How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Haiduk]

55 minutes ago, Tenses said:

Avdiivka is increasingly looking like Bakhmut in terms of situation and danger of encirclement. I know that it is a meat grinder for Russia but still the entire eastern front is looking grim right now. If these two cities will be encircled, new territory gains for Russia will take much less time and effort.

Indeed Russian penetration from north not like on the map - fightings are now in Krasnohorivka. Russians control eastern part of village. On the southern flank elements of 59th mot.inf brigade slightly pushed the enemy back in Nevelske area. Though, situation is really very similar to Bakhmut. The same meat waves, but more armored, because terrain is more suitable for it, than around Bakhmut. Last video with captured Russians showed, that even in DPR unit (110th motor-rifle brigade - former 100th motor-rifle brigade of DPR) all captured are mobiks from Orenburg oblast of Russia.

[LongLeftFlank]

5 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

And now some hard evidence that China is supplying some quantities of firearms, body armor, and drone parts directly to Russia:

https://www.politico.com/news/2023/03/16/chinese-rifles-body-armor-russia-ukraine-00087398

Steve

Because of course they are, if there's money in it.

That said, this one is pretty lame (that's what $13k usd gets you on Alibaba).  20kg payload, downed with small arms.

The weaponized commercial drone did not have a camera fitted, which means it could not have been used for surveillance, and essentially makes it similar to a “dumb bomb,”  

Edited March 17, 2023 by LongLeftFlank

[Haiduk]

8 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Because of course they are, if there's money in it.

 

Mugin-5 is commercial drone, so can be ordered free like DJI. UKR side also used drones, based on Mugin-5 in atatcks on Russian infrastructure. Representatives of Chineese manufacturer claimed they already stopped sales of these drones to both Russia and Ukraine, but of course, drones can be bought via third country  

Edited March 17, 2023 by Haiduk

[LongLeftFlank]

Tatarigami is excellent! Glad he's getting a lot of attention. Source piece below worth reading in full, by a Commonwealth [?] adviser.

https://maidan.org.ua/en/2023/02/glen-grant-2023-a-time-and-chance-for-military-change-in-ukraine/#Geographical_command_boundaries

Despite the maxim of “we trust in the ZSU” this organisation cannot be perfect having grown and changed so dramatically in such a short time....

The battle commander under fire being king and not the most senior officer is a NATO standard and policy that some commanders are clearly finding it difficult to understand and implement. It goes against all their training and education. 

We need clear ownership and responsibilities of every piece of ground on the frontline and behind to avoid casualties due to a lack of boundary clarity. This requires every area to have a designated commander, and all personnel entering that area to be under their command. Geographical boundaries must not constrain the unit's ability to maneuver and attack the enemy from the sides or change positions. 

- Numerous independent units operate in opposition to each other....

- SOF are supposed to be (and were trained by the US to be) the deep attack organization working behind the lines to disrupt and destroy. Instead, they are often being used as light infantry wasting years of expensive US training.

- To counter evolving tactics used by Russia and Wagner, troops require resources such as drones, radios and internet, night sights, 60mm mortars, grenades and grenade launchers for platoons, a full 81/82mm mortar company for each battalion, short-range missiles, AFAKs, uniform and safety equipment for every soldier. 

Especially the dedicated medium mortars. Does UKR have a capability to make the clip fed Vasilek 82mm? (what is it, a dozen bombs in the air before the first one lands?).  Wait, according to Wiki it is, or was, licence built in Hungary (talk about coin-operated lol).

 

Edited March 17, 2023 by LongLeftFlank

[LongLeftFlank]

Also interesting, Trent Telenko on JDAMS and some other cool tidbits, courtesy of Pat Lang's blog.

https://turcopolier.com/how-the-jdam-er-will-be-employed-ttg/

“The firepower of the Russian Army is in its vehicles,” pretty much covers it. All the best Russian digital spread-spectrum and frequency hopping radios were in its newest vehicles.  Most of which have been destroyed in the last year of fighting. This leaves Russian artillery with older Cold War generation radios, 3G cell phones or Chinese commercial radios which are all horribly vulnerable to 1980s technology direction finding, let alone that of the 2020’s gear with 1 to 3 meter geolocation performance.

This plays into Ukraine’s new JDAM-ER glide bombs.  Which, when toss bombed at low altitude under radar coverage, can travel up to 44 km....

the JDAM-ER is relatively inexpensive, about $25,000 for a 500 lb warhead, larger and far cheaper than a GLMRS round.

Edited March 17, 2023 by LongLeftFlank

[LongLeftFlank]

A quick look at the fighting in the balkas and woodlands of the northern front (Kupyansk-Kreminna), overshadowed of late by the battles for the fortress cities of unoccupied Donbass.

It seems clear that Russia is aiming to reestablish a line of control along the Oskil River, and if it can, the Siversky Donetz bank as well (Lyman - Sviatohirsk). There's only fragmentary evidence as to the blood price being paid for these gains.  Sense I get is that the UA is mainly using territorials, Jaeger units and SpecOps to hold this front.

.... oh and I should add, this front appears to be prime HIMARS hunting grounds.  Speaking of balkas.

 

Edited March 17, 2023 by LongLeftFlank

[Grossman]

11 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Since the Kharkiv offensive petered out and the Kherson one wound up a missed opportunity, I've downgraded my expectations for this year.

I will be quite pleased if Ukraine breaches the southern line and creates a decidedly unpleasant situation for the Russians.  If it can do that while not losing terrain anywhere else, and do it without excessive losses, I expect Ukraine will not be forced into negotiations.  If it makes no progress or OK progress with a lot of casualties, then negotiations might have to happen.  As I said a bunch of pages ago, if Ukraine feels it needs to freeze the conflict then it should.  Russia is in such a bad state I don't see it getting any better after a pause.  Ukraine, on the other hand, can benefit from a pause.

Steve

We've had virtual silence from the UKR side since Kherson with holding attritional actions in Bakhmut and Avdiivka through the winter. Zelenskyy promises an offensive, so clearly not likely to happen. Perhaps infiltration, probing, getting to the Sea of Azov, cutting supply and the Kerch Bridge. Cutting all supply to the Russian forces to the west. . 

[Bulletpoint]

2 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Nice frame by frame analysis and locational context of that trench knife fight. It shields Bakhmut's lifeline....

 

So it turns out I was right. It wasn't a video of Ukrainians attacking Russians, as was originally claimed, but Russians attacking Ukrainians.

[LongLeftFlank]

10 minutes ago, Grossman said:

We've had virtual silence from the UKR side since Kherson with holding attritional actions in Bakhmut and Avdiivka through the winter. Zelenskyy promises an offensive, so clearly not likely to happen. Perhaps infiltration, probing, getting to the Sea of Azov, cutting supply and the Kerch Bridge. Cutting all supply to the Russian forces to the west. . 

Wait, you think getting to the Azov would be minor? 

****

OK, every Northern kid who's done doughnuts late at night in a snowy supermarket parking lot in their hand-me-down rear wheel drive Impala or Buick station wagon will feel the pure joy of this driver!

 

Edited March 17, 2023 by LongLeftFlank

[Haiduk]

Hmmm.... Either "Honor" has next success, or something more significant around Bakhmut

I can't translate this slang phrase adequately, but it close to "That's an action is dashing! Ai-yai! "

 

[LongLeftFlank]

I'm gonna quit bogarting the Thread for a bit (there really was a lot of interesting stuff tho!), but be sure to take a look at DanSpiun: lots of recent AFV bang-bangs. 

Here's a teaser (retweet)

 

Edited March 17, 2023 by LongLeftFlank

[Harmon Rabb]

Bravo Slovensko!

[Haiduk]

@sburke

Major Maksim Chigirenko, comamnder deputy of logistic battalion of 155th naval infantry brigade, Pacific Fleet, was killed on 27th of Feb 2023 near Vuhledar

Major Albert Galiakhmetov, 5th tank brigade (HQ or motor-rifle battalion), 36th CAA, Eastern military district, was killed on 15th of March 2023 probbaly near Vuhledar

 Major (retired) Yuriy Terentyev, last duty - officer-educator in Suvorov's military schoool. Probably enlisted to some BARS battalion. Was killed on 5th of March

Lt.colonel Vladimir Bukatkin, commander of 68th tank regiment, 150th motor-rifle division, Southern military district. Was killed on 25th of March 2022 in Mariupol by artillery strike.

 

[kevinkin]

2 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

prime HIMARS hunting grounds.

With the ground so barren and beat up, maybe hiding in a clump of trees in NOT the best tactic. So hiding in plain sight might offer a statically better chance at survival (if well dug-in). 

[kevinkin]

https://www.defenseone.com/business/2023/03/pentagon-mobilized-support-tech-startups-after-bank-failure/384033/

Something to consider down the road when Ukraine is re-building and re-arming - venture capital and its growing role in innovation apart for the big boys like Lockheed. A friend of mine has a son who owns a small company that develops all sorts of deadly stuff. Most prototypes never go into production. But the ideas get kicked around and combined with others from other small outfits and they do "knock out the seed corn" but run on thin margins where cash flow (aka pay role) is sometimes funded by short term loans. Ukraine will require all sorts of financing and one size does not fit all. 

Edited March 17, 2023 by kevinkin

[Battlefront.com]

3 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

OK, every Northern kid who's done doughnuts late at night in a snowy supermarket parking lot in their hand-me-down rear wheel drive Impala or Buick station wagon will feel the pure joy of this driver!

Buick?  Whatever.  I had Chevy Caprice Classic for my fun.  A '78 Buick was my first car after that.

The one thing we never said during our youth of donuts in parking lots was "it's all fun and games until someone throws a track!".  It was mostly "it's all fun and games until someone hits a light post".  Fortunately I avoided that.

I checked on this vehicle as I'm not familiar with it and found it was quite rare even back in its day.  As I suspected based on looking at it, this is older than any vehicle I had as a youth except for one (1967).  It is also rather infamous!  It is on the Wiki page for the GT-MU!  DPR had this in service and Ukraine captured it sometime last year.  This is the only one documented in this war, which makes it super rare for sure.

The question that comes to mind is did DPR get this before or after Feb 2022?  If it was before then it's just another example of Russia giving its proxies crap equipment.  If it was in 2022 then it might be further evidence of Russia's difficulty fielding more modern equipment.

Steve

[sburke]

6 hours ago, chuckdyke said:

If this happens the UN Security Council is beyond repair.

 

posted that a few pages back.  It sucks but it isn't the first time, won't be the last.   They had it back in Feb 2022.

[Battlefront.com]

3 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

I'm gonna quit bogarting the Thread for a bit (there really was a lot of interesting stuff tho!), but be sure to take a look at DanSpiun: lots of recent AFV bang-bangs. 

Here's a teaser (retweet)

 

That's a lot of close in shooting.  Again, we see Ukrainian tanks operating without fear of getting hit by close range AT weapons.  A suicidal/dumb Ukrainian tank crew every so often wouldn't be a surprise, but it seems to be more informed behavior than that.

Another video on this guy's Twitter channel shows a kinda fun scene where there's a BMP-2 with what appears to be a transmission problem (goes backwards, gears forward are locked up).  A truck with a plow on it starts to try and push it inside a building (presumably a repair shop) when mortar rounds start impacting and that changes some behaviors

Targeting forward repair facilities is an excellent way to put further strain on Russia's mechanized capabilities.  The vehicles that went into this fight last year weren't as well maintained as they should have been, we can only imagine how much attention is needed to keep vehicles that were rushed out of storage and sent to the front in good working order.  Having worked on older vehicles myself, I am well aware of the myriad of things that go wrong simply due to age.

Steve

[The_Capt]

6 hours ago, Seminole said:

If it isn't a real worry, then why are we on the sidelines again?

That is not the issue.  Of course out of control escalation of this conflict is a worry.  What a lot of people in the “must not start WW3” side of things tend to forget is that Russia is just as afraid of WW3 as we are.  Proof: despite severe setback and bleeding at historic levels, Russia has not turned to WMDs in this war.  Now we know that they do have red lines and we cannot forget that; however, we should also remember that we have red lines too.  

There are lines that are worth escalation and Russia (as well as ourselves, apparently) need to be reminded of that.  Controlled escalation to be sure, but if we’re are too terrified to act in a measured response to escalating Russian aggression we basically cede the strategic initiative.  This would give Russia de facto escalation dominance in this conflict.  FDR was right, the thing we need fear the most is our own fears.

A measured but clear escalation to this drone nonsense is required and while we are keeping this war in a box, we also cannot let our fears - nor forget that they are just as nervous as we are - hold back deliberate action.

”But why are we not imposing a no fly zone/boot on ground/striking Moscow”.  Couple reasons - all war is negotiation .  Escalation ladders have  rungs one can only use for the first time once, after that they become de-escalation options or norms of conflict.  So we want to keep strategic options open.  If we jump straight to no fly zones, we have a lot less escalation room before things get to a nuclear exchange threshold.  

Second one is trying to avoid inducing strategic panic on our opponent through miscommunication.  A no-fly zone over the Black Sea may seem reasonable to us but rationality is relative.  Russia may see this as a prelude to establishing air superiority for an invasion and panic.  Putin needs a centralized and functioning control system on his own escalation and panic is toxic to that.  So in this responses must be clearly communicated and demonstrated through signalling.

So, for example, if one is going to employ offensive cyber to shut down Russian military airspace control, unlike in a Grey Zone/Subversive context, this action would have to be more clearly a communication of action - all war is communication.  The primary mechanisms of that communication are cause and consequence.  Attribution would need to be clear and message needs to be received that buggery out over the Black Sea against US assets has consequences.

This speaks to the reality that the west needs to accept, this war is as much ours as it is Ukraines.  With China now communicating along with Iran it is becoming clear that this entire thing is becoming a global decision point in just how the global order will proceed.  We are not supporting Ukraine because Russia is bad (they are in this), or “the children!”.  We are doing it because this war is an attack on the global order that demands a response or we risk losing that order itself.  In many ways this war is already moving towards a global conflict as power poles invest in it as a proxy conflict - it is becoming an indirect WW3.  And while we must do what we can to avoid a direct WW3, we cannot let that fear drive us to losing the war we are already in.

[Butschi]

1 hour ago, Harmon Rabb said:

Bravo Slovensko!

Visegrad24 conveniently forgot to mention a few minor details...

[Pete Wenman]

Seems this is for real, although of very little real impact - excuse the fruity language from Eliot H

 

P

[Battlefront.com]

6 minutes ago, Pete Wenman said:

Seems this is for real, although of very little real impact - excuse the fruity language from Eliot H

 

P

All the major press is reporting it, so for sure true.  Not to mention the Twitter account cited seems pretty authoritative

https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2023-03-17/icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrant-against-putin-over-alleged-war-crimes

This actually does have real impact.  Putin now can not represent Russian interests in person outside of Russia, Belarus, and a few other places without concern for his safety.  This might not seem like a big deal now, but it sure doesn't help him maintain the air of normalcy for things like the G-20.

Steve

[LongLeftFlank]

18 minutes ago, Butschi said:

Visegrad24 conveniently forgot to mention a few minor details...

Cash for clunkers lol

[Battlefront.com]

17 minutes ago, Butschi said:

Visegrad24 conveniently forgot to mention a few minor details...

Well, while Visegard24's reporting wasn't complete, I disagree that these should be called "junk".  Ukraine has the technical capabilities and parts to get at least some up and flying again.  Even if all they do is provide parts to other MiG-29, that is also useful.

But yeah, making it sound like Ukraine has another 11-13 airframes to loft into the air is definitely incorrect.

Steve

[Beleg85]

15 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

This actually does have real impact.  Putin now can not represent Russian interests in person outside of Russia, Belarus, and a few other places without concern for his safety.  This might not seem like a big deal now, but it sure doesn't help him maintain the air of normalcy for things like the G-20.

Steve

If some country in the future would like to host Putin, he may be granted immunity anyway. Probably BRICS and similar "non-involved" states will not care at all, which in turn may dimnish importance of Tribunal itself. So rather symbolic value, but nice, especially in light of expected meeting with Xi.

33 minutes ago, Butschi said:

Visegrad24 conveniently forgot to mention a few minor details...

Yup, this website is sensationalist. However, I wouldn't call those fighter planes junk either- even if some are not operaitonal, they still will be of use for Ukrainian AirForce. Spare parts, training etc. Given that they figured out how to carry some Western armament now, they can serve their role.

 

Importance of correct recognition of state of casualty: here Ukrainian commander of some special forces was gravely wounded and marked as "dead" by his soldiers. Volunteer medics didn't believe, checked the guy and despite heavy wounds especially to neck area did ultimately saved him.

This group also conduct exercises for both military and civilians. One of problems for both sides they mentioned , especially for fresh soldiers who often tend to panick under fire, is to correctly assume if their buddy is indeed KIA or just WIA. Duda mentioned he saw examples of soldiers left by comrades, who wake up from shock after some time and discovered they were bandoned. Russians care ofc. way less about theirs, but this can also happen to UA side (one such guy reportedly crawled  and walked 7km to their positions). Another difference between this conflict and War on terror.

 

Edited March 17, 2023 by Beleg85