How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[The_Capt]

8 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Well noted mate, and I'm not trying to twist your tail here as some-rando-on-keyboard.

(... and while I've never personally toted a rifle in anyone's service but my own, my personal life experience with conflict zones and landmines, and with their victims, is nonzero).

You seem to be of the view though that the war of attrition is going for Ukraine militarily.... how? as well as can be expected? (I won't put words in your mouth).

****

Let me flip a few of our fondly held ideas on their heads here, for argument....

1.  How long can Ukrainian society *really* keep this up? Yes, they have no choice and are putting a valiant face on it all, but war economies basically eat themselves over time. Some 10% of the people are DPs, internal and external, a net economic drag. Winter comes early.

2.  Ukraine's true rear area -- unmobilised Western economies -- is slowing down, a secular trend. The Globalisation 2.0 asset auction is largely played out now (that's where I carry a rifle, metaphorically). Compassion fatigue, hard choices and 'cutting losses' lie ahead.

3. Russia is running way short on a lot of key inputs. But they show little sign yet of being unable (or unwilling) to hold their ill gotten gains to date: the Izyum bulge, the Azov shore and the shattered Lukhansk zone.

With the exception of the Kherson salient, which he'll need to let go in the fall, Putin actually does appear to be 'freezing' the conflict, at least since June.

Sure, that strategy is forced on him by RA's failure to advance, and is nothing close to what he wanted, but such a stalemate may be something a battered but stubborn Russia can drag out for years. Can Ukraine?

4. This thread has amply demonstrated the limitations of historical analogies, but Ukraine is in a France 1915 situation. Some 1/5 of its lands (1/4+ if we count 2014 losses) are under enemy control, disproportionately heavy industry.

We've skipped the Marne (and thankfully, so far, the Somme) and have gone straight to Verdun. Also, as yet there is no BEF sharing the blood price, and unlikely to be.

5. How long can Ukraine's fighting pool of some 1.2 million brave, still mainly cheerful, Vikings remain effective and superior, even at a reduced 'stalemate' level of intensity? Again, there's a massive economic cost to having these guys and gals sitting in trenches.

TL:DR   A lot of major dynamics change as and when this war goes 'long' and by no means all of them swing against Russia.

All war is a collision of certainties - which of course means it produces uncertainty.  And we as humans abhor uncertainty - as demonstrated here.

Most people have been in a physical fight at some point in their lives - schoolyard, bar, or whatever.  Thing is, very few have been in a lethal fight and they are a very different species.  A regular, "two guys having at it" is going to end with injury of some scale - bruises, knocked out teeth, maybe even a few broken bones.  A fight to the death is unique as neither party really knows how it will end; we have no real idea what lies beyond the veil.  That uncertainty alone makes deadly fights unique, having a different texture - parties know that one of you is not going home, one of you is going somewhere "else".  Now that is the uncertainty that those who do war must live with every day - worse, you live it long enough and you realize that everyday, even in peace, is lethal - means you never really go home again, but that is a separate conversation.

Unfortunately I cannot help you here.  I have no idea how this is going to unfold - how long Ukraine can hold out, how long and how much western resolve, or how long Russia can continue - no one does.  The Russian front could collapse tomorrow, or the UA could have a major setback - these are simply symptoms of a deeper deadly contest.

 This is the reality of war...all stop.  Now that we have got that out of the way.

Are things at a decision point?  Do we need to adopt new strategies because what we have "ain't working"?

Well for Russia, I expect the answer is "yes", while for Ukraine I would say "no".  Based on the progress of the collision, Ukraine has traded terrain (and lives) for time.  Time to force generate.  Which is not only getting all the sexy western kit, it is training people on how to employ it.  This is a lot more than crew training, this runs the full gambit all the way up to training people to be staff and plan complex joint integrated operations.  It takes 1-2 years in the west to train up a major, a senior tactical officer, to be able to function and wage operational level warfare - and Ukraine has a lot of operational level warfare going on right now. 

Russia on the other hand appears to be panicking.  They are simply sticking uniforms on people and pushing them at the front a la Enemy at the Gates. I highly doubt they are able, or willing, to churn out the full gambit of professional fighters they are going to need to sustain this war, while I know Ukraine is - we are training some of them right now. 

Russia has culminated at least strategically, possible operationally.  They never came out of the "pause" of last summer.  The fact that we are talking about them "freezing the front" is a sign of this.  We have gone over at length the challenges they are going to face holding onto an 850km frontage, and entire depth now in range of Ukrainian weapons and ISR.  Can Russia freeze this thing and drag it out for years - sure, the Donbass lines were a conflict region that lasted 8 years before this war.  I think it much less likely given the conditions they are facing now; however, it is always a possibility.

Ukraine has adopted a strategy of "hold, nibble and deep strike".  Holding everywhere they need to, nibbling to sustain the initiative and force Russia to react to them and deep strike to hammer stuff Russia cannot easily get back.  It seems to be working, so I am not sure if Ukraine needs to dramatically shift strategies right now.  And definitely not ones that come with too much political risk.

So where from here...running in the darkness? Well time is actually not on Russia's side, more so than Ukraine.  Ukraine has a couple years at least.  As I posted elsewhere, the US alone spent $2.3 trillion (I would love to see the total NATO bill) in a landlocked hole with zero larger scale geopolitical repurcutions.  I do not think they are out of runway yet.  Even the staunchest pro-Russian politician is going to have trouble turning things off in a couple years.  And then there is Europe - notoriously fickly bunch but when they do get their act together that have an economy that is in the same league as the US.  For them Ukraine is "too big to fail" now - so my point is we have some time here, like probably 18-24 months of continued support.

Russia, not so much. Its loss rates are too high.  It economy is going to start to buckle, signs are already there.  Worse, they are going to run out of excess human capital they can throw at this thing, then force generation will start to hit organs and bone.  Putin knows this, hence the incredible machinations to avoid general mobilization.  My point being that politically and strategically Russia has no escalation room left.  There is no "other gear" that won't risk completely blowing the engine, in my opinion.  It would be a different story if Ukraine were at the gates of Moscow but to Russia this is a foreign adventure and no amount of pundit quacking is going to change that.  Russia has pretty much broken its professional force in being, and its ability to force generate more forces, based on what we have seen, is questionable. 

So what?  Well, I am of a "stay the course" mind on this whole thing.  The Russian war machines has some really weird rattles and popping sounds in this thing and they are getting louder.  In my experience, these are symptoms of a machine that is not well.  Ukraine on the other hand is getting better, able to hit deeper and harder everyday.  Will they solve for the offence, no idea but I like to think so.  I am not sure we in the west could solve for the offence given these conditions; however, Ukraine is highly motivated and more importantly they are learning, fast.

So what have learned - war is hell, darkest before dawn, keep calm and carry on - kinda weird but all those platitudes kinda ring true, don't they?

[Huba]

5 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Russian attack with two BMP-3 finished too fast.

Here a two Russian propagandists:

ColonelCassad: this was BMP zerg-rush of AFU on positions of Pacific Fleet naval infantry

VladlenTatarskyi: Yes. Just there is a little nuance - theese are BMP-3 on cadres. They recently appeared on armament of 155th naval infantry brigade. BMP were blew up on mines, but all still alive.

[I have seen only six running troopers, probably a driver - seventh was hit]

Also more likely this is not 155th naval infantry brigade, but volunteer battalion "Tigr" of Primorye region, formed on the base of 155th brigade. There were mentions, they are operating on Vuhledar direction.

The guys who bailed out should consider themselves very lucky that they weren't machinegunned the second they left the vehicles. Also, it's hard to be sure due to low quality of the video, but were they driving with rear hatches open? They were expecting to be hit, that's for sure...

[Haiduk]

Two more Russian armors and mines

Russian soldier blew up himself probaby with underbarrel grenade

 

Edited August 27, 2022 by Haiduk

[Huba]

Learning about RPG backblast the hard way:

 

[Grigb]

And the next stage of the show is upon us - RU fresh 3rd Army Corps is on the move. CIT reports: 

Possible final destination

• According to UKR Mashkovets (and confirmed by my observations) RU Command loves to shift mechanically the direction of attacks in search of the weak spot. And the only direction they have not tried yet is Zaporozhye. 
• Also, they like to chase several goals at once - attack at Zaporozhye gives them option to roll the right flank of UKR Donetsk grouping and quickly achieve political goal of liberation DPR. 
• Finally, the offensive at Donetsk is stalled and further attack (reinforcing failure) with fresh reserves might bring only minor gains but at the cost of wasting the last fresh formation.

Counter points

• Push to Zaporozhye city does not solve any RU problems but add problem of another city assault
• Push to Dnipto threatens hole URK eastern grouping but extremely risky
• Next is to roll right UKR flank for example along Donetsk region border avoiding dealing with Slayvansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration completely. Still risky move.
• What is left is to ram UKR right flank straight through Ugledar to Maryinka through Krasnohorivka to Pervomaiske to secure left flank of L-DPR advance encircling Avdyivka. Much safer and does ease both political problems ("liberation" of DPR and moving UKR arty away from Donetsk)

Let's see what RU Command plans.

[Huba]

6 minutes ago, Grigb said:

And the next stage of the show is upon us - RU fresh 3rd Army Corps is on the move. CIT reports: 

Possible final destination

• According to UKR Mashkovets (and confirmed by my observations) RU Command loves to shift mechanically the direction of attacks in search of the weak spot. And the only direction they have not tried yet is Zaporozhye. 
• Also, they like to chase several goals at once - attack at Zaporozhye gives them option to roll the right flank of UKR Donetsk grouping and quickly achieve political goal of liberation DPR. 
• Finally, the offensive at Donetsk is stalled and further attack (reinforcing failure) with fresh reserves might bring only minor gains but at the cost of wasting the last fresh formation.

Counter points

• Push to Zaporozhye city does not solve any RU problems but add problem of another city assault
• Push to Dnipto threatens hole URK eastern grouping but extremely risky
• Next is to roll right UKR flank for example along Donetsk region border avoiding dealing with Slayvansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration completely. Still risky move.
• What is left is to ram UKR right flank straight through Ugledar to Maryinka through Krasnohorivka to Pervomaiske to secure left flank of L-DPR advance encircling Avdyivka. Much safer and does ease both political problems ("liberation" of DPR and moving UKR arty away from Donetsk)

Let's see what RU Command plans.

But would they push from the east (from Volnovakha region) or from Melitopol? Going from the east sounds like a much much better plan logistically (not saying it's a good one, just better), as Melitopol seems to be extremely isolated by UA fires at the moment. Having Rostov as a main supply base makes a lot of sense, as it is a completely safe area for now.

In other news, M119s are on the front already, and reportedy very well liked by the crews. That's great news, as the reserves of NATO 105mm, both guns and ammunition are ginormous. More info and videos in the thread, I recommend taking a look:

 

Edited August 27, 2022 by Huba

[Haiduk]

We need more howitzers. Those, which work now, just burning own barrels due to overload, where platoon makes the work of battery

 

Edited August 27, 2022 by Haiduk

[Artkin]

19 minutes ago, Huba said:

Learning about RPG backblast the hard way:

 

[Artkin]

37 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Russian soldier blew up himself probaby with underbarrel grenade

If it's vog-30 wouldnt there be a minimum arming distance? 

[Artkin]

Falklands had 1 month? Of boots on the ground with a few thousand casualties between both sides. Ukraine has had 6 months and around a hundred thousand casualties. 

Edited August 27, 2022 by Artkin

[akd]

22 minutes ago, Artkin said:

If it's vog-30 wouldnt there be a minimum arming distance? 

Might have been in the process of arming a small drone.

[Battlefront.com]

8 hours ago, Letter from Prague said:

This Finnish MP has I think the best response for "poking the bear".

Oh that is classic!  Even read that one out loud to my wife.  But as much as I love the Finns, providers of fantastic humor (and now, fun dancing!), credit should go where credit is due... Lithuania.

Steve

[Huba]

New Girkin:

 

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

So where from here...running in the darkness? Well time is actually not on Russia's side, more so than Ukraine. 

Yup.

At the beginning of the war many people were criticized for focusing too heavily on Russia's obvious mistakes rather than Ukraine's brilliant ability to trigger, amplify, and benefit from them.  At times I'd do that too, mostly because the Russian mistakes were so astonishing and visual, whereas the Ukrainians were do more subtle stuff.  I've tried mightily to make sure that whenever I'm examining one side that I check to see what sort of influence from and opportunities for the other side exist.

Soooooo...

FFL made a post last page that is a "violation" of the concept of looking at both sides before drawing conclusions.  For sure, presented the way he presented tings does raise some questions and concerns about how long Ukraine can keep this up.  The "violation" is that he didn't check each point to see if there are parallels on the Russian side and, if so, what possible conclusions might come to light.  Then an equal amount of effort should be made to see what troubling circumstances face Russia that haven't yet been mentioned, the apply the same process of examining what it might mean for Ukraine.

I won't go through point by point to show that whatever concerns there might be for Ukraine there are vastly more facing Russia.  And this is problematic for any argument showing Ukraine as being the one more likely to "blink first".  In fact, it is quite the opposite.

If we think of the age old military axiom that you should have a 3:1 advantage before you attack, one can come up with something similar for political and economic advantages.  I don't think any sane person would think that Russia has political or economic advantages at this stage.  It is behind in both as it is also behind militarily.  And all indications are that it is getting worse, not better for Russia.

OK, let's take FFL's points and presume that everything else we know about the state of this war is wrong.  Ukraine calls up Putin this evening and says "we're totally spent and want to freeze the conflict as it is and kick the can down the road.  Please stop shooting at us".  Would Russia win?  Not in any meaningful sense and also not for long.

The Putin regime is now radioactive like North Korea's.  Trade will not resume normalcy with Russia for decades and this has VERY little to do with sanctions at this point.  The capitalists in the West simply don't view Russia as a reasonably safe investment any more.  Even if sanctions were lifted tomorrow, trade with Russia would be very slow to return.  Many years. 

Russia's economy was heading into a death spiral even before this war happened.  In fact, it seems that distracting Russians from an ever decreasing standard of living was one of the motivations for starting the war in the first place.  The losses, expenditures, and "lost opportunity" suffered by Russia already is one for the history books. There is absolutely no capacity for Russia to get things back to January 2022 levels for 5 or more years, not to mention getting back to a happier time before.

All of what I just said is with universal and total cancellation of sanctions.  With sanctions remaining in place, Russia is left as much larger North Korea with a less effective means of controlling an unhappy population.  Even if Ukraine surrenders tonight, the sanctions will remain and Russia will collapse.  Ukraine would then take advantage of that chaos and reverse whatever terms of the cease fire might be.

In conclusion... it is fine to look at what challenges Ukraine faces and to be concerned about them.  But doing so without looking at what is facing Russia is pointless.  Ukraine is not going to surrender any time soon and sanctions are not going to end until Putin is gone from power.  All the rest, including weapons supplies, are just details that in the end don't really change the Big Picture. 

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

30 minutes ago, Huba said:

New Girkin:

 

Yesh.

OK, so back to my theory about Darya Dugina assassination.  Either I'm wrong and it wasn't someone trying to send a message to the RU Nats *or* it was and it didn't work.  Regardless of Dugina's assassination I think something is becoming quite clear:

The RU Nats have come to understand that the war is lost unless Putin is ousted

Let that sink in a bit.

What this means is one of the most dangerous elements of the Russian internal political structure has lost faith in Putin to such an extent that it is willing to risk real consequences from the police state.  This means they are either fanatical enough to not care, confident enough their influence protects them, or desperate enough to gamble with their lives.  Or some combination of the three.

If this is true then we are now witnessing the first signs of a serious revolution or, at least, a coup that might gain traction.

Steve

[Huba]

11 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Yesh.

OK, so back to my theory about Darya Dugina assassination.  Either I'm wrong and it wasn't someone trying to send a message to the RU Nats *or* it was and it didn't work.  Regardless of Dugina's assassination I think something is becoming quite clear:

The RU Nats have come to understand that the war is lost unless Putin is ousted

Let that sink in a bit.

What this means is one of the most dangerous elements of the Russian internal political structure has lost faith in Putin to such an extent that it is willing to risk real consequences from the police state.  This means they are either fanatical enough to not care, confident enough their influence protects them, or desperate enough to gamble with their lives.  Or some combination of the three.

If this is true then we are now witnessing the first signs of a serious revolution or, at least, a coup that might gain traction.

Steve

I'm not going to discuss with the general notion here, cause it isn't really my area of expertise, but this particular text I read a bit differently.

Girkin is still not criticizing Putin himself, but RU AF and Shoygu in particular. It is Shoygu who tries to make an impression that he's pushing Putin to announce mobilization, while in  fact due to his incompetence it would be a disaster, and in reality he's doing everything to prevent it.
A long shot here, but reading various RU Nats texts posted here I'm still poised to think that The Tsar is kinda sacred for them, and they would rather not touch him personally. Wouldn't the coup against the 'court' be an option, the way Japanese army/ nationalists did, leaving reverend, but practically powerless Emperor on the throne?

Edited August 27, 2022 by Huba

[Letter from Prague]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Oh that is classic!  Even read that one out loud to my wife.  But as much as I love the Finns, providers of fantastic humor (and now, fun dancing!), credit should go where credit is due... Lithuania.

Steve

Oh god, I am terrible at flags.

Lithuania please accept my sincere apologies.

Edited August 27, 2022 by Letter from Prague

[Battlefront.com]

One of the primary reasons to think that whatever stress Ukraine is under it is Russia that is likely to break first.  Quote from Girkin in the above linked rant:

Quote

(I remind you that in my eyes, the protracted war in the so-called Ukraine “was and will be a catastrophe that can lead to the collapse of the Russian Federation, which I wrote about many times for many years in a row).

Despite Girkin's distorted view of Russia's successes in this war are, he has concluded that Russia is going to lose and in doing so collapse.  Not just now that the war is obviously going so poorly, but in the past prior to the war.  This is significant because it means two different vantage points (mine here, his there) has come to the same conclusion that Russia is likely to collapse.  I think this is meaningful.

It's kinda like a bunch of people assessing whether a car can jump a particular canyon.  One person says "I've done the math and checked the physics, I don't think it will work".  Another person says "I know the driver and he sucks only slightly less than his head mechanic, so I don't think it will work either".  And yet another person says "I think it can work, but only if the driver and mechanic are replaced, the car swapped out, and a less wide canyon is found".

Having the same conclusion come about by very different means of assessment does not provide grounds for confidence in an alternative outcome.

Steve

[kraze]

14 minutes ago, Huba said:

I'm not going to discuss with the general notion here, cause it isn't really my area of expertise, but this particular text I read a bit differently.

Girkin is still not criticizing Putin himself, but RU AF and Shoygu in particular. It is Shoygu who tries to make an impression that he's pushing Putin to announce mobilization, while in  fact due to his incompetence it would be a disaster, and in reality he's doing everything to prevent it.
A long shot here, but reading various RU Nats texts posted here I'm still poised to think that The Tsar is kinda sacred for them, and they would rather not touch him personally. Wouldn't the coup against the 'court' be an option, the way Japanese army/ nationalists did, leaving reverend, but practically powerless Emperor on the throne?

Russians can't survive without tsar leading them. Concept of a court having more power than the tsar is absolutely alien to them - they tried it only once in their history and it ended with them crowning Lenin to be the new tsar in just 6 months.

Reading so called "RU Nats" (perfectly common russians to me) I get an impression they simply live with an illusion of bad boyars surrounding the tsar, who suck at their job and if tsar is to replace them with better ones - suddenly everything will be well. Another well known classic.

[Huba]

Just now, kraze said:

Reading so called "RU Nats" (perfectly common russians to me) I get an impression they simply live with an illusion of bad boyars surrounding the tsar, who suck at their job and if tsar is to replace them with better ones - suddenly everything will be well. Another well known classic.

But that's what I meant exactly - changing Shoygu to Girkin ( :P) would be an objective, but replacing Putin with him sound like sacrilege.

Edited August 27, 2022 by Huba

[Battlefront.com]

11 minutes ago, Huba said:

I'm not going to discuss with the general notion here, cause it isn't really my area of expertise, but this particular text I read a bit differently.

Girkin is still not criticizing Putin himself, but RU AF and Shoygu in particular. It is Shoygu who tries to make an impression that he's pushing Putin to announce mobilization, while in  fact due to his incompetence it would be a disaster, and in reality he's doing everything to prevent it.
A long shot here, but reading various RU Nats texts posted here I'm still poised to think that The Tsar is kinda sacred for them, and they would rather not touch him personally. Wouldn't the coup against the 'court' be an option, the way Japanese army/ nationalists did, leaving reverend, but practically powerless Emperor on the throne?

For sure the criticism is mostly aimed at Shoigu most directly, but there is plenty of it aimed at Putin even if not directly. 

Girkin's premise is that full mobilization and martial law (Girkin fully understands the two must go together) is the only way to win this war and that Putin is absolutely against it.  In his words:

---
our president is most of all inclined to “do nothing and wait until something happens…”
---

The reason why Putin doesn't want to do what is necessary is because it would involve having a spine to admit that for 6 months he's done nothing but fed the Russians lies.  He says as much here:

---
But after all, in the event of mobilisation, our Russian society will face a logical question: “But how is that!? We were defeating everyone for six months! And suddenly mobilisation is required? Konashenkov has been lying to us all this time?!?!” To this question – like it or not, something will need to be answered. And “organisational conclusions” must be made. And who will be the first candidate for “organisational conclusions”? What do you think? Konashenkov? Hardly!

Or, perhaps, do you think that Vladimir Vladimirovich himself will appear on TV and ask “to be treated with understanding”, taking the blame on himself? I highly doubt it.
---

To summarize, Girkin believes the only way to victory is through a course of action that Putin refuses to do.  A real Defense Minister would take a stand on this issue, but Shoigu is not such a minister and so no stand is evident.  Instead, Putin just sits around hoping that reality will magically change so that he won't have to do anything that is difficult.

As much criticism as he is heaping on Shoigu, it is Putin's lack of will to do something difficult that is the real cause of what Girkin sees as the road to defeat.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

3 minutes ago, Huba said:

But that's what I meant exactly - changing Shoygu to Girkin ( :P) would be an objective, but replacing Putin with him sound like sacrilege.

And you and Kraze are correct in many ways.  Girkin is only hinting that Putin needs to be ousted, not openly stating it.  Instead he's focusing his direct ire at Shoigu for not providing the Tzar with proper council.  However, as I said there's definite signs that privately, at least, Girkin believes the problem originates with the Tzar and not with the boyars that surround him.

Tea leaves...

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, Grigb said:

And the next stage of the show is upon us - RU fresh 3rd Army Corps is on the move. CIT reports:

Interesting.  This is going to change the nature of fighting fairly soon but, like Girkin (ironically), I don't see it producing much more than a pile of Russian dead and wounded.  I also wonder if these volunteer battalions will hold together as well as the PMCs.  I doubt it as the PMCs are heavily populated by ex-soldiers with combat experience in search of better pay.  The volunteer battalions seem to be mostly regular people (perhaps with dated military experience) in search of money.

2 hours ago, Grigb said:

Possible final destination

• According to UKR Mashkovets (and confirmed by my observations) RU Command loves to shift mechanically the direction of attacks in search of the weak spot. And the only direction they have not tried yet is Zaporozhye. 
• Also, they like to chase several goals at once - attack at Zaporozhye gives them option to roll the right flank of UKR Donetsk grouping and quickly achieve political goal of liberation DPR. 
• Finally, the offensive at Donetsk is stalled and further attack (reinforcing failure) with fresh reserves might bring only minor gains but at the cost of wasting the last fresh formation.

Counter points

• Push to Zaporozhye city does not solve any RU problems but add problem of another city assault
• Push to Dnipto threatens hole URK eastern grouping but extremely risky
• Next is to roll right UKR flank for example along Donetsk region border avoiding dealing with Slayvansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration completely. Still risky move.
• What is left is to ram UKR right flank straight through Ugledar to Maryinka through Krasnohorivka to Pervomaiske to secure left flank of L-DPR advance encircling Avdyivka. Much safer and does ease both political problems ("liberation" of DPR and moving UKR arty away from Donetsk)

Let's see what RU Command plans.

I think this is a solid assessment.  However, I would say that the counter points you raised aren't likely big concerns for the Russians right now.  They fall into the category of "having to figure out what to do after a breakthrough is a problem we'd love to have".  This is the sort of operations we've seen from Russia since the start of the war.

Another point that should push the Russian leadership into a Zaporozhye offensive is that they desperately need to distract Ukraine from Kherson.  The only realistic way of doing that is launching an offensive somewhere else.  Figuring out what to do with the Ukrainian response is a problem they want to have because it means they might have bought some time for Kherson.

Interesting that they (probably) concluded that a renewed push towards Kharkiv isn't a viable alternative despite the shorter LOCs.  My assumption is there simply isn't enough military infrastructure in the area to support a new Russian style offensive, so it has to be in the south where there is something meaningful to build off of right now instead of in 3 months.

Steve

[Grigb]

2 hours ago, Huba said:

But would they push from the east (from Volnovakha region) or from Melitopol? Going from the east sounds like a much much better plan logistically (not saying it's a good one, just better), as Melitopol seems to be extremely isolated by UA fires at the moment. Having Rostov as a main supply base makes a lot of sense, as it is a completely safe area for now.

And Volnovaha direction is safer and politically better. However, DPR is already advancing there. Actually, it stalled there. So, from the point of RU Command view it is not a valuable direction - they love to shift their attacks to previously quiet front in search of a weak spot they can exploit. That means Melitopol.

Well, we will see soon enough.  

[Kinophile]