How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Beleg85]

1 hour ago, danfrodo said:

We really have not idea what is really happening overall right now it seems.

I am getting faint whiffs of 1918 german summer offensive to try to win before the tide irrevocably turns against them.  That offensive was seriously dangerous but americans showed up just in time.  What will happen here?  We know UKR & RU taking heavy casualties but we don't know the ratio.  We know UKR has only given up limited territory and even the fall of Bakhmut doesn't matter strategically.  We know the ground stays frozen for the next 7 days.  We hear reports that RU has artillery superiority around Bakhmut.  Is that by UKR choice or by UKR deficiency??

I think we are still in shaping operations phase for several days, but it is done "Russian style"...so looks like actual offensive. I heard various reporting of Ukraine withdrew many troops from the lines; clearly they are gathering forces. Wolski's theory (who isn't very good when comes to operational art) is that muscovites intend to create several (3-5) main spearheads of roughly equal proportions, in order to fool defenders which as to which is the main thrust. At least that is their doctrine. The main question is if they can even secure enough logistics; as much as I understand it, they never trained jumping off any offensive from dispersed logistical base before on similar scale. All timetables for fuel, ammo, food and similar stuff were done under completelly different assumptions than those they met in this war. Add shoddy communications, distrust of various units to each other and various other X Factors moskals are famous for. However, we shouldn't underestaimate them. There is clearly a plan for something big.

Note that Ukranians have an awfully lot of ground to cover, so even given mastery over inner lines of communication/movement prudent managment of reinforcements will be absolutelly crucial to this phase of the war. I am afraid we may witness some heavy local situations and uneasy choices.

Edited February 11, 2023 by Beleg85

[The_Capt]

17 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

I think we are still in shaping operations phase for several days, but it is done "Russian style"...so looks like actual offensive. I heard various reporting Ukraine withdrew many troops from the lines; clearly they are gathering forces. Wolski's theory (who isn't very good when comes to operational art) muscovites intend to create several (3-5) main spearheads of roughly equal proportions, in order to fool defenders which as to which is the main thrust. At least that is their doctrine. The main question is if they can even secure enough logistics; as much as I understand it, they never trained jumping off any offensive from dispersed logistical base before on similar scale. All timetables for fuel, ammo, food and similar stuff were done under completelly different assumptions than those they met in this war. Add shoddy communications, distrust of various units to each other and various other X Factors moskals are famous for. However, we shouldn't underestaimate them. There is clearly a plan for something big.

Note that Ukranians have an awfully lot of ground to cover, so even given mastery over inner lines of communication/movement prudent managment of reinforcements will be absolutelly crucial to this phase of the war. I am afraid we may witness some heavy local situations and uneasy choices.

So two dimensions to consider - annihilation through dislocation or attrition.  Annihilation through dislocation is the breakdown of cohesion leading to collapse of organization as a fighting force.  To do this the RA will need to demonstrate a break in, break through and break out success.  Only then could the gain deep manoeuvre to cut UA supply lines and C2.  In doing this they would need to sustain a tempo faster than the UA can cope with.  Frankly my assessment of the RA pulling this off is near zero.

Annihilation through Attrition - degradation of the UA at a worse relative rate than the RA leading to systemic collapse of either Will or Physical capability.  I think this is the one that concerns people the most but I also do not think we have enough data.  First off I am not sure that the RA actually has more people then the UA.  There was a lot of heat and light on RA mobilization but Ukraine has been mobilizing for nearly a year with the full support of the west.  Equipment wise the RA has lost an entire army’s worth of hardware on par with Iraq during Desert Storm.  

Now these are not divorced concepts, for example attrition can lead to degradation that leads to manoeuvre and dislocation.  Massive dislocation can lead to heavy attrition as a force is cut up piecemeal.

People here often throw in Exhaustion but this is something different.  Strategic Exhaustion is more akin to Germany at the end of WW1, it is larger than the military component.  Neither Ukraine nor Russia appear to be showing symptoms of strategic exhaustion, at least not yet.  Russian economy could be showing signs but we also have contrary predictions.

So as to this offensive, the thing to watch for is break out.  If we do not see this at an operationally significant level then we essentially still have a stalemate.  This phenomenon should be visible in either an attrition or dislocation scenario.

[chuckdyke]

Interesting point of view one of his better contributions. 

 

[Beleg85]

40 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

So two dimensions to consider - annihilation through dislocation or attrition.  Annihilation through dislocation is the breakdown of cohesion leading to collapse of organization as a fighting force.  To do this the RA will need to demonstrate a break in, break through and break out success.  Only then could the gain deep manoeuvre to cut UA supply lines and C2.  In doing this they would need to sustain a tempo faster than the UA can cope with.  Frankly my assessment of the RA pulling this off is near zero.

Annihilation through Attrition - degradation of the UA at a worse relative rate than the RA leading to systemic collapse of either Will or Physical capability.  I think this is the one that concerns people the most but I also do not think we have enough data.  First off I am not sure that the RA actually has more people then the UA.  There was a lot of heat and light on RA mobilization but Ukraine has been mobilizing for nearly a year with the full support of the west.  Equipment wise the RA has lost an entire army’s worth of hardware on par with Iraq during Desert Storm.  

Now these are not divorced concepts, for example attrition can lead to degradation that leads to manoeuvre and dislocation.  Massive dislocation can lead to heavy attrition as a force is cut up piecemeal.

People here often throw in Exhaustion but this is something different.  Strategic Exhaustion is more akin to Germany at the end of WW1, it is larger than the military component.  Neither Ukraine nor Russia appear to be showing symptoms of strategic exhaustion, at least not yet.  Russian economy could be showing signs but we also have contrary predictions.

So as to this offensive, the thing to watch for is break out.  If we do not see this at an operationally significant level then we essentially still have a stalemate.  This phenomenon should be visible in either an attrition or dislocation scenario.

Precious observations, worth to remember what we should search for. Logically I would expect mix of both- something like slow burning pressure applied along entire frontline (or on selected segments,) costing Moskals a lot of casualties but ultimatelly pinning down UA reinforcements. Then these main mechanized columns may try to break through. The question is of course if Russia has enough pawns to exchange for Ukrainian figures. And time-one of major variables is of course weather; a week or two of cold may pass quickly, and General Mud start its work.

Lachowski and several other sources also reported several instances about katsaps more and more frequently (chiefly at Bakhmut and Kreminna direction) moving down supplies disguised as civil buses or trucks carrying wood or coal, reportedly even one fuel truck with soldiers inside. They definitelly try some old-style maskirovka there, but hard to tell how widespread it is. It would be really suprising if they suddenly bring out army of human ants carrying supplies in singular trucks, stacked in some cellars for this very hour.

Edited February 11, 2023 by Beleg85

[LongLeftFlank]

7 hours ago, Jiggathebauce said:

Say, whatever happened to JasonC? Is he still alive? Loved his posts, as a long time lurker

Welcome mate, feel free to chime in.

He's still active at BoardGameGeek, but hasn't posted here since 2016. We aren't friends per se, 'His Supreme Magisterial JasonC' treated me as haughtily as everyone else here. But yeah, he was very deeply read and a great macro (OR) brain, though not infallible.

[NamEndedAllen]

3 hours ago, Beleg85 said:

I think we are still in shaping operations phase for several days, but it is done "Russian style"...so looks like actual offensive. I heard various reporting of Ukraine withdrew many troops from the lines; clearly they are gathering forces. Wolski's theory (who isn't very good when comes to operational art) is that muscovites intend to create several (3-5) main spearheads of roughly equal proportions, in order to fool defenders which as to which is the main thrust. At least that is their doctrine. The main question is if they can even secure enough logistics; as much as I understand it, they never trained jumping off any offensive from dispersed logistical base before on similar scale. All timetables for fuel, ammo, food and similar stuff were done under completelly different assumptions than those they met in this war. Add shoddy communications, distrust of various units to each other and various other X Factors moskals are famous for. However, we shouldn't underestaimate them. There is clearly a plan for something big.

Note that Ukranians have an awfully lot of ground to cover, so even given mastery over inner lines of communication/movement prudent managment of reinforcements will be absolutelly crucial to this phase of the war. I am afraid we may witness some heavy local situations and uneasy choices.

Will be interested in how they plan to avoid the Ukraine/USA intel magic eye(s) and ears, once things start coalescing for each spearhead. Also, the tantrum by Musk about denying Ukraine Starlink use for drones is suspiciously coinciding with this buildup.

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, Beleg85 said:

The question is of course if Russia has enough pawns to exchange for Ukrainian figures.

This does seem to be what we're about to see put to the test.

If I were sitting in the Kremlin trying to figure out what to do next, I would first start out by looking at what not to do.  Attempting complex pincer movements along multiple axis has never worked so far.  Even fairly tactical encirclements have gone poorly, either costing far too much time and resources or not succeeding even after large investments.  So, I wouldn't try that.  Yet, it does seem like Russia is lining up for exactly that.

Unless, that is, they set up the front to look like they were going to try "annihilation through dislocation", but in fact are setting up for "annihilation through attrition".  These preliminary attacks might just be theater to draw Ukraine's reserves while the main force readies itself for a massive brute force frontal assault intended to advance wherever and whenever Ukraine's forces get too thin to hold. 

Such brute force attacks are just about the only thing that's worked thus far, but the gains have been small and the costs extraordinarily high.  They've left Russia weak and vulnerable with difficult choices to make on addressing force shortages.

Sitting in my fictional armchair in the Kremlin, I'd probably go with brute force on the widest scale possible, do not pin hopes on specific breakthroughs but a general thinning of the Ukrainian lines that they have to fall back.  Bagration, in other words.

If Bagration 2.0 is what they are preparing to do, then one has to question their timing.  We're most of the way through the winter season and not even a very good one.  The brute force attritional strategy doesn't do well when it's paused before accomplishing its goals.  Weather could stop things pretty solidly without warning and it doesn't appear Russia has the sort of artillery it needs to keep pressure on front wide until better weather.

The only two things I think we can be pretty sure of at this is Russia's plans to do something on a grand scale and Ukraine holding back it's reserves to wait until they know what those plans really are.

Steve

[NamEndedAllen]

7 hours ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

This is a Ukraine thread

It’s a one line reply to the billbindc post about China.You missed it even though quoted? 

[billbindc]

1 hour ago, NamEndedAllen said:

Will be interested in how they plan to avoid the Ukraine/USA intel magic eye(s) and ears, once things start coalescing for each spearhead. Also, the tantrum by Musk about denying Ukraine Starlink use for drones is suspiciously coinciding with this buildup.

And the last time he talked about pulling Starlink out was during the last big Ukrainian offensive. Musk's sympathies are pretty clear.

[kevinkin]

 

19 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

whenever Ukraine's forces get too thin to hold. 

Yes, agree. In football we spread the defense thin and try to set-up one on one match-ups to enable a strike downfield. The RA has the ability to spread the UA thin, but their talent does not match up well in the subsequent one on ones where small unit commanders have to make quick decisions in the open field. Perhaps the RA can move their best north and south in the backfield waiting for the thinning operations to open something up for a deep strike. A misdirection play. Hail Putin on 3. Not a touchdown, but maybe to get within field goal range before they run out of downs and supplies. (Sorry, its Superbowl weekend). Is it even thinkable the RA can deceive the west's ISR into believing the backfield is not where it really is? They used to be pretty good at that. 

[Seminole]

10 hours ago, Bearstronaut said:

Oh noes! What if we offend the Russians?

Aren't we living that 'what if'?

Your answer is pretty horrific: over 100,000 dead, a multiple of that wounded, millions displaced, towns and cities wrecked, malnutrition and poverty exacerbated in the third world.

[Seminole]

10 hours ago, billbindc said:

Just quoting people from 14 or 25 years ago isn't an argument, it's basically just an assertion.

He provides his justifications, and they echo comments made here about 'Russian pride'.

More importantly, these observations about the reaction NATO expansion would trigger are consistent, broadly held and decades old.  Even CFR was making that part of the case right up to the most recent expansion of hostilities.  They haven't even taken those opinions offline.

You can't just hand wave it away like it never mattered.  That's just wrong.  Mistaken.  Part of how we got where we are now.

 

10 hours ago, billbindc said:

As to strategic assessment...give me a list of practical, realistic examples in which Ukraine being in NATO would undermine Russian security. And no, a "NATO invasion to the Urals" an acceptably serious response.

What does the loss of Sevastopol do to Russian strategic options?

Nothing at all?  I don't think you're being realistic.

I doubt they share that view.  And their view has to be a consideration, unless you're completely callous to the consequences.

[chuckdyke]

3 minutes ago, Seminole said:

Your answer is pretty horrific: over 100,000 dead, a multiple of that wounded, millions displaced, towns and cities wrecked, malnutrition and poverty exacerbated in the third world.

Hundred Thousand is a horrible figure but not as horrific as forty million that's the last time they dealt with a dictator. Putin is the reason God gave members of the human race a middle finger.

[Seminole]

10 hours ago, Kinophile said:

What utter total Tosh. Again,  yet again it's trotted out as a rationale for why Russia is "justifiably" aggressive.

An assailant's motive can be unjustified, and yet still their motive.

You make the mistake of conflating the concepts.

Under what righteousness would the U.S. invade Cuba to prevent the installation of weapons 'too close for comfort' and the White House's view of their essential security interests?

Khrushchev could have said the U.S. has no right to dictate what military defense arrangements a neighboring country makes, especially one they had invade a few times in living memory.

But he backed off, and the world avoided what could only have been an ugly war.

Russia has no right to tell Ukraine, or anyone else who they can ally with.  But a realist look at the world suggests they might not see it that way, and the result will be a catastrophe.

I do wish the US had taken Putin's bait for some kind of UN registered treaty on Ukrainian neutrality (akin to post-WW2 Austria).  That would have also provided the impetus for countries like Mexico to join the Russian embargo, and could have put others like China [edit: and India] on the hook.

Edited February 11, 2023 by Seminole

[chuckdyke]

2 minutes ago, Seminole said:

Ukrainian neutrality

Ukraine has the prerogative about their neutrality nobody else. It was decision by a democratic Ukrainian government to apply for NATO and EU membership. Their government decided to defend themselves militarily. 

[kevinkin]

A taste of the front lines:

https://unherd.com/2023/02/the-madness-behind-the-battle-for-bakhmut/

Cheap drones and additively printed shells. I wonder who supplies the resin to knock out a T90? 

 

 

Edited February 11, 2023 by kevinkin

[Kinophile]

48 minutes ago, Seminole said:

An assailant's motive can be unjustified, and yet still their motive.

You make the mistake of conflating the concepts.

Nope, because again this isn't about Russia's rights (real or perceived) but it's potential victims. Im rejecting idea that the parties looking to defend themselves from a hostile aggressor were wrong to do so in the best possible way - getting under NATO's conventional and nuclear umbrella.

Under what righteousness would the U.S. invade Cuba to prevent the installation of weapons 'too close for comfort' and the White House's view of their essential security interests?

Umm... because SU were installing Nuclear Weapons? 

Khrushchev could have said the U.S. has no right to dictate what military defense arrangements a neighboring country makes,

He did,  indeed say that.

especially one they had invade a few times in living memory.

Yup

But he backed off, and the world avoided what could only have been an ugly war.

Eh no, it would have been the death knell of civilization. Bit higher stakes than just war. Have you even read about the Cuban Missile Crisis deeper than a cracked.com. article? 

Russia has no right to tell Ukraine, or anyone else who they can ally with.  But a realist look at the world suggests they might not see it that way, and the result will be a catastrophe.

Sure they won't see that way. But Lithuania,  Latvia,  Estonia,  Romana, Poland,  etc all joined and look -  no catastrophe. Ukraine doesnt join, so no NATO securities,  so Russia invades. The non-act of joining,  and this deterring Russia,  was the mistake that begat this catastrophe. 

I do wish the US had taken Putin's bait for some kind of UN registered treaty on Ukrainian neutrality (akin to post-WW2 Austria).

So Ukraine doesn't get a say? 

  That would have also provided the impetus for countries like Mexico to join the Russian embargo,

Not sure how important Mexico is here. Let's throw in Nigeria too,  why not. Oil producing also. 

and could have put others like China [edit: and India] on the hook.

Extremely unlikely. 

Well this has been silly useless fun, BFC did warn you so....send us a postcard. 

Edited February 11, 2023 by Kinophile

[chuckdyke]

8 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

Well this has been silly useless fun, BFC did warn you so....send us a postcard. 

Till today Cuba has a Communist Government and like Cuba, Ukraine agreed to get rid of their nuclear arsenal. In return Russia with the US agreed to guarantee its national integrity. Now the world can see that guarantees from Russia are not worth the paper it is written on. since the US guaranteed the integrity of the Ukraine as a state it is only decent they give the weapons to defend itself.

Edited February 11, 2023 by chuckdyke

[Kinophile]

7 minutes ago, chuckdyke said:

Till today Cuba has a Communist Government and like Cuba, Ukraine agreed to get rid of their nuclear arsenal. In return Russia with the US agreed to guarantee its national integrity. Now the world can see that guarantees from Russia are not worth the paper it is written on.

TBH, I think Cuba has a better guarantee than any piece of paper - it's location, geography and topology. It requires a massive amphibious assault against a rough shore line against prepared defence with vietnam style jungle fighting immediately after landing. Attacking Cuba is a logistical and casualty lists nightmare. 

With Ukraine, Russia could just walk across some fields and bingo, invasion has begun. The ZSU has turned the rest of their jaunt into a bloody farce,  even so, it's relatively easy. 

And same with the Baltic,  which is why they went for NATO. 

 

Edited February 11, 2023 by Kinophile

[The_MonkeyKing]

10 hours ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

yeah, yesterday's photo confirmed loss data ratio was 69:4

Yesterday's ratio was 34 : 5

RUS

vs.

UKR

 

These two Twitter threads have this daily loss data going back to the start of the war.

[Kinophile]

3 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

This does seem to be what we're about to see put to the test.

If I were sitting in the Kremlin trying to figure out what to do next, I would first start out by looking at what not to do.  Attempting complex pincer movements along multiple axis has never worked so far.  Even fairly tactical encirclements have gone poorly, either costing far too much time and resources or not succeeding even after large investments.  So, I wouldn't try that.  Yet, it does seem like Russia is lining up for exactly that.

Unless, that is, they set up the front to look like they were going to try "annihilation through dislocation", but in fact are setting up for "annihilation through attrition".  These preliminary attacks might just be theater to draw Ukraine's reserves while the main force readies itself for a massive brute force frontal assault intended to advance wherever and whenever Ukraine's forces get too thin to hold. 

Such brute force attacks are just about the only thing that's worked thus far, but the gains have been small and the costs extraordinarily high.  They've left Russia weak and vulnerable with difficult choices to make on addressing force shortages.

Sitting in my fictional armchair in the Kremlin, I'd probably go with brute force on the widest scale possible, do not pin hopes on specific breakthroughs but a general thinning of the Ukrainian lines that they have to fall back.  Bagration, in other words.

If Bagration 2.0 is what they are preparing to do, then one has to question their timing.  We're most of the way through the winter season and not even a very good one.  The brute force attritional strategy doesn't do well when it's paused before accomplishing its goals.  Weather could stop things pretty solidly without warning and it doesn't appear Russia has the sort of artillery it needs to keep pressure on front wide until better weather.

The only two things I think we can be pretty sure of at this is Russia's plans to do something on a grand scale and Ukraine holding back it's reserves to wait until they know what those plans really are.

Steve

That's what I see Bahkmut et al about - pinning significant UKR forces as the attack much further north/south. 

[Jiggathebauce]

1 hour ago, Seminole said:

An assailant's motive can be unjustified, and yet still their motive.

You make the mistake of conflating the concepts.

Under what righteousness would the U.S. invade Cuba to prevent the installation of weapons 'too close for comfort' and the White House's view of their essential security interests?

Khrushchev could have said the U.S. has no right to dictate what military defense arrangements a neighboring country makes, especially one they had invade a few times in living memory.

But he backed off, and the world avoided what could only have been an ugly war.

Russia has no right to tell Ukraine, or anyone else who they can ally with.  But a realist look at the world suggests they might not see it that way, and the result will be a catastrophe.

I do wish the US had taken Putin's bait for some kind of UN registered treaty on Ukrainian neutrality (akin to post-WW2 Austria).  That would have also provided the impetus for countries like Mexico to join the Russian embargo, and could have put others like China [edit: and India] on the hook.

Zelensky was on TV the day after invasion begging Putin to quit and they would sign something promising not to join NATO. 

 

Why are you in favor of everyone having to tiptoe around Russias insecurities? 

[Zeleban]

9 hours ago, Beleg85 said:

Are we talking about KIA and MIA only?

I'm talking about irretrievable losses near Mariupol (killed + prisoners). So, if these numbers are to be believed, the Russians have devised a tactic to destroy the Ukrainian army without even surrounding it. Ukrainians lose more than if they were completely surrounded

9 hours ago, Beleg85 said:

Well, since russians finally crawled onto Soledar only in january and touch villages around Bakhmut, managing to capture some solid buildings and turn them into command posts/ammo dumps/occassionaly wounded collection points (or execution chambers in case of Wagner), they may in fact achieve closer parity now. These urban battles are brutal. Also note that soldiers other than Wagner are also now fighting there in larger numbers, at least since Soledar assault.

I'm also talking about the losses in December, at that time they had not yet captured a single building in Soledar, the Ukrainians had already lost 3,500 people killed. If we take into account your statement, then after the capture of some corps, the losses of the Ukrainians increased even more and reached several brigades only killed. Do you seriously believe this?

9 hours ago, Beleg85 said:

Btw. northern axis is also not bloodless- one of volunteers who is constantly sitting with Donbas batalion reported constant flow of lossess while AFU tried to encircle Svatovo. Numbers like 12, 15 KIA for several days, just from this unit (and maybe brigade itr was attached to). She also remarked her guess that casualties on this front are relatively equal in one dispatch. No easy victories there.

So, we have come to the complete debunking of the myth that the losses of the defender and the losses of the attacker are equal even without taking into account the breakthrough of the defensive line by the attackers and the capture of many prisoners. It makes no sense to break through the enemy's line of defense, you can achieve parity in losses simply by attacking enemy positions over and over again. We made a discovery in tactical science

 

Edited February 11, 2023 by Zeleban

[chuckdyke]

1 minute ago, Jiggathebauce said:

Zelensky was on TV the day after invasion begging Putin to quit and they would sign something promising not to join NATO. 

Only one NATO country is required to stop the Ukraine from joining, I doubt if not a single NATO member would have promised something like this behind the scenes. The issue is putin wants to decide who is to become a president of an ex Soviet State and not the people who live there.

[Zeleban]

8 hours ago, Beleg85 said:

Also Oryx is heavily dependant on published visual sources, and katsaps always publish them proportionally less than UA for some reasons.

Why do you think so? Their propaganda constantly publishes videos with the capture or destruction of any small equipment in Ukraine. I recently saw a propaganda video about the capture of several empty containers of equipment from Ukrainian positions. Demonstrating the high losses of Ukraine is vital for Russian propaganda. And believe me, they will not hide Ukrainian losses from the public