How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[kevinkin]

"Where orcs have no name".

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, Beleg85 said:

Aftermath of previous battle filmed by K2 battalion- Ukrainian soldiers collect bodies of killed comrades.

https://twitter.com/technicznybdg/status/1644720439950704640

Also a lot of empty, open spaces filmed by drone seem to attest to small density of troops per km.

I recognize this battlefield from the earlier K-2 videos.  It would be interesting to know the sequence of events.  In the earlier K-2 videos we saw the Russians (about 8 from my count on this video, forget what I might have counted before) died by drone and/or artillery fire.  Did these two Ukrainians die when stumbling upon the Russians, or did they die when the Russians overran their positions?  It's not important to know, just curiosity.

Steve

[danfrodo]

Wow, y'all are on a roll.  Great posts.  I teared up a little at the U2-background training 'warning' to Putin.  And then laughed out loud at the 'leak' video.  The discussion of the southern front offensive was the really excellent bit.  All of these are interesting and possible.  So much of what UKR does, I think, depends on what they see as the opportunity areas.  If RU heavily reinforces the line Vasylivka-tokmak, maybe UKR makes its move further east (with the cost of have both flanks hostile) and trying to unhinge that line.  

I still want to get RU betting heavily on one end of the line or the other, meaning convince them the attack is coming south or coming to Luhansk.  The second best option is where they try to defend everything and spread out their strength (hopefully close to front line), which is what I think is most likely.  The more planning that Putin himself can do the better of course, as he's taken the Hitler course on defensive operations.   Putin was fooled once and made ridiculously amateur decision to double down in Kherson which led to double disaster, so it'll be interesting to see if or how that influences his thinking going forward.

Perhaps we can think of Bakhmut & entire winter offensive as Putin's Kursk?  Burning up mountains of valuable men, resources & time while in the end only leaving him open to exploitation of his weakened sectors.

[danfrodo]

Next time I think I should feel sorry for some RU schmuck dying in a trench, I'll remember this article.  Sorry for paywall.  UKR mothers take ~3000 mile journey to get their kids out of RU-occupied regions.  They go through Poland-Belarus-Russia-occupied region, get kid, then similar trip back though seems able to cross directly Belaus-UKR. 

The sooner they are all dead (or surrendered) the better.  The child kidnapping part of this war makes my blood absolutely boil. 

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/08/world/europe/ukrainian-children-mothers-russia.html

 

Edited April 9, 2023 by danfrodo

[Beleg85]

It seems Russians last year send a tank painted like Easter Egg.

Happy Easter to everyone, by the way.

 

[Battlefront.com]

7 hours ago, Grossman said:

Steve....I can see your point. Much more do-able and less risk. Of course UKR might try to do both, phased of course. Depending. 

The thing I like most about the concept I laid out is that at any point the Ukrainians can stop and hold what they have taken up to that point *and* cause logistics problems for sectors they did not manage to take.  This is not the case for doing a drive to the Sea of Azov.

There are other benefits as well:

1. whole breadth of the attack zone, which wouldn't be fully active at one time, is about 60-70km, which is narrower then what was done for Kharkiv and 1/3rd as much as Kherson. 
2. the narrow attack frontage allows a concentration of force sufficient to give Ukraine as much force as needed to crush the defenders.  3:1 or even 4:1 would be easily achievable.
3. the superior force ratio, ISR, and PGMs should combine to quickly rip open this sector of front.  The Russians don't have any forces to the West, so their ability to react must come from the south or east.  There are only a few paths available to them so interdiction should be fairly effective at stalling out any response.  And there might not be much of any as Russia definitely is short on forces in this sector, especially heavy ones.  Plus, we have seen how poorly they handle their forces at scale, so whatever interdiction doesn't head off is not likely to be a significant threat.
4. the narrower breakthrough area minimizes the amount of forces that potentially get chewed up in breaking through.  As a result, the amount of forces available for exploitation is maximized.  This avoids the problem that appears to have dogged Ukraine at Kherson where they had difficulty exploiting gains.
5. the path towards Kherson is ideal for mobile forces that have a mindset to keep moving.  This is exactly what the Russians did in early 2022 and it was the one time they really succeeded at it.  Ukraine should be able to do it in reverse.
6. by going south of the Bilozerka River much of the populated areas of Vasylivka Raion area of Zaporizhzhia.
7. there's a certain nuke power plant that would be nice to recover!

One thing that this or any other operation should plan on is the Russians not wanting to die in place.  Throughout this war whenever they sensed they were to be cut off they proactively retreated.  Usually extremely thoroughly, but if it meant leaving behind large quantities of equipment (such as Izyum) they were OK with that as well.  They often didn't take the time to blow up ammo dumps.  This gives Ukraine the possibility of seizing territory with few casualties and minimal damage to civilian infrastructure.  Obligating your enemy to leave is always the best course of action!

What this means is Ukraine *should* plan on objectives which encourage established Russian behavior patterns to retreat instead of fight.  The large swath of territory along the Dnepr, within Vasylivka Raion, is extremely easy to isolate.  In fact, it would be effectively cut off in the first hours/days of the offensive as its primary road and rail supply goes through Vasylivka City (easily interdicted, not difficult to physical sever) with suboptimal backup roads running along the left bank of the Dnepr (easily interdicted) and from the south off of M-14 highway, both of which could be cut off within days (it's only about 80km drive to physically cut both).

Finding large areas of land that are geographically easy to isolated are few. Vasylivka Raion offers one of those rare opportunities.  The only other obvious one is to drive straight through Melitopol to Crimea, but it is extremely ambitious and prone to being incomplete.  Vasylivka Raion, on the other hand, is comparatively easy.

 

Well, that's just one man's opinion   Fortunately we won't have to wait more than a couple of weeks to couple of months to see what option/s Ukraine chose.

Steve

[Beleg85]

If anybody ever wandred how world looks like from beneath Cope Cage:

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

I recognize this battlefield from the earlier K-2 videos.  It would be interesting to know the sequence of events.  In the earlier K-2 videos we saw the Russians (about 8 from my count on this video, forget what I might have counted before) died by drone and/or artillery fire.  Did these two Ukrainians die when stumbling upon the Russians, or did they die when the Russians overran their positions?  It's not important to know, just curiosity.

Steve

In 3rd video from combat of the trench UA soldiers did tended some wounded, perhaps they took them and only later get back for bodies of killed. This is unfortunatelly common in this war, I recall one former Afghan veteran serving in IL complaining how displeased and even shocked he was initially of this practice, contrary to what he experienced in NATO militaries. Only later he get along with the fact it was "luxurious" wars in the Middle-East that were anomaly in this regard, and current conflict is simply back to basics again. In fact those soldiers searching for bodies seem to be quite brave, they probably could be hit with sniper rifles or mortar rounds.

[danfrodo]

52 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

The thing I like most about the concept I laid out is that at any point the Ukrainians can stop and hold what they have taken up to that point *and* cause logistics problems for sectors they did not manage to take.  This is not the case for doing a drive to the Sea of Azov.

There are other benefits as well:

1. whole breadth of the attack zone, which wouldn't be fully active at one time, is about 60-70km, which is narrower then what was done for Kharkiv and 1/3rd as much as Kherson. 
2. the narrow attack frontage allows a concentration of force sufficient to give Ukraine as much force as needed to crush the defenders.  3:1 or even 4:1 would be easily achievable.
3. the superior force ratio, ISR, and PGMs should combine to quickly rip open this sector of front.  The Russians don't have any forces to the West, so their ability to react must come from the south or east.  There are only a few paths available to them so interdiction should be fairly effective at stalling out any response.  And there might not be much of any as Russia definitely is short on forces in this sector, especially heavy ones.  Plus, we have seen how poorly they handle their forces at scale, so whatever interdiction doesn't head off is not likely to be a significant threat.
4. the narrower breakthrough area minimizes the amount of forces that potentially get chewed up in breaking through.  As a result, the amount of forces available for exploitation is maximized.  This avoids the problem that appears to have dogged Ukraine at Kherson where they had difficulty exploiting gains.
5. the path towards Kherson is ideal for mobile forces that have a mindset to keep moving.  This is exactly what the Russians did in early 2022 and it was the one time they really succeeded at it.  Ukraine should be able to do it in reverse.
6. by going south of the Bilozerka River much of the populated areas of Vasylivka Raion area of Zaporizhzhia.
7. there's a certain nuke power plant that would be nice to recover!

One thing that this or any other operation should plan on is the Russians not wanting to die in place.  Throughout this war whenever they sensed they were to be cut off they proactively retreated.  Usually extremely thoroughly, but if it meant leaving behind large quantities of equipment (such as Izyum) they were OK with that as well.  They often didn't take the time to blow up ammo dumps.  This gives Ukraine the possibility of seizing territory with few casualties and minimal damage to civilian infrastructure.  Obligating your enemy to leave is always the best course of action!

What this means is Ukraine *should* plan on objectives which encourage established Russian behavior patterns to retreat instead of fight.  The large swath of territory along the Dnepr, within Vasylivka Raion, is extremely easy to isolate.  In fact, it would be effectively cut off in the first hours/days of the offensive as its primary road and rail supply goes through Vasylivka City (easily interdicted, not difficult to physical sever) with suboptimal backup roads running along the left bank of the Dnepr (easily interdicted) and from the south off of M-14 highway, both of which could be cut off within days (it's only about 80km drive to physically cut both).

Finding large areas of land that are geographically easy to isolated are few. Vasylivka Raion offers one of those rare opportunities.  The only other obvious one is to drive straight through Melitopol to Crimea, but it is extremely ambitious and prone to being incomplete.  Vasylivka Raion, on the other hand, is comparatively easy.

 

Well, that's just one man's opinion   Fortunately we won't have to wait more than a couple of weeks to couple of months to see what option/s Ukraine chose.

Steve

Really well reasoned, I like it.  I am definitely on the side of unhinging RU forces.  If UKR did start making progress as you suggest, I bet Putin would panic and send every vehicle, gun, and man possible that direction, knowing what a disaster was possible.  Hopefully this would dramatically weaken other areas.  So UKR does thrust that does not encompass Melitopol/sea of Azov, but Putin reacts as if that's the target, shifts forces, then gets hit in Luhansk or maybe some of the Donetsk salients get cut off.  Could be an interesting game of UKR punching the face then hitting the belly when the face is immediately covered up.

[Vet 0369]

7 hours ago, kevinkin said:

Another longer interview with the General from 1979. Interesting for those who have not seen this:

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA160703.pdf

 

Thank you, this was excellent!

[akd]

After the Battle for the "T" position, part 2:

Looks like they had a 9K115 Metis ATGM launcher in the position, although soldier here refers to "Kornet".  Maybe the partially-buried tube is for Kornet also?  Looks too big for Metis.

Edited April 9, 2023 by akd

[akd]

Another nope cage:

 

[Kinophile]

2 hours ago, Vet 0369 said:

Thank you, this was excellent!

Yah,  I loved the last paragraph :

"The Russians clean out the prisons, form companies and battalions, stick a few rifles in the hands of the prisoners and march them off to the attack. They take unbelievable losses -- maybe they achieve something and maybe they don'tbut in either case the Russians say to themselves "Well, at least we are rid of our criminals."

... 

 

[sburke]

5 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

Yah,  I loved the last paragraph :

"The Russians clean out the prisons, form companies and battalions, stick a few rifles in the hands of the prisoners and march them off to the attack. They take unbelievable losses -- maybe they achieve something and maybe they don'tbut in either case the Russians say to themselves "Well, at least we are rid of our criminals."

... 

 

well, the criminals too stupid to either get caught or not have connections to the higher up criminals.

[akd]

BMP-3 commander minus one arm?

 

Edited April 9, 2023 by akd

[Beleg85]

Rarely post here something from Galeev about Medvedev, but this time it is interesting. He reads latest, absurd Nazi in spirit and rhetoric diatribes as a way to secure himself in the eyes of a Tsar. For that he must show his loyalty by smelling to the West as much bad as possible.

Frankly, It seems rather he simply try to rebrand himself as a hawk and elevate his position, perhaps romancing with more hardline elements in government. Adiitionally, Putin as a rule does not kill his direct entourage. It is true, however, that Dima may be be potentially useful as political idiot Malenkov for potential successor at Kremlin.

 

Edited April 9, 2023 by Beleg85

[Battlefront.com]

3 hours ago, akd said:

After the Battle for the "T" position, part 2:

Looks like they had a 9K115 Metis ATGM launcher in the position, although soldier here refers to "Kornet".  Maybe the partially-buried tube is for Kornet also?  Looks too big for Metis.

As we saw from the drone footage, these guys had a LOT of LATW available to them and there was no evidence of any being used.  They just hunkered down, which obviously didn't end well for them.

Interesting that the Ukrainians didn't seem all that interested in taking the LATWs, but instead focused on small arms and electronics.

Steve

[Kinophile]

 @Battlefront.com

What do you (and others of course)  think of ZSUs chances at taking Melitopol?

You've outlined essentially creating it into a Kherson  - almost cut off, almost isolated,  with a nice attractive Golden Bridge for the Ivan to exit out eastwards. 

Is Melitopol worth a direct assault "off the March"? Does the ZSU have the forces? Would a siege/is landing of the city become a thorn in the Offensive,  tying down a lot of needed units? 

Edited April 9, 2023 by Kinophile

[Kinophile]

But no. Boris Johnson

Still,  seems the RUS weren't fully BS... 

 

[Battlefront.com]

Some interesting videos from Kanal 13.  First one states that Russians seem to be pulling back from over extended positions in most of the Donbas battlefields and active engagements have slackened off.  This is a pragmatic action given that it's pretty obvious their offensive capacity has been exhausted and the counter offensive is bound to start soon.  If this is accurate, it is surprising that the Russians are finally addressing the situation more realistically.

The second one is about the uptick in soldiers using the "I Want To Live" help line.  The increase in activity has already been noted here.  In this video you can see a lot of truly captured Russian soldiers as well as some footage from videos put out by the I Want To Live campaign to help Russians surrender successfully.  The BMP is, I presume, part of those videos.  What I noticed here is some apparently recent footage of 10+ groups captured.

Steve

[Beleg85]

10 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

But no. Boris Johnson

Still,  seems the RUS weren't fully BS... 

 

I am not sure, they only base on Times article citing anonymous source in AFU, while people here/ in Ukraine more into the topic were very reserved as to why even conduct such a raid.

 

[Battlefront.com]

18 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

But no. Boris Johnson

Still,  seems the RUS weren't fully BS... 

 

Interesting.  I was just reading some Russian aligned media reports and at first, as normal, dismissed it as bunk.  But I guess not.

Seems an odd time to launch an attack on the nuke plant.  I would have thought better timing would be after the general offensive started when ground forces could link up with them.

I also saw a Kanal 13 video claiming that Kadarovites were fighting each other in large numbers in a pitched battle somewhere in the area.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

39 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

 @Battlefront.com

What do you (and others of course)  think of ZSUs chances at taking Melitopol?

You've outlined essentially creating it into a Kherson  - almost cut off, almost isolated,  with a nice attractive Golden Bridge for the Ivan to exit out eastwards. 

Is Melitopol worth a direct assault "off the March"? Does the ZSU have the forces? Would a siege/is landing of the city become a thorn in the Offensive,  tying down a lot of needed units? 

I think Ukraine needs to avoid urban fighting generally.  Melitopol is likely well defended or at least well prepared for defensive ops.  Attacking it would preclude doing many other things that have a much higher chance of success.

The thing is, for Ukraine to attack into Melitopol it will need to at least envelop if not surround it.  That won't happen unless it clears at least a 60-80km wide path to it from current positions.  That in and itself is a tough assignment, but then having to defend it against counter attacks?  That would be even more challenging.

It is possible for Ukraine to drive straight towards Melitopol and then push east and west from the breach.  But that is a LOT of territory to cover and I do not think Ukraine has the resources to achieve it.

Short of a Russian military collapse, I don't think it is wise to drive straight toward Crimea or Azov from the north.  My suggestion of clearing out the east first seems far more sure of success and will, in the end, neutralize Melitopol's importance because it will be cut off from Crimea.  Dealing with such a large urban area can then be done at Ukraine's discretion over time instead of as an absolute short term need.

Steve

[danfrodo]

41 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

What do you (and others of course)  think of ZSUs chances at taking Melitopol?

My vote on this?  (Worthless, of course).  UKR will not try to take Melitopol if it is a fight.  It would destroy the city & eat up forces that could be doing more damaging activities elsewhere.  If UKR is all the way to Melitopol then they would be well into the rear of RU defenses.  yes, maybe RU could pull back and set up defenses in that area, but the continuous line would be even longer than the current one, giving UKR more opportunities to cut RU logistics.  I think UKR will try to unhinge RU forces whenever possible.  (EDIT: dang it, ninja'd by Steve)

28 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

The second one is about the uptick in soldiers using the "I Want To Live" help line

I hope the 2X increase in RU soldiers surrendering is real and would be expected given the awful conditions and lack of care for RU soldiers' welfare & lives.  The video showed nothing interesting, sadly. 

 

18 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Seems an odd time to launch an attack on the nuke plant.  I would have thought better timing would be after the general offensive started when ground forces could link up with them.

Denys Davydov spoke about this in his Saturday video.  Said ~600 UKR personnel involved.   Said hey were engaged w heavier than expected resistance and retreated back across the river w losses.

And RU retreating from the N & S salients around Bakhmut??  Good news if true but needs a lot more confirmation.  But too bad UKR couldn't cut them off and bag them all.  Reports show the mud is horrific right now.

Edited April 9, 2023 by danfrodo

[Kinophile]

52 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

My vote on this?  (Worthless, of course).  UKR will not try to take Melitopol if it is a fight.  It would destroy the city & eat up forces that could be doing more damaging activities elsewhere.  If UKR is all the way to Melitopol then they would be well into the rear of RU defenses.  yes, maybe RU could pull back and set up defenses in that area, but the continuous line would be even longer than the current one, giving UKR more opportunities to cut RU logistics.  I think UKR will try to unhinge RU forces whenever possible.  (EDIT: dang it, ninja'd by Steve)

I hope the 2X increase in RU soldiers surrendering is real and would be expected given the awful conditions and lack of care for RU soldiers' welfare & lives.  The video showed nothing interesting, sadly. 

 

Denys Davydov spoke about this in his Saturday video.  Said ~600 UKR personnel involved.   Said hey were engaged w heavier than expected resistance and retreated back across the river w losses.

And RU retreating from the N & S salients around Bakhmut??  Good news if true but needs a lot more confirmation.  But too bad UKR couldn't cut them off and bag them all.  Reports show the mud is horrific right now.

600 seems unlikely. That would definitely have popped up clear on a lot of peoples radars. 

[kimbosbread]

I very much like the idea of Troitske and hugging the river on the southern front and going for Tokmak + Vasylivka instead of Melitopol.

57 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I think Ukraine needs to avoid urban fighting generally.  Melitopol is likely well defended or at least well prepared for defensive ops.  Attacking it would preclude doing many other things that have a much higher chance of success.

Strongly agreed. Ukraine needs to avoid getting bogged down and instead capture territory and hammer logistics and command, making it unteneable to hold the city. Also there is the moral effect- Ukraine reconquers a city, it is not completely destroyed, vs Russia it's complete destruction.

 

Is there some other major goal that would justify an attack nearer to the "center" of the front? The north and south attacks basically serve to cut railways (one that isolates Crimea, the other that makes the entire SMO harder to resupply). I cannot imagine any reason to go for Berdiansk or Mariuopol over going West; similarly Donetsk is presumably too fortified to be worth it. The only thing I can think of is an opportunistic encirclement or flanking maneuver of exhausted Russian troops that have been basically enjoying the freeze-thaw cycle for the entire winter and early spring. What about going for Lychansk and threatening the rear of the Russian forces at Bakhmut?