How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[billbindc]

 

Worth pondering if you still think that a nose to nose offensive was a better option than fog melting snow.

[Battlefront.com]

Addendum to my previous post about Russians not routinely blowing up their own stuff.  Because they knew for quite some time that they would withdraw, it is probable that we'll see more evidence of blowing stuff up they knew they couldn't save.  And like everything Russian, it will be half assed at best

Here's some video of blowing up two tanks.  Judging by the explosions they were loaded with ammo.  Probably didn't need more than a lit cigarette to get them to go boom like that:

https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarRoom/comments/ysofy3/russians_blowing_up_their_own_tanks_and_other/

Steve

[TheVulture]

Another small bit of good news today: 45 Ukrainian soldiers returned home in a prisoner swap. I didn't see any information about what Russian prisoners were exchanged.

https://twitter.com/AndriyYermak/status/1591045090663092226

 

 

[Beleg85]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Below is a link (it was original in Foreign Policy Magazine in late January).  I think the mood today is so good that it's actually a good time to read this.  I found myself laughing at it more than wanting to punch a hole in the wall Especially when I just watched videos of Humvees and M113s streaming into Kherson with soldiers armed with Javelins and US small arms:

It's piece by Samuel Charap, one of the more famous "realists". Like most of them now, he may be temporarly "unavailable" for comments for some time. Important business travel or something similar...

A good advice for the future whom NOT to read regarding geopolitics (some list of failed articles in the comments, by him and other Machiavelli wannabies):

4 hours ago, Kinophile said:

Ukraine has forced respect and engagement on some sector of the Russian political landscape, which is absolutely not the Kremlin line. 

 

Which sector exactly you mean? As of now I don't see special change in rhetorics regarding this war overall, maybe except that it will be longer than before and that even propagandist like Soloviev (worth watching today's episode, he yelled at anybody/anything around...) become more sarcastic/furious for several days. The number of imagined NATO "mercenaries" grows exponentially, but as of now no talk of negotiations. And returning Donbas or, God Forbid, uber-Russian Crimea is still anathema for them.

Kharhiv was much more shocking for Russian public, but perhaps we should wait several weeks.

 

 

Edited November 12, 2022 by Beleg85

[TheVulture]

37 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Honestly, I'm not sure that is in Kherson.  Could be some other city, such as Kyiv or Lviv, celebrating.  That's a lot of civilian vehicles driving around.  But it if is Kherson, I'll have to figure out how to smile more. 

I'm far from sure, but it certainly looks like very similar surroundings to videos of Ushakova Avenue in Kherson from several months ago. But maybe that's just a common style of buildings / fences/ sidewalks etc that you'd see in a lot of large Ukrainian towns and cities.

[billbindc]

https://www.thebulwark.com/the-liberation-of-kherson/

A big outcome of the US elections is that the candidates pushing hardest to reduce aid to Ukraine last pretty badly. For you non-US folks, the out party tends to crush in the mid terms. This time, it didn't. Really good news.

[Beleg85]

27 minutes ago, billbindc said:

A big outcome of the US elections is that the candidates pushing hardest to reduce aid to Ukraine last pretty badly. For you non-US folks, the out party tends to crush in the mid terms. This time, it didn't. Really good news.

Very good news indeed. I see a lot of discussions "What now with Ukraine?", but so far no trace of any serious political wavering, except maybe odd takes in gen. Milley speech. To the contrary, for example Italy and Germany stances visibly changed into more supportive ones than 1-2 months ago.

Now after Kherson both sides of the war has several tens of thousands soldiers basically freed. Russian ones are of course in much worse condition, with all these lossess and necessity to defend approach to Crimea. What do you think, how they will be used now?

I would vote Russians will try to reinforce Bakhmut push quite significantly. It seems whole Kherson withdrawal was forced on Putin by new Surovikin/Prigozhin tandem, so it would be logical now to throw part of freed divisions into only sector Russians seem to be interested in taking now (minus Vuhledar, of course, which was operationally enforced on them). Perhaps that was mystery behind constant, irrational attacks by Prigozhin's men? He did not want to be perceived as looser and kept momentum till arrival of fresh meat and some veterans? Possibly both operations are connected already from several weeks.

Edited November 12, 2022 by Beleg85

[danfrodo]

9 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Very good news indeed. I see a lot of discussions "What now with Ukraine?", but so far no trace of any serious political wavering, except maybe odd takes in gen. Milley speech. To the contrary, for example Italy and Germany stances visibly changed into more supportive ones than 1-2 months ago.

Now after Kherson both sides of the war has several tens of thousands soldiers basically freed. Russian ones are of course in much worse condition, with all these lossess and necessity to defend approach to Crimea. What do you think, how they will be used now?

I would vote Russians will try to reinforce Bakhmut push quite significantly. It seems whole Kherson withdrawal was forced on Putin by new Surovikin/Prigozhin tandem, so it would be logical now to throw part of freed divisions into only sector Russians seem to be interested in taking now (minus Vuhledar, of course, which was operationally enforced on them). Perhaps that was mystery behind constant, irrational attacks by Prigozhin's men? He did not want to be perceived as looser and kept momentum till arrival of fresh meat and some veterans? Possibly both operations are connected already from several weeks.

I  think the good news is that RU units leaving Kherson are incapable of effective offensive action.  They are beat up and lost much of their gear.  Maybe some more 'elite' units got out in good shape, but I doubt most units did.  They've been there a long time under pressure.  I think RU will use these troops to hold the front so that more capable units can be pulled out to send wherever -- like Bakhmut, as you suggest.  Hopefully they will send lots of troops to Bahkmut.  UKR has lots of artillery it can now put in that sector.  I want to see UKR offensive toward Melitopol so just don't want the better RU troops in that area.

[FancyCat]

 

 

 

[chris talpas]

15 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

 

 

Lea

I think history will reflect favourably on Biden.  He has effectively lead the western response and the sharing of intelligence on Russian intentions prior to the Feb invasion blunted any surprise.  The courage and determination of the Ukrainian people have been an inspiration.  They have earned their place in the drivers seat of their self determination.

Zelensky, at least to this external observer, has been a great leader. He has been relentless in his pleas for support to the world.  He is held in high regard amongst the public.

 

[dan/california]

Good thread, nothing we haven't discussed. But a nice compact summary.

[OldSarge]

23 minutes ago, chris talpas said:

I think history will reflect favourably on Biden.  He has effectively lead the western response and the sharing of intelligence on Russian intentions prior to the Feb invasion blunted any surprise.  The courage and determination of the Ukrainian people have been an inspiration.  They have earned their place in the drivers seat of their self determination.

I do think future historians will see Biden as a pivotal figure for international affairs. If for no other reason than the fact that he was able to assemble a competent team of professionals who could do their jobs in the background.

But it is ultimately the courage of the Ukrainian people who will secure their own freedom and liberty. My hat is off to them, for they have shown themselves capable of determining their own future.
 

Quote

Zelensky, at least to this external observer, has been a great leader. He has been relentless in his pleas for support to the world.  He is held in high regard amongst the public.

Cometh the hour, cometh the man. He has done a yeoman's job representing Ukrainian interests on the world stage.

Edited November 12, 2022 by OldSarge

[dan/california]

2 minutes ago, OldSarge said:

But it is ultimately the courage of the Ukrainian people who will secure their own freedom and liberty. My hat is off to them, for they have shown themselves capable of determining their own future.

Alot of brave people have died in trenches, and in worse ways. Many of them had not the slightest plan of being a soldier on 2/23. I think we should send them every single piece of gear they can physically crew to try to keep that number as low as possible.

[Kinophile]

4 hours ago, Beleg85 said:

Which sector exactly you mean? 

I dont know, it's not clear.  I'm inferring to a broad conclusion, but it's certainly not the only possible interpretation. 

Essentially,  I'm taking the relatively non-violent nature of the evacuation to imply some level of contact between the UKR and RUS operational level force HQs. Then, because Putin's war is a military operation conceived,  driven and defined by personal, political considerations I'm asuming that any peer-level communication is framed by those internal political pressures.

Putin has repeatedly denied the validity and equivalence of Ukrainian political structures and demands -  instead everything Ukraine says or does is supposedly a mindless expression of the true foe,  NATO/West/Hilary Clinton/whatever, so anything Ukraine says is dismissed out of hand if it does not match exactly with the True Enemy(tm)'s line of thought. 

If there was a localized agreement between the UKR and RUS militaries, then that means part of Putin's domestic power structure is now dealing with the Ukrainians in a rational, realistic manner contrary to Putin's ideological framing of the "Ukrainian Problem" as a Western sock puppet with Biden's geriatric arm up their butts.

So someone or group of someone's in the Putin's power structure has clear eyes on the real nature of their situation and accepts the political concepts that 1) the Ukrainians themselves are a deciding faction, and 2) Putin's ideological approach is unrealistic/ unusable - and has acted on that. Russians must therefore deal with Ukraine direct, which is contrary to the fundamental tenet of Putin's War that Ukraine has no agency of its own and is but the benighted, simple creature of Nefarious NATO. 

So I'm extrapolating a lot, I'm aware, and the theory is entirely dependent on if there was actual communication and negotiation between the opposing militaries. 

I'm still only watching, and thinking,  pondering, squinting... 

Edited November 12, 2022 by Kinophile

[Kinophile]

5 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Yeah!!!!!  This is an excellent week for all of Ukraine, isn't it?

Credit really goes to Kinophile for coming up with such an excellent idea in the first place.  And yes, lots of familial diplomacy finally paid off!

Steve

Team effort,  my friends!  Thank you to all of you for your contributions, support and patience. At times,  parts of the process of getting the gear to @Haiduk has really felt like taking a poop in reverse, but it's been worth it all. The tears, the tissue paper,  the bottles of VIM spray... All worth it. 

I'm delighted we've moved as a group to materially support one of our own (and his wife!). It really makes me happy. 

Of course, once this goddamn stupid and cruel war is over,  @Haiduk must show us his Black Sea tactical chops in an AAR! 

 

See, buddy,  it was all an elaborate trap... 

Edited November 12, 2022 by Kinophile

[Kinophile]

Btw,  taking bets on how soon before Zelensky appears in Kherson... 

I say by Sunday. 

[NamEndedAllen]

Two scenarios

1. Weather, restoration of troops and equipment, consolidation of territorial changes, etc combine to bring the war to a slow grind of local probes and engagements., if not a complete freezing of the lines. Two boxers in a clinch. Europe is cold and some industries struggle for lack of energy. A mood of stagnation settles over the perception of the Western public’s sense of the war. The Russian mobilization training finally produces large numbers of fresh troops with more credible training, good for strengthening their lines and forcing local breakthrough attempts. With no significant victories or defeats on the battlefield, political initiatives to convince Ukraine to negotiate take hold. 
 

2. Over the past few months, Ukraine has wargamed numerous versions of maintaining the overall counter offensive, with USA and European partners’ information and advice. Also, it realized that stagnation during a long cold winter with no progress could begin to undermine the political resolve of various European individual nations, while large segments of the USA public lose sense of urgency about the war and turn inward to address their own vexing issues. Meanwhile, frequent volleys of new Iranian ballistic missiles will take a toll on civilian and some military infrastructure. And the last thing Ukraine needs is for the Russians to have the time to construct serious, extensive defensive lines in more and more key locations. With all this factored in, Ukraine has committed to new coordinated powerful thrusts in ______.and______Also in a sudden and surprising effort______?

Which scenario will happen?  OK, my real question is how do you think the Ukrainian forces will maintain their momentum and keep the overall initiative? Will the presumed strengthened Russian offensive overcome the Bakhmut defense and continue? Will they attempt or threaten a second offensive, perhaps from Belorussian territory in an attempt to tie down freed up Ukrainian units from Kherson, and to lessen chances of a new major Ukrainian thrust?

[Kinophile]

On to Melitopol

[Battlefront.com]

41 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

If there was a localized agreement between the UKR and RUS militaries, then that means part of Putin's domestic power structure is now dealing with the Ukrainians in a rational, realistic manner contrary to Putin's ideological framing of the "Ukrainian Problem" as a Western sock puppet with Biden's geriatric arm up their butts.

This whole thing is a very, very interesting pot of tea leaves to read for sure.  Lots of things to ponder, but you have an excellent point here.  If, and it is a big if, there was any coordination between Ukraine and Russia then it means either Putin is recognizing the need to cut deals with Ukraine or his commanders on the ground feel they need to keep Putin out of the loop.  Either way, that's a big shift.

Steve

[Kinophile]

5 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

This whole thing is a very, very interesting pot of tea leaves to read for sure.  Lots of things to ponder, but you have an excellent point here.  If, and it is a big if, there was any coordination between Ukraine and Russia then it means either Putin is recognizing the need to cut deals with Ukraine or his commanders on the ground feel they need to keep Putin out of the loop.  Either way, that's a big shift.

Steve

Or, the biggest potential shift of all, the premier Siloviki start treating with Ukraine outside of Putin's direction.

Prigozhin could actually be a starter - or he might think he could. Funnily often a hawkish position allows dovish moves, due to the perceived credibility gained from harsh rhetoric, plus he now has a literal military powerbase. What's Putin going to do, arrest him?

Edited November 12, 2022 by Kinophile

[Battlefront.com]

8 minutes ago, NamEndedAllen said:

Which scenario will happen?  OK, my real question is how do you think the Ukrainian forces will maintain their momentum and keep the overall initiative? Will the presumed strengthened Russian offensive overcome the Bakhmut defense and continue? Will they attempt or threaten a second offensive, perhaps from Belorussian territory in an attempt to tie down freed up Ukrainian units from Kherson, and to lessen chances of a new major Ukrainian thrust?

I expect that a large number of units will be withdrawn for rest and refit ahead of the winter campaign season.  Not all of them from the Kherson groping either.  Some stiffening of defenses in the Donetsk sector is probable, though it could come in the form of artillery.  Ukraine is getting more HIMARS ammo so Wagner might see some special attention.

What comes next is a very, very good question.  Clearing out the rest of Luhansk lost in this war is likely to continue, though I don't think it will be the major effort.  Pushing a bit further east and then cutting south into Donetsk from behind the Siverskyi Donets would be extremely problematic for the Russians for a number of reasons.  In particular it could get DLPR to start thinking for themselves, especially if Russia isn't willing or able to commit meaningful forces.

However, the obvious one is punching through somewhere between the Dnepr and Donetsk City.  A push southward along the Dnepr would be the easiest and have a quicker payoff than anywhere else.  Well, excepting some sort of amphibious operation to cross opposite Kherson   I don't think that's likely, but Ukraine does like to surprise us.

Steve

[Kinophile]

9 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

so Wagner might see some special attention.

Interestingly, crushing Wagner has enormous domestic political implications within Russia. If there's anything that would truly get the Siloviki's knickers in an unholy tangle it would be Prigozhin's boys getting annihilated, Prigozhin screaming blue murder and the RUS MOD being forced to reinforce/save it as a formation, to the overall operational/theatre wide detriment of the entire force in Ukraine and the intense irritation (or satisfaction!) of the MOD. Holy moly, talk about cats in a bag...

Taking out Wagner could be the key to the entire war, because of how its bound into the political forces morphing inside Putin's power structure.

Edited November 12, 2022 by Kinophile

[Battlefront.com]

6 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

Interestingly, crushing Wagner has enormous domestic political implications within Russia. If there's anything that would truly get the Siloviki's knickers in an unholy tangle it would be Prigozhin's boys getting annihilated, Prigozhin screaming blue murder and the RUS MOD being forced to reinforce/save it as a formation, to the overall operational/theatre wide detriment of the entire force in Ukraine and the intense irritation (or satisfaction!) of the MOD. Holy moly, talk about cats in a bag...

Taking out Wagner could be the key to the entire war, because of how its bound into the political forces morphing inside Putin's power structure.

Yes, there's a lot of reasons to focus on Wagner.  The most important of which is scale.  Ukraine could gain huge rewards with relatively small scale investment.  Wagner has most of its forces concentrated in a very small geographic area.  Imagine 4 HIMARS hitting them every single day for a week.  The results of that would likely be disproportionally effective than hitting any similar sized sector of front with that amount of firepower.

I think smashing up Wagner hard and then pushing them back a few KMs would be well worth the effort.  The RU Nats would go ballistic.

Steve

[dan/california]

25 minutes ago, NamEndedAllen said:

Two scenarios

1. Weather, restoration of troops and equipment, consolidation of territorial changes, etc combine to bring the war to a slow grind of local probes and engagements., if not a complete freezing of the lines. Two boxers in a clinch. Europe is cold and some industries struggle for lack of energy. A mood of stagnation settles over the perception of the Western public’s sense of the war. The Russian mobilization training finally produces large numbers of fresh troops with more credible training, good for strengthening their lines and forcing local breakthrough attempts. With no significant victories or defeats on the battlefield, political initiatives to convince Ukraine to negotiate take hold. 
 

2. Over the past few months, Ukraine has wargamed numerous versions of maintaining the overall counter offensive, with USA and European partners’ information and advice. Also, it realized that stagnation during a long cold winter with no progress could begin to undermine the political resolve of various European individual nations, while large segments of the USA public lose sense of urgency about the war and turn inward to address their own vexing issues. Meanwhile, frequent volleys of new Iranian ballistic missiles will take a toll on civilian and some military infrastructure. And the last thing Ukraine needs is for the Russians to have the time to construct serious, extensive defensive lines in more and more key locations. With all this factored in, Ukraine has committed to new coordinated powerful thrusts in ______.and______Also in a sudden and surprising effort______?

Which scenario will happen?  OK, my real question is how do you think the Ukrainian forces will maintain their momentum and keep the overall initiative? Will the presumed strengthened Russian offensive overcome the Bakhmut defense and continue? Will they attempt or threaten a second offensive, perhaps from Belorussian territory in an attempt to tie down freed up Ukrainian units from Kherson, and to lessen chances of a new major Ukrainian thrust?

Belarus would be the hail mary of hail mary's for the Russians. It is far more likely to Bring down Lukashenko and install a Western leaning government in Minsk than it is to seriously damage Ukraine. Among other things the border is the biggest marsh in Europe, and the Ukrainians have mined every bit of it you can stand on like the Korean DMZ. I think Ukraine will take one deep breathe and push HARD towards whatever spot of the Southern front line they think is the weakest. Melitopol is ideal, but breaking the land bridge anywhere is more than good enough.

[LongLeftFlank]

5 hours ago, Beleg85 said:

It's piece by Samuel Charap, one of the more famous "realists". Like most of them now, he may be temporarly "unavailable" for comments for some time. 

 

General Winter will destroy our enemies!

So with the 'November surprise' (elections) gone, Russia apologists (and their source material is basically RT) have piled on to their newest copium theory.

It seems winter in Ukraine is going to utterly confound and defeat an army made up of people who freeking *live there.*

Although it looks like the Third Romer -tankies are crawling up their own nether regions even further and have convinced themselves that it's not really Ukrainians (and their cokehead president) fighting now, but nefarious Polish and British mercs. Who will perforce crawl into a hole and die the moment it snows.

Plus, Ukraine's freight rail and overland transportation are mainly electric, ergo all offline now, or sumfink. Bummer.

https://strategic-culture.org/news/2022/11/10/sun-tzu-walks-into-a-kherson-bar/

So why are the Americans desperate to offer a deal? Because they may be sensing the next Russian move with the arrival of General Winter should be capable of conclusively winning the war on Moscow’s terms. That would include slamming the Polish border shut via a long arrow move from Belarus downwards. With weaponizing supply lines cut, Kiev’s fate is sealed.