How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Battlefront.com]

52 minutes ago, Seminole said:

I can’t put bombing the radio station on the same plane as carpet bombing cities or throwing people in gas chambers.  It strikes me as a normal and natural target in war.  Not genocidal.  
 

If the war is illegal, then the acts committed by the people waging that war are also illegal.  Legal culpability is not limited to the head of state or senior leaders.  Doesn't matter if it is carpet bombing an entire city or killing a single armed civilian.  Just like it is illegal for me to break into a department store and everything I do inside is subject to additional criminal charges.  It doesn't matter if I take a candy bar or burn the place down, everything done is subject to legal scrutiny.

Whether this is enforced by a country or International Courts is completely irrelevant to the principles involved.

52 minutes ago, Seminole said:

If the illegal nature of the war make everything that happens in its course a war crime you just indicted hundreds of thousands, (millions?) of Americans.
It’s absurd.  

Legal principles are absurd?  Interesting concept.

Steve

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, Kinophile said:

Your math is suspect my friend.... January was about 2000 dead,  6-8k wounded,  I believe. 

100,000 is WW2 scale and equivalent to 1/3 of their current force...in a month. 

I do, and have always, used the official issued Ukrainian figures. I do assume that the number includes killed and wounded. But when you consider the fact that wounded men either suck up a ton of resources, or add themselves to the dead column they are a problem either way. Said Ukrainian numbers are running between 500 and a thousand per day.

I am sure these numbers are not perfect, but I don't think there are any perfect, or even really good numbers. I doubt the Russian's have good numbers given the lying and dysfunction in their system. We may NEVER know the real numbers on the Russian side.

 

Edited March 6, 2023 by dan/california

[The_Capt]

5 hours ago, dan/california said:

See below...

Okay, let us assume that Grigb's source, translation, and so on are correct for purposes of this discussion. You have just stated in the same morning that Russia's military is on the verge of epic failure. You have stated that the Russian state is simply clueless about what to do next, they simply have no idea how to lose this war. So if the Ukrainians smash the Russian army into flaming dust bunnies the way they deserve, and it seems as likely as not they will. Does the Russian regime survive? Does the Russian state survive? They are not quite the same thing. Or are we on an inevitable track towards something at least as dramatic as the Bolshevik revolution?

I do not know.  No one does and that is what is particularly scary.  We have not outlined a strategy in the West that includes a theory of a Russian defeat - at least not publicly.  All the O2 is taken up with “Ukraine can’t win” or “Ukraine can’t lose”, or how much support we need to push in order to make Ukraine achieve a “complete victory”.  Problem is that we have largely left the post-Russia issue up to the dice rolls.  Zelensky basically outline the Ukrainian position: “We do not care, so long as they are out.”  Which is very understandable, but the grown ups in the West can’t think that way, it is far too dangerous.  Worst case is Russia falls apart completely and descends into a violent break up.  This will immediately raise the nuclear question.  We have never had a nuclear power undergo a civil war or complete collapse.  The USSR folded but it was pretty organized, more rolling up shop - although it came within inches (https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/10/20-years-ago-russia-had-its-biggest-political-crisis-since-the-bolshevik-revolution/280237/)

So a Russia in full free fall means that nuclear risk and regional instability goes up dramatically.  I am not sure what the Russia theory of defeat is, I am pretty sure Putin does not have one considering how tightly he has boxed himself in. I can only hope some power players in the backfield have got a plan B.

[dan/california]

4 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

I do not know.  No one does and that is what is particularly scary.  We have not outlined a strategy in the West that includes a theory of a Russian defeat - at least not publicly.  All the O2 is taken up with “Ukraine can’t win” or “Ukraine can’t lose”, or how much support we need to push in order to make Ukraine achieve a “complete victory”.  Problem is that we have largely left the post-Russia issue up to the dice rolls.  Zelensky basically outline the Ukrainian position: “We do not care, so long as they are out.”  Which is very understandable, but the grown ups in the West can’t think that way, it is far too dangerous.  Worst case is Russia falls apart completely and descends into a violent break up.  This will immediately raise the nuclear question.  We have never had a nuclear power undergo a civil war or complete collapse.  The USSR folded but it was pretty organized, more rolling up shop - although it came within inches (https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/10/20-years-ago-russia-had-its-biggest-political-crisis-since-the-bolshevik-revolution/280237/)

So a Russia in full free fall means that nuclear risk and regional instability goes up dramatically.  I am not sure what the Russia theory of defeat is, I am pretty sure Putin does not have one considering how tightly he has boxed himself in. I can only hope some power players in the backfield have got a plan B.

Out of likes, excellent as always!

 

 

[sburke]

6 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

I do not know.  No one does and that is what is particularly scary.  We have not outlined a strategy in the West that includes a theory of a Russian defeat - at least not publicly.  

Hell I don't think we even have a grasp of what happens if Putin just up and dies (other than complaints from Satan that there is no election process in hell and no, Putin can't run a campaign.)

[Peregrine]

7 hours ago, womble said:

The question I'm asking is, to pose a more specific example "How many nukes would Siberia end up with on its soil, if Russia fell apart tomorrow and couldn't pull them back to Moscow before doing so would need another Special Military Operation?" And the same question for any other successors to the Russian State that Putin rules today.

Most likely the same thing that happened last time Russia fell apart. Elements of the west / UN that do not want small unstable states being nuclear armed will give some guarantees of their borders against Russian aggression in return for giving up the nuclear weapons.

[chuckdyke]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Legal principles are absurd?  Interesting concept.

A more interesting concept. Ignorance is not a defense when you break the law. Most motorists don't realize that they speed or think it is ok as everybody is doing it. My trip to the US a few years ago, made sure I didn't get a ticket. If the sign said 70 mph 70 mph it was but I had the impression I was standing at times. Looting in the Ukraine? Russians probably think it is OK like the traditions of the middle ages looting was how you were paid.

[sburke]

14 minutes ago, Peregrine said:

Most likely the same thing that happened last time Russia fell apart. Elements of the west / UN that do not want small unstable states being nuclear armed will give some guarantees of their borders against Russian aggression in return for giving up the nuclear weapons.

yeah that didn't seem to work out all that well.  

[Peregrine]

4 minutes ago, sburke said:

yeah that didn't seem to work out all that well.  

Basically the point of my post. I do not understand the Russian ability to project their power beyond their borders with ground forces very well but it sort of looks like they have always wanted to since Putin established himself and have pretty much constantly antagonized all their neighbours and others up to their limits of this power. Ukraine is obviously and overextension of their capabilities but hey a scorpion is going do what a scorpion does.

[chrisl]

9 minutes ago, Peregrine said:

Basically the point of my post. I do not understand the Russian ability to project their power beyond their borders with ground forces very well but it sort of looks like they have always wanted to since Putin established himself and have pretty much constantly antagonized all their neighbours and others up to their limits of this power. Ukraine is obviously and overextension of their capabilities but hey a scorpion is going do what a scorpion does.

You were a little off there - see the correction above.

[The_Capt]

50 minutes ago, Peregrine said:

Most likely the same thing that happened last time Russia fell apart. Elements of the west / UN that do not want small unstable states being nuclear armed will give some guarantees of their borders against Russian aggression in return for giving up the nuclear weapons.

The major difference between the collapse of the USSR and one of Russia, is that the USSR collapsed into existing states.  For the most part they simply fell back on internal structures and held the order together.  The notable exception was Former Yugoslavia - from direct experience loose nukes in FRY was a nightmare scenario.

So Russia does not have a state structure safety net.  They have regional centres of power but Russia is highly centralized, so if that goes away quickly things have potential to go all loopy in a lot of ways.  

The list of destabilization scenarios is pretty long, but loose nukes is probably amongst the worse (unless some real crazies break into the Russian bio weapon programs) but frankly any WMD is just plain bad in this sort of thing as it can very well wind up in violent extremism circles pretty quickly. 

[dan/california]

1 minute ago, The_Capt said:

The major difference between the collapse of the USSR and one of Russia, is that the USSR collapsed into existing states.  For the most part they simply fell back on internal structures and held the order together.  The notable exception was Former Yugoslavia - from direct experience loose nukes in FRY was a nightmare scenario.

So Russia does not have a state structure safety net.  They have regional centres of power but Russia is highly centralized, so if that goes away quickly things have potential to go all loopy in a lot of ways.  

The list of destabilization scenarios is pretty long, but loose nukes is probably amongst the worse (unless some real crazies break into the Russian bio weapon programs) but frankly any WMD is just plain bad in this sort of thing as it can very well wind up in violent extremism circles pretty quickly. 

As is always the case in these scenarios the worst actors probably have the most mature plans to take advantage of the situation. Ghirkin and Prigozhin come immediately to mind. Although they might waste their first mover advantage trying to kill each other.

[fireship4]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

We have never had a nuclear power undergo a civil war or complete collapse.

Apart from the very difficult question of how to directly secure a state's nuclear arsenal in such a scenario, perhaps the first measure of a mature state on the brink of such might be to destroy their 'nuclear codes'.  Presumably the weapons could be re-enabled, but that would take time, and direct access.

[chrisl]

10 minutes ago, fireship4 said:

Apart from the very difficult question of how to directly secure a state's nuclear arsenal in such a scenario, perhaps the first measure of a mature state on the brink of such might be to destroy their 'nuclear codes'.  Presumably the weapons could be re-enabled, but that would take time, and direct access.

That was essentially why the former USSR members, including Ukraine, gave up their nukes.  The systems were all set up for control from Moscow and it would have been a major undertaking to set up systems for control from Ukraine and change the control over on all the stuff inside their borders. Plus all the protections and maintenance programs.  For a country that's not particularly rich, getting support from richer countries in return for giving up a high risk expense looks like a pretty good good deal.  At least until Russia decides it wants to reunite with you.

[billbindc]

20 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

The major difference between the collapse of the USSR and one of Russia, is that the USSR collapsed into existing states.  For the most part they simply fell back on internal structures and held the order together.  The notable exception was Former Yugoslavia - from direct experience loose nukes in FRY was a nightmare scenario.

So Russia does not have a state structure safety net.  They have regional centres of power but Russia is highly centralized, so if that goes away quickly things have potential to go all loopy in a lot of ways.  

The list of destabilization scenarios is pretty long, but loose nukes is probably amongst the worse (unless some real crazies break into the Russian bio weapon programs) but frankly any WMD is just plain bad in this sort of thing as it can very well wind up in violent extremism circles pretty quickly. 

I personally would not predict a breakup of the core state. The more likely scenario is that the fringes will continue to peel off late Ottoman style. And of course that's what we are seeing already. The near abroad that Russia still held degrees of sway over is now rapidly signing up with other power centers (China, Turkey, the US) with Ukraine being the most obvious example. Even Belarus is in a sort of limbo where Russia actually can't quite seize control without creating a counterreaction is might be unable to handle. The next wave of dissolution is likely to start with Chechnya and other component states in the Caucasus. Why do I think so? Because of those very same nukes. In an early age, stronger powers would be actively prising open Russian sovereignty on the fringes. Nukes force them to wait until internal forces have already frayed Russian state claims on a territory past the point where Russia itself feels able to defend its interests those places in that way.

Russia will likely ending up being the Sick Man of Europe whose status remains simply because the dominant powers don't want to deal with the mess its end would create.

[fireship4]

50 minutes ago, billbindc said:

I personally would not predict a breakup of the core state.

Unfortunately, the nukes are all over the shop: https://www.atomicarchive.com/almanac/facilities/cis-facilities.html

[sburke]

and you get a nuke, and you get a nuke and you..

[danfrodo]

1 hour ago, dan/california said:

Ghirkin and Prigozhin come immediately to mind

To me, these guys seem very unlikely to ever have power in Moscow.  I think they are far from the actual levers of actual power.  I'd bet on someone in security apparatus that is actually in Moscow and can get powerful forces, like security services and military, behind him quickly to stabilize the situation.  Why would military back prigozhin?  Or some social media clown like Ghirkin?  They are loud but they have no real power on their own -- if RU army stops supplies Wagner is just a bunch of starving bandits.

[danfrodo]

1 hour ago, billbindc said:

I personally would not predict a breakup of the core state. The more likely scenario is that the fringes will continue to peel off late Ottoman style. And of course that's what we are seeing already. The near abroad that Russia still held degrees of sway over is now rapidly signing up with other power centers (China, Turkey, the US) with Ukraine being the most obvious example. Even Belarus is in a sort of limbo where Russia actually can't quite seize control without creating a counterreaction is might be unable to handle. The next wave of dissolution is likely to start with Chechnya and other component states in the Caucasus. Why do I think so? Because of those very same nukes. In an early age, stronger powers would be actively prising open Russian sovereignty on the fringes. Nukes force them to wait until internal forces have already frayed Russian state claims on a territory past the point where Russia itself feels able to defend its interests those places in that way.

Russia will likely ending up being the Sick Man of Europe whose status remains simply because the dominant powers don't want to deal with the mess its end would create.

I wasn't exactly sure what I most expected, then BillBinDC told me exactly what I was thinking but didn't know I was thinking.

[The_Capt]

2 hours ago, billbindc said:

I personally would not predict a breakup of the core state. The more likely scenario is that the fringes will continue to peel off late Ottoman style. And of course that's what we are seeing already. The near abroad that Russia still held degrees of sway over is now rapidly signing up with other power centers (China, Turkey, the US) with Ukraine being the most obvious example. Even Belarus is in a sort of limbo where Russia actually can't quite seize control without creating a counterreaction is might be unable to handle. The next wave of dissolution is likely to start with Chechnya and other component states in the Caucasus. Why do I think so? Because of those very same nukes. In an early age, stronger powers would be actively prising open Russian sovereignty on the fringes. Nukes force them to wait until internal forces have already frayed Russian state claims on a territory past the point where Russia itself feels able to defend its interests those places in that way.

Russia will likely ending up being the Sick Man of Europe whose status remains simply because the dominant powers don't want to deal with the mess its end would create.

That is one scenario.  I do not know.  Things this war has demonstrated is that there is 1) a whole lot of distance between what a lot of Russians think and reality, and 2) there is a whole lotta crazy on the table when that reality hits.  I cannot see the ultranationalists accepting their lot as the Sick Man of Europe quietly.

Edited March 6, 2023 by The_Capt

[dan/california]

1 minute ago, The_Capt said:

That is one scenario.  I do not know.  One this war has demonstrated is that there is 1) a whole lot of distance between what a lot of Russians think and reality, and 2) there is a whole lotta crazy on the table when that reality hits.  I cannot see the ultranationalists accepting their lot as the Sick Man of Europe quietly.

Seven things I think are important, and I don't know how good our info is on any of them.

1) To what extent have the ultranationalist quietly co-opted the mid levels of the security services?

2) To what extent is anyone besides the ultranationalist willing to really fight for power? Clearly the people at the very top of the regime are, and so far the apparatus has followed orders, does that hold?

3) Is the war making the ultranationalist stronger or weaker? I mean at least some of the real fire breathers have been killed in Ukraine. 

4) Is the war convincing what passes for the broad middle that the ultras are the solution, or the problem?

5) Is there actually real separation between the ultras, and the FSB/GRU?

6) Are the FSB and GRU cultivating separate ultra communities as their "private" foot soldiers?

7) How is the relationship between the FSB and the GRU anyway?

 

Grigb it is great to have you chiming in again! any chance to could opine on any of these, at least very briefly?

 

[dan/california]

5 hours ago, Kinophile said:

Your math is suspect my friend.... January was about 2000 dead,  6-8k wounded,  I believe. 

100,000 is WW2 scale and equivalent to 1/3 of their current force...in a month. 

 

Quote

https://kyivindependent.com/news-feed/nato-commander-in-europe-russias-losses-in-ukraine-amount-to-over-200-000-troops

Would you accept the best estimate of the current NATO commander?

 

Quote

 

NATO's Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, U.S. Army General Christopher Cavoli, said that Russia has lost more than 200,000 troops since the start of its invasion in Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022, describing the extent of the war as "unbelievable."

He added that over 1,800 Russian officers were killed or wounded, German magazine Der Spiegel reported.

 

 

 

[Ts4EVER]

I think you are talking about different things, namely if the casualties are per month or overall.

[Battlefront.com]

We talked about the potential breakup scenarios for Russia earlier in the war when there was less known about how defeats would impact Putin's regime continuing. 

What we have to remember is that the breakup of Russia is inevitable.  It is an inflexible governmental system that is inherently based on full domination of its components largely for the benefit of the urban centers of European Russia and individuals controlling resources.  It is unclear Putin has a succession plan in place that can succeed in keeping the Russian Federation together once he is out of power.  This war has further reduced the chances of a succession plan working smoothly.

Depending on a bunch of factors yet to be determined and/or not quantifiable at this time, I can see four different scenarios:

1. Repeat of 1990 - some existing politically cohesive regions demand independence and the Kremlin is unable to squash the ambitions of all of them.  Instead, the Kremlin picks and chooses, letting some go peacefully and using some degree of force/coercion to keep others under control as we saw in the Caucuses in the 1990s.  The newly independent states will likely have areas of dispute with neighbors and have their own violence to deal with.
2. Yugoslavia 1991 - too many places the Kremlin cares about retaining decide they want to go their own way.  Instead of a peaceful breakup with some degree of violence, we instead see a large amount of violence with a smaller amount of peaceful departure.  Siberia might be akin to Slovenia, but then again it could be more like Croatia with Serbia bent on keeping territory (in this case access to the Adriatic Sea). Violence continues for years.
3. Revolution of 1917 - unlike the other two scenarios, the Kremlin is too caught up in its own internal violence that the periphery sorts itself out without cohesive and centralized influence from Russia.  In this case things go to Hell pretty much all over Russia, with some states figuring now is the time to dominate neighbors instead of squabbling with them.  Several major conflicts break out at the same time, perhaps even within geographic Russia itself (e.g. St. Petersburg trying to separate).
4. Slow dissolution - power remains concentrated in Moscow, however it has to concede to demands from various political entities within the current Russian Federation.  Greater autonomy, but short of full independence.  Some areas, however, see opportunity and push for more which probably invites violence from the Kremlin.  However, weakened by general conditions and uncertain domestic politics, this probably won't last long and one of the other scenarios kicks in.

Which way do I think this is headed?

It's not hard to see a "pile on" situation where powerful people and ethnic based movements determine the best chance for leaving the Federation is when others are trying to do the same thing.  Especially if Russia's ability to physically enforce its will is perceived as too weak for the circumstances.  However, nobody wants to make the first move because that allows the Kremlin to focus on squashing any moves to undermine its authority.

Once some significant push for independence starts, whether that be in the Caucuses (the obvious suspect) or in one of the large central or eastern Asian republics, it's way too soon to say.  But I do think something will happen reasonably soon (within a few years) that will give us some indication as to how this is going to play out.

At present I think #4 is most likely the near term path for Russia.  In this scenario the periphery agrees to stay with the Russian Federation, but only if its leadership has more control of their territories and (of course) increased self enrichment.  After that, I'm thinking it transitions to #2 where too many aggressive actions are taken too quickly in too many places at once to be contained by Moscow or anybody else.  Things get out of control very quickly and profoundly.

In all situations any state with nukes (power generation and weaponry) will try to leverage them to their advantage.  How that plays out depends on the scenario, but generally I don't expect them to be used.  Mutually assured destruction applies to them just as much as it does between existing actors now.  There's far more value in nukes as a bargaining chip.

Steve

[dan/california]

Allow me to clarify. 200,000/12= 16500 +/- per month. Obviously that is smoothing out a lot of variation. Although the low point was in summer 2022, and casualties went WAY up when they started committing mobiks that had been trained very poorly or not at all, and have just stayed on the high side since. It is a crazy number, but not apparently enough to get the point across. I admit that a 100,00 in a month is truly optimistic. The AFU would have to smash through Melitipol and on to the access points to Crimea faster than the Russians cold withdraw, and trap a really big batch of them against the Dnipro with the AFU on both sides. But it is going to take something close to that to get. the Russians to quit and go home, unless Putin has a stroke, and the new guy has few working brain cells.

Edited March 6, 2023 by dan/california