How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[mosuri]

48 minutes ago, Elmar Bijlsma said:

That does seem to point towards a certain psychological breaking point being reached. Not recovering your dead or even chucking them over the parapet are indicators of a very grim mindset having set in. Of course, that is not an indicator of fragile morale. It may even be evidence of a fatalistic mindset amongst Russians that they will endure whatever they need to. OTOH I think troops that let their dead buddies lie where they fell aren't first in line to take the initiative in a fight.

Grimness (or ghoulishness) aside, isn't there a very real hygienic aspect to this? Even with cold weather I shudder to think of the potential for rat infestation, and with insects in the warm season the spreading of disease is guaranteed.

One would think that you have to be very far gone to ignore that, but luckily I don't have any experience with such situations.

[Beleg85]

2 hours ago, Chibot Mk IX said:

I saw the uploader mention that this is the second known incident of Russian forces surrendering to a drone, but it should be the first documented case of humans surrendering to a drone.

This surrendering appears to be low efficiency. Perhaps in the future, we might witness each squadron of drones with one drone assign to a special task, carrying a loudspeaker, communicating with the Russian forces below?

It may be the third recorded from my memory, but I read somewhere there are more unregistered on videos and similar situation may happen more often when Ukrainian infantry is close by.

 

Definitelly topic of drone-human interaction is fascinating, we spoke about it some time ago, but since drone warfre surprise us with something new literally every consecutive month of this conflict, this issue will become more relevant. Rules of Engagement in the future will perhaps involve some very basic "sign language" so drone operator could force enemies to lay down their weapons and secure their surrender..

After entire wave of really sick videos with grunts being murdeed by these little electroinc buggers in thousands different ways (there is one from today when one wounded Muscovite blows his own head in order to avoid it- clearly effect of shock and fear) this one is something really different. It shows that after isolating enemy, with some effort on Ukrainian side, it is at least sometimes possible to undergoe such operation without human factor on the ground. If Ukrainians would develop more working procedures for such actions, it would be very powerful morale breaking/propaganda tool as well- Russian telegrams are furious this guy surrendered and are visibly afraid it may happen in the future on larger scale, given worse morale and general "drone fever" on muscovite side. For now it's isolated case, but one day- who knows how many people on both sides would live if drone operators would have more options to their disosal than just dropping granade on their necks. It also send positive signal to Western allies (in contrary to these "pranks" with Wehrmacht crosses on humvees), as it shows Ukrainian army can put some effort to keep surrendering enemy alive. Plus they have one more guys for prisoner fund.

[Battlefront.com]

47 minutes ago, Elmar Bijlsma said:

Certainly seen my fair share of troops seemingly sleeping or feigning death in the hope of avoiding the attention of the drones bombers.

But in my viewing of drone and combat videos these last few weeks, there's a very constant theme of trenches littered with Russians that are obviously dead. And not infrequently, as far as it can be determined, some of the dead are a bit ripe.

Yes, absolutely.  So many videos that I'm starting to get a better sense of what is what.  Which is why I reassessed that previous trench full of "dead" to be "sleeping".  Lighting seemed to me very early morning as well.  My guess is it was an early morning recon drone flight.

47 minutes ago, Elmar Bijlsma said:

That does seem to point towards a certain psychological breaking point being reached. Not recovering your dead or even chucking them over the parapet are indicators of a very grim mindset having set in. Of course, that is not an indicator of fragile morale. It may even be evidence of a fatalistic mindset amongst Russians that they will endure whatever they need to. OTOH I think troops that let their dead buddies lie where they fell aren't first in line to take the initiative in a fight.
 

I always think back to the story of a Russian tank knocked out in Brest-Litovsk in 1941.  For days German forces moved past the wreck on the way to the rapidly moving frontline.  Suddenly the tank burst to life and (IIRC) hit a German vehicle.  The Germans easily knocked it out.  An examination found that one crew member had stayed buttoned up with his dead comrades for days in the hot sun with no food or water just waiting for an opportunity to shoot at something (the turret was likely inoperable).

For sure there's a different mindset deep in the recesses of the Russian soldier's mind that does not exist in the West in the same way.  It's been pondered and discussed in the West increasingly since the Winter War, but until recently it was unclear if modern day Russia still had this hardened fatalism baked into its would be soldiers.  It's been a long time since Chechnya and Russia had seemingly progressed a bit.  Now we know more and the answer is that modern day Russians are not all that different than they have been in the past.

47 minutes ago, Elmar Bijlsma said:

All in all, I have confidence that the Ukrainians will be able to break through wherever they decide to launch their big attacks. And I have very little faith in the Russians in their current state being up to the task of slowing or stopping an advance once they break through. If the reserve trenches fail to stop the Ukrainians, the latter can keep going until logistics or the Azov sea forces them to stop, I think.

Yup!

Steve

[The_Capt]

16 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

I doubt it.  One scenario is that the Ukrainians knew a month or two ago that Storm Shadow was being lined up.  If that's the case, for sure they would have taken it into consideration.  Even if they got wind of this possibility more recently, it's still going to be in their plan somewhere.

Generally in warfare it is best to pull a surprise after the defender's forces have been committed to a specific action.  That makes it much, much harder for the defender to respond effectively.  Sometimes the defender has a bad feeling about what's happening, but doesn't have good options.  I think this is what happened last year with Kharkiv.  My gut tells me that senior Russian leadership had a pretty good idea what was about to happen but everything was committed to Kherson and so they couldn't do much about it but hope it wouldn't be too bad.  It is quite possible that is what Ukraine is attempting to do again for this counter offensive.

Here's a rough concept of how things could go:

1.  Launch a series of significant, but small scale, counter attacks in the Donbas.  We MIGHT be seeing this already (see ISW's report from May 9).

2.  Wait for Russian reserves to be committed to those areas then smash concentrations with HIMARS and other systems we know they have, including a lot more JDAM type attacks.

3.  Increase the scope and scale of the ground attacks in hopes that Russia won't be able to sit back, but instead either commit more forces or be obligated to withdraw.

4.  Hopefully gain significant ground, triggering Russia to commit more forces which can then get smashed when concentrated, thus committing more Russian troops.

5.  When it seems the Donbas counter offensive has got Russia's full attention, start hitting everything in the south.  If Storm Shadow is available, smash the Hell out of everything that Russia moved far to the rear.  Do this for a little while without significant ground action.

6.  With Russian forces tied up in Donbas and chaos (hopefully!) happening in the south, launch the main attack towards Tokmak and drive down towards Crimea while also pushing along the Dnepr.  Cut up Russia's LOCs as quickly and thoroughly as possible in order to get Russia forces to panic and withdraw (Russians do not like being cut off!).

7.  Keep the focus on the south and use the Donbas to pin down Russian forces.  Have modest expectations for taking terrain in Donbas, however if Russian forces withdraw or are overwhelmed, definitely take advantage to a point.  Better to be cautious here until the south is settled.  The last thing Ukraine needs is to overextend itself in the Donbas and have to divert forces from the south to stabilize things.

That's my thinking

Steve

This is probably the Most Likely COA on the board right now.  It can give a win in Donbas is the RA does not take the bait, and gives a win if it does.  Here the air picture could get interesting if the UA is indeed short on air denial (but I am kinda doubting this to be honest).

Few other possible COAs:

- Screw the plot lines, foreplay and mood lighting - go straight to the money shot.  A mechanized heavy assault straight down the middle, hammering everything in depth and deep strike laterally to ensure that reinforcing/c-moves cannot really do much anyway.  This one is bold and loud but could yield the big results, which are political gold.  It would depend very much on the real shape of the RA.  If they are severely beat up as I suspect, they might just be able to do this job up front.  I would still expect deep strike/fires all along the line to do the shaping on this one.

- Do a rough plan A as Steve outlines but roll in a river crossing to the west.  If timed right this could break the RA completely.  The RA is weakest south of Kherson by all accounts and a bold assault water xing would be simply breathtaking if they can pull it off. 

- Corrosive warfare and wait and see where things fall apart for the RA.  This good is that this would be the lowest risk for the UA, but 1) resource intensive on ammo and 2) time.  Would test patience of the West as we would basically be watching not much happen but strikes all over the place.   It would mirror what they did last fall.  Where the follow-on hammer lands would be conditions-based - so operationally the UA would need to be pretty agile to exploit it. 

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

Few other possible COAs:

- Screw the plot lines, foreplay and mood lighting - go straight to the money shot.  A mechanized heavy assault straight down the middle, hammering everything in depth and deep strike laterally to ensure that reinforcing/c-moves cannot really do much anyway.  This one is bold and loud but could yield the big results, which are political gold.  It would depend very much on the real shape of the RA.  If they are severely beat up as I suspect, they might just be able to do this job up front.  I would still expect deep strike/fires all along the line to do the shaping on this one.

I've been thinking about this a lot as Russian forces continue to expose themselves to losses in the Donbas.  It could be that the troop density is better than ahead of Kharkiv, but the ability to resist is even lower.  It would be risky for Ukraine to spread its reserves over the whole front, but it could be that after hitting a few sectors in the Donbas and perforating the south that some sectors of front could go on at least a limited offensive without significant reinforcement.

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

- Do a rough plan A as Steve outlines but roll in a river crossing to the west.  If timed right this could break the RA completely.  The RA is weakest south of Kherson by all accounts and a bold assault water xing would be simply breathtaking if they can pull it off. 

100+ pages ago I did a fairly detailed suggestion for how Ukraine can take the south.  Crossing the Dnepr at multiple points, even on a small scale, is pretty much a no brainer.  I'd wait until whatever reserves the Russians have are busy, so this would be somewhere in the middle of the operation instead of a leading action.

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

- Corrosive warfare and wait and see where things fall apart for the RA.  This good is that this would be the lowest risk for the UA, but 1) resource intensive on ammo and 2) time.  Would test patience of the West as we would basically be watching not much happen but strikes all over the place.   It would mirror what they did last fall.  Where the follow-on hammer lands would be conditions-based - so operationally the UA would need to be pretty agile to exploit it. 

I'm not a fan of this one, but it is certainly logically sound.  It really depends on how Ukraine feels about Russia's ability to resit against the forces it has on hand.  I suspect they think they can be more aggressive than this.

Also, watching the previously posted video of 3rd Battalion's tanks hammering a Russian position has made me (once again) concerned that Ukraine hasn't fully embraced Western combined arms warfare.  Last night I reread an article with some significant Special Forces types from the US and Canada who wrote a report based on 9 months in Ukraine.  Their experience was Ukraine was still following the Russian/Soviet model of loosely coordinated small scale attacks that relied on one arm more than another.  The tanks in Bakhmut being an example of something they were explicitly critical of (i.e. lone armor blasting away and then withdrawing).  This is the same thing we saw with the K2 video where the tank went in without infantry support, which only arrived later after the tank had done its work (and barely survived it too).

What I'm very curious to see is whether the new wave of Western trained units, currently in reserve, will fight more as a whole and less as component parts.  Corrosive warfare and maneuver warfare are different tools.  Ukraine needs some significant maneuver warfare to wrap this war up sooner rather than later.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Topic of poor state of Russian training, why they still can advance despite near zero skills, and what is needed to change the situation:

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Interesting chart.  Looks reasonable, though of course it's all educated guesswork when it comes to this stuff:

 

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

I've been thinking about this a lot as Russian forces continue to expose themselves to losses in the Donbas.  It could be that the troop density is better than ahead of Kharkiv, but the ability to resist is even lower.  It would be risky for Ukraine to spread its reserves over the whole front, but it could be that after hitting a few sectors in the Donbas and perforating the south that some sectors of front could go on at least a limited offensive without significant reinforcement.

100+ pages ago I did a fairly detailed suggestion for how Ukraine can take the south.  Crossing the Dnepr at multiple points, even on a small scale, is pretty much a no brainer.  I'd wait until whatever reserves the Russians have are busy, so this would be somewhere in the middle of the operation instead of a leading action.

I'm not a fan of this one, but it is certainly logically sound.  It really depends on how Ukraine feels about Russia's ability to resit against the forces it has on hand.  I suspect they think they can be more aggressive than this.

Also, watching the previously posted video of 3rd Battalion's tanks hammering a Russian position has made me (once again) concerned that Ukraine hasn't fully embraced Western combined arms warfare.  Last night I reread an article with some significant Special Forces types from the US and Canada who wrote a report based on 9 months in Ukraine.  Their experience was Ukraine was still following the Russian/Soviet model of loosely coordinated small scale attacks that relied on one arm more than another.  The tanks in Bakhmut being an example of something they were explicitly critical of (i.e. lone armor blasting away and then withdrawing).  This is the same thing we saw with the K2 video where the tank went in without infantry support, which only arrived later after the tank had done its work (and barely survived it too).

What I'm very curious to see is whether the new wave of Western trained units, currently in reserve, will fight more as a whole and less as component parts.  Corrosive warfare and maneuver warfare are different tools.  Ukraine needs some significant maneuver warfare to wrap this war up sooner rather than later.

Steve

 

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

This is probably the Most Likely COA on the board right now.  It can give a win in Donbas is the RA does not take the bait, and gives a win if it does.  Here the air picture could get interesting if the UA is indeed short on air denial (but I am kinda doubting this to be honest).

Few other possible COAs:

- Screw the plot lines, foreplay and mood lighting - go straight to the money shot.  A mechanized heavy assault straight down the middle, hammering everything in depth and deep strike laterally to ensure that reinforcing/c-moves cannot really do much anyway.  This one is bold and loud but could yield the big results, which are political gold.  It would depend very much on the real shape of the RA.  If they are severely beat up as I suspect, they might just be able to do this job up front.  I would still expect deep strike/fires all along the line to do the shaping on this one.

- Do a rough plan A as Steve outlines but roll in a river crossing to the west.  If timed right this could break the RA completely.  The RA is weakest south of Kherson by all accounts and a bold assault water xing would be simply breathtaking if they can pull it off. 

- Corrosive warfare and wait and see where things fall apart for the RA.  This good is that this would be the lowest risk for the UA, but 1) resource intensive on ammo and 2) time.  Would test patience of the West as we would basically be watching not much happen but strikes all over the place.   It would mirror what they did last fall.  Where the follow-on hammer lands would be conditions-based - so operationally the UA would need to be pretty agile to exploit it. 

Crossing the Dnipro towards the southern end would be the highest risk, highest reward way to do it. But if the AFU can just attack at two widely separated points on the land bridge they put all the Russian forces in between at risk of being cut off. This could dislocate a massive piece of the Russian defensive line, and approximately nobody thinks these so called battalions of mobiks are capable of fighting a complicated maneuver battle. With or without a river crossing this give a real chance of the highway of death part two. I have this vision of a platoon of Bradleys wrecking a column of retreating Russian trucks from one end to the other. 

[DesertFox]

Reuters picked it up. So it appears something is happening.

Ukraine unit says Russian brigade flees outskirts of Bakhmut | Reuters

[Pete Wenman]

 

18 minutes ago, DesertFox said:

Reuters picked it up. So it appears something is happening.

Ukraine unit says Russian brigade flees outskirts of Bakhmut | Reuters

Tom Coopers take on this action

Quote

Just how nasty became obvious when the 3rd Assault was sent to clear the Russian-controlled bridgehead west of the Siversky Donets – Donbass Canal. This was held by the 72nd Motor Rifle Brigade (VSRF). Ukrainians attacked from two sides (approx. west to east and south to north). As first, they blew up one or two of its BMPs carrying elements of a newly-arrived Russian battalion and panicked its infantry to flee. The commander of the Russian brigade rushed his second battalion to the frontline, but this panicked when hit by artillery and infantry attacks - and run away over the Canal. A 2,000-metres-wide and 500-metres-deep sector of the Russian frontline collapsed.

When hearing about this, Wagner commanders in Bakhmut – already nervous because of Prigozhin’s constant complaints about the ‘Ministry of Intrigue’ (Keystone Cops in Moscow), lack of ammunition, and warning about ‘Ukrainian counteroffensive on the flanks of their advance into Bakhmut’ – assessed that Ukrainians were about to advance all the way to Klishchivka. Obviously, there was no option but to stop assaults into western Bakhmut and rush at least one of Wagner’s assault groups – reinforced by at least one of the VDV – to the Canal with the aim of stopping Ukrainian advance and re-establishing the frontline.

Obviously, when troops are on the move, they are exposed in the open. Moreover, after securing positions of the 72nd Motor Rifle, the 3rd Assault stopped and entrenched itself. Thus, this Wagner and VDV assault groups run straight into an ambush. Result?

To quote one of involved Ukrainian troops: ‘Wagner has shown a masterclass in running’.

While some Ukrainian sources are claiming as many as 500 Russians for killed, the 3rd Assault collected at least 64, possibly 87 Russian killed and 5 prisoners, knocked out or captured one or two BMPs, several mortars and the main forward ammunition depot of the 72nd Motor Rifle, and reached the Canal.

full article here

https://xxtomcooperxx.substack.com/p/ukraine-war-10-may-2023-ministry?fbclid=IwAR2_gLZGRwnbKISW1DRYDEeSO_Qd0uVL1MnIg_fEYQ_Tg1Et4PtQAso8g04

P

[Battlefront.com]

5 minutes ago, Pete Wenman said:

 

Tom Coopers take on this action

full article here

https://xxtomcooperxx.substack.com/p/ukraine-war-10-may-2023-ministry?fbclid=IwAR2_gLZGRwnbKISW1DRYDEeSO_Qd0uVL1MnIg_fEYQ_Tg1Et4PtQAso8g04

P

Thanks for that.  Looks like my instincts were correct that the line of BMPs in the previously posted video were unloading reinforcements when they were hit.

This is an excellent example of what Ukraine can do in the Donbas specifically.  Hit a soft sector, obligate reinforcements, hit the reinforcements.  Worst case Russia stabilizes the situation at the expense of some other location.  Best case is the targeted sector remains weak AND there's now new weakness somewhere else.  It gives Ukraine somewhere else to repeat the process.  Do that enough times and the Russians will have to pull forces from some other sector much further away.

Corrosive warfare is really difficult to counter if you don't have numerical superiority to start with.

Steve

[dan/california]

10 minutes ago, Pete Wenman said:

 

Tom Coopers take on this action

full article here

https://xxtomcooperxx.substack.com/p/ukraine-war-10-may-2023-ministry?fbclid=IwAR2_gLZGRwnbKISW1DRYDEeSO_Qd0uVL1MnIg_fEYQ_Tg1Et4PtQAso8g04

P

Quote

Essentially, after months of critical shortages on artillery ammo and heavy infantry weapons, Ukrainians have – finally – received both. Plenty of both. So much so, the last 4-5 days they’re shooting ‘at will’: as much as necessary and whenever necessary, without any kind of limits in expenditure.

Key quote here, AFU general staff have turned the tap on. Very curious how widely they have done that. We might see a lot more running Russians soon.

[Pete Wenman]

7 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Thanks for that.  Looks like my instincts were correct that the line of BMPs in the previously posted video were unloading reinforcements when they were hit.

This is an excellent example of what Ukraine can do in the Donbas specifically.  Hit a soft sector, obligate reinforcements, hit the reinforcements.  Worst case Russia stabilizes the situation at the expense of some other location.  Best case is the targeted sector remains weak AND there's now new weakness somewhere else.  It gives Ukraine somewhere else to repeat the process.  Do that enough times and the Russians will have to pull forces from some other sector much further away.

Corrosive warfare is really difficult to counter if you don't have numerical superiority to start with.

Steve

I thought this part was instructive. Seems like a deliberate action to halt and dig in, rather than to continue to try and exploit the Russian withdrawal. 

Quote

Moreover, after securing positions of the 72nd Motor Rifle, the 3rd Assault stopped and entrenched itself.

 

 

[Harmon Rabb]

 

[Battlefront.com]

17 minutes ago, Pete Wenman said:

I thought this part was instructive. Seems like a deliberate action to halt and dig in, rather than to continue to try and exploit the Russian withdrawal.

This is prudent.  Russia these days attacks simply because it is in their DNA to do so.  They'll likely launch Human Wave attacks that will nibble at the Ukrainian's forces, but leave mountains of dead Russians and burnt out equipment on the battlefield.  These will need to be replaced by drawing down from other sectors.  The corrosion, therefore, continues without Ukraine having to commit to another offensive in that particular spot or risk defending more exposed positions.

As stated many times before, this sort of warfare works when the enemy is playing along, which Russia certainly is doing.  However, it is slow and costly because time gives the enemy opportunity to cause casualties with artillery and suicide attacks.  Time theoretically also allows the enemy a chance for reflection and learning from the corrosive experiment.  Fortunately, Russia shows zero signs of learning.

Steve

[sburke]

It will be curious to see if that sudden retreat represents something larger within the ranks of the RA.  The coming counter offensive has been hyped not just by the West, but Putin and the Russian command as well.  Considering what they have experienced in the last couple months and how badly the RA fared at Kharkiv, I wonder if this sense of panic isn't a reflection of a very corroded Russian resolve.  It is one thing to be told to throw yourself into a forlorn hope.  it is quite another to not know if you are now on your own and wanting to race to the rear with no cohesive leadership that you trust.

[panzermartin]

Could be a first hint, UA is trying a Stalingrad maneuver to push around the flanks of the Wagnerites in the city , knowing their are manned propably by lower quality Roma... Er russian conscripts. 

But I don't think it's possible for them to advance more against the artillery and aviation russian forces amassed currently in the area. They are not spread between hundreds of kms like in Kharkov in the summer. 

Or maybe the main south offensive starts with a bold distraction move in Bakhmut?

[Haiduk]

According to news two hours ago - 3rd assault brigade "Azov" had next success in their local (?) counter-offensive. Detalis probably will be tomorrow. 

Inside Bakhmut, Wagners continue to advance slowly in western part in cottadges quarters. Rest streets without significant changes.

 

[dan/california]

 

Quote

https://t.me/Ukraine_365News/52024

The turret in this video gets more altitude that SpaceX's first attempt at launching Starship. And I am only barely kidding.

Edited May 10, 2023 by dan/california

[Haiduk]

3 minutes ago, dan/california said:

The turret

The man %)

[Battlefront.com]

7 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

The man %)

I dunno, looks a little big for a man.  Certainly not a turret unless Russians are putting tanks on top of large buildings

Steve

[Haiduk]

Russians strike with guided bombs some facilities in Beryslav, Kherson oblast, like potential place for ammunition storages and personnel deployment

 

[Kinophile]

3 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Last night I reread an article

 

Link? 

[Kinophile]

1 hour ago, sburke said:

It will be curious to see if that sudden retreat represents something larger within the ranks of the RA.  The coming counter offensive has been hyped not just by the West, but Putin and the Russian command as well.  Considering what they have experienced in the last couple months and how badly the RA fared at Kharkiv, I wonder if this sense of panic isn't a reflection of a very corroded Russian resolve.  It is one thing to be told to throw yourself into a forlorn hope.  it is quite another to not know if you are now on your own and wanting to race to the rear with no cohesive leadership that you trust.

Tbh it seems specific  to the chain of tactical events. A UKR unit hit while unloading would panic and fall back, any unit would. How far and quickly they de regroup would depend on expert,  command losses and training.  Terrain slso,  if there's not much cover.

The ZSU took tactical advantage of that moment and the local commanders prudently didn't charge on too far, nailed the imprudent Wagner counter attack and settled down.

 A more steady and careful Wagner commander would have given this a less dramatic coda.

Bit of a storm in a teacup,  operationally.  I'm leery of giving this too much wind. 

Edited May 10, 2023 by Kinophile

[TheVulture]

3 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

Tbh it seems specific  to the chain of tactical events. A UKR unit hit while unloading would panic and fall back, any unit would. The ZSU took tactical advantage of that moment and the local commanders prudently didn't charge on to far.

 It if a storm in a teacup,  operationally.  I'm leery of giving this too much wind. 

Agreed, although the argument could be made that the apparent large increase in UKR artillery is an operational factor that contributed to this. But yeah, the increased artillery is part of the softening up of various points along the front before the offensive kicks off, and this is just a tactical level example where the Ukrainians were able to exploit that softening to regain some ground when the Russians panicked.