How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[hcrof]

4 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Interesting clip in a lot of ways. What struck me was that despite relatively accurate fire from the IFV, the troops in the trench were surpassed but not obviously hit. Am I correct in thinking this is one of many cases we have seen where an auto-cannon with programmable airburst would be vastly more effective?

The thing that struck me is that a drone makes fighting along a trenchline much less dangerous. You don't need to expose yourself since you can throw grenades blind into the correct section of trench. 

[Grigb]

It's going to be a long and tedious post, but I believe it's vital to address all points. 

1 hour ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

They all seem in agreement that the level of casualties in Bachmut is high, Russians there are figthing well and Vuhledar is something completely else than is happening in Bachmut, whereas e.g. Kreminna is something else alltogether. 

Bakhmut's is somewhat different from norm since Wagnerites' leadership is moderately competent and they are used to shooting a week's worth of ammunition in one day. 

Vuhledar is somewhat different from norm since the RU command there is more obsessed with the result. These are RU marines who are envious of VDV's reputation and are determined to prove that they are superior to VDV.

Svatove-Kreminna is somewhat different from norm becasue RU army regulars there are not especially keen on dying or showing off. (RU Nats specifically accuse them of sabotaging offencive)

But, the overall situation is the same everywhere - RU are experiencing high (and in many places terrible) losses as a result of an explicit order for non-stop assault. 

1 hour ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

The Polish angle in this is Muzyka, who specifically came forward with the 1:1 ratio on Polish twitter.

Let us examine how fighting happens in urban areas (and why UKR are keen to hold them). The UKR defense is based on concealed firing positions with pre-planned killzones. Subterranean passageways link the fire positions through subterranean infrastructure. The Soviet-style buildings contain basement levels, which UKR soldiers connect to form a system of passageways to maneuver between fire positions.

A RU meat aka assault group advance until getting in to a killzone. Then it dies. Now the crucial difference between Wagnerites and RU regulars - RU regulars do not have a lot of drones so it takes them a few more meat groups to figure out what has happened. Wagnerites have drones and they watch progress in real time. As soon as the group dies they know where and how it died and more importantly what building to hit with arty to push UKR troops out of firing position. Then the next meat group goes out and dies in the next killzone and so on and so forth.

The only time when RU can get 1:1 ratio is when UKR get out to counter-attack a RU penetration - RU can hit UKR attack with overwhelming arty (sometimes).  But UKR counter-attack are not a main part of battle. They happen but not that often. 

So, my question - how exactly does RU archive 1:1 ratio?

• Their tactics are not better than during summer offensive. In fact, the current Wagnerite tactic is nothing more but LDPR hardcore volunteer tactics used during summer offenicve
• Their arty is significantly weaker
• Their zek supply does not exists anymore (well, for Wagnerites at Bakhmut)

That's my first concern with the experts opinion - they are unable to describe how exactly RU got significantly better. 

1 hour ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

The podcast also provides some details of the trip which to me are sufficient to disprove the angle, that this was just a publicity trip. E.g. the main source of their information is not visual inspection of the frontline, but meeting with their contacts and getting them to talk in a more extended and frank way, that is the case over the telephone or Signal. Gady and Muzyka did not even go to Bachmut itself, but elected to visit a replacement depot behind the lines. 

This is my second problem the experts - they seems oblivious to the Ukrainian cultural thing.

What do you get when talking to two Ukrainians? Dozens stories about how everything is f*cked up. What do you get when talking with three Ukranians? Millions of stories about how everything is f*cked up.

This is how RU intelligence got messed up - RU cultural thing is exactly the opposite. Therefore, when RU operatives spoke with Ukrainian contacts, they heard true stories of how everything is f*cked up in Ukraine. Rest is  history.

Let me reitterate - my second concern is whether the experts used a cultural filter when listening to what their UKR contacts told them. Because it does not appear that they did.

Just in case - I've been reading straight from UKR sources about how everything is f*cked up with dead corpses everywhere, beginning from Severodonetsk (that when I started reading UKR sources), Lysichask, and then Pisky. A few weeks before Izum collapse, I read about how UKR is suffering on the frontlines at Izum.

 

1 hour ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

It is of course just my impression, but looking at what kind of arguments are put forward in favour and against, by whom and on what basis I find that the claim of 1:1 attrition ratio - specifically in the context of e.g. past two or three weeks, on the frontline between Krasnopopivka in the North to Krasne in the South - to be fully believable. 

My impression is that nothing serious was put in favor of 1:1 ratio. So far I have seen only one explanation that when both sides shoot out of buildings UKR do not get an advantage. Since this is not how the fighting occurs, I do not buy it.

It does not mean somewhere sometimes UKR do not suffer bigger losses (see my explanation about UKR counter-attacks). It does mean on average 1:1 ratio is highly questionable.

1 hour ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

To the contrary, the arguments referring to those huge 1:7 or 1:5 ratios seem to be just weaker, as they tend to be based on just "because Vuhledar, because zek rush and because Russian Orc stupid" general sentiment

While I am not fan of 1:7 or 1:5 ratio (we have no firm independent data to confirm it) I must reiterate that the following is not a general sentiment but facts. 

• Vuhledar is not exception
• Meat assaults (previouslyzek rushes) is a norm (this winter and spring)
• Institutionaly RU military is orc stupid (it is cultural thing). Wagnerites like to think they are smarter and they certainly are.. to a certain extend, but not by much (it is cultural thing).

 

1 hour ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

or averaging out the casualty ratios in Bachmut area over a period of several months.

In reality, based on RU Nats conversations, I see RU suffering horrendous losses starting from January. Over the same time period, Wagnerites lost zek sources, were cut off from arty supplies. 

Despite this, I've heard from experts that RU are doing better currently.

1 hour ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

Now, the answer to the above question most recently presented by the Ukrainians is no longer attritional, but positional. UKR defends Bachmut because otherwise, the Russians will attack upwards and eliminate the salient from the north of Soledar to Kreminna. E.g. that is what Mashovets said the previous Monday on his Kanal5 programme.

Just some clarification - In March 10 post Mashovets said the RU Center group cannot simultaneously fight for Bakhmut and conduct an offensive toward Siversk. The most combat-capable units are engaged in Bakhmut. After the fighting in Bakhmut stops, RU Center will turn them north and attack Siversk to threaten the UKR salient (Belohorivka). So, this is the military reason (not attriting RU) to hold Bakhmut according to Mashovets.

 

1 hour ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

I am not sure about this one - if the RUS want to attack to the North, why do they need to take Bakhmut to the South? They took Soledar, which was closer to Bachmut than Krasnopopivka or Siversk.

Initially, they intended to seize Bakhmut as a prelude for the battle for Slavyanks-Kramatorsk. That's how they got engaged in Soledar-Bakhmut battle. But, the Izum line collapsed at some point, and the UKR gained a salient at Belohorivka [toward Lysychansk], which seriously alarmed the RU (not Wagnerites) command. As a result, the RU High command intended to destroy the salient during the winter offensive by striking it from multiple directions, including from attack from Bakhmut sector.

[Grigb]

1 hour ago, chrisl said:

If this is representative, does it imply that the Russians aren’t even handing out rpgs in any kind of quantity, let alone atgms?  With dispersed troops in a long trench that was a pretty exposed vehicle side.

RU ATGM teams often operate at a significant distance from the front line. I have not seen any explanation of that but I believe it is due to a combination of vulnerability and a noticeably smaller number of ATGM posts (I believe they prefer less posts but more missiles per post).

[Battlefront.com]

43 minutes ago, hcrof said:

The thing that struck me is that a drone makes fighting along a trenchline much less dangerous. You don't need to expose yourself since you can throw grenades blind into the correct section of trench. 

It's even worse than that for the defender.  The drone can update the assault units on how effective their fire is and that in turn produces more directed fire on where the actual defenders are.  What I mean by this is the knowledge a drone provides is specific and ongoing, two different concepts that combined create a really bad situation for the defender.

In such cases the defender is likely going to get killed without doing anything significant.  Best to try running away or surrendering.

Now, if this trench were backed up by sufficient combined arms, well, then the story might be different.  As it was in this video, a bunch of infantry was left in a very long trench without anything other than small arms to defend themselves with.  Sitting ducks for an APC (M113?), tank, and infantry.

From what I can see...

Attacker
   1x MBT
   1x APC with HMG (could be M113, could be YPR-776)
   1x Rifle Team (most I see in action is 4 guys) armed with plenty of LATW
   1x Drone

Defender
   1x Rifle Squad (looks like there might have been about 8 guys in total, hard to tell) armed with rifles

APC and Rifle Team were able to get right up close and suppress the Russians in the trench.  Single soldier went into the trench, quickly came upon one dead or wounded (mortally, most likely) defender and used grenades to go after a single defender.  Drone saw that they had consolidated into a position with overhead cover.  MBT came in and beat the snot out of the consolidated position.  Edit to end where there's a bunch of destruction and defender bodies, no apparent casualties for the attacker.

The defender should have been able to do a lot more than this.  A few AT weapons and some wire obstacles could have produced a much different result.

Steve

P.S.  any CMer knows that trenches without adequate soldiers to defend them are a liability because the attacker can get in and once in that's usually really bad for the defender

[Battlefront.com]

27 minutes ago, Grigb said:

It's going to be a long and tedious post, but I believe it's vital to address all points. 

Hmm.  Maybe this is a problem of you not being a native English speaker because it seems what you mean to say is a "long and interesting post"

27 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Let us examine how fighting happens in urban areas (and why UKR are keen to hold them). The UKR defense is based on concealed firing positions with pre-planned killzones. Subterranean passageways link the fire positions through subterranean infrastructure. The Soviet-style buildings contain basement levels, which UKR soldiers connect to form a system of passageways to maneuver between fire positions.

A RU meat aka assault group advance until getting in to a killzone. Then it dies. Now the crucial difference between Wagnerites and RU regulars - RU regulars do not have a lot of drones so it takes them a few more meat groups to figure out what has happened. Wagnerites have drones and they watch progress in real time. As soon as the group dies they know where and how it died and more importantly what building to hit with arty to push UKR troops out of firing position. Then the next meat group goes out and dies in the next killzone and so on and so forth.

The only time when RU can get 1:1 ratio is when UKR get out to counter-attack a RU penetration - RU can hit UKR attack with overwhelming arty (sometimes).  But UKR counter-attack are not a main part of battle. They happen but not that often. 

This times 100.  For Ukraine to be suffering 1:1 losses it would mean that Ukraine's defenders are poor quality and Russia's attackers are significantly better *or* the Russians have some sort of overmatch capability at play.  Why?  Because that's the only way to explain how Ukraine could be giving up so little ground and yet be taking as many casualties as the attacker.

Further, the whole Ukraine culture of complaint has been on display since the start of the war.  Remember all the complaints about logistics and supplies of AT weaponry at the beginning of the war?  And they say that when they are out in the middle of nowhere with a pile of Javelins sitting behind them.  Or about how stupid their senior commanders are and yet somehow smart enough to defeat the "2nd biggest army in the world".

Anyway, it is the job of the frontline soldier to complain.  It's in their DNA.  Ukrainians certainly are no different.  But we also see them saying "it's all f'd up here, but we're doing fine despite that".  Maybe part of it is to build up their own myth of superiority in that they are able to defeat not only the Russians but their own side's defects. 

Whatever the case is, it gets back to what The_Capt and I said way back when the Kofman et all trip was concluded.  If all they did was visit the front, then their conclusions aren't likely reliable.  It takes talking with senior leadership to round out the picture, and senior leadership is not talking to pretty much anybody.

That said...

27 minutes ago, Grigb said:

My impression is that nothing serious was put in favor of 1:1 ratio. So far I have seen only one explanation that when both sides shoot out of buildings UKR do not get an advantage. Since this is not how the fighting occurs, I do not buy it.

It does not mean somewhere sometimes UKR do not suffer bigger losses (see my explanation about UKR counter-attacks). It does mean on average 1:1 ratio is highly questionable.

While I am not fan of 1:7 or 1:5 ratio (we have no firm independent data to confirm it) I must reiterate that the following is not a general sentiment but facts. 

It's pretty clear we're seeing now is a much tougher fight and no opportunities for Ukraine to slaughter large numbers of Russians without breaking a sweat.  So I think it's pretty safe to presume that the favorable casualty rates of the past few months are reduced.  Which is why I said in my previous post that at this point I think it is safer to start with the 1:1 estimate and modify upward then to go with the 1:5 or 1:7 estimates and reduce from there.

Steve

[Lethaface]

3 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

It's still a sampling of incomplete evidence, but I agree we should take their assessment as a starting point.  Other evidence is lining up with this, such as the change in terrain, forces Russia is committing to the battle, and consistent daily advances.  The lack of out in the open rushes by lightly armed untrained men without supporting fire also seem to be over.

However, the nature of all of this means it is more difficult than ever for Ukraine to estimate Russian casualties.  Urban terrain makes assessment much harder and it's even more difficult when the enemy is taking ground.  If you're not walking the terrain with your own soldiers, it's likely there's casualties you're unaware of because a) bodies aren't being seen and b) the enemy has more opportunities to evacuate casualties unseen.

Unfortunately, this situation means that Ukraine might be OVER estimating Russian casualties, making the ratio less favorable than even 1:1.  The point is we just don't know, but if the forces on the ground feel that it's closer to 1:1 then that's probably the best estimate we'll get.  Likely ever, as Russia isn't known for being forthcoming with information even decades after the fact.

Yes, those highly favorable estimates for Ukraine do seem to be no longer relevant to Bakhmut.  Which should be no surprise because the high body count was always associated with the Human wave attacks of both zerks and mobiks.  Those attacks are not happening any more, therefore the high casualty ratio isn't either.

We'll see what happens in Vuhledar in the coming days, but my guess is the weather is going to reduce activity there for a while.

Russia lacks the combat power to do anything significant if it takes Bakhmut.  If Russia were able to do something on this scale we'd have seen it this winter an we saw the exact opposite.  Three limited and unsuccessful areas of focus, none of which have secured much ground.  Even Russia's successes in Bakhmut are measured in meters and not kilometers.

Steve

I personally find the casualty ratio a less interesting subject, mainly because we just don't know the casualties and we haven't known about them. The delta between two unknowns is probably something like unknown². The bean-counting machine don't like computing that one though ;-). 
Maybe Ukraine casualties have always been 'high' or higher than some had assumed, I mean what is even 'high'?

The facts which were assertable showed that Bakhmut has been, for quite a while, the only significant offensive pressure Russia was able to mount (apart from long range (terror) strikes). Progress, as we all know here, has been slow. Bakhmut was were Wagner was making a real name for itself (by keeping up the only offensive) and built up influence, subsequently losing it after months of fighting without much to show for. Even the presumed 'anniversary offensive' turned out to be a form of continuation of the already ongoing Bakhmut offensive, without much to show for yet. 

Without travelling to Bakhmut one could imagine that over time defenses would be degraded / 'the defensive puzzle' as it was called here, more and more solved. So less favorable conditions for Ukraine compared to earlier in the battle.
 

It doesn't, at least imho, change the general outlook of the proceedings of the war. Nor does it necessarily require to adjust ones 'best case vs worst case scenarios' on the subject of overall casualty ratios. I'd say that overall the ratio for Ukraine is 'good enough', given that they dialed back the offensive 'prongs', forced Russia to mobilize a bunch of extra troops to throw in the grinder and we haven't seen Ukraine being forced to abandon positions without fighting. 

 

On another subject, yesterday I read something about Nova Kakhovka being taken by Ukraine but that might have been just rumors; didn't see much about it today although I haven't really done much digging yet.

If/when the UKR spring/summer offensive materializes it will be interesting to see how well Russia can defend against those. Of course there are no guarantees but if I had to gamble money on an outcome I'd put it on a successful Ukraine offensive (operational victory not yet strategic collapse, although I hope I'm wrong on this one), some 'gestures of good will' and perhaps a push towards negotiations (not necessarily formally originating from Russia). 

[Battlefront.com]

33 minutes ago, Grigb said:

RU ATGM teams often operate at a significant distance from the front line. I have not seen any explanation of that but I believe it is due to a combination of vulnerability and a noticeably smaller number of ATGM posts (I believe they prefer less posts but more missiles per post).

It's not just ATGMs.  We've been noting for a while now the absence of any AT weaponry, even the ubiquitous RPG-7 or the common disposable RPGs.  In this last video we saw Ukrainian dismounts firing something like 3-5 LATWs from a SINGLE VEHICLE, whereas not a single one coming from the defender.  We've seen this in other videos as well and have commented on it before.  So while these videos are not statistically valid to base a hypothesis on, there does seem to be a hint Russian forces are short on AT weapons in some way.

Steve

[Grigb]

2 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

It's not just ATGMs.  We've been noting for a while now the absence of any AT weaponry, even the ubiquitous RPG-7 or the common disposable RPGs.  In this last video we saw Ukrainian dismounts firing something like 3-5 LATWs from a SINGLE VEHICLE, whereas not a single one coming from the defender.  We've seen this in other videos as well and have commented on it before.  So while these videos are not statistically valid to base a hypothesis on, there does seem to be a hint Russian forces are short on AT weapons in some way.

Steve

Based on photos of RU troops with RPG-16 UKR believe RU experience severe shortage of modern RPGs. 

[Battlefront.com]

6 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Based on photos of RU troops with RPG-16 UKR believe RU experience severe shortage of modern RPGs. 

I wonder.  Maybe Russia pushed too many into Ukraine and other conflicts (Syria, Armenia, etc.) over the past 8 years and didn't replenish their stocks?  Now they've pretty much used up what the had on hand?

Steve

[danfrodo]

1 hour ago, Grigb said:

It's going to be a long and tedious post, but I believe it's vital to address all points. 

Bakhmut's is somewhat different from norm since Wagnerites' leadership is moderately competent and they are used to shooting a week's worth of ammunition in one day. 

Vuhledar is somewhat different from norm since the RU command there is more obsessed with the result. These are RU marines who are envious of VDV's reputation and are determined to prove that they are superior to VDV.

Svatove-Kreminna is somewhat different from norm becasue RU army regulars there are not especially keen on dying or showing off. (RU Nats specifically accuse them of sabotaging offencive)

But, the overall situation is the same everywhere - RU are experiencing high (and in many places terrible) losses as a result of an explicit order for non-stop assault. 

Let us examine how fighting happens in urban areas (and why UKR are keen to hold them). The UKR defense is based on concealed firing positions with pre-planned killzones. Subterranean passageways link the fire positions through subterranean infrastructure. The Soviet-style buildings contain basement levels, which UKR soldiers connect to form a system of passageways to maneuver between fire positions.

A RU meat aka assault group advance until getting in to a killzone. Then it dies. Now the crucial difference between Wagnerites and RU regulars - RU regulars do not have a lot of drones so it takes them a few more meat groups to figure out what has happened. Wagnerites have drones and they watch progress in real time. As soon as the group dies they know where and how it died and more importantly what building to hit with arty to push UKR troops out of firing position. Then the next meat group goes out and dies in the next killzone and so on and so forth.

The only time when RU can get 1:1 ratio is when UKR get out to counter-attack a RU penetration - RU can hit UKR attack with overwhelming arty (sometimes).  But UKR counter-attack are not a main part of battle. They happen but not that often. 

So, my question - how exactly does RU archive 1:1 ratio?

• Their tactics are not better than during summer offensive. In fact, the current Wagnerite tactic is nothing more but LDPR hardcore volunteer tactics used during summer offenicve
• Their arty is significantly weaker
• Their zek supply does not exists anymore (well, for Wagnerites at Bakhmut)

That's my first concern with the experts opinion - they are unable to describe how exactly RU got significantly better. 

This is my second problem the experts - they seems oblivious to the Ukrainian cultural thing.

What do you get when talking to two Ukrainians? Dozens stories about how everything is f*cked up. What do you get when talking with three Ukranians? Millions of stories about how everything is f*cked up.

This is how RU intelligence got messed up - RU cultural thing is exactly the opposite. Therefore, when RU operatives spoke with Ukrainian contacts, they heard true stories of how everything is f*cked up in Ukraine. Rest is  history.

Let me reitterate - my second concern is whether the experts used a cultural filter when listening to what their UKR contacts told them. Because it does not appear that they did.

Just in case - I've been reading straight from UKR sources about how everything is f*cked up with dead corpses everywhere, beginning from Severodonetsk (that when I started reading UKR sources), Lysichask, and then Pisky. A few weeks before Izum collapse, I read about how UKR is suffering on the frontlines at Izum.

 

My impression is that nothing serious was put in favor of 1:1 ratio. So far I have seen only one explanation that when both sides shoot out of buildings UKR do not get an advantage. Since this is not how the fighting occurs, I do not buy it.

It does not mean somewhere sometimes UKR do not suffer bigger losses (see my explanation about UKR counter-attacks). It does mean on average 1:1 ratio is highly questionable.

While I am not fan of 1:7 or 1:5 ratio (we have no firm independent data to confirm it) I must reiterate that the following is not a general sentiment but facts. 

• Vuhledar is not exception
• Meat assaults (previouslyzek rushes) is a norm (this winter and spring)
• Institutionaly RU military is orc stupid (it is cultural thing). Wagnerites like to think they are smarter and they certainly are.. to a certain extend, but not by much (it is cultural thing).

 

In reality, based on RU Nats conversations, I see RU suffering horrendous losses starting from January. Over the same time period, Wagnerites lost zek sources, were cut off from arty supplies. 

Despite this, I've heard from experts that RU are doing better currently.

Just some clarification - In March 10 post Mashovets said the RU Center group cannot simultaneously fight for Bakhmut and conduct an offensive toward Siversk. The most combat-capable units are engaged in Bakhmut. After the fighting in Bakhmut stops, RU Center will turn them north and attack Siversk to threaten the UKR salient (Belohorivka). So, this is the military reason (not attriting RU) to hold Bakhmut according to Mashovets.

 

Initially, they intended to seize Bakhmut as a prelude for the battle for Slavyanks-Kramatorsk. That's how they got engaged in Soledar-Bakhmut battle. But, the Izum line collapsed at some point, and the UKR gained a salient at Belohorivka [toward Lysychansk], which seriously alarmed the RU (not Wagnerites) command. As a result, the RU High command intended to destroy the salient during the winter offensive by striking it from multiple directions, including from attack from Bakhmut sector.

Outstanding post, thanks much GrigB

[Haiduk]

47 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

1x APC with HMG (could be M113, could be YPR-776)

I've seen in comments that was FV103 Spartan

[cesmonkey]

Yet another Kofman interview.

He says that Ukraine is suffering losses around Bakmut due to more elite Wagner forces that attack at night using night vision, when Ukrainians are exhausted from fighting off the human wave attacks during the day.

 

 

 

[dan/california]

1 minute ago, cesmonkey said:

Yet another Kofman interview.

He says that Ukraine is suffering losses around Bakmut due to more elite Wagner forces that attack at night using night vision, when Ukrainians are exhausted from fighting off the human wave attacks during the day.

 

 

 

That also implies Wagner is committing it most experienced fighters to take a town that just has no major weight in the outcome of this war. It means a lot of those better troops are not going to be available to oppose Ukraines spring offensive. As measure of combat power this is still a good trade, probably, because we still don't know anything about Ukraine's actual losses.

[Battlefront.com]

16 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

I've seen in comments that was FV103 Spartan

As far as I know there isn't a Spartan variant that has a ramp for dismounts.  My guess is YPR as the vehicle in the video has uneven edges and a more sloped front, which rules out the M113.

Steve

[akd]

NM, addressed

 

Edited March 13, 2023 by akd

[Haiduk]

34 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

As far as I know there isn't a Spartan variant that has a ramp for dismounts.  My guess is YPR as the vehicle in the video has uneven edges and a more sloped front, which rules out the M113.

Steve

On the video only 4 dismounts - too low for M113

We have enough zoo of FV103-based vehicles

35 FV103 were handed over by UK government

At least 14 vehicles (FV103, FV104, FV105) were bought by Petro Poroshenko charity fund and delivered to Ukraine during November-December

World Congress of Ukrainans bought 25 vehciles (12 FV103, 1 FV103 SPA8, 1 FV103 SPA017 - I didn't find anything what is it SPA8/017, 2 FV104, 7 FV432, 2 FV434). Last batch came to Ukraine about week ago

Serhiy Prytula charity fund bought 101 vehicles (FV103, FV104, FV105, FV106, CVRT Shielder, Stormer, FV432, FV434). 44 vehicles already in Ukraine

    

 

Edited March 13, 2023 by Haiduk

[Haiduk]

Work of drone with thermal camera, likely Mavik 3T, 3rd assault brigade "Azov"

 

[Battlefront.com]

Report that Iran has sent Russia a large quantity of ammunition. 

https://censor.net/en/news/3404406/iran_secretly_handed_russia_hundreds_of_thousands_of_shells_sky_news

If this reporting is correct, it shows that Russia has pretty much shot out its existing ammo stocks.  The shipments from Iran will be helpful for sure, but even an impressive 300,000 shells might be, it's in fact quite limited.  Using Russia's late 2022 rate it's only 15 days worth or 60 days worth with the recent 5000 per day rate.  That's not a lot.

Steve

[dan/california]

3 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Work of drone with thermal camera, likely Mavik 3T, 3rd assault brigade "Azov"

 

What was the actual munition? FPV drones of some kind? You can see them coming in slow in a very flat trajectory, and then diving. Visible across several frames, so not super fast.

[Haiduk]

2 minutes ago, dan/california said:

FPV drones of some kind?

Too fast for usual FPV. Artillery shell (MT-12, for example) or SPG-9 projectile. 

[Haiduk]

6 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Dimitri posted two translated videos (Magyar and Kyianyn) about the state of the battle in Bakhmut:

@Bulletpoint

"Madyar's birds" now redeployed to Avdiivka sector

"Kyianyn" is swindler! 93rd brigade made official statement, this man not from their unit and hasn't a right to put on them brigade's chevron. He is not in Bakhmut. so this is completely not reliable source. 

Edited March 13, 2023 by Haiduk

[Battlefront.com]

Kadyrov met with Putin today in person.  Supposedly:

https://www.msn.com/en-in/money/watch/russian-president-vladimir-putin-holds-meeting-with-chechen-leader-ramzan-kadyrov-news18/vp-AA18ySfA

Here is the transcript:

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/70667

For sure Kadyrov looks fine.  Putin's table gripping and (I think) foot slapping was noticeable.  However...

Russia has a history of combating rumors of illness with video footage or pictures from some earlier time, claim it's current, then tell people there's nothing to see.  When Putin disappeared for 2 weeks back in 2014 they did this sort of thing. 

The thing to look for is some indication of when the video/picture was taken.  I watched these two ramble on for most of the 6 minutes of the video and I saw nothing that provides a solid time reference beyond maybe January 2023 (4th Quarter of 2022 is mentioned). 

I don't know about these meetings with Putin to know if it's normal to have things be so vague, so I can't comment on if the lack of definitive recent events is abnormal or not.  However, I don't see anything in this video that makes me sure Kadyrov is fine, even though I think the rumors of him going to Germany are unlikely true.  Therefore, for now, I'm keeping an open mind.

Steve

[womble]

2 hours ago, Grigb said:

So, my question - how exactly does RU archive 1:1 ratio?

 

Speculative theorycraft answer, but serious, even if it makes me slightly queasy to type:

1. The Russians send a fire team to die.
2. The death of the fireteam exposes one or more UKR positions, which might be manned by a fireteam.
3. Indirect fires reduce the locations of the UKR fire team(s) to rubble graves for pulverised UKR troopers.

Depending on the ratio of "death by recon" elements to "fire positions located" over time, it's possible that this form of warfare, if the RU economy of force is well-controlled and they can put enough HE on the targets revealed by their recon, it's not inconceivable  that the RU commanders are getting somewhere close to unity in the casualty ratios just in that form of warfare. So, in the best-case-for-Russia where Wagner have enough drone-observers to real-time the guns assigned to that assault phase onto the revealed targets, maybe 1:1 is more credible.

[dan/california]

39 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Report that Iran has sent Russia a large quantity of ammunition. 

https://censor.net/en/news/3404406/iran_secretly_handed_russia_hundreds_of_thousands_of_shells_sky_news

If this reporting is correct, it shows that Russia has pretty much shot out its existing ammo stocks.  The shipments from Iran will be helpful for sure, but even an impressive 300,000 shells might be, it's in fact quite limited.  Using Russia's late 2022 rate it's only 15 days worth or 60 days worth with the recent 5000 per day rate.  That's not a lot.

Steve

Chinese ammo or peace on Ukraine's terms then? Don't see the third choice. 

Edited March 13, 2023 by dan/california

[Battlefront.com]

10 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

"Kyianyn" is swindler! 93rd brigade made official statement, this man not from their unit and hasn't a right to put on them brigade's chevron. He is not in Bakhmut. so this is completely not reliable source. 

Heh.  Well, I guess my suspicions were valid!  I did not like that the video showed nothing of his surroundings and I could hear no combat in the background.  I did what I could to check on him, but I relied mostly on Dmitri's reputation.  It appears Kyianyn is very well known, but it seems wise to ignore him as a fraud.

Steve