How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[LongLeftFlank]

24 minutes ago, kimbosbread said:

I can’t second this enough. If Russia was confident, they wouldn’t be wasting precious treasure on something that doesn’t change their strategic position or as some people would say, expand their option space.

If Russia was confident, they’d be improving their fortifications and blunting Ukraine’s offense while clevely husbanding their resources for the spring.

An 'alternative Russian facts' view might suggest some method to the seeming madness. Just a theory, of course:

1. While they won't admit it yet, I'd guess 'pragmatists' in Russia (the term is relative) are looking at the likelihood that neither side can make further major gains and that a cease fire eventually occurs along roughly the current front.

2. The Russians seem truly hell bent on keeping their current holdings in Donetsk and Kherson, and making those a permanent part of Russia. These rust belt zones are of limited economic value, and completely trashed as well, but they shield Crimea which Moscow just plain wants to keep, full stop.

(They'd probably love to take north Luhansk too, up to the Seversky Donets, but the terrain -- boggy woods and balkas -- is NOT proving favourable to offensive ops. The Ukes were very fortunate in being able to take back so much land when the 27th CAA front from Kupiansk-Izium collapsed last fall)

3.  Since super-dense mine belts from hell seem to be working, at least until tech (fratricide-inducing burrowing LGVs or sumfink?) provides a counter, look for Ivan to duplicate those belts along the entire line.

Already happening, I'd guess.

4.  If we look at things this way, then reducing the Avdiivka salient could make sense for them 'defensively' (in a way that Bakhmut -- which was supposed to flank Siversk and open the road to Kramatorsk -- did not). It pushes the Donetsk urban area out of regular artillery range and frees up some rail lines.

(Remember, they actually believe the stuff about Ukron@zis blowing up elementary schools in Donetsk since 2015)

[cesmonkey]

 

[Battlefront.com]

51 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

An 'alternative Russian facts' view might suggest some method to the seeming madness. Just a theory, of course:

1. While they won't admit it yet, I'd guess 'pragmatists' in Russia (the term is relative) are looking at the likelihood that neither side can make further major gains and that a cease fire eventually occurs along roughly the current front.

2. The Russians seem truly hell bent on keeping their current holdings in Donetsk and Kherson, and making those a permanent part of Russia. These rust belt zones are of limited economic value, and completely trashed as well, but they shield Crimea which Moscow just plain wants to keep, full stop.

(They'd probably love to take north Luhansk too, up to the Seversky Donets, but the terrain -- boggy woods and balkas -- is NOT proving favourable to offensive ops. The Ukes were very fortunate in being able to take back so much land when the 27th CAA front from Kupiansk-Izium collapsed last fall)

3.  Since super-dense mine belts from hell seem to be working, at least until tech (fratricide-inducing burrowing LGVs or sumfink?) provides a counter, look for Ivan to duplicate those belts along the entire line.

Already happening, I'd guess.

4.  If we look at things this way, then reducing the Avdiivka salient could make sense for them 'defensively' (in a way that Bakhmut -- which was supposed to flank Siversk and open the road to Kramatorsk -- did not). It pushes the Donetsk urban area out of regular artillery range and frees up some rail lines.

(Remember, they actually believe the stuff about Ukron@zis blowing up elementary schools in Donetsk since 2015)

This is entirely possible.

To sum up, Russia might have thrown in the towel on doing anything significant with this war and is instead trying to straighten the line before trying for a multi-year cease fire.  Whether they get one or not, they are probably going to set up defensive belts equivalent to the south along their entire frontage.  Maybe they think this is the best it can get for now, maybe they think they'll be back years from now to try again.  Who knows, but the short term effect would be exactly the same either way.

Steve

[cesmonkey]

 

[Beleg85]

On slightly lighter note- Russian sources also confirm that Alexander "Babai" Mozhaiev aka "Muppet of Donbabwe" died lately in occupied part of Ukraine. A persona that is perhaps known to folks who followed the conflict from 2014, this former spetsnaz member was accused of atrocities in Donbas and bullying western journalists. In short- typical example of career of local "freedom fighter".
 

 

[Battlefront.com]

56 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

On slightly lighter note- Russian sources also confirm that Alexander "Babai" Mozhaiev aka "Muppet of Donbabwe" died lately in occupied part of Ukraine. A persona that is perhaps known to folks who followed the conflict from 2014, this former spetsnaz member was accused of atrocities in Donbas and bullying western journalists. In short- typical example of career of local "freedom fighter".
 

 

I recognized that (expletive) face even before I read the text.  Very good news.

The question I have is who killed him.  I was always surprised that he wasn't killed by his fellow scumbags like so many of his "freedom fighter" peers.

Steve

[Beleg85]

43 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I recognized that (expletive) face even before I read the text.  Very good news.

The question I have is who killed him.  I was always surprised that he wasn't killed by his fellow scumbags like so many of his "freedom fighter" peers.

Steve

I read somewhere on Russian forum that it was rather part of regular combat than targeted killing, reportedly artillery strike on some base or trench.

So...who is left alive? Girkin in arrest, Borodai almost dead once and living borrowed time, Pasha Guberiev already looks like he stared into abyss too long and (pardon my French) Penis Dushylin still ticking somehow, somewhere... damn, Separ stars leave this world faster than members of Club 27.

Edited October 19, 2023 by Beleg85

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, Beleg85 said:

I read somewhere on Russian forum that it was rather part of regular combat than targeted killing, reportedly artillery strike on some base or trench.

So...who is left alive? Girkin in arrest, Borodai almost dead once and living borrowed time, Pasha Guberiev already looks like he stared into abyss too long and (pardon my French) Penis Dushylin still ticking somehow, somewhere... damn, Separ stars leave this world faster than members of Club 27.

Alexander Khodakovsky is unfortunately alive and well.  He even is allowed to be critical of the MoD, which is a novelty these days.  Due to his involvement in MH-17 he has some info stashed away "in case of death" that is keeping him alive?

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

ISW's report for the 19th states that Ukraine claims it has downed 5 fixed wing Russian aircraft in the Donetsk area over the past 10 days.  Whatever the count is, that has to be included in the cost of the Avdiivka attack.

Here's an interesting perspective that ISW reported on from a Russian blogger:

Quote

A Russian milblogger observed that Ukrainian forces are successfully and asymmetrically attriting Russian reserves in ongoing offensive operations. In a series of long Telegram posts on October 19, the milblogger noted that Ukrainian forces are purposefully conducting offensive operations to attrit limited Russian reserves while preserving their own reserves to the utmost possible extent.[26] The milblogger claimed that the state of Russian infantry is at its lowest point in the war and emphasized that Ukrainian forces are exploiting the fact that Ukraine knows Russia will not conduct a general mobilization.[27] These observations are largely consistent with ISW's assessment that Russian forces largely lack high-quality reserves and are struggling to generate, train, and soundly deploy reserves to effectively plug holes in the frontline and pursue offensive operations, instead relying largely on tactical-level lateral redeployments.[28] ISW has also previously observed that Ukrainian forces have engaged Russian troops in an asymmetrical attrition gradient along many critical sectors of the frontline.[29] Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) analyst Dr Jack Watling similarly observed on October 19 that as long as Ukrainian forces can continue inflicting a high casualty rate on Russian forces, ”it becomes possible to suppress Russia’s ability to train sufficient new troops to the standard needed to effectively conduct offensive action.”[30]

This is something I don't think we've considered here.  Specifically that Ukraine is not racking up Russian body counts for generalized purposes, but explicitly trying to force Russia into going into another generalize mobilization or suffering the consequences for not doing so.  I had not thought of this for one simple reason... Russia is the one gifting Ukraine with these opportunities.  If Russia instead went on the defensive and limited its counter attacks to situations that were favorable, then Ukraine would not be able to wrack up such huge Russian body counts.  Therefore, it is Russia and not Ukraine that is forcing the decision point about mobilization.  Latest example is committing the 25th CCA months too early so that it could conduct the very costly Avdiivka offensive.

Steve

[danfrodo]

I am still wondering how long nights and loss of leaf cover is going to affect operations.  Mud would normally be the problem, but w UKR's tactics maybe not a show stopper.  I am pretty sure UKR will have more infantry/vehicle night/thermal vision and more drones w same.  I'm hoping RU soldiers find themselves severely underequipped for night ops w no concealment.

[Battlefront.com]

Ukraine's Defense Intelligence sums up Russia's mobilization history and current capabilities quite succinctly.  Anybody reading the bottom section of ISW's daily reports will be familiar with the details.

The short of it is... Russia is ready to conduct a far more invasive and effective mobilization than the first one they did.

https://gur.gov.ua/en/content/na-rosii-use-hotove-do-masovoi-mobilizatsii-ale-oholosyty-ii-ne-mozhut-vadym-skibitskyi.html

Steve

[Twisk]

Related to the current Russian attacks we are seeing them making a high effort at a point that is relatively well defended and that Ukraine has had control of for years. So while on a map it looks easy to pinch off the Russians are stepping into the same sort of attack they forced Ukraine to step into near Tokmak. The question that brings up is why not attack near Tokmak?  Attacking in that sector would likely be easier and also result in a solid political victory (look as we rolled up Ukraine's breakthrough).

That they didn't seems to reinforce the thought that they don't have true reserves and more importantly seems to say something about Russia's ability to move and maintain large forces in the Kherson - Tokmak area. Namely that they are unable to. With that in mind I think the Ukrainian raids across the Dnepr might have big payoffs if Ukraine can continue to step them up. Its essentially a Ukrainian opportunity to strike from where they are well supplied and Russia has difficulty doing so.

[Battlefront.com]

Some vids:

1.  Ukrainian strikes behind the lines in the south:

2.  Zaluzhny is out visiting the frontlines and it's not in the south.  This shows that Ukraine is paying attention, but it also probably signals that the south's operations have largely played out (or "culminated" if I want to sound smarter!)

3.  Two Russian BMPs blown up big time near Vodyne (south of Avdiivka).  Looks like the lead one took a wrong turn, realized, turned around, and then found out it probably would have been better to have kept going in the wrong direction:

4.  A still image from a recent video from Avdiivka (I think it was linked a few pages ago).  It shows a bunch of damaged/destroyed BTRs.

5.  Images circulating of a bunch of smashed up Russian vehicles in the Kupyansk sector:

 

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

6 minutes ago, Twisk said:

Related to the current Russian attacks we are seeing them making a high effort at a point that is relatively well defended and that Ukraine has had control of for years. So while on a map it looks easy to pinch off the Russians are stepping into the same sort of attack they forced Ukraine to step into near Tokmak. The question that brings up is why not attack near Tokmak?  Attacking in that sector would likely be easier and also result in a solid political victory (look as we rolled up Ukraine's breakthrough).

That they didn't seems to reinforce the thought that they don't have true reserves and more importantly seems to say something about Russia's ability to move and maintain large forces in the Kherson - Tokmak area. Namely that they are unable to. With that in mind I think the Ukrainian raids across the Dnepr might have big payoffs if Ukraine can continue to step them up. Its essentially a Ukrainian opportunity to strike from where they are well supplied and Russia has difficulty doing so.

We've batted this around a few times.  The number one reason they didn't launch a counter attack in the south is because the bulk of the forces used for the Avdiivka area are DPR origins and will likely mutiny if they are deployed outside of Donetsk.  So the best Russia could have done is taken the forces they pulled out of Svatove-Kreminna and transferred them A LONG WAYS to the south.  They likely wouldn't be able to do anything significant beyond defending and local counter attacks.  Just not enough forces on their own.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Here's a detailed examination of Russian vehicle losses north of the Avdiivka slag heap.  It is interesting to note that all of these vehicles are on roads and largely spaced apart, but there's clearly areas that Ukraine had multiple hits.  What we don't know is how many of these vehicles were in related attacks and how many were in subsequent ones.

Steve

[dan/california]

 

[dan/california]

Apologies if this is more Gaza War than you want on the thread, but it seems VERY relevant. feel free to remove it if needed. If the Israelis just allowed Spike missiles and other tech that they have already sold to various European militaries to be sent to Ukraine, It would have a non trivial impact. If they send Ukraine the full military sales catalogue and tell them to order whatever they want....

Edit: Then we get to the fascinating question of helping Poland and Ukraine set up production lines.

Edited October 20, 2023 by dan/california

[LongLeftFlank]

4 hours ago, Twisk said:

The question that brings up is why not attack near Tokmak?  Attacking in that sector would likely be easier and also result in a solid political victory (look as we rolled up Ukraine's breakthrough).

 

....As I returned across the fields I'd known
I recognized the walls that I'd once made
Had to stop in my tracks for fear
Of walking on the mines I'd laid
And if I built this fortress around your heart
Encircled you in trenches and barbed wire....

[chrisl]

5 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Ukraine's Defense Intelligence sums up Russia's mobilization history and current capabilities quite succinctly.  Anybody reading the bottom section of ISW's daily reports will be familiar with the details.

The short of it is... Russia is ready to conduct a far more invasive and effective mobilization than the first one they did.

https://gur.gov.ua/en/content/na-rosii-use-hotove-do-masovoi-mobilizatsii-ale-oholosyty-ii-ne-mozhut-vadym-skibitskyi.html

Steve

And arm them with what?  T-34s pulled from monuments?  Mosin Nagants?  Maybe there are a few IS-2s still floating around on a back lot.

I know they’re not quite down to that, but they’ve burned through decades of Soviet and post-Soviet production and are nowhere near being a manufacturing powerhouse to build back up.  They don’t have a huge base of non-military manufacturing that they can convert.  China is the only real source they have for manufacturing resources, and they’re not being particularly generous.  And Russia has been suffering brain drain for three decades.
 

And who will train the newly mobilized on the higher tech equipment?  Maybe it doesn’t matter, because it will all have been destroyed or fallen out of the sky by the time the next wave shows up.

[Maciej Zwolinski]

15 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

3.  Since super-dense mine belts from hell seem to be working, at least until tech (fratricide-inducing burrowing LGVs or sumfink?) provides a counter, look for Ivan to duplicate those belts along the entire line.

I am in favour of a drone-delivered "synthetic MCLIC" for want of a better term. Say a dozen drones, protected by multispectral smoke and ECM, fly in a single file into the minefield, and from low level drop mine clearing explosives direcly on the ground, close to one another, and quickly withdraw. Once the drones are in safe distance, the charges are detonated as if they were a massive MCLIC. Repeat as necessary. 

[The_Capt]

8 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Ukraine's Defense Intelligence sums up Russia's mobilization history and current capabilities quite succinctly.  Anybody reading the bottom section of ISW's daily reports will be familiar with the details.

The short of it is... Russia is ready to conduct a far more invasive and effective mobilization than the first one they did.

https://gur.gov.ua/en/content/na-rosii-use-hotove-do-masovoi-mobilizatsii-ale-oholosyty-ii-ne-mozhut-vadym-skibitskyi.html

Steve

But can’t.  Why?  Some in the West have been afraid of the mobilization escalation since the start of this thing.  Hordes of Russians sweeping down from the Steppes.  Thing is, one does not normally wait until things are this bad to do that.  Mass mobilization is a bit of a remnant of the old ways.  Nations can still do it but the bar for modern operations is much higher than it was back in WW2.  Equipment, training and data demands are much higher now.  

And then there is will.  Even in Russia the public can see what is going on, or at least some of them.  And finally timing.  Why would Russia wait until they have lost 100k and most of what they took back Feb 22?  Last Fall at least should have triggered the mobapocalypse.  Russian mobilization has been just keeping up with losses.  Troops levels have been pretty much level.  Troop quality has plummeted.  Overall operational quality is very low.  The RA is holding on with pretty rudimentary capability right now across most areas.  They are learning in a few, but are basically down to good old landmines to hold the front - that, is the one thing they did mobilize.

I suspect that Putin’s support in this war is not a big as we fear.  And also likely why we see Western restraint, we do not want to drive support into his arms.

[akd]

Possibly most effective use of DPICM seen yet:

 

[pintere]

From the Deep State Telegram Channel:

https://t.me/DeepStateEN/2646

🗡 The enemy lost at least 63 armored vehicles on the northern front of the Avdiivka direction

 

🛰 After analyzing the changes on satellite images, the loss of more than six dozen pieces of equipment was recorded. Almost all of the equipment was destroyed in the area of Krasnohorivka (A) and at the entrance to the settlement. As the classics would say - an illustration to the General Staff's reports.

 

These images show the entire "success" of the enemy's actions, which was mainly present in their information space. On the battlefield, despite their superiority on all counts, the katsaps lost the battle. Of course, it is difficult to estimate the enemy's losses in manpower. In this area alone, the number of dead ruzzians is measured in hundreds.

 

But there is also unpleasant news. This attack is yet another proof of the ineffectiveness of the armored fist tactic, when one side concentrates its equipment and tries to achieve success on the battlefield by using its superiority. Our destroyed columns near Mala Tokmachka, Verbove, Robotyne, Staromaiorske, Novodonetske and Rivne, as well as the enemy's destroyed columns near Vuhledar, Novoiehorivka, Makiivka, Andriivka, Marinka, and now Krasnohorivka (A) and Vodiane-Pervomaiske, are further proof of this thesis.

 

This is all a consequence of the growing effectiveness of aerial reconnaissance and artillery. The same cheap quadcopters equalize the capabilities of both sides. And so far, there is no technology that can provide an advantage. The goal of our military-industrial complex is to find the key to victory, otherwise history will simply repeat itself.

 

🖼 Full-resolution image.

 

Location of the village - deepstatemap.live/en#13/48.2069/37.7256

[Bearstronaut]

It seems to me that Ukraine has realized that what the game is and is fighting like it is 1918 and the Russians are still fighting in 1915.

[The_MonkeyKing]

23 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

My feelings exactly.  I rolled my eyes when I read WotR summary posted by Monkey King.  I don't like doing that, but well... here's why:

I've been saying this since the start of the operation, but they left out the fact that "elite" infantry were not used.  So I stand by my position that what Russia learned was that throwing unsupported cannon fodder at prepared Ukrainian units doesn't achieve much.  Otherwise, how is this attack any different than other large scale attacks in the past, with possible addition of more air strikes?

And I take issue with the difficulty of launching multiple battalion sized attacks in multiple locations.  It's actually VERY easy to do this.  What is extremely difficult is doing it successfully.  Russia just proved that, once again, issuing unrealistic orders and forcing zombie troops to pursue them is not a winning capability. They've been doing this THE ENTIRE WAR and they are NOT LEARNING from it.  If Russia was truly learning from their past losses is that they don't have a force that is capable of offensive action without taking massive losses in the process.

Contrast this with Ukraine.  They tried large scale multiple battalion coordinated attacks and found that they weren't up to the challenge.  Ukraine, therefore, learned and learned quickly to go back to something it was competent at... company sized attacks with very limited objectives.

And why is this "worrying"?  Nobody expected Russia to still be using the same exact tactics as it did in February 2022, so why is it "worrying" that they have made some changes 1.75 years into the war that wound up being just as ineffective as the ones that came before them?  That eventually they will figure something out?

What the HELL is a military analyst doing making a statement like this?  Battle of the Bulge and Spring Awakening at least proved that Nazi Germany were not on the ropes?  My god... sometimes I wonder if they think about what they say before saying it.

Russia still has a lot of combat power.  Fact.  But what about the possibility that Russia is desperate and this is the best that it can come up with?  To me, that is the sign of the invader being "on the ropes".

As for the rest of it (Ukraine's counter offensive is about to, or already has, culminated) looks fine to me.  It's pretty clear that the offensive stalled out early and has only made progress through intelligent grinding attacks which, not surprisingly, have pretty clearly exceeded Ukraine's ability to sustain momentum.  The landings on the left bank of the Dnepr are the equivalent of Russia's attack on Avdiivka from what I can tell.  They are hoping to distract rather than to open up a new front.

Steve

Featured analysts on "War and the Rocks" see significant development in Russian tactics in the recent Avdiivka offensive.

Not significant improvement enough to turn an offensive that might have been doomed to fail no matter the people behind it into victory. They see that the coordination and implementation of forces was a significant step up from anything we have seen for a long while from the Russians.

If the trend continues and Russians keep being able to learn and raise the quality of their force it will have an impact next year.