How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[dan/california]

34 minutes ago, NamEndedAllen said:

(We don’t need to spend time on red herrings like Ukraine somehow miraculously wiping out Russia’s entire widespread nuclear arsenal! Although if Ukraine could somehow have this impossible superpower ability, to defang the wobbly bear, just the threat of it would have already ended the war. The emperor would truly have no clothes.)

I have zero access to nonpublic information, but I REALLY question the extent to which the strategic rocket forces have escaped the corruption that is consuming the rest of Russia. That is one of the three  most important intelligence evaluations out there. The others of course are the actual state Putin's opposition within the Russian regime, and Xi's real intentions about Taiwan.

[MSBoxer]

1 hour ago, womble said:

And what's going to happen to the rest of "whatever the Russian Government usually does"?

If other nations struggle to spend 2% of their budget on defense, how can the Russians shake loose so large a proportion of revenues? I know they aren't exactly supporting an NHS/DHSS-standard social safety net...

Perhaps the amount spent on defense is not really changing.  It is just that due to the effect of sanctions and lowered productivity from conscription that their overall budget has lowered so much that defense spending that used to be 5% is now 30%. 

[kevinkin]

Not going to pass judgement of this 3 part analysis of 3 scenarios until they are all published. The writers are from conservative institutions. Looks like they are not for bailing on Ukraine due to the same factors often cited. They want Ukraine to be whole again i.e. scenario 1. I guess scenario 2 will be the other extreme with the utter defeat everything Russian since WW2. And number three will try to harmonize both (hopefully with some new insight on how to freaking achieve it.) They are coming to this analysis asking what is in America's best interest now that the war is in its current state.

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2022/12/10/an_endgame_in_ukraine_american_strategic_options_869474.html

Grand finale of part 1:

The harsh reality is that, for the foreseeable future, the current Russian regime will not become an ally of the United States, nor will the Russian kleptocratic autocracy be replaced with a liberal-democratic state that shares Western values. Russian political culture, the history of repeated invasions, and the geostrategy of threat to Russia’s long borders all militate against establishing a limited government. At best, Russia could be a client state to the U.S., sharing a suspicion of Chinese intentions, rather than an ally that shares both interests and values. It is far from clear that any level of capitulation in Ukraine would help turn Russia into a client, aligned against the threat from China.

[sburke]

Russian Mercenary Group's HQ Destroyed in Another Blow to Putin—Report (msn.com)

[The_Capt]

9 hours ago, FancyCat said:

Plus considering the record of caution by the West, while it's important to note things could change, it's probably a safe bet that any isr, targeting packages, etc for strikes on Russia proper, will be very strictly limited to stuff like equipment, personnel directly involved in the Ukrainian conflict and probably not leadership. I mean we still are kneecapping Ukraine with no Leopard tanks. And no ATACMS. So worry about ISR seems preemptive considering the fact these are not provided.

And you know, say Ukraine did want to strike a target and asked the U.S for verification on targets, it would be best for the U.S to ensure everything goes well and the target and not collateral is hit.

https://www.lawinsider.com/dictionary/act-of-war

Act of war definitions are pretty broad and being integrated into a kill chain by essentially doing the targeting on another sovereign nation is going to be an escalation…no “poo pooing” that one.  

I have said this repeatedly - look at the whole system.  ATACMS are of very limited utility without real-time hi resolution ISR.  We know the US is already providing this to the UA for targets in Ukraine - even the unrecognized annexed territories.  However, the US direct supporting targeting of Russian strategic installations and/or capability directly is not a step to be take lightly.  Sorry but to try and spin it otherwise is being disingenuous.

Ok, so Russia has been hit and have not started WW3 - it is a leap of extreme logic between a few “dropped cigarettes” or “industrial accidents” and the very broad strategic precision strike campaign the UA would need to do in order to actually change operational conditions, which are already in their favour btw. To hit things like Russian strategic ISR, industrial capacity, Strat LOCs and even political HVTs (aka Decapitation Strikes) effectively, meaning beyond symbolic or on the scale that Russia is doing to Ukraine, will take an enormous effort.  We are talking hundreds of HIMARs all hooked into a US based ISR/target enterprise.  

We can quibble “act is war” all day but I am pretty confident that meets the threshold and if the situation was reversed we would also consider it an act of war.  I am also pretty sure we are risking getting pulled directly into this war as western strategic ISR would now become legitimate military targets for Russia - arguable they are now but likely only if they are in or over Ukraine.

If strikes are “highly restricted” then what is the point?  For example, in order to cripple SLOCs one would be talking a sustained campaign against Russian rail infrastructure. To hit one or two bridges is basically worthless but comes with significant risks.  A strategic harassment campaign is likely to stiffen Russian resolve and not actually degrade their ability to sustain this war.  No, if we are going to do this it cannot be half-assed and will be one hell of an escalation. 

 

Edited December 12, 2022 by The_Capt

[The_Capt]

5 hours ago, dan/california said:

You are, as always, correct. But I think you are perhaps less correct than usual. If somewhere north of 75,000 KIA isn't enough of a casus belli to to attack the supply bases in Poland ,it leads me to a really strong conclusion that the Russian leadership understands they don't want to attack Poland. So let's get back to red lines. first of all the only red line left within the border of Ukraine is the actual invasion of Crimea. Even after the Kerch bridge attack Russia just sat there and tried to make Ukrainian civilians more miserable, and that might have been their preexisting plan anyway. So for starters, why don't we give the Ukrainians the missiles to put a kilometer of said bridge in the water, and utterly wreck the the one strand of the Russian logistics system that still functions across the land bridge? 

Let me restate, U.S./NATO has decided the current slow motion meat grinder that is slowly but systematically mincing both Ukraine and Russia into dog food is the lowest risk option on the table. I disagree, among other things nuclear nonproliferation is already dead, or on life support. Why would Taiwan, Vietnam, Japan, or for that matter Kazakhstan ever take our security guarantees seriously, after Ukraine gave up a thousand plus nukes and then had this happen? Does a world with 25 or thirty nuclear powers have better or a worse chance of making it to 2100 without a major nuclear exchange?

And yes, we all have to acknowledge that the actual decision makers have a LOT of information we don't, but we have been ignoring that for 1800 pages and counting.

Well beyond the hard left turn at pro-proliferation, for which I can think of about a dozen arguments against with respect to Ukraine or any other small power nation for that matter - back to my question: “so what is the Russian redline?”  The pro-“give them everything” crowd has either undersubscribed this factor or simply sidestepped the question.  

“We should do everything from no-fly zones to providing Ukraine with ATACMS to F22s and M1 Abrams.  We should feed them targeting data on Russian targets everywhere and hope they stick to them.”  Ok, so again, people in this camp have highlighted what they are pretty sure are not Russia escalation tolerance lines but have offered no insight as to what those lines may actually be.  What would it take for Russia to be forced into a corner enough to escalate to WMDs?  If the answer is “they will never escalate” then prove it - post some studies that support this.

I have no idea what those Russian red lines are, or are not.  75k dead clearly is not, how about 150k?  A few strategic hits, how about 20 or 30, or 300?  Try and kill Putin and hit the Kremlin?  Really hit their nuclear arsenal and not a single airbase?  I don’t know and I am betting neither NATO, nor the US knows either.  This is not a schoolyard fight, it is a really dangerous war.  If we are going to get serious about hitting Russia fast and hard, we are talking about doing it to the point where the entire Russian war machine collapses.  Widening the war to hitting their entire military strategic system - not some amateur hour lobbing of a few ATACMS.  So is that going to trip the trigger?

I am glad some of you are very confident in your positions - but these levels of confidence in warfare make me very nervous.  War is all about uncertainty and we are in the middle of a high consequence big uncertainty right now.  I applaud the US and the west for playing this one so carefully and still ensuring Ukraine is coming out on top. This has been a masterclass in smart incremental warfare.

[sburke]

Three fires in Moscow raise suspicions of Ukrainian arson attacks (msn.com)

The headline is more just looking for clicks.  At least two of the fires are suspected electrical faults.  Still Moscow citizens are gonna wonder

Edited December 12, 2022 by sburke

[Kinophile]

https://nuke.fas.org/guide/russia/agency/mo-budget.htm

@sburke at its height Soviet  Russia spent max 20% on military budget (mid 1980s). Afghanistan cost an extra 10-12% I think. A decade later buh-bye USSR. 

So a 33% of the national budget on a much harder, bloodier and larger war makes sense. 

Still crazy to think that Putler is willing to throw away a third of his national budget for... What?  A stalemate? Christ, his ego. 

[dan/california]

40 minutes ago, sburke said:

Three fires in Moscow raise suspicions of Ukrainian arson attacks (msn.com)

The headline is more just looking for clicks.  At least two of the fires are suspected electrical faults.  Still Moscow citizens are gonna wonder

i saw an interesting theory somewhere that a lot of the fires, especially at places with no perceptible military/industrial utility were insurance fraud. That enormous building that was originally the Moscow IKEA being exhibit A. Anyone who bet on the Russian consumer economy is completely bleeped. Some of them are rolling the dice on their insurance companies actually making a pay out. It isn't a bet I would want to make in Russia, but when you are bankrupt anyway...

[Beleg85]

https://mickryan.substack.com/p/winning-the-adaptation-battle?r=1gv0l&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web

[dan/california]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Well beyond the hard left turn at pro-proliferation, for which I can think of about a dozen arguments against with respect to Ukraine or any other small power nation for that matter - back to my question: “so what is the Russian redline?”  The pro-“give them everything” crowd has either undersubscribed this factor or simply sidestepped the question.  

“We should do everything from no-fly zones to providing Ukraine with ATACMS to F22s and M1 Abrams.  We should feed them targeting data on Russian targets everywhere and hope they stick to them.”  Ok, so again, people in this camp have highlighted what they are pretty sure are not Russia escalation tolerance lines but have offered no insight as to what those lines may actually be.  What would it take for Russia to be forced into a corner enough to escalate to WMDs?  If the answer is “they will never escalate” then prove it - post some studies that support this.

I have no idea what those Russian red lines are, or are not.  75k dead clearly is not, how about 150k?  A few strategic hits, how about 20 or 30, or 300?  Try and kill Putin and hit the Kremlin?  Really hit their nuclear arsenal and not a single airbase?  I don’t know and I am betting neither NATO, nor the US knows either.  This is not a schoolyard fight, it is a really dangerous war.  If we are going to get serious about hitting Russia fast and hard, we are talking about doing it to the point where the entire Russian war machine collapses.  Widening the war to hitting their entire military strategic system - not some amateur hour lobbing of a few ATACMS.  So is that going to trip the trigger?

I am glad some of you are very confident in your positions - but these levels of confidence in warfare make me very nervous.  War is all about uncertainty and we are in the middle of a high consequence big uncertainty right now.  I applaud the US and the west for playing this one so carefully and still ensuring Ukraine is coming out on top. This has been a masterclass in smart incremental warfare.

Let me rephrase, you are the real professional in this conversation, and I really do mean that and respect your opinion immensely. What should we be sending them that we aren't to wrap this up as quickly as possible, and with the lowest total butcher's bill on the Ukrainian side? I could care less about the Russians, although your point that that "let's chase the six thousand loose nukes is a lousy game" is well taken.

Edit: I might as well get my moneys worth from my regular letter to my elected representatives.

Edited December 12, 2022 by dan/california

[NamEndedAllen]

5 hours ago, MSBoxer said:

Perhaps the amount spent on defense is not really changing.  It is just that due to the effect of sanctions and lowered productivity from conscription that their overall budget has lowered so much that defense spending that used to be 5% is now 30%. 

If that suggests that Putin held the war budget constant, the rest of the full national budget would have to be the variables to hold that much expense steady. Implying a reduction of 25% of expenditures elsewhere in the budget. And THAT would be a quite large hit for anyone’s budget! Not to mention an entire nation.

Another explanation might be that the announcement is just propaganda. Of course that would imply that Putin was not telling the truth…

[MSBoxer]

2 minutes ago, NamEndedAllen said:

If that suggests that Putin held the war budget constant, the rest of the full national budget would have to be the variables to hold that much expense steady. Implying a reduction of 25% of expenditures elsewhere in the budget. And THAT would be a quite large hit for anyone’s budget! Not to mention an entire nation.

Another explanation might be that the announcement is just propaganda. Of course that would imply that Putin was not telling the truth…

My comment was in jest, I refrained from using a smiley emoji so as not to cause emotional damage to one of our revered members

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, dan/california said:

i saw an interesting theory somewhere that a lot of the fires, especially at places with no perceptible military/industrial utility were insurance fraud. That enormous building that was originally the Moscow IKEA being exhibit A. Anyone who bet on the Russian consumer economy is completely bleeped. Some of them are rolling the dice on their insurance companies actually making a pay out. It isn't a bet I would want to make in Russia, but when you are bankrupt anyway...

Possible, though it could also be due to standard Russian shoddy equipment maintained by shoddy companies employing shoddy workers.  And in some cases, all of that except the shoddy workers are now shoddy soldiers.  I read at least one article detailing city services failures due to key people being mobilized.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

2 minutes ago, MSBoxer said:

My comment was in jest, I refrained from using a smiley emoji so as not to cause emotional damage to one of our revered members

I dunno if revered is accurate, but your sentiment wasn't misplaced.

Steve

[NamEndedAllen]

3 minutes ago, MSBoxer said:

My comment was in jest, I refrained from using a smiley emoji so as not to cause emotional damage to one of our revered members

Of course! The perils of e-mail. To which forums do resemble. My apologies!

[Battlefront.com]

17 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

https://mickryan.substack.com/p/winning-the-adaptation-battle?r=1gv0l&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web

Good article.  And a plug for my profession:

Quote

That doesn’t mean they should not attempt to prepare themselves intellectually and physically for the next war. But it does mean they must accept, as institutions, that the initial clashes with an adversary will highlight areas that were given the wrong emphasis or aspects of war that they entirely missed. It is impossible for a military institution to anticipate every eventuality.

For sure there is no way that a military institution can anticipate "every eventuality", however it can at least put theories to realistic tests inside of simulations.  Everything from a new weapon system to global warfare can, with the right software and mindset, be simulated reasonably well in virtual.  Combat Mission covers a small, though very important, subset of warfare simulation.  With the proper guidance and parameters it can be used to test existing, emerging, and theoretical capabilities to produce at least some degree of insight into how a particular situation might play out.

As has been said here many, many times... Combat Mission is one of the reasons I knew that the Russians would get their arses kicked.  Unlike the professional tank counters, who based their conclusions on flawed assumptions and bad data, someone sitting down to repeated games of Black Sea could have foreseen many of the failures that befell the Russians in the first month of the war.

Everything else Ryan has to say is still 100% valid, because meaningful results in a sim won't amount to anything if the military isn't institutionally prepared for change on a moment's notice.

His specific examples of adaptation by both Ukraine and Russia are quite good (yeah, I quibble about "death of the tank" thing a bit!).  Counter systems for drones, in particular, is the one we have discussed here many times in great detail.  He's spot on correct with this:

Quote

To even up this fight, military institutions need a new generation of counter-autonomy systems that are cheaper to purchase and deploy widely than it is to purchase and deploy the autonomous systems they defend against. They might even then comprise a future ‘cost imposition’ capability. But, the key lesson from this subsidiary battle is that military forces require a new generation of counter-autonomy systems that are cheaper to purchase and deploy widely.

The big, expensive kinetic counter drone systems out there are just not going to cut it for anything but critical fixed infrastructure.  Some whiz-kids will hopefully figure out a solution, because I'm not sure the big defense contractors are looking at small, affordable systems hard enough.

Steve

[The_Capt]

17 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Let me rephrase, you are the real professional in this conversation, and I really do mean that and respect your opinion immensely. What should we be sending them that we aren't to wrap this up as quickly as possible, and with the lowest total butcher's bill on the Ukrainian side? I could care less about the Russians, although your point that that "let's chase the six thousand loose nukes is a lousy game" is well taken.

Edit: I might as well get my moneys woort from my regular letter to my elected representatives.

Honestly I think we are sending just about everything we can that makes sense for this war…at least right now,  We have escalation room but they come with risks, some pretty severe.  I do not think there is a magic bullet solution here. For example, we send the Leo 2s - great, but tanks have not been definitive in this war and we have little evidence a more modern tank will really change the game.  It will put more strain on the UAs force generation and sustainment challenges though. Same goes for AirPower etc.

Decisive weapons like HIMARS are part of a larger package that as we have discussed might make things much worse if we expand their use.  ISR has probably been the most important thing we have given the UA but it is likely restricted as well.  Logistics support will be critical in winter, medical supplies etc.  

I think even though everyone’s heart is in the right place, we have become a bit biased in our views of warfare in the last 30 years. Small wars can be long and slow burning, but big ones are supposed to end in a few weeks.  Well this one is big and it is long, and there really is not much we can do to change that without taking some pretty big risks that may very well get more Ukrainian’s killed than if we had not.

So if someone was asking me “what do we need to do/spend money on?”

- sustain what we already have pushed in and build a pipeline with enough flex to ensure we can be strategically agile in the future. Keep up the force generation support.

- if we are going to expand capability investment stick to the big 3 - PGM fires, infantry and unmanned (offensive and defensive).  All supported by ISR and logistics backbone.  EW and Cyber are also areas we could put some more weight behind.

- Streamline the fleets. The UA is starting to look like a bit of a western military dumping ground, which has to be creating holy hell in sustainment.  

- Enhanced C4ISR integration, that loop needs to get tighter and tighter.  Double down on corrosive warfare support, it is the only thing that consistently seems to work in this war.

- Start thinking about fishing rods. Ukraine needs a domestic arms industry for so many reasons.

- Start thinking Ukraine Reconstruction and post-war.  The follow through is the most important part and we frankly suck at it.

- Strategic narratives - show no daylight in our resolve or unity.

Those would be off the top of my head.  

[kevinkin]

Have thermobaric devices come up? You know, the mother of all bombs. Russia has the FOABs. But I bet we could out  mother the fathers in a protracted exchange. Tongue and cheek? Yes, but this war is getting down to taking a look at the entire menu of killing methods. Ukraine could say they were just getting a head start clearing minefields for future plantings in the Spring. Didn't Russia use thermobaric shells are some point? 

[dan/california]

Russia has used as many thermobarics as they could figure out how to deliver. The Tos-1A being the obvious example. In terms of the Truly inexplicable things the Ukrainians want that we aren't giving them is DPICM, for both 155 an GMLRS. The Russians are raining it everywhere, along with every kind of machine and artillery deployed mines they have in inventory. If the Ukrainians think it is worth an incremental increase in an already incomprehensible clean up job to get the Russians out faster, well it is their country...

[Offshoot]

Wagner taking a pounding?

Svatove

Kadiivka

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63933132

Also "The Armed Forces hit 9 enemy control points "

https://www-pravda-com-ua.translate.goog/news/2022/12/12/7380326/?_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en&_x_tr_pto=wapp

Edited December 12, 2022 by Offshoot

[FancyCat]

7 hours ago, The_Capt said:

https://www.lawinsider.com/dictionary/act-of-war

Act of war definitions are pretty broad and being integrated into a kill chain by essentially doing the targeting on another sovereign nation is going to be an escalation…no “poo pooing” that one.  

I have said this repeatedly - look at the whole system.  ATACMS are of very limited utility without real-time hi resolution ISR.  We know the US is already providing this to the UA for targets in Ukraine - even the unrecognized annexed territories.  However, the US direct supporting targeting of Russian strategic installations and/or capability directly is not a step to be take lightly.  Sorry but to try and spin it otherwise is being disingenuous.

Ok, so Russia has been hit and have not started WW3 - it is a leap of extreme logic between a few “dropped cigarettes” or “industrial accidents” and the very broad strategic precision strike campaign the UA would need to do in order to actually change operational conditions, which are already in their favour btw. To hit things like Russian strategic ISR, industrial capacity, Strat LOCs and even political HVTs (aka Decapitation Strikes) effectively, meaning beyond symbolic or on the scale that Russia is doing to Ukraine, will take an enormous effort.  We are talking hundreds of HIMARs all hooked into a US based ISR/target enterprise.  

We can quibble “act is war” all day but I am pretty confident that meets the threshold and if the situation was reversed we would also consider it an act of war.  I am also pretty sure we are risking getting pulled directly into this war as western strategic ISR would now become legitimate military targets for Russia - arguable they are now but likely only if they are in or over Ukraine.

If strikes are “highly restricted” then what is the point?  For example, in order to cripple SLOCs one would be talking a sustained campaign against Russian rail infrastructure. To hit one or two bridges is basically worthless but comes with significant risks.  A strategic harassment campaign is likely to stiffen Russian resolve and not actually degrade their ability to sustain this war.  No, if we are going to do this it cannot be half-assed and will be one hell of an escalation. 

 

Certainly we won’t know what the UKR general Staff and Zelensky are thinking of using should long range missiles be provided, but every indication from prior history indicates exceeding awareness of how to best not provoke Russia or cross lines that benefit Russia and negatively affect Ukraine. Everything I’ve seen in public statements points to silencing Russian airfields, Russian airbases and missile infrastructure that so far Ukraine has no way of stopping Russia from lobbing massive missile strikes. 

As far as I can tell, those targets aren’t exactly one for one the same as your suggested targets, industrial capacity (tho military repair bases have been set afire), ISR (tho Ukraine has hit airfields and radar sites in Belarus and Russia proper with drones and missiles), SLOCs in Russia close to the border have not been heavily impacted like in Belograd, or political HVTs. Except maybe that car bombing, but I still think it was a FSB op. 

Actually, a very restricted campaign against a few targets is in my opinion well aligned with Ukrainian intentions and understanding of how to best inflict damage against the Russian government without needlessly causing rallying the flag effects. For example, a limited campaign striking the airfields where the long range missiles striking Ukraine with impunity would absolutely be worthwhile, considering the limited infrastructure for Russia to site these forces, the limited amount of aircraft, and their logistical tail, and certainly, Ukraine has already struck at these targets, both closer to the border and the recent attacks. A limited campaign to strike a tanker aircraft, or 1-4 strategic bombers, and that’s it, Russia would have to stop or risk further unsustainable damage to the strategic air fleet. It wouldn’t cause a rally the flag effect, it would be a significant boost to Ukrainian military and civilian morale, it would degrade and delay the ability for the Russian military to launch further missile attacks, and importantly, would represent a commitment to Ukraine by the West without being “needlessly” destructive and backfiring. 

Sorta like when only 4 HIMARS were provided to Ukraine at the beginning. (Later more but still) I recall people being annoyed at the fact that the US has 450 himars but only provided 4. We certainly don’t need to provide more than a few ATACMS missiles to Ukraine, this entire conflict has been characterized by quite slow and few supplies to Ukraine.

Example, U.S waits for Russia to launch another massed missile strike at Ukraine, publicly declare a few missiles were given, amid Ukraine firing them at the airfields. Russia must takes steps to prevent losses, and degrades the ability for missile strikes on Ukraine as a result.

I mean we already helped sink the Moskva. Is the Admiral Makarov off limits due to being able to fire missiles against land targets? Russia has already virtually ignored the drone attack on the Engels air base. Wiki says it’s the only base where the Tu-160 is based at so another limited strike via ATACMS could force Russia to relocate or stop using it for missile strikes, certainly a important goal worth pursuing.

[FancyCat]

One very, very important factor, while we can only guess as to the actual intent of Western leaders being “slow”, “cautious”, “limiting” in regards to aid to Ukraine, we see that Putin is publicly prepared to continue the war, particularly with respect to betting on Western support to Ukraine to wane, and Russian positions improve so Putin thinks the West is weak and unwilling to support Ukraine and anger Russia. In that sense, limited provision of ATACMS matches well with Western reluctance to support Ukraine. Provide a few missiles, refuse more, Ukraine is pissed, Putin sees that yes, long range missile strikes are harder to do by Russia, but Ukraine is publicly left to dry…not really “escalatory” is it? I.e, we have no idea whether the mood in the Kremlin is panicked or calm, but certainly Biden and co does, including potential warning signs like alertness of the nuclear triad, etc, therefore, combined with how the West has operated during this invasion, it is absolutely within Russian mindset that the weak West is “half-assing” support for Ukraine including these ATACMS and therefore, not likely to panic. Merely a scenario, but one to illustrate how escalation might not be so clear to Putin.

[fireship4]

Multiple flights from Moscow & St. Petersburg seemingly unable to land at Kaliningrad Krabrovo this morning.  It's a long way back!

[NamEndedAllen]

31 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

Certainly we won’t know what the UKR general Staff and Zelensky are thinking of using should long range missiles be provided, but every indication from prior history indicates exceeding awareness of how to best not provoke Russia or cross lines that benefit Russia and negatively affect Ukraine. Everything I’ve seen in public statements points to silencing Russian airfields, Russian airbases and missile infrastructure that so far Ukraine has no way of stopping Russia from lobbing massive missile strikes. 

As far as I can tell, those targets aren’t exactly one for one the same as your suggested targets, industrial capacity (tho military repair bases have been set afire), ISR (tho Ukraine has hit airfields and radar sites in Belarus and Russia proper with drones and missiles), SLOCs in Russia close to the border have not been heavily impacted like in Belograd, or political HVTs. Except maybe that car bombing, but I still think it was a FSB op. 

Actually, a very restricted campaign against a few targets is in my opinion well aligned with Ukrainian intentions and understanding of how to best inflict damage against the Russian government without needlessly causing rallying the flag effects. For example, a limited campaign striking the airfields where the long range missiles striking Ukraine with impunity would absolutely be worthwhile, considering the limited infrastructure for Russia to site these forces, the limited amount of aircraft, and their logistical tail, and certainly, Ukraine has already struck at these targets, both closer to the border and the recent attacks. A limited campaign to strike a tanker aircraft, or 1-4 strategic bombers, and that’s it, Russia would have to stop or risk further unsustainable damage to the strategic air fleet. It wouldn’t cause a rally the flag effect, it would be a significant boost to Ukrainian military and civilian morale, it would degrade and delay the ability for the Russian military to launch further missile attacks, and importantly, would represent a commitment to Ukraine by the West without being “needlessly” destructive and backfiring. 

Sorta like when only 4 HIMARS were provided to Ukraine at the beginning. (Later more but still) I recall people being annoyed at the fact that the US has 450 himars but only provided 4. We certainly don’t need to provide more than a few ATACMS missiles to Ukraine, this entire conflict has been characterized by quite slow and few supplies to Ukraine.

Example, U.S waits for Russia to launch another massed missile strike at Ukraine, publicly declare a few missiles were given, amid Ukraine firing them at the airfields. Russia must takes steps to prevent losses, and degrades the ability for missile strikes on Ukraine as a result.

I mean we already helped sink the Moskva. Is the Admiral Makarov off limits due to being able to fire missiles against land targets? Russia has already virtually ignored the drone attack on the Engels air base. Wiki says it’s the only base where the Tu-160 is based at so another limited strike via ATACMS could force Russia to relocate or stop using it for missile strikes, certainly a important goal worth pursuing.

Well said! This is the scale I’ve hope for. NOT the straw man of a full on NATO type assault across all Russia to destroy their entire military industrial complex! Just please continue the frog boiling, raise the heat another nice juicy notch!. A follow on to the first wave of HIMARS and the other Allied assets that were so important to Ukraine’s seizing the momentum.  Another incremental increase to Ukraine’s reach, sufficient to push farther back the exclusion zones for the major Russian logistic centers, vital junctions, GLOCs. Shutting down remaining airbases in Crimea. Wrecking the next layer of their networks across the theater. Increased ability to choke supplies to Russian invaders. Increased air defense and offense capabilities. Ensure continued joy in the Black Sea. Aid in blunting Russian SLOC. Port facilities. I’m sure the Ukrainian high command could and has laid out the argument and plans for thus more than once. 

To what end? Strengthening the momentum to force Russians out of Ukraine. Guarding against their return. However, IIRC @The_Capthas hinted that this sort of turning the heat up on the frog may not be feasible. If so, knowing the specifics of why would help relieve the frustration. Excluding targeting issues - I believe Ukraine has or can solve that without major USA ISR escalation, what is militarily impractical about peeling the Russian onion another couple layers?