How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[MikeyD]

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2 Platoon, of C Company IV Battalion could actually be experiencing 1:1 for a variety of reasons... ...However C Company as a whole would likely be suffering a different exchange ratio

This is the argument I used to make when CMBS and CMSF2 players would complain that in-game casualty rates were too high for modern war (which seem ironic now). If you just look at a platoon that got wiped out its a 100% casualty rate. If you look at the Brigade that the platoon was part of its a 1% casualty rate. The tip of the spear always gets the worst of it.

[Beleg85]

Letest report with maps, for several days:

https://threadreaderapp-com.translate.goog/thread/1635418225302450176.html?_x_tr_sl=pl&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=pl&_x_tr_pto=wapp

[dan/california]

It will buff out.

 

[Vic4]

A seemingly comprehensive though pessimistic article that is relevant to the current conversation. Interview with a commander at the front... Hopefully these headlines will be eclipsed by a successful counteroffensive. 

Ukraine short of skilled troops and munitions as losses, pessimism grow

Ukraine’s military has been degraded by a year of heavy casualties. Front-line units are now struggling with new, poorly trained troops and a shortage of ammunition.

Read in The Washington Post: https://apple.news/ARmuLouubT82YY5BNmh8GKg

[Fenris]

Nice story with a heartwarming outcome

 

[dan/california]

4 minutes ago, Fenris said:

Nice story with a heartwarming outcome

 

It makes my drone drop video habit feel entirely justified, and then some. 

[billbindc]

45 minutes ago, Vic4 said:

A seemingly comprehensive though pessimistic article that is relevant to the current conversation. Interview with a commander at the front... Hopefully these headlines will be eclipsed by a successful counteroffensive. 

Ukraine short of skilled troops and munitions as losses, pessimism grow

Ukraine’s military has been degraded by a year of heavy casualties. Front-line units are now struggling with new, poorly trained troops and a shortage of ammunition.

Read in The Washington Post: https://apple.news/ARmuLouubT82YY5BNmh8GKg

These are precisely the sort of articles that were common in the months before the Kharkiv and Kherson offensives. Maybe it's true, maybe not...but that's exactly what I'd want in the press while if I were planning a Ukrainian offensive.

[sross112]

5 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

This would mean every single death by recon attempt winds up with at least as many Ukrainian casualties.  I don't buy that.  Plus, it would mean that all other exchanges of fire are decidedly advantageous to Russia, for example all those Excalibur and HIMARS strikes hit nothing more than what Russia's unguided artillery can strike.

Nope, too much other evidence out there to suggest 1:1 is possible.  Closer to 1:1 than 1:5?  Absolutely believe that is true starting very recently.

Steve

I don't believe the 1:1 ratio for two reasons, but they are both anecdotal.

First, we see a lot of figures up to 40,000 casualties for the RA in the fighting around Bahkmut. Even if you halve that number it is multiple brigades totally chewed to nothing. Yet we don't see or hear anything for months about this? Doesn't seem probable to me. So I go with the maybe in isolated instances or individual battles here and there, but it can't be for the entire op over the entire time. 

Second, there is a metric boat load of video out there showing the UA getting very favorable results. If the RA was getting favorable results we would see it. They have constantly made a big deal out of anything they can claim as a win so I don't see why now would be any different. Prig would have been putting out videos standing in a field of UA body bags and not Wagner body bags if it was at all possible.

[danfrodo]

25 minutes ago, billbindc said:

These are precisely the sort of articles that were common in the months before the Kharkiv and Kherson offensives. Maybe it's true, maybe not...but that's exactly what I'd want in the press while if I were planning a Ukrainian offensive.

It definitely might be true that this commander has bad troops & shortage of ammo.  And it definitely might be intentional.  Economy of force, which gets broadcast to the world as UKR military is on the brink.  This could, of course, be true, but the more likely reason is that UKR is trying to not let RU distract from the coming offensive. 

What does make my blood boil is how the allies dragged their feet for month after month and so these troops under pressure have less than otherwise would have.

[dan/california]

2 minutes ago, billbindc said:

These are precisely the sort of articles that were common in the months before the Kharkiv and Kherson offensives. Maybe it's true, maybe not...but that's exactly what I'd want in the press while if I were planning a Ukrainian offensive.

In case no one noticed, the Ukrainians and the relevant parts of the U.S. Government can run an info op when they set heir minds to it. That is why Kharkiv was being held by the Russian equivalent of "Dad's Army" When Ukraine kicked the door down. 

 

[danfrodo]

4 minutes ago, sross112 said:

Prig would have been putting out videos standing in a field of UA body bags and not Wagner body bags if it was at all possible.

Which gets into how utter incompetent RU propaganda is.  They actually should be putting blue tape on their own dead in those muddy fields and saying 'look at all the dead ukrainians"

[dan/california]

2 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

It definitely might be true that this commander has bad troops & shortage of ammo.  And it definitely might be intentional.  Economy of force, which gets broadcast to the world as UKR military is on the brink.  This could, of course, be true, but the more likely reason is that UKR is trying to not let RU distract from the coming offensive. 

What does make my blood boil is how the allies dragged their feet for month after month and so these troops under pressure have less than otherwise would have.

This, exactly this!

 

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, dan/california said:

It will buff out.

 

Judging by all the ammo crates and transit casings these tanks had been there for quite a while.  As the narrator said, they would go out with one and then swap it out with the other.  I bet the UA forces on the receiving end of it decided enough was enough, called in the suicide drone guys, and boom... problem sorted.  Maybe hitting another location (3 more tanks) as well.

If you sit in one place long enough, chances are a drone will come hunting for you.  I think that's the new battlefield lesson we're seeing in this war.

Steve

[cesmonkey]

My YouTube recommendations keep pointing me to additional Kofman videos - probably because I keep watching them.

Here, about 2 weeks ago, he is on a panel with two other analysts looking at more of the big picture of what the conflict in Ukraine means for the future of warfare and what lessons can be learned.
 

 

[Battlefront.com]

I feel like we're seeing more and more videos of drone bombers moving in to pick off survivors from a failed assault near Avdiivka:

https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarRoom/comments/11qpipx/avdiivka_after_a_russian_tank_is_destroyed_a/

In this video there is a burning tank with a wounded dismount in front of it (not likely a crew member based on equipment).  He is likely killed by two direct hits from 30mm grenades.  After that you can see 6 other bodies scattered around the field.  The drone operator drops two grenades on a crater with two unmoving soldiers in it.  First goes wide and no reaction.  Second one is direct hit and no reaction, confirming the two were already dead or on the doorstep of it.

Think about this tactically.  Traditionally when an assault fails out in the fields, the survivors generally attempt to retreat to the nearest cover.  From there they filter back to friendly positions.  But what if there's drones keeping an eye on such activity and are able to act if they see something moving?  Either by bombing or by calling in more artillery, perhaps even alerting a sniper.  This sort of tactic could reasonably ensure the total destruction of the attacking unit without continually raking the area with indirect fire.  Another example of precision having some pretty profound effects on the battlefield.

Steve

[danfrodo]

16 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I feel like we're seeing more and more videos of drone bombers moving in to pick off survivors from a failed assault near Avdiivka:

https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarRoom/comments/11qpipx/avdiivka_after_a_russian_tank_is_destroyed_a/

In this video there is a burning tank with a wounded dismount in front of it (not likely a crew member based on equipment).  He is likely killed by two direct hits from 30mm grenades.  After that you can see 6 other bodies scattered around the field.  The drone operator drops two grenades on a crater with two unmoving soldiers in it.  First goes wide and no reaction.  Second one is direct hit and no reaction, confirming the two were already dead or on the doorstep of it.

Think about this tactically.  Traditionally when an assault fails out in the fields, the survivors generally attempt to retreat to the nearest cover.  From there they filter back to friendly positions.  But what if there's drones keeping an eye on such activity and are able to act if they see something moving?  Either by bombing or by calling in more artillery, perhaps even alerting a sniper.  This sort of tactic could reasonably ensure the total destruction of the attacking unit without continually raking the area with indirect fire.  Another example of precision having some pretty profound effects on the battlefield.

Steve

Oh my, that was harsh!  The kinda thing ya can't un-see.  I start to feel sorry for him then I remember what he was trying to do, whether compelled or not. 

[chrisl]

12 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I feel like we're seeing more and more videos of drone bombers moving in to pick off survivors from a failed assault near Avdiivka:

https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarRoom/comments/11qpipx/avdiivka_after_a_russian_tank_is_destroyed_a/

In this video there is a burning tank with a wounded dismount in front of it (not likely a crew member based on equipment).  He is likely killed by two direct hits from 30mm grenades.  After that you can see 6 other bodies scattered around the field.  The drone operator drops two grenades on a crater with two unmoving soldiers in it.  First goes wide and no reaction.  Second one is direct hit and no reaction, confirming the two were already dead or on the doorstep of it.

Think about this tactically.  Traditionally when an assault fails out in the fields, the survivors generally attempt to retreat to the nearest cover.  From there they filter back to friendly positions.  But what if there's drones keeping an eye on such activity and are able to act if they see something moving?  Either by bombing or by calling in more artillery, perhaps even alerting a sniper.  This sort of tactic could reasonably ensure the total destruction of the attacking unit without continually raking the area with indirect fire.  Another example of precision having some pretty profound effects on the battlefield.

Steve

Yeah - cover is a very different thing when there are quiet drones with cameras and grenades cruising around in the area.  A shell crater that might give a little protection from direct fire is the same as sitting out in the open.  Vehicles become very difficult to protect when they're behind the lines - park the IFV for dinner or while you eat and you might come back to find it's had a grenade or two dropped inside.  Trenches don't protect you from drones unless you have a lid on them, and even then in some cases you can get a grenade dropped inside or a guided drone through the door.  And it's only going to get worse.

Ukraine needs to send out a protocol to the Russians for surrendering to drones - it might make things better for everybody.

[Battlefront.com]

Here's another perspective on the whole casualties thing we've been discussing.  I just watched two videos uploaded by two different Ukrainian units (25th Airborne and 77th Air Assault) in the Bakhmut area.  They were shot up close and personal by Ukrainian infantry.

In one video the 25th cleared out a Russian held trench.  There are 3 dead, possibly 4, in the few seconds of video.

In the other the 77th pans the camera over 7, possibly 8, dead Russians in light woods.  Most were within a meter or two of each other, a couple were 10m+ away.

Yes, yes, yes... these are anecdotal videos.  Yes, I know, the dangers of bias confirmation.  That said, I believe both videos show the poor state of Russian infantry because these guys all got killed pretty much at the same time.  Sure, that happens in war all the time, and no doubt happens to Ukrainians as well, but I dunno... to me it feels like it's showing the result of a lack of proper training, combined arms, weaponry, troop density, and ISR. 

The guys in the trench might have died because they didn't have the weapons or ammo to hold out on their own and nobody had their backs.  We've recently commented on the apparent lack of Russian LATWs and I've also noticed a lack of PKMs as well.

The guys killed in the woods were too close together and apparently didn't know they were in danger when whatever hit them hit them.  Judging from the ground and bodies, I suspect it was small arms.

I don't frequent Pro Russian warporn sights because, frankly, I can't stomach the fascist commentary on top of watching good people die.  So maybe I'm missing a parallel to all of these videos showing 5+ Russian casualties in small spaces, but I do get the sense that such an avalanche from the Russian side isn't out there.  Anybody know?

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

An interesting post from a Ukrainian officer attempting to help set realistic expectations for this year's fighting and where the war is headed.  I do not disagree with him one iota.  Talk of taking Crimea should remain on pause indefinitely.

The second is an interesting take on why Russian soldiers fight:

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

ISW's take on the meeting between Putin and Kadyrov.  Others have also noted how nervous Kadyrov was:

Quote

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov continues efforts to maintain Chechnya’s relevance in the Russian political and military sphere. Kadyrov met with Putin on March 13 to discuss Chechnya’s socioeconomic achievements and domestic developments in 2022.[7] Kadyrov also used the meeting to laud the success of Chechen fighters in Ukraine and emphasized that Chechen fighters are dutifully fulfilling Putin’s orders and “aim to act to the bitter end,” to which Putin responded by acknowledging the role of Chechen fighters and thanking Kadyrov.[8] Kadyrov appeared visibly nervous during the meeting, potentially indicating that he felt considerable pressure to present Chechnya, himself, and his troops to Putin in a positive and productive light.[9] Chechen troops are currently playing a very minimal role on the frontline in Ukraine and mainly appear to be conducting offensive operations near Bilohorivka, Luhansk Oblast, and are otherwise carrying out law enforcement tasks in rear areas of occupied Ukraine.[10] Kadyrov may therefore fear that he is losing favor with Putin because he has very little to show in terms of Chechen combat gains, and likely hoped to correct and bolster his reputation over the course of this meeting. Putin, in turn, likely hopes to pressure Kadyrov into increasing the role of Chechen fighters in combat operations due to continued losses to both the Wagner Group and conventional Russian forces in ongoing offensive operations in Ukraine.

And this quote on what's going on at Bakhmut:

Quote

A Wagner-affiliated milblogger agreed with ISW’s prior assessments on the Ukrainian defense of Bakhmut, claiming that Ukrainian forces are grinding Russian forces’ best available infantry around Bakhmut to reduce Russian forces’ capability to stop any Ukrainian advances.[17] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces would be able to drive south and face minimal Russian resistance in southern Ukraine, unlike other areas of the front line.

We've discussed this a lot in the past few days, but there is a point we haven't explicitly mentioned as far as I can recall.  We know for a fact that Ukraine has significant fresh units with Western equipment preparing for some form of action this campaign season.  How much and to what degree of readiness we do not know.  However, based on what happened last year it is probable that the units will be of sufficient quality to conduct complex offensive operations.

What does Russia have in reserve?  It seems nothing.  Reports are the remaining mobilization forces that were in Belarus have been moved into Ukraine, in full or in part.  We've got many forms of evidence that Russia is running out of stuff to reequip its units with.  Maybe not as dire as we would like it to be, but it's the opposite experience of Ukraine where some significant new systems (Leopards, Bradleys, and others) are soon to be introduced.  On top of that, there's little indication that Putin is going to conduct another mobilization effort in advance of the upcoming campaign season, meaning only covert mobilization and internal personnel transfer schemes are available to replace losses.

So what happens if Russia is investing its best units into meatgrinder attacks now?  What will it have left over when Ukraine goes on the offensive?  Isn't wearing them down now a smart strategic move even if it comes at a short term cost?  Anybody that thinks there is no argument for keeping up the defenses in Bakhmut should ponder that.

Steve

[Grigb]

11 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Report that Iran has sent Russia a large quantity of ammunition. 

https://censor.net/en/news/3404406/iran_secretly_handed_russia_hundreds_of_thousands_of_shells_sky_news

If this reporting is correct, it shows that Russia has pretty much shot out its existing ammo stocks.  The shipments from Iran will be helpful for sure, but even an impressive 300,000 shells might be, it's in fact quite limited.  Using Russia's late 2022 rate it's only 15 days worth or 60 days worth with the recent 5000 per day rate.  That's not a lot.

Steve

Mashovets colleague wrote recently

Quote

By May, the Russian artillery will be unable to fire even 10 thousand rounds each day.

They will be shooting 4-5 thousand rounds per day by July, on par with domestic output.

If Russia does not find a third-party shell supplier, it will suffer a shell stroke this summer.

 

[Fenris]

Maybe UKR should pull back, create a nice bulge in the front.  I mean if RU's remaining best get bogged down in street to street city fighting and UKR pull off their own Op Uranus... The effect of inflicting one of the holy grails of Soviet WW2 victories against them would really be something.

[FancyCat]

53 minutes ago, Fenris said:

Maybe UKR should pull back, create a nice bulge in the front.  I mean if RU's remaining best get bogged down in street to street city fighting and UKR pull off their own Op Uranus... The effect of inflicting one of the holy grails of Soviet WW2 victories against them would really be something.

If I recall, the eastern half of Bakhmut is in Russian hands, Ukraine holds the west, with a solid defense line anchored on better terrain west of Bakhmut. Not a big bulge, but certainly Russia is very bogged down in Bakhmut.

[Grigb]

 

12 hours ago, cesmonkey said:

Yet another Kofman interview.

He says that Ukraine is suffering losses around Bakmut due to more elite Wagner forces that attack at night using night vision, when Ukrainians are exhausted from fighting off the human wave attacks during the day.

 

 

 

This is an interesting point since it clarifies the problem with UKR defense. The Ukraine has elite units that are better trained and equipped for night combat. They can resist such RU attacks. However, these units are also required as reserves and for offensive purposes.

As a result, there is a certain pattern with UKR defense - elite units are used to defending something important. Afterwards they are replaced by regular units, which can withstand regular RU units but struggle against better-equipped RU elite units.

 

10 hours ago, womble said:

 

Speculative theorycraft answer, but serious, even if it makes me slightly queasy to type:

1. The Russians send a fire team to die.
2. The death of the fireteam exposes one or more UKR positions, which might be manned by a fireteam.
3. Indirect fires reduce the locations of the UKR fire team(s) to rubble graves for pulverised UKR troopers.

Depending on the ratio of "death by recon" elements to "fire positions located" over time, it's possible that this form of warfare, if the RU economy of force is well-controlled and they can put enough HE on the targets revealed by their recon, it's not inconceivable  that the RU commanders are getting somewhere close to unity in the casualty ratios just in that form of warfare. So, in the best-case-for-Russia where Wagner have enough drone-observers to real-time the guns assigned to that assault phase onto the revealed targets, maybe 1:1 is more credible.

Interesting point. 

• Usual meat group is a squad sized unit
• Yet, there are claims that Wagnerites do not allow their groups to retreat if at least one person is alive and not injured (regulars and volunteers groups tend to retreat when a couple of people are wounded).
• As a result, a fire team or even just a few of guys may be able to reach the UKR defensive positions. That would be sufficient for Wagnerite command.
• UKR troops aren't waiting around firing positions. They typically return to underground "bunkers" to observe situations using cameras and drones. As a result, the time between detection and arty fire is critical. I read somewhere that some elite RU units were able to reduce the delay from hours to minutes. Looks like they revived old WW2 method - they assign guns to assault groups and link guns directly to the assault group leader. This is supposed to be part of the Storm tactic you've undoubtedly read about.
• Urban buildings are not very vulnerable, and RU arty fire is not always accurate enough to produce rubble graves most of the time. Village houses, on the other hand, are vulnerable, and if hit near enough, they can become a grave for the occupants.

To summarize:

Wagnerites refined RU Volunteer tactics - their brutality helps them to relentlessly drive Meat groups forward, yielding greater outcomes (identifying UKR positions and weak points) per casualty. Improved drone supply, along with better processing of fire requests and ammo delivery, enables them to hit UKR troops harder. Particularly when UKR forces are defending a village (or not adequately fortified field position). After softening the UKR position, RU employs elite Meat units with night fighting equipment to raid/assault it.

It works against UKR regular units in villages but not against UKR elite units in cities. This is exactly what we see in Bakhmut.

[Kinophile]

I do wonder if Ukraine will continue the same operational approach to counter offensives as in 2022.

2023 feels like a very beast, slouching towards Bethlehem...