.  Now imagine if the West gave Ukraine 500 tanks and they lost 70 percent of them in an afternoon.  Because we are talking kms deep minefield belts here one would not have enough to sustain a breakthrough based on those losses.  

Of mine rolling vehicles? I am not saying a suicide tank rush. The idea is if enough of these breaches appear at the same time, supporting systems will be overloaded, maybe stop 70-80%, the rest could have a fighting chance. But I dont think in all of Nato there exist this many specialized vehicles, even if they all were available.

So, since they cant be breached or moved around realistically, only option I see is moving this war into russia proper, but I am sure Scholz and many others would have a heart attack

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38 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Heading in Hobarts Funnies here.  How do you keep these guys in a straight line?  First strike and they are pretty much done so you would need to follow up with more in a breaching lane.  And then there is the terrain problem.  The divots from artillery and just plain old rocks will knock these off course.  I think you would wind up with lanes all over the place that follow on troops would have to try and follow.  This would likely see them slaloming through the minefield, which is bad.

My personal favorite would be UGVs with GPR that have a bunch of small little spider buggers with shaped charges to find and then lay down over top the mines.  Detonate all in sequence and then you have a safe lane...right up until the enemies little spider bastards crawl back into the safe lane or they just drop more FASCAM n the safe lane.

Best way to avoid minefields is to kill an opponent before they can lay them to be honest.

I was imagining a whole bunch of them slaloming through a minefield blowing up all over the place.  Big, cheap, stupid, and would make a good cartoon.

A more clever approach would be ground skimming drones (not necessarily autonomous) that drop little detonators on any mines that they detect. They won't do well on buried mines, but would at least get the scattered ones.

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On 11/5/2023 at 4:37 AM, Battlefront.com said:

You still seem to be glossing over my point.  Fundamentally Ukraine has a lot of real incentives to fight, Russia has practically none.  As the long term costs/stresses of war build up, Ukraine has more incentive to say "this sucks, but let's keep going" than Russia does.  This is not about breaking points, it's about starting points.  Ukraine is starting from the position that fighting is a matter of survival, Russia is starting from a house of lies built upon a flimsy foundation of ego.  The two are not the same.

Yes, I guess I've been glossing over this because I fundamentally agree with you and don't think this needs much discussing. Except that for Russia we should differentiate between regime and general population. Whatever incentives Putin and his oligarchs had for starting the war - I'm not certain if it was just ego or actually ideology in the sense that Putin came to believe in what he was saying - and have for continuing it, they are certainly different from the incentives people have for volunteering to die in Ukraine or even just supporting the regime.

Those incentives are also not constant. Let's assume Putin started the war for his ego alone. Now ego would still be a point but now strong incentives to keep the war going are survival and hope. Survival because a real defeat (not some freezing the conflict) could be dangerous for the regime and hope because it still remains to be seen who runs out of steam first (and here I am indeed talking about capability).

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43 minutes ago, Kraft said:

Of mine rolling vehicles? I am not saying a suicide tank rush. The idea is if enough of these breaches appear at the same time, supporting systems will be overloaded, maybe stop 70-80%, the rest could have a fighting chance. But I dont think in all of Nato there exist this many specialized vehicles, even if they all were available.

So, since they cant be breached or moved around realistically, only option I see is moving this war into russia proper, but I am sure Scholz and many others would have a heart attack

Question for those in the know: Would it not be possible to equip the existing tanks with plows? Is there that much more to it than fabricating a package that can be mounted or dismounted as needed? I know it is a simplified idea, but I think of the snow plows in the northern climes. Dump truck in the summer. Slap the blade on and put the salt shaker in the back and it's a snow plow in the winter. Is there anything that needs added other than a plow that makes it impossible?

I think it was @poesel that first brought up a lighter model. I keep thinking about those petal mines and think they would work great for that type of clearance. The problem is when the AT mine gets in the way. So maybe a small UGV that weighs under 100kg that would be sturdy enough to take AP hits all day, but not heavy enough to set off the AT mines? 

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1 hour ago, Kraft said:

Of mine rolling vehicles? I am not saying a suicide tank rush. The idea is if enough of these breaches appear at the same time, supporting systems will be overloaded, maybe stop 70-80%, the rest could have a fighting chance. But I dont think in all of Nato there exist this many specialized vehicles, even if they all were available.

So, since they cant be breached or moved around realistically, only option I see is moving this war into russia proper, but I am sure Scholz and many others would have a heart attack

Well to outfit a broad frontage assault based on rollers alone would likely take the entire NATO inventory.  A modern tank Bn might have 8 of these systems, so even outfitting 100 UA tanks with rollers is going to deplete an entire Corp.  Then there is the problem of endurance.  The mine roller can maybe take 5 good hits, give or take depending on the mine types.  So on a single minefield the lead tank is likely going to burn out its roller.  This means you will have to go in echelons and I am not sure on a broad front breach that you would not run out of rollers before you ran out of minefield.

And all that is before the punishment for mass kicks in.  Every PGM, UAS, gun and tac aviation is going to be positioned to counter as they are going to see the 100 tanks coming from space kms before they hit the minefields.  So I don’t think massed rollers (or ploughs for that matter) are a viable tactic.

Flanks- four operational options…none of them good:

Short Right - assault water xing down by Kherson.  Been waiting for that one all summer but I think it may be off the table.  Too hard to sustain in this environment is the likely issue.  But damn I was hoping.

Long Right - amphib assault deep on the western coastline.  Very cool idea but capability to do that at an operational level is held by only one nation right now.  Maybe a couple others could cobble something together but Ukraine is nowhere near able to pull it off.  Raids and SOF maybe but some sort of deep amphib manoeuvre is not going to happen.

Short Left.  Cut up through Russian territory east of Kharkiv and do a short left hook down into Luhansk.  Starobilsk would be a likely operational objective.  One would need to synch this with a push coming out of the west in the Devorichna area.  We will come back to “invading Russia” strategic risk but even operationally this one is risky.  First you would need to establish an Air Denial corridor to sustain that offensive and RUAF would likely throw the kitchen sink at it.  If you could do that you are still looking at a long LOC to keep a deep offensive alive in gas and bullets.  You would also be facing the ISR/PGM/Guns problem.  Good news is you might surprise the Russians and crack that whole flank.  Bad news is that they will likely stop it along that Severodonetsk - Stanytsia marsh/river line..and that is your best case.  You can expect all sorts of hell coming in from the East out of Russia as they would likely throw any reserves they have left at the problem.  This entire plan is very high risk and likely not enough gain to justify it.

Long Left Flank (damn him, had to say it) - a Reverse Priggy.  Go really deep to the M4 and then south all the way to Rostov-on Don.  This would likely knock Russia out of the war as it would cut the entire logistical spine of the SMO.  Problem is obvious, the forces needed to pull off a 500km (+) advance through deep Russkie country far exceeds what the UA have.  The Air problem would be immense and you would likely wind up like the RA did back at Kyiv - way over extended and vulnerable.  In fact this manoeuvre could just as likely knock Ukraine out of the war.

Strategic Risks - poo poo the nukes all you want but if the UA invades directly into Russia two things are likely going to happen..both bad.  1) Putin will likely green light tactical WMDs.  No one in the West is going to start WW3 because Russia decides to use tac WMDs on their own soil.  You could risk some major operational level losses in the UA with almost zero chance of western back up.  2) It would drive all the support into Putin’s arms. The Russian IO would make sure that a Russian Bucha happened and then Putin’s war footing latitude would widen dramatically.  Political narratives would go sideways and the western coalition of support may very well crack.

So basically they are all bad operational choices with really terrible strategic risks.  It is not fair that Russia gets to invade and Ukraine cannot pay back the favour but the world is not fair.  Russia is a nuclear power and would get just the acceptable excuse to use them in this scenario and Putin would get all the support to drag this war into the next century.  And even if they did not do all that only one operational scenario has any hope..and frankly it might not be worth it.  A major re-taking of land would shore up support but if the UA over extends…well you get it.

So we are kinda stuck with up the middle, lots of smoke and HE.

Edited by The_Capt
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2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

So basically they are all bad operational choices with really terrible strategic risks.  It is not fair that Russia gets to invade and Ukraine cannot pay back the favour but the world is not fair...

So we are kinda stuck with up the middle, lots of smoke and HE.

What about taking out as much Russian infrastructure as possible on the down low with drones? Power plants, trains (not the tracks, but the locomotives), water treatment plants, factories, communications infrastructure, airports etc.?

Don’t invade them, but corrode them as a country? And obviously help support a Dagestani separatist movement.

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4 hours ago, Butschi said:

Yes, I guess I've been glossing over this because I fundamentally agree with you and don't think this needs much discussing.

OK.  The context and reason for me posting what should be obvious is that we were having the long term prognosis discussion again.  The same question as to who has more time on its side than the other.  This particular point wasn't brought up so I fixed that ;)

4 hours ago, Butschi said:

Except that for Russia we should differentiate between regime and general population.

Absolutely.  From the regime's perspective there were good reasons to attack Ukraine because it posed a threat to its business model, Putin wanted to be the next Peter The Great, domestic economy was headed down, etc.  These are not great reasons to share with the general population.

"I took Russia to war with Ukraine because Viagra just wasn't doing it for me any more".

Steve

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11 hours ago, Harmon Rabb said:

I really like David D aka secret squirrel.

I hope this is all accurate.

 

I like him too, but SecretSqrl has also been caught out in some Chuck Pfarrer/Igor Sushko level wayyyy-over-the-skis exaggerations in the past, so all his claims, including retweets, should be taken with significant salt.

That said, his map analysis is pretty good, which I think is his mil background. 

Mind you, it would be nice if the map grogs in general could use smaller icons for Bn or Bn-strength formations, to distinguish them from  parent formations, and perhaps 'blur' or dotted outline deployments that are only rumoured.

...Otherwise, all these icons are just eye candy (it's probably too much to expect actual unit frontages from OSINT sources given Opsec), if not downright misleading as to relative force strengths (hmm, there seem to be more little red boxes than blue ones, therefore....?)

P.S.  I miss our own @Grigb's mapwork from last fall. That was quite outstanding, giving the terrain context for the movements and positions.  Shout out, brother, let us know you're OK?

Edited by LongLeftFlank
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3 hours ago, Letter from Prague said:

Russia seems to be gaining a lot of initiative lately, meanwhile the Western support is slowly going away. I kind of suspect this war will not see its second anniversary.

It certainly seems like Ukraine have spent the operational initiative they had after Bakhmut but I’m not sure Russia have gained much (pending the outcome of the Avdiivka operation).

What terms do you think both sides might agree upon within the next three months?  It’s not totally inconceivable (but I think it is extremely unlikely) that Ukraine calls exhaustion and offers terms for a freeze but can Putin really accept that?   ‘We’ve got a land corridor and there’s no chance in hell the Russian Army can take any more from puny Ukraine so I’ve agreed a ceasefire’…?

Surely Putin would/could only accept that if he thought it was better than continuing to fight, in which case Ukraine would be encouraged to withdraw the offer and get back to the trenches?

In my opinion we have hit a temporary military stalemate but we are far from actual exhaustion on the part of either side. 

Edited by Tux
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7 hours ago, kimbosbread said:

What about taking out as much Russian infrastructure as possible on the down low with drones? Power plants, trains (not the tracks, but the locomotives), water treatment plants, factories, communications infrastructure, airports etc.?

Don’t invade them, but corrode them as a country? And obviously help support a Dagestani separatist movement.

That does have some option space but keep in mind that is a LOT of infrastructure.  In order to create strategic corrosion at a level that could move the needle we are talking a sustained campaign of systematic strikes along entire sectors.  So volume is the first problem.  Second is pace.  If you strike too slowly Russia will simply repair rebuild and you never really achieve corrosion.  Too fast (assuming one has the resources) and you could trip the “driving support into Putin’s arms” thing.

The realty is that Ukraine is the weaker power here in many ways and will likely benefit from weaker power strategies rather than adopting greater power ones.  Stalemate is actually a key step on the strategy map of Mao’s “People’s War”.  Smaller powers normally play for time and erode a stronger opponents will.  The tricky part is sustaining western will.  The best way to do this is through demonstrations and signalling if one cannot pull off major drama.  Ukraine will likely only get itself into serious trouble if it tries to pretend that it is a great power and over-extends.  Further, small powers can also gain by controlling the narrative - we are seeing this contest in Gaza right now.  By triggering an overreaction (or a perceived overreaction) from the greater power the narrative can be manipulated to pull in wider support.

More simply put Ukraine will likely have to start thinking about a long game as a benefit as opposed to a risk, while Russia needs to fear it.

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7 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

The realty is that Ukraine is the weaker power here in many ways and will likely benefit from weaker power strategies rather than adopting greater power ones.

Perhaps the best strategy for now is for Ukraine to consolidate their own defences and then concentrate on making Russian Army’s life on the land bridge as uncomfortable as possible.  Get back to plinking HQs and logistics nodes with PGMs and put the onus on Russia to come up with a solution.

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Just now, Tux said:

Perhaps the best strategy for now is for Ukraine to consolidate their own defences and then concentrate on making Russian Army’s life on the land bridge as uncomfortable as possible.  Get back to plinking HQs and logistics nodes with PGMs and put the onus on Russia to come up with a solution.

Not sure if they are there yet but they definitely do not want to over-extend to the point that they cannot do this over a longer haul.

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2 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Not sure if they are there yet but they definitely do not want to over-extend to the point that they cannot do this over a longer haul.

They have to have a goal though, right?  If they are advancing because, for example, they want to get within x-distance of the coast so that the whole land bridge can be taken under fire then that’s one thing.  If they’re advancing because they can but they understand that defensive primacy has re-emerged and they know they have no hope of making major gains then they should stop and put their manpower to more efficient use, no?

I’m sure they do still have a goal but at this point I don’t think it could realistically be very spectacular.

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28 minutes ago, Ales Dvorak said:

(This is after all Page 3003)

...I think this video has been around before. I have no idea where it came from, or whether it's real or faked (trying to order around terrified guys whose language you don't speak is probably chancy in any army) but the entire idea of foreign barrier detachments keeping Ukrainian mobiks in line is utter tosh.

Typical Russian second grade schoolyard propaganda:  Well, YOU'RE blocking detachments times TWO!

Edited by LongLeftFlank
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