How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[A Canadian Cat]

OR

17 hours ago, chris talpas said:

During his visit with Xi,

Someone else decides Putin is enjoying China and should stay but taking over the government and letting him know not to bother coming home.

[Haiduk]

1 hour ago, akd said:

Today I learned that Ukrainians refer to PKMs as “Pokémons.”

Some other weapon slang (usually common for UKR and RUS): 

- Dashka (was heard in this video) - hypocrism form of female name Darya - DShK HMG

- Kalashmat - combined "Kalashnikov"+"avtomat" (SMG), but also similar to the Russian word "koloshmatit' " - jargon, which means "to inflict many punches, to beat up" - AK-rifle 

- bekha - jargon name of BMW car -  BMP 

- Kabanchyk ("little boar") - 120 mm or 122 mm shell

- mishka - hypocrism from Russian "medved' "(bear) - tank. I don't know why

- motolyha  - combined from "motor" and consonant jargon word "kolymaha" (eng."rattletrap") - MTLB

- Grach ("rook") - Su-25 

- Sushka - any Su-aircraft

- Krokodil - Mi-24

- Sapog  ("hight boot") - SPG-9  

[Huba]

Even more tension building:

 

[sburke]

6 minutes ago, IanL said:

OR

Someone else decides Putin is enjoying China and should stay but taking over the government and letting him know not to bother coming home.

I'm sorry. all flights to/from China are cancelled due to a shortage of parts.  

[sburke]

1 minute ago, Huba said:

Even more tension building:

 

lol didn't Russia JUST say they expect total surrender from Kiev?  

[billbindc]

38 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

RUMINT - Russia is pulling forces out of the south and redirecting them to or through Crimea.

 

It's pretty hard to know which of these stories to take seriously and which to discount but a couple of things are clear:

1. Most of the better Russian formations are in the south and, unfortunately for them, in Kherson. 

2. The UA is not lunging of the Oskil. Yes, Lyman is holding them up but it's clear that they are being methodical.

3. The UA is definitely taking a force on force approach in Kherson to destroy rather than chase them over the Dnieper.

4. The RuAf clearly think an attack is coming through to either Melitopol or to Mariupol.

5. Zelenksy originally wanted a general offensive as per the last entry.

If you add all of that up along with the estimates I've seen of some 40,000 UA reserves remaining unused...it certainly looks like there might be a dramatic attempt to end the war with by splitting the Russians in two via Melitopol and/or Mariupol. Just a wild guess but if they remain true to form, the Russians will be racing depleted forces virtually everywhere else.

 

[The_Capt]

24 minutes ago, Grigb said:

He is a possible RU Nat power line that will pump anything that is needed for to keep RU Nat forces at least afloat and force UKR and West to the negotiation table. 

Hey it is ok to disagree.  So how many troops are we about here?  You mention that they are better equipped etc but how many are we talking about?

Honestly, though, once the RA scuttles a back to wherever they wind up, this force is going to be holding out on its own and UA can give these guys their full concentration.  Unless this Prigo fella has a magic shield that will make these guys HIMAR proof I think the best they can hope for is to die later. 

But this has been a weird war, so I won’t bet the mortgage on my predictions just yet.

[Battlefront.com]

Now that Ukraine has officially taken Volchansk, and the rest of the surrounding area, how badly is this going to impact supplies going into Luhansk?  My take is it's a huge problem for Russia's logistics.

For the whole war Belgorod has been the primary staging area for Russian forces and supplies going into Ukraine.  This is now cut.  Now LPR and DPR have to be supplied from the east, but from where specifically?

Here is the rail map that Chibot Mk IX kindly posted a bunch of pages ago...

According to this map (I haven't verified the details) the Russians have four rail links into Ukraine now.  The cities are the first major settlements on both sides of the border in order to help locate them more easily:

1. Millerovo (Rostov) to Luhansk City (Luhansk)

2. Gukovo (Rostov) to Dovzhansk (Luhansk)

3. Avilo-Uspenka (Rostov) to Amvrosiivka (Donetsk)

4. Vyshesteblievskaya (Krasnodar Kai) to Dzhankoi (Crimea)

Rostov-on-Don is the biggest Russian city in the area and is already a hub for rerouting supplies into the remaining portion of Russia's occupied territories.  It's a long ways away from the main points of supply, that's for sure.

Once supplies are into the occupied territories things get pretty restricted very fast.  There's only one line running directly between Luhansk and Donetsk, there's only a couple of lines that matter internally for both.  There's two lines out of Crimea (to Kherson and to Melitopol).

With the taking of Kherson, all of these rail lines can be cut within Ukraine if Ukraine has a weapon with a 150km range.  Currently the only one it might have that can do that is Hrims-2, and even if it exists it's in tiny numbers.  Not nearly enough to interdict rail travel.

If the US gives ATACMS to Ukraine, guess what?  Critical rail yards and switching stations are all well within striking distance.  In fact, they could be hit today.

The rationale for not giving Ukraine very long range weapons is the fear of either Russia responding in some way simply for Ukraine having them and/or Ukraine might use them for deep Russian territory strikes and/or Ukraine won't use them wisely.  I think the last two aren't an issue any more and the fear of Russia responding (boiling frog) is very low.

On top of this, with the collapse of Russian forces in Kharkiv Ukraine is capable of hitting infrastructure within Russia pretty easily even without any NATO supplied system.  ATACAMS, therefore, doesn't really change the equation in terms of Ukraine doing something to risk a wider war.

I'm hopeful that if Ukraine goes to the US with a plan to take out the rail yards that the US will send over ATACMS.  The logic and need is certainly there!

Steve

[DesertFox]

8 minutes ago, sburke said:

lol didn't Russia JUST say they expect total surrender from Kiev?  

They mean the other Kiev, you know? Not that Kiev...

[The_Capt]

2 minutes ago, billbindc said:

40,000 UA reserves remaining unused...it certainly looks like there might be a dramatic attempt to end the war with by splitting the Russians in two via Melitopol and/or Mariupol. Just a wild guess but if they remain true to form, the Russians will be racing depleted forces virtually everywhere else.

This is my guess as well.  The cutting of the infamous land bridge is not only symbolic but it cuts the AOs off from each other.  My only question/concern is just how much gas does the UA have left in the tank?  At what point are the risking over-reach - and as Bil H will tell you I am a famous over-reacher, so I know the pain.

That is three operational axis to pull that off - have UA logistics gotten that robust?  Then there is the question of what will be left in reserve if they pull that trigger?  But the pay-off would be huge, could be talking back to 2014 lines before Halloween - and then the arguing can start.

[Probus]

27 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

My guess is that maybe the RA has one good defensive left in it.  If they were smart they would pull back the entire western front into that bottleneck at the Crimea and try to hold onto what they took in 2014.  That is really messy ground up there and they would stand a chance, even as shot up as they are.

They haven't been doing the smart thing.  They've proven that.  If Ukraine can keep up the pressure and the momentum, Russia is going to have a hard time reorganizing.  What I've been reading on here is that their command and control has taken a beating, their logistics have taken a beating and they don't have the ammo to use their arty effectively to stop the Ukrainians.  As you say @The_Capt, the smart thing to do is retreat to the choke point and they prolly aren't going to do that.  So what are they going to do?

[kraze]

1 minute ago, Probus said:

.As you say @The_Capt, the smart thing to do is retreat to the choke point and they prolly aren't going to do that.  So what are they going to do?

Die, hopefully.

[dan/california]

 

5 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

This is my guess as well.  The cutting of the infamous land bridge is not only symbolic but it cuts the AOs off from each other.  My only question/concern is just how much gas does the UA have left in the tank?  At what point are the risking over-reach - and as Bil H will tell you I am a famous over-reacher, so I know the pain.

That is three operational axis to pull that off - have UA logistics gotten that robust?  Then there is the question of what will be left in reserve if they pull that trigger?  But the pay-off would be huge, could be talking back to 2014 lines before Halloween - and then the arguing can start.

 

2 minutes ago, Probus said:

They haven't been doing the smart thing.  They've proven that.  If Ukraine can keep up the pressure and the momentum, Russia is going to have a hard time reorganizing.  What I've been reading on here is that their command and control has taken a beating, their logistics have taken a beating and they don't have the ammo to use their arty effectively to stop the Ukrainians.  As you say @The_Capt, the smart thing to do is retreat to the choke point and they prolly aren't going to do that.  So what are they going to do?

 

Just now, kraze said:

Die, hopefully.

A ridiculous attack at the worst possible spot, under the glare of the all seeing eye and infinite HIMARS. So yes, suicide by AFU.

[Huba]

5 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Now that Ukraine has officially taken Volchansk, and the rest of the surrounding area, how badly is this going to impact supplies going into Luhansk?  My take is it's a huge problem for Russia's logistics.

For the whole war Belgorod has been the primary staging area for Russian forces and supplies going into Ukraine.  This is now cut.  Now LPR and DPR have to be supplied from the east, but from where specifically?

Here is the rail map that Chibot Mk IX kindly posted a bunch of pages ago...

According to this map (I haven't verified the details) the Russians have four rail links into Ukraine now.  The cities are the first major settlements on both sides of the border in order to help locate them more easily:

1. Millerovo (Rostov) to Luhansk City (Luhansk)

2. Gukovo (Rostov) to Dovzhansk (Luhansk)

3. Avilo-Uspenka (Rostov) to Amvrosiivka (Donetsk)

4. Vyshesteblievskaya (Krasnodar Kai) to Dzhankoi (Crimea)

Rostov-on-Don is the biggest Russian city in the area and is already a hub for rerouting supplies into the remaining portion of Russia's occupied territories.  It's a long ways away from the main points of supply, that's for sure.

Once supplies are into the occupied territories things get pretty restricted very fast.  There's only one line running directly between Luhansk and Donetsk, there's only a couple of lines that matter internally for both.  There's two lines out of Crimea (to Kherson and to Melitopol).

With the taking of Kherson, all of these rail lines can be cut within Ukraine if Ukraine has a weapon with a 150km range.  Currently the only one it might have that can do that is Hrims-2, and even if it exists it's in tiny numbers.  Not nearly enough to interdict rail travel.

If the US gives ATACMS to Ukraine, guess what?  Critical rail yards and switching stations are all well within striking distance.  In fact, they could be hit today.

The rationale for not giving Ukraine very long range weapons is the fear of either Russia responding in some way simply for Ukraine having them and/or Ukraine might use them for deep Russian territory strikes and/or Ukraine won't use them wisely.  I think the last two aren't an issue any more and the fear of Russia responding (boiling frog) is very low.

On top of this, with the collapse of Russian forces in Kharkiv Ukraine is capable of hitting infrastructure within Russia pretty easily even without any NATO supplied system.  ATACAMS, therefore, doesn't really change the equation in terms of Ukraine doing something to risk a wider war.

I'm hopeful that if Ukraine goes to the US with a plan to take out the rail yards that the US will send over ATACMS.  The logic and need is certainly there!

Steve

Here's a really cool tool for tracking all the railway lines in the world, I can't recommend it enough if anybody want's to familiarize himself with the rail logistics in Ukraine: https://openrailwaymap.org/

You are absolutely right here, to support Donbas, Russia will have to redirect all the traffic to south of Luhansk, or to Rostov. The closest big city that could serve as a main supply base is Volgograd. It really takes a moment to comprehend how screwed they are, even without any UA strikes on the rail infrastructure. 
And regarding ATACMS, I wonder how soldiers of the western grouping would deal with Crimean bridge going down...

[akd]

53 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Also, I expected RU Nat forces around Lyman to collapse in short order. In both cases I was wrong as I underestimated RU Nat capabilities. They did not collapse in summer. They prevented RU regulars from collapsing around Lyman now. 

I doubt Ukraine expected to be exploiting their offensive all the way past Lyman and that, more than unexpected resistance, likely explains their inability to breakthrough in depth that far.

Edited September 13, 2022 by akd

[Battlefront.com]

23 minutes ago, billbindc said:

It's pretty hard to know which of these stories to take seriously and which to discount but a couple of things are clear:

1. Most of the better Russian formations are in the south and, unfortunately for them, in Kherson. 

2. The UA is not lunging of the Oskil. Yes, Lyman is holding them up but it's clear that they are being methodical.

3. The UA is definitely taking a force on force approach in Kherson to destroy rather than chase them over the Dnieper.

4. The RuAf clearly think an attack is coming through to either Melitopol or to Mariupol.

5. Zelenksy originally wanted a general offensive as per the last entry.

If you add all of that up along with the estimates I've seen of some 40,000 UA reserves remaining unused...it certainly looks like there might be a dramatic attempt to end the war with by splitting the Russians in two via Melitopol and/or Mariupol. Just a wild guess but if they remain true to form, the Russians will be racing depleted forces virtually everywhere else.

 

The issue I have with these sorts of reports is they don't convey scale.  A sighting of a train loaded up with a single company's or battalion's worth of equipment might look pretty impressive, but it means nothing strategically.

One thing we've seen Russia do over and over and over and over again is to desperately move around forces to try and keep whatever is at immediate risk of loss.  If their forces up north are not functional, then there will be no new line forming.  That is bad for Russia because, well, this whole idiotic thing is about the Donbas.  Hard to convince Russians that things are going well if they lose Luhansk, eh?  In fact, it seems much of what Russia has done for the past 4 months has been to try and take the Donbas, not properly dealing with Kherson or the front between the Dnepr and Donetsk City.

Therefore, my bet is that Russia is going to do what it has done in the past... remove some forces from A to reinforce B because it doesn't want to lose either.  However, it doesn't have enough forces to keep both, so it weakens an already weak A to inadequately buff up B.  Thus ensuring they are weak in two places instead of just one.

Let's also not rule out panic at a strategic level.  Never a good thing for decision making.

Steve

 

[Battlefront.com]

4 minutes ago, akd said:

I doubt Ukraine expected to be exploiting their offensive all the way past Lyman and that, more than unexpected resistance, likely explains their inability to breakthrough in depth that far.

I agree.  Ukraine is cautious about spreading itself too thin.  However, they also likely know that there's not much in front of them right now.  Therefore, I think we are seeing an "operational pause".  And like everything in this war, Ukraine will do it right

Steve

[BletchleyGeek]

12 minutes ago, Huba said:

Here's a really cool tool for tracking all the railway lines in the world, I can't recommend it enough if anybody want's to familiarize himself with the rail logistics in Ukraine: https://openrailwaymap.org/

You are absolutely right here, to support Donbas, Russia will have to redirect all the traffic to south of Luhansk, or to Rostov. The closest big city that could serve as a main supply base is Volgograd. It really takes a moment to comprehend how screwed they are, even without any UA strikes on the rail infrastructure. 
And regarding ATACMS, I wonder how soldiers of the western grouping would deal with Crimean bridge going down...

That map really says it all... Looking at it, the push from Vuhledar south makes more sense to me (if that rail line going in parallel to the Azov sea coast is still operational).

[Huba]

I just read the latest Rybar update (google translate is very reasonable). To sum it up, RU is expecting UA counterattacks literally everywhere except Bakhmut: In Kherson, on Melitopol and Mariupol, around Lysychansk and Lyman, and east across Oskil.

Edited September 13, 2022 by Huba

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, Grigb said:

We all agree on the main things:

• RU regulars are comprehensibly defeated (but most likely will try to do last one dumb offensive)
• RU L-DPR + Volunteers forces will hold longer but will be defeated as well

But next is where we depart.

Previously I got painful lesson from RU Nats - I expected RU forces to start collapsing July-August. Also, I expected RU Nat forces around Lyman to collapse in short order. In both cases I was wrong as I underestimated RU Nat capabilities. They did not collapse in summer. They prevented RU regulars from collapsing around Lyman now. 

I can see your point.  Caution is not a bad thing, especially after so many gains.  However, the entire counter push by Ukraine has been going slower than expected because Ukraine is doing things the right way.  Therefore, I think the biggest reason the RU Nat units haven't disintegrated yet is because Ukraine hasn't tried to do it.  With Kharkiv and Kherson (soon!) out of the way, all of Ukraine's forces can be refocused.  I don't think LPR will have a good time when that happens.

1 hour ago, Grigb said:

Still not enough to dramatically affect the outcome. But what if we add another factor into the mix - Prigozhin. This is where I depart from you and @The_Capt.  I believe Prigozhin is significant factor that will affect (or already affects) RU Nat forces. He is a possible RU Nat power line that will pump anything that is needed for to keep RU Nat forces at least afloat and force UKR and West to the negotiation table. 

You need to understand that Prigozhin right now is second most powerful man in RU. He got carte blanche from Putin. And he is focusing on L-DPR.

We are not dealing anymore with just RU Nats. We are dealing now with RU Nats that are increasingly backed up by second powerful man in RU.

This gets into the issue that has vexed Russia since the war started... difficulty translating desire into success.  Prigozhin can flood the RU Nats with the weapons they want, but if they don't have the guys to man them it doesn't matter.  If they don't have the minimum troop density to man the new front that Ukraine just tore open they are doomed.

We've talked a lot about mass and numbers throughout this war.  Russia started out with superiority in all categories, now it is inferior in just about all.  The RU Nat units, on their own, are even more outclassed just from numbers standpoint.  Then we get into a capabilities discussion that makes things even worse for the RU Nats.

1 hour ago, Grigb said:

Can I be wrong? Yes, I can - if UKR will defeat shortly RU Nat forces at Lyman-Kremenna it means most likely RU Nat forces are spent. Otherwise, we must expect somewhat longer war with significantly improved RU Nat forces at the expense of RU regulars.  One scenario I already explained - fortify L-DPR and make as much of UKR wasteland as possible. 

Here we agree more.  I think Ukraine should advance in Luhansk only if the going is easy.  As soon as it gets tough, stop, pull out all excess forces, then focus on liberating the south.  I don't think fighting through determined RU Nat resistance is smart.  Let the LPR and DPR regimes struggle through the winter while the south of Ukraine breaths freely.

Steve

[billbindc]

8 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Therefore, my bet is that Russia is going to do what it has done in the past... remove some forces from A to reinforce B because it doesn't want to lose either.  However, it doesn't have enough forces to keep both, so it weakens an already weak A to inadequately buff up B.  Thus ensuring they are weak in two places instead of just one.

Let's also not rule out panic at a strategic level.  Never a good thing for decision making.

Steve

 

This is precisely what I imagine is happening right now. What that they are saying when they say no new BTG’s will go to Ukraine is that they need every new recruit to hold onto NE Luhansk and that’s not enough to keep it. And those convoys likely aren’t units running for the border but units being redeployed and to the NE and taking their loot with them.

[The_Capt]

26 minutes ago, Probus said:

They haven't been doing the smart thing.  They've proven that.  If Ukraine can keep up the pressure and the momentum, Russia is going to have a hard time reorganizing.  What I've been reading on here is that their command and control has taken a beating, their logistics have taken a beating and they don't have the ammo to use their arty effectively to stop the Ukrainians.  As you say @The_Capt, the smart thing to do is retreat to the choke point and they prolly aren't going to do that.  So what are they going to do?

Well I cannot say what they will do with any confidence; however, if they stick to their A game they will keep trying to hold onto every inch they took in something that resembles a military operational seizure.  I doubt they have a unified Army command, let alone a Joint one.  Rumours of direct political micro-managing abound so it is very likely we have multiple chains of commands competing with each for resources and at cross purposes.

So with that I suspect that they will set themselves up for an even worse collapse, the question will be whether they can make it to the wet season when the UA will probably have to go firm and consolidate - however based on the UA trajectory I am half wondering if an amphib or airborne op isn’t in the cards.

The RA could easily collapse before the end of Oct at the current rate but that is a lot of ground to retake and the UA will likely be stretch to do it in a single big bite.  Here is hoping.

[Battlefront.com]

19 minutes ago, akd said:

I doubt Ukraine expected to be exploiting their offensive all the way past Lyman and that, more than unexpected resistance, likely explains their inability to breakthrough in depth that far.

I believe Ukraine has the rest of the liberation planned out in detail, but the Kharkiv operation went better than expected and have had to move the timetable up for the next offensive.  Reorientation takes time, even if it is caused by really good events.

Steve

[Huba]

9 minutes ago, BletchleyGeek said:

That map really says it all... Looking at it, the push from Vuhledar south makes more sense to me (if that rail line going in parallel to the Azov sea coast is still operational).

No way it is. It is inside UA artillery range along considerable part of it's length. And at least parts are single track. All Russian transports to Kherson in Melitopol are routed through Crimea.

[sburke]

36 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

This is my guess as well.  The cutting of the infamous land bridge is not only symbolic but it cuts the AOs off from each other.  My only question/concern is just how much gas does the UA have left in the tank?  At what point are the risking over-reach - and as Bil H will tell you I am a famous over-reacher, so I know the pain.

That is three operational axis to pull that off - have UA logistics gotten that robust?  Then there is the question of what will be left in reserve if they pull that trigger?  But the pay-off would be huge, could be talking back to 2014 lines before Halloween - and then the arguing can start.

my personal uninformed worth less than what is in the cat's litter box opinion is consolidate the gains around Kharkhiv and regroup, finish off the Kherson pocket then see where things stand.  The troops just put on an amazing offensive, but I expect the adrenalin is wearing thin and they need a rest.

I don't put too much stock in Russia counter attacking.  I suspect they are in so much disarray they can barely reorganize a defense.  That being said anything going south is a very very long logistical hurdle.