How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Haiduk]

You have a message from Hogwarts

[dan/california]

The whole thread is worth your time. We need to push stuff to Ukraine fast enough to stay ahead of the curve. The fact that there are not F-16s making Ka-52s too scared to come within 50 miles of the front line is exhibit A. Not equipping the stuff we sent with APS is example B. 

[The_Capt]

4 hours ago, Haiduk said:

Russians enlisted to VDV soldiers of unknown nation %) Syrians? Nepalian Gurkhas? Bangladesh? India? On the video allegedly Gurhas in training center in Belarus.

One guy with obviously Indian name Sakh Anit Kumar from 217th VDV regiment. Contract signed on May 16 2023 for one year. 

 

Hard to tell for that video - may be Nepalese (or another Asian country for that matter).  Definitely not Gurkhas, they would not need “training in Belarus” as they are already among the best soldiers on the planet.  Gurkhas would more likely be training other troops.  

[dan/california]

 

[Harmon Rabb]

Now that is a good photo.

[Battlefront.com]

4 hours ago, _Morpheus_ said:

Another video from K2 - 54th Mechanized Brigade.
Looks like the distance between russians and Ukrainian position less than 100 meters and artillery is really precise. 

 

Unusual to see drone video of AGL shots pummeling infantry positions.  Interesting to note a couple of times we saw what looked to be direct hits but the Russians there weren't incapacitated. Though for sure many were wounded and it appears at least a couple KIA, most probably from AGL hits.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

4 hours ago, Grigb said:

Regarding the morale of the Russian army, here is an unverified interview with a Russian officer that I still feel is credible. The interview (or rather phone conversation) is a reaction from an officer to a previous piece that included statements from other RU officers who criticized Putin's speech during meetings with RU Nat reporters.

It is lengthy, but I believe it is necessary to transcribe it in its whole in order to convey an impression of the real RU army morale and mentality now. 

 

That was an interesting read, thanks.  Lots of things to take away from this, but the overarching theme is that the officer feels the whole war is hopeless and yet can't bring himself to oppose it.  Reading this I kept thinking of a WW2 German officer at the end of the war with ONE critical exception.  This Russian officer does not believe any of this is to defend Russia, the German officer did (and he was correct as well).  From a morale standpoint, this is a very critical element missing from the Russian war since the beginning and it doesn't seem to have changed much.

The description of Russian soldiers fitting into three categories jibes with other information we have:

1.  Guys fighting for money, be it PMCs or supposedly patriotic volunteers.  They might say they are fighting for idealistic reasons, but it's just a facade to cover up for the fact that they are only fighting for money.

2.  Zealots who have been successfully brainwashed.

3.  Old timer professional soldiers (a dwindling percentage of the whole force).  They are in this war because that is what their chosen profession is, not because they believe in the war or are in it for the money.

His comments about theft were interesting.  He acknowledged that Russian forces (in his experience) have always been thieves, but they used to not steal from each other.  He says that now if a soldier takes a nap he'll be lucky to wake up with everything he went to sleep with.  Yeah, that's gotta really build up unit cohesion!

Steve

[Maquisard manqué]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

Hard to tell for that video - may be Nepalese (or another Asian country for that matter).  Definitely not Gurkhas, they would not need “training in Belarus” as they are already among the best soldiers on the planet.  Gurkhas would more likely be training other troops.  

There are Gurkhas and Gurkhas. The UK takes the best, then India. Pretty much anyone from Nepal or adjoining areas of India could call themselves Gurkha soldiers, but they might not be actual Gurkhas, let alone from Nepal - or even Gurkhali.

[Harmon Rabb]

 

[Battlefront.com]

7 hours ago, cesmonkey said:

French channel TF1 does a report from the Russian side of the front lines:

 

If it wasn't for the French voice I'd say this was Russian propaganda.  This looks nearly identical to one of the Kadyrov videos from their supposed positions near Kreminna.  Pristine, well constructed defensive line in immaculate condition.  I don't doubt that this is a real position, but I do doubt this is typical of what Russian defenses look like.

Steve

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Unusual to see drone video of AGL shots pummeling infantry positions.  Interesting to note a couple of times we saw what looked to be direct hits but the Russians there weren't incapacitated. Though for sure many were wounded and it appears at least a couple KIA, most probably from AGL hits.

Steve

Attrional/corrosive warfare in action, KIA is good, wounded is probably better, but the whole unit is being run absolutely ragged. 

[Vanir Ausf B]

3 hours ago, dan/california said:

The whole thread is worth your time. We need to push stuff to Ukraine fast enough to stay ahead of the curve. The fact that there are not F-16s making Ka-52s too scared to come within 50 miles of the front line is exhibit A. Not equipping the stuff we sent with APS is example B. 

Different article in the NYT talking about the evolution of Russian tactics (paywalled, I assume).

___________

American officials acknowledge that Russian tactics have improved. But those officials believe, based on battlefield intelligence reports, that the success in Bakhmut was largely because of Wagner’s willingness to throw prisoners into the fight, no matter the cost in lives.

But the soldiers on the ground saw something else happening.

Soldiers fighting for Ukraine in Bakhmut described a fight that ended much differently from how it began. Prisoners were not as prevalent. Instead, they said, Wagner’s professional fighters coordinated ground and artillery fire on Ukrainian positions, then quickly outflanked them using small teams.

As Ukrainian territory shrunk to a final few blocks, for example, Russian forces saturated a Ukrainian-held building with artillery. Moments after they retreated, Russian troops were inside.

“The Ukrainians just couldn’t keep up,” said one foreign legion soldier. To counter Russia’s strategy, Ukrainian forces wired buildings to explode, detonating them as they retreated.

The March mission report shared with The Times alluded to this type of enemy: “Assumed to be Wagner group,” the report read. “Evidence of being well-trained.”

“Used effective fire and maneuver,” it continued, describing “the best equipped Russian soldiers.”

But prowess in one area or during one mission has not yet translated widely. And American officials say that while Russia has adapted its tactics, its troops overall are not growing more sophisticated.

________

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/17/world/europe/russia-ukraine-war-tactics.html

Edited June 18, 2023 by Vanir Ausf B

[Kinophile]

So explain this Ka-52 issue to me.

We've been assuming that low level air attacks are doomed/limuted due to ground level MANPADS saturation,  yet there are consistent reports of helo problems for advancing UKR mech infantry and often from 10 km away. 

How can UKR close this tactical loop hole? 

[Kinophile]

So explain this Ka-52 issue to me.

We've been assuming that low level air attacks are doomed/limuted due to ground level MANPADS saturation,  yet there are consistent reports of helo problems for advancing UKR mech infantry and often from 10 km away. 

How can UKR close this tactical loop hole? 

[dan/california]

9 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

So explain this Ka-52 issue to me.

We've been assuming that low level air attacks are doomed/limuted due to ground level MANPADS saturation,  yet there are consistent reports of helo problems for advancing UKR mech infantry and often from 10 km away. 

How can UKR close this tactical loop hole? 

Their missiles outrange the man pads. If the helicopters can keep track of the farthest forward Ukrainian units they can take pop up shots from out of manpad range. It is a by the book employment of the helicopter. 

[sburke]

11 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

So explain this Ka-52 issue to me.

We've been assuming that low level air attacks are doomed/limuted due to ground level MANPADS saturation,  yet there are consistent reports of helo problems for advancing UKR mech infantry and often from 10 km away. 

How can UKR close this tactical loop hole? 

hit their bases.  Soooo we need to help with the info and the weapons to ... hit their bases.  

[Fenris]

Ya, was about to post the exact same thing.  Work out where they are and destroy them on the ground.  Or at least destroy their support facilities..

Obviously a lot easier said than done but hopefully this can be achieved before any big pushes start.

Edited June 18, 2023 by Fenris

[dan/california]

18 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

So explain this Ka-52 issue to me.

We've been assuming that low level air attacks are doomed/limuted due to ground level MANPADS saturation,  yet there are consistent reports of helo problems for advancing UKR mech infantry and often from 10 km away. 

How can UKR close this tactical loop hole? 

NATO assumes it will have fighter planes to avoid this problem.

[sburke]

17 minutes ago, dan/california said:

NATO assumes it will have fighter planes to avoid this problem.

not so sure fighter planes are the answer.  Seems they'd be more the hunted rather than the hunter trying to get the helos with all the AD assets around.  

[Undaunted]

Vs choppers

How about drone?  Killer drones, drone + PGM/arty, drone mounted manpad?

[Vanir Ausf B]

37 minutes ago, sburke said:

hit their bases.  Soooo we need to help with the info and the weapons to ... hit their bases.  

That's well-within Storm Shadow range. Not sure why it hasn't been hit.

 

[dan/california]

13 minutes ago, sburke said:

not so sure fighter planes are the answer.  Seems they'd be more the hunted rather than the hunter trying to get the helos with all the AD assets around.  

Helicopters primary trick is staying too low to show up on ground based radar. Look down, shoot down radar, and AMRAMS can solve that problem from way, way back. And no helicopter on earth is going to outrun an AMRAAM. If they had to the F-16s could even hold at low altitude until they got the word there were helicopters coming forward, and pop up just long enough to lock the missile on.

[kevinkin]

I read Afghans had a pretty good record using MANPADS vs Soviet choppers. Could the RA learned from that debacle? Probably not. The terrain is very different or perhaps the UA is holding back MANPADs and other AD assets for the big push. UA ammo storages might play a role right now. Or maybe the UR is operating from small hard to fire and mobile assembly and refueling areas close behind the line but out of most artillery fire. I am confident that the choppers will not become a operational problem but remain a tactical one. They need fuel and rockets etc.. Those can in interdicted. But I have not seen much on the state of the ISR capabilities Ukraine has access to and if they are less effective now than a year ago. 

[chrisl]

1 hour ago, sburke said:

not so sure fighter planes are the answer.  Seems they'd be more the hunted rather than the hunter trying to get the helos with all the AD assets around.  

Hang a sidewinder from one of the big drones.

[Jiggathebauce]

Have a totally left field question about helicopters: have there been recorded instances where air assets were hit by ground based artillery, out of pure coincidence and serendipity? Accidental reverse anti air, if you will?