How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Kinophile]

 

 

Edited October 16, 2023 by Kinophile

[cesmonkey]

4 hours ago, Kinophile said:

That is questionable. The lack of ZSU  SHORAD is what enabled the RUS helos. But when UKR got a counter tactic in place (I believe they pushed MANPAD teams further forward, plus (I assume) better integration with local ISR and mech AAD), the KA slowly backed off. 

RUS however has a much stronger tactical AA/AD envelope.  Unless ZSU does an focussed anti-AD campaign similar to the HIMARSing of RUS arty then UKR helos will die like flies in a furnace. 

If the Ukrainians are currently, successfully, lofting unguided rockets from Mi-8 helicopters with an effective range of 3-4 km, you don't think they would benefit from Longbow Apache's that can launch fire-and-forget Hellfire missiles with a range of 8 km?

https://mil.in.ua/en/news/the-military-demonstrated-hydra-rockets-on-ukrainian-helicopters/
 

Quote

Ukrainian aviation uses Hydra rockets to conduct distant strikes by low-toss firing. Their effective range when shooting in this mode reaches 3 to 4 kilometers, depending on the rocket modification and the helicopter’s flight parameters, such as speed and altitude.

 

[LongLeftFlank]

Don't recall seeing this posted yet. 

https://nitter.net/wartranslated/status/1712794208883351965#m

Ukrainian Special Forces compromised the Russian supply of fuel and ammo in the Zaporizhzhia frontline this morning.

"This morning, a unit of the SSO "Rukh Oporu" carried out a successful operation in temporarily occupied Melitopol.

Thanks to the sabotage actions of our soldiers at 07:30 in the morning, the railway track was blown up.

As a result of the explosion, the railway track and the train that delivered ammunition and fuel for the Russian army were damaged.

 

[dan/california]

17 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Don't recall seeing this posted yet. 

https://nitter.net/wartranslated/status/1712794208883351965#m

Ukrainian Special Forces compromised the Russian supply of fuel and ammo in the Zaporizhzhia frontline this morning.

"This morning, a unit of the SSO "Rukh Oporu" carried out a successful operation in temporarily occupied Melitopol.

Thanks to the sabotage actions of our soldiers at 07:30 in the morning, the railway track was blown up.

As a result of the explosion, the railway track and the train that delivered ammunition and fuel for the Russian army were damaged.

 

First reported a couple of days ago. No phos/video i know of though.

Edited October 16, 2023 by dan/california

[Battlefront.com]

10 hours ago, Haiduk said:

Particularly Avdiivka is not "strategic offensive", but it shouldn't be considered as something separate and local. 

For sure.  My comments were directed towards someone who was painting this as some sort of "game changing" offensive that didn't come together.  This is untrue.  It was a localized attack designed to achieve a very limited military objective (Avdiivka), not something that ever had any chance of doing more than that.

However, I think it's pretty clear that this offensive had "strategic" political goals.  Your post covered them very well, but I will simplify it... Putin needed some sort of victory to point to amidst all the failures.  Something.  Anything.  The MoD looked around the frontlines to see what might possibly produce something meaningful (politically, at least) and this is all they could come up with.  And even that failed.

I've already stressed how important this battle is in our understanding of Russia's near future capabilities.  But I should have added the political limitations Russia is also facing.  This attack seems to hammer home the point that Putin doesn't have options to fake making it look like the war is going well for Russia.

10 hours ago, Haiduk said:

There are rumors about conflict between Gerasimov and some generals, who keep Putin in warm bath (or Putin, who want to be in warm bath - no matter). Gerasimov demands immediate mobilization of 300 000 people in order to prepare them for several month, else as if he claims, exists a real risk of catastrophe if UKR troops early of later break through southern front. Because will no reserves to stop them by weakened units. As alternative he offered to withdraw troops to Tokmak to save their capabilities, but this was rejected. So, Russian authotities in front of coming elections can't do both unpopular things - neither to make "a gesture of free will", nor announcing mobilization, because this can rise social unstability and entail additional significant expences. 

This does not surprise me.  We saw this fight between pragmatists and Putin loyalists play out with the Kherson operation, with pragmatism finally winning the argument.  Given the problems we know Russia is having, and the unexpected fight to the death to keep forward positions, it would be very strange to not see this sort of struggle within the MoD.

One final thought to consider.  It is probably too late for Russia to pull back its forces and maintain a defensive line in the south.  When Russia skillfully (I rarely have occasion to say that!) withdrew from Kherson they had capable forces in the line and the river to hide behind.  Now?  A flexible defense is no longer feasible as pretty much all of Russia's forces are committed as well as degraded.  Moreover, whatever positions they might withdraw to can be directly attacked without the Dnepr to protect them.  Large scale withdrawal would likely be a disaster for Russia at this point, therefore it is likely obligated to stay where it is and fight on.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

13 hours ago, Sojourner said:

I'm curious why you say that. I thought the same thing but then I saw this report in Reuters...

"KYIV, Oct 14 (Reuters) - Russia's military pressed on with fierce assaults on the eastern Ukrainian town of Avdiivka on Saturday, with shelling so fierce that emergency crews were unable to recover the dead from wrecked buildings, the town's top administrative official said."

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/top-ukraine-general-says-fighting-northeast-has-significantly-worsened-2023-10-14/

This battle is (so far) following a similar pattern of failed Russian offensive actions.  When the breakthrough attack is defeated the offensive grinds on with ground attacks diminishing in both quantity and quality.  Artillery and air (when it is present) doesn't necessarily do the same.  Earlier in the war such operations could go for many weeks or even months before petering out into nothingness.  The important thing to note is that generally the subsequent attacks aren't as strong as the ones before them (for longer battles it is trends more than literal day by day accounting).

The pattern for Avdiivka seems to be the same, except this one peaked within a couple of days and is already in the decline phase.  How long before Russia ceases investing in this battle remains to be seen.  ISW's view is that if Russia wants to keep throwing away its combat power in pointless attacks, it probably can do so for a while.  See the underlines last sentence in their October 15th report:

Quote

Russian forces will likely continue offensive operations at this decreased tempo in the near term, however, and will remain a threat to Ukrainian forces in the area despite being unlikely to achieve a decisive breakthrough or encircle Avdiivka at this time. Any decrease in the tempo of Russian offensive operations may be the result of a temporary adjustment to the tactical situation, and Russian forces may intensify their attempts to encircle Avdiivka in the coming days. A Ukrainian military observer noted that Russian forces have penetrated Ukrainian flanks around Avdiivka and pose a significant threat to Ukrainian positions despite being unlikely to encircle Avdiivka in the near term.[16] Ukrainian military observers indicated that Russian forces had concentrated a significant grouping of forces consisting of elements of 15 motorized rifle regiments and 11 rifle regiments to the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front and have already executed regiment-size offensive operations in the area (meaning three or more battalions conducting cohesive assaults, a scale beyond that of most Russian or Ukrainian attacks at this stage in the war).[17] This reported Russian grouping will likely be able to sustain offensive operations aimed at encircling Avdiivka if Russian commanders are willing to sustain relatively high losses, despite being insufficient for an immediate breakthrough.

Given how much cannon fodder Russia has committed to this fight, I agree with ISW's assessment.  However, I have a feeling that the artillery usage will slacken off fairly soon.  My guess is that they've largely spent whatever they accumulated for the attack and I don't think they will continue to expend new artillery to back an obviously failed ground offensive.

Steve

[Hapless]

Another interesting one:

Raises some questions to me:

• Have people started painting the top side of drones yet? That Zala was ridiculously easy to spot and would have been less so even if the topside was just matt green or something. Are drones so expendable it's not worth it?
• Is the EW capability there to allow the use of friendly drones but jam the enemy? Does the profusion of COTS drones on both sides prohibit that because they all share similar frequencies?
• How easy are drones to operate? How easy should drones be to operate? Assuming the operator/team was destroyed in that shack, how easy are they to replace? Are they specialists that need specific training, or can you grab anyone who played a modern games console?
• Or... does someone in the Russian army consider a drone, operator and team eating a precision munition an attritional win for them?
• Either way... someone should probably explain that counterbattery rules apply to them too. I can remember plenty of videos of Ukrainian drone operators being very careful about retrieving their drones.
• It would be interesting to find out how the Ukrainian drone was in the right place at the right time to pick them up. It could be sheer chance, but did they chase the Zala? Intercept it after getting information it was heading in x direction? Were they lurking in anticpation based on SIGINT?

[akd]

Random image from Israel, but 1.) MBT Cope is spreading and 2.) confirmation of vertical limits of Trophy engagement (could be less, of course, but can’t be more):

[Bearstronaut]

25 minutes ago, akd said:

Random image from Israel, but 1.) MBT Cope is spreading and 2.) confirmation of vertical limits of Trophy engagement (could be less, of course, but can’t be more):

We call them cope cages but if nothing else it still prevents a drone from flying over and dropping a grenade down an open hatch.

[TheVulture]

One minor bit of good news: a deal via intermediaries in Qatar to return four abducted children from Russia to Ukraine. It is apparently a trial deal in the hope of a much larger scale return of children.

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-67121574

Edited October 16, 2023 by TheVulture

[Beleg85]

30 minutes ago, akd said:

Random image from Israel, but 1.) MBT Cope is spreading and 2.) confirmation of vertical limits of Trophy engagement (could be less, of course, but can’t be more):

Btw. there are another videos of Hezbollah targeting Merkava's with atgms while tanks standing still on checkpoints, with Trophy switched-off and crew outside. It seems they need to adjust their tank operating procedures in border warzone.

It's ofc. different climate and war than Ukraine, but clearly tanks face new challanges now. We will need to see yet how Cahal plan to use them in urban fights, that means if they will actually enter Gaza proper.

[Battlefront.com]

Based on prior discussions here...

4 hours ago, Hapless said:

Raises some questions to me:

• Have people started painting the top side of drones yet? That Zala was ridiculously easy to spot and would have been less so even if the topside was just matt green or something. Are drones so expendable it's not worth it?

I have no idea, but I was thinking the same exact thing.  It's big enough that it should have the top painted.  Stuck out like a sore thumb.

4 hours ago, Hapless said:

 

• Is the EW capability there to allow the use of friendly drones but jam the enemy? Does the profusion of COTS drones on both sides prohibit that because they all share similar frequencies?

Copious complaints from Russian sources indicate that Russian EW kills pretty much everything, or at least can be set to do so.  However, I suspect that applies mostly to COTS and not to larger military drones. 

4 hours ago, Hapless said:

• How easy are drones to operate? How easy should drones be to operate? Assuming the operator/team was destroyed in that shack, how easy are they to replace? Are they specialists that need specific training, or can you grab anyone who played a modern games console?

Just reading the description caused me to think this very same thing.  That's a pretty expensive way to take out a drone operator, regardless of how easily replaced it is.  Ukraine isn't known for wasting its ammo, especially not special forces, so my assumption is that this is no ordinary asset they knocked out.  I'm also curious about it being in a civilian type mobile office.  Is this an attempt to disguise it or is it a sign that Russia ran out of purpose built command centers?  Either way, it also stuck out like a sore thumb due to it being white and stuck in the middle of an unlikely environment for such a thing.

4 hours ago, Hapless said:

• Either way... someone should probably explain that counterbattery rules apply to them too. I can remember plenty of videos of Ukrainian drone operators being very careful about retrieving their drones.

Yeah, someone didn't get a memo either because it wasn't written or communicating lessons isn't Russia's strong suit.  Drone units, on both sides, have had years of experience with being shot at.  This team must have thought they were too far to the rear to be targeted.

4 hours ago, Hapless said:

• It would be interesting to find out how the Ukrainian drone was in the right place at the right time to pick them up. It could be sheer chance, but did they chase the Zala? Intercept it after getting information it was heading in x direction? Were they lurking in anticpation based on SIGINT?

If this indeed was Ukrainian special forces, then I'd guess they were out there specifically looking for the drone command center.  Could have been pure luck, but I'd ascribe that more to a standard line unit than special forces.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Scratch a Russian Mi-8

Scratch another TOS-1 (I don't think we've seen this one before):

And a good summary of the slag heap battle which Russian bloggers initially claimed they took, then backed off those claims.  This guy does pretty good summaries so it's likely his take on the battle is more-or-less accurate:

Steve

[Maciej Zwolinski]

17 hours ago, Kinophile said:

RUS however has a much stronger tactical AA/AD envelope.  Unless ZSU does an focussed anti-AD campaign similar to the HIMARSing of RUS arty then UKR helos will die like flies in a furnace. 

 That would not matter significantly in the case of helicopters used defensively like Russians used the Ka52s. In particular Longbow Apaches can fire Hellfires hovering behind terrain obstacles with only the radar extending above them. In such tactical situations despite Tunguskas and Pantsyrs the Russian would be unlikely to inflict meaningful losses.  The Hokums started to get shot down because the Ukrainians had stopped trying armoured assaults and they reverted to firing unguided rockets at infantry, where they could be caught by Manpads on the approach to target.

[Maciej Zwolinski]

25 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

And a good summary of the slag heap battle which Russian bloggers initially claimed they took, then backed off those claims.  This guy does pretty good summaries so it's likely his take on the battle is more-or-less accurate:

He seemed optimistic to me. He makes his updates daily, and usually they include something to be happy about. Not always confirmed by the other bloggers.

[Beleg85]

Murica vibes 100%.  Yeah, why not three?

But seriously it is interesting how much military help USA is willing to give to Israel in current situation. Beside guarding aganst Iran with navy/airforce there is probably not that much material assistance that Israel would need against Hamas alone. Maybe some quality bunker-buster munitions, drones and similar top-shelf stuff; only military resource that could seriously compete with Ukrainian demand are perhaps AA assets.

It also seems Blinken managed to tame Netanyahu for a week or so (I don't believe weather explanation), so heads could cool off and at least some basic limitation of fighting field could be done. Subsequently, Ukrainian war will likely take precedence over help to Middle East, unless somethng bery bad happens. I can bet Putin counted for more.

Edited October 16, 2023 by Beleg85

[Battlefront.com]

7 minutes ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

He seemed optimistic to me. He makes his updates daily, and usually they include something to be happy about. Not always confirmed by the other bloggers.

I agree generally, but he is not deliberately inaccurate.  In this case, however, he is summarizing something that happened over a couple of days and it is focused just on the slag heap portion of the Avdiivka battle.  At the very least he does a good job explaining the importance of the position and why even a large scale attack failed.

Steve

[JonS]

10 hours ago, Hapless said:

Have people started painting the top side of drones yet? That Zala was ridiculously easy to spot and would have been less so even if the topside was just matt green

Why bother? The only reason you could see it is because your vantage point was above, looking down. Every other set of eyes in Ukraine was below, looking up.

Even if a hostile drone or aircraft happened to be in the same area and happened to be looking in the direction, and the drone hadn't already been noticed on radar or sumfink ... so what? What are you going to be able to meaningfully do in the time available - watch your mates die in 4k?

On the flipside, being able to easily visually track a friendly airframe from a buddy drone or aircraft has its advantages.

Edited October 16, 2023 by JonS

[JonS]

7 hours ago, akd said:

Random image from Israel, but 1.) MBT Cope is spreading and 2.) confirmation of vertical limits of Trophy engagement (could be less, of course, but can’t be more):

Are we sure they aren't just sun shielding? The Aussies have had similar things on their tanks for years just to try and keep the crews going in the sun.

From 2005;

https://www.defencetalk.com/military/photos/a-rare-pic-of-an-australian-as1-leopard-tank-with-its-barracuda-quot.7113/

Edited October 16, 2023 by JonS

[Haiduk]

Drone unit "Rarog" of 24th mech.brigade destroyed two Russian 2S19 SP-howitzers in night bombing with R18 drone, Verkhniotoretske villlage. In comments several servicemen thank to "Rarog" that at last these two pieces of sh...t were cought. 
Verkkniotoretske is ralative close rear of two Russian sectors - Avdiivka and Toretsk, so artillery can work in both directions. 24th brigade defends Toretsk sector

 

[Twisk]

22 minutes ago, JonS said:

Even if a hostile drone or aircraft happened to be in the same area and happened to be looking in the direction, and the drone hadn't already been noticed on radar or sumfink ... so what?

Did we not just watch a video where the "so what" was the drone crew being tracked and killed?

Like you might have some points but you are talking about it as if you we didn't just watch the UAV recovery guy and whoever else was in that structure turned to mince meat.

Edited October 16, 2023 by Twisk

[Haiduk]

New video of 79th air-assault brigade from Novomykhailivka direction. First part of video with "doghoused" MTLBs already known, but added other episodes. 

Despite losses Russian troops of 39th motor-rifle brigade could advance in this direction in last two days. 

Russians attack here, trying push UKR troops off from Volnovakha, where will be future railway node, when Russians will complete Rostov - Mariupol railroad as reserve to Crimean bridge.

Edited October 16, 2023 by Haiduk

[Haiduk]

Significant gains for last days on southern flank of Bakhmut. UKR troops firmly gained foothold beyond ralroad from Klishchiivka to Andriivka and pushed Russian positions further east. UKR assault units, repelling enemy counter-attacks step by step move to Odradivka - the village on the road Horlivka - Bakhmut. 

Also UKR troops crossed railways north from Zelenopillia, making a threat to Kurdiumivka garrison

Russian milbloggers write situation in southern flank of Bakhmut as close to critical, because command continue to send infantry in senseless assaults with very weak and mostly ineffective artillery supoprt, in hope to turn back lost positions, but they have been finishing with big losses. They write Russian command forces to go in attacks even light wounded soldiers from field hospitals, because of critical lack of personnel

Just for illustration, new video of "Liut' " National Police assault brigade, likely recent fights in northern part of Klishchiivka. At the beginning of the video UKR fighters walk along several bodies of Russians

 

[LongLeftFlank]

35 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

New video of 79th air-assault brigade from Novomykhailivka direction. First part of video with "doghoused" MTLBs already known, but added other episodes. 

Despite losses Russian troops of 39th mech.brigade could advance in this direction in last two days. 

Russians attack here, trying push UKR troops off from Volnovakha, where will be future railway node, when Russians will complete Rostov - Mariupol railroad as reserve to Crimean bridge.

The vatniks are seriously assaulting across open, mined terrain mounted in softskinned trucks? (first :30)

Wot he said.... 

... although Tatarigami_UA notes that some of these wrecks are from earlier attacks. 

Edited October 16, 2023 by LongLeftFlank

[Haiduk]

1 minute ago, LongLeftFlank said:

The vatniks are seriously assaulting across open, mined terrain mounted in softskinned trucks? (first :30)

They discovered convenience of M113, but had MTLBs only %)