How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Kinophile]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

 

If this is true then we are now witnessing the first signs of a serious revolution or, at least, a coup that might gain traction.

Steve

Considering theyre at least more realistic or better informed than Putler,  a RU Nat coup with more competent leadership would be not good, in some ways. The end result is probably the same (retreat from Ukraine), as they are still working with the same garbage.  However They believe they can stop the 10-ton Boulder Of Inevitability squishing everything with what, to us, look like better wooden wedges. So they'll try,  and fail,  and get squished but the squishing will become way more fanatical, violent and aggressive (which would speed up the very collapse they fear). 

 

 

[dan/california]

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/26/opinion/russia-ukraine-oil-gas-prices.html

From Krugman, yes I know many of you already have an opinion about him. But this this actual area of academic expertise and he was an upper-mid level government official decades ago when the Russian gas pipelines were getting built. And yes everyone new it was bad idea then, but the Germans did it anyway.

The short version of the rest of it is that the most gas dependent parts of Europe should , just barely, make it thru the winter. Th oil and grain markets are moving back towards more normal prices and will probably keep doing so.

His big take away is that industrial and trade policy for national security reasons are going to be a long term thing. Trade with China, the Saudis and so on is going to get evaluated on something besides the who has the lowest price next month.

 

[dan/california]

20 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

Considering theyre at least more realistic or better informed than Putler,  a RU Nat coup with more competent leadership would be not good, in some ways. The end result is probably the same (retreat from Ukraine), as they are still working with the same garbage.  However They believe they can stop the 10-ton Boulder Of Inevitability squishing everything with what, to us, look like better wooden wedges. So they'll try,  and fail,  and get squished but the squishing will become way more fanatical, violent and aggressive (which would speed up the very collapse they fear). 

 

 

But the first question about a coup is can they manage a clean takeover? If the transition isn't quick and complete they will be right where Lenin was in late 1917 to early 1918, making peace with his external enemies at any price so they can fight their internal ones. The separate treaty that Lenin signed to get Russia out of WW1 was one of the worst deals ever. The newly formed Soviet Union was able to tear it up months later when the Germans lost the war, but I don't see where that miracle comes from this time.

 

Edit: And if things are bad enough for an RU Nats. coup to work at all the army will likely be a similiar state of collapse to the one Lenin faced. 

Edited August 27, 2022 by dan/california

[dan/california]

10 hours ago, G.I. Joe said:

Good point, although that does remind me that I was forgetting the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979.

The Sino-Vietnamese War is a classic case of a better run autocracy. The Chinese made a bad little gamble on a short victorious war, it spectacularly didn't work. They just quit, went home, offered the Vietnamese a return to the pre war state of affairs, and memory holed the whole thing. This is EXACTLY what Putin should have done about March 15. He has endlessly doubled down on a losing hand instead.

Edited August 27, 2022 by dan/california
dropped a word

[billbindc]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Yesh.

OK, so back to my theory about Darya Dugina assassination.  Either I'm wrong and it wasn't someone trying to send a message to the RU Nats *or* it was and it didn't work.  Regardless of Dugina's assassination I think something is becoming quite clear:

The RU Nats have come to understand that the war is lost unless Putin is ousted

Let that sink in a bit.

What this means is one of the most dangerous elements of the Russian internal political structure has lost faith in Putin to such an extent that it is willing to risk real consequences from the police state.  This means they are either fanatical enough to not care, confident enough their influence protects them, or desperate enough to gamble with their lives.  Or some combination of the three.

If this is true then we are now witnessing the first signs of a serious revolution or, at least, a coup that might gain traction.

Steve

We should be careful of the assumption that there's perfect information available to virtually anyone involved. The RusNats clearly ducked a bit when it happened. Now they've started to stick their heads up again. I'd say that tells us that at minimum they weren't sure at first who it was aimed at but that they've been either reassured or know it wasn't for a message for them. But that's all it tells us.

[Huba]

Regarding pressure on RU Nats:

 

[billbindc]

 

Soldatov sees a long war coming. I'm not sure I agree but he's a legit and careful observer.

[chrisl]

4 hours ago, Grigb said:

And the next stage of the show is upon us - RU fresh 3rd Army Corps is on the move. CIT reports: 

Possible final destination

• According to UKR Mashkovets (and confirmed by my observations) RU Command loves to shift mechanically the direction of attacks in search of the weak spot. And the only direction they have not tried yet is Zaporozhye. 
• Also, they like to chase several goals at once - attack at Zaporozhye gives them option to roll the right flank of UKR Donetsk grouping and quickly achieve political goal of liberation DPR. 
• Finally, the offensive at Donetsk is stalled and further attack (reinforcing failure) with fresh reserves might bring only minor gains but at the cost of wasting the last fresh formation.

Counter points

• Push to Zaporozhye city does not solve any RU problems but add problem of another city assault
• Push to Dnipto threatens hole URK eastern grouping but extremely risky
• Next is to roll right UKR flank for example along Donetsk region border avoiding dealing with Slayvansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration completely. Still risky move.
• What is left is to ram UKR right flank straight through Ugledar to Maryinka through Krasnohorivka to Pervomaiske to secure left flank of L-DPR advance encircling Avdyivka. Much safer and does ease both political problems ("liberation" of DPR and moving UKR arty away from Donetsk)

Let's see what RU Command plans.

Is there any info out yet on the actual strength of the "fresh" 3rd Corps?  RU has been struggling since before day 1 to fill out its units to anything close to the full number of people.  Is this going to be the same thing, but with even less training?  They can send all the equipment to make it look like they're going to start an offensive in Donbas, but if nothing has more than a poorly trained driver and assistant driver, they're just going to get blown up in the parking lots.

[Huba]

9 minutes ago, chrisl said:

Is there any info out yet on the actual strength of the "fresh" 3rd Corps?

These threads provide a bit of info, no specific TO&E though:

 

[Calamine Waffles]

Msta-B claimed to be hit by a tank unit, but I think it's probably from the attached artillery, rather than by a tank.

https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=443804901139390

[Haiduk]

18 minutes ago, chrisl said:

Is there any info out yet on the actual strength of the "fresh" 3rd Corps?  RU has been struggling since before day 1 to fill out its units to anything close to the full number of people.  Is this going to be the same thing, but with even less training?  They can send all the equipment to make it look like they're going to start an offensive in Donbas, but if nothing has more than a poorly trained driver and assistant driver, they're just going to get blown up in the parking lots.

What I know, 3rd Army Corps is forming on the base of "regional volunteer battalions". Also as I read, the Corps enough good equipped with weapon and vehicles (including even newest like BMP-3 and T-90M) but has a big lack of personnel. Also there is a question about training level of this personnel. Many "volunteers" in theese units are men 35...40+ 

Edited August 27, 2022 by Haiduk

[sburke]

2 hours ago, Grigb said:

And Volnovaha direction is safer and politically better. However, DPR is already advancing there. Actually, it stalled there. So, from the point of RU Command view it is not a valuable direction - they love to shift their attacks to previously quiet front in search of a weak spot they can exploit. That means Melitopol.

Well, we will see soon enough.  

with the added bonus for Ukraine that the units in the heaviest fighting can get a breather, refit, resupply etc hopefully.

[Haiduk]

9 minutes ago, Calamine Waffles said:

Msta-B claimed to be hit by a tank unit, but I think it's probably from the attached artillery, rather than by a tank.

https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=443804901139390

Indirect tank fire is usual now. What you need is a spotter, having a LOS, equipped with PDA with Kropyva battlefield info system or at least artillery soft. If the spotter has a drone this will be exellent at all.

Edited August 27, 2022 by Haiduk

[Calamine Waffles]

4 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Indirect tank fire is usual now. What you need is a spotter with PDA with Kropyva battlefield info system or at least artillery soft. If the spotter has a drone this will be exellent at all.

Would the Russians put a Msta-B so close that a tank could engage it even with indirect fire?

Have the Ukrainians also modified the tank FCS for indirect fire?

Edited August 27, 2022 by Calamine Waffles

[sburke]

5 hours ago, The_Capt said:

So what have learned - war is hell, darkest before dawn, keep calm and carry on - kinda weird but all those platitudes kinda ring true, don't they?

A thousand points of HIMARs?

[Haiduk]

6 minutes ago, Calamine Waffles said:

Would the Russians put a Msta-B so close that a tank could engage it even with indirect fire?

Max.range 3OF26 HE tank shell is 12 000 m. Situation can be different, maybe Russians wanted to reach far rear area. In 2015 there was episode, when separs put Grad MLRS almost on "zero line" and shelled the site of UKR 2S7 Pion battery, which thought they are on safe distance. One gun was destroyed, one damaged, several of personnel were killed and wounded. 

Edited August 27, 2022 by Haiduk

[Haiduk]

@sburke

Lt.colonel Dmitriy Golosenko, deputy regimental commander of rear service (supply), 1st GTR of 2nd GMRD "Tamanskaya". Got lost 25th of Feb

His name already appeared in captured document about losses as far as in March, but only now it was confirmed by Russian media

 

[Beleg85]

Ok, this somehow was not posted...I don't know if the sources (two intelligence officers ) are trustable, but perhaps worth to note - reportedly, Russians are considering placing Tactical nukes at Crimea.

Probably controlled leak...but anyway, they fear they may loose peninsula.

 

Edited August 27, 2022 by Beleg85

[Haiduk]

21 minutes ago, Calamine Waffles said:

Have the Ukrainians also modified the tank FCS for indirect fire?

No. Spotter just transmits range/angle or coordinates to crew by radio or via PDA and gunner, using artillery soft just calculates bearing/angle of gun for targeting

This practic existed as far as in Soviet army, but was almost forgotten and also was almost "mission impossible", because tank units didn't have own spotters - tank regiment had SP-howitzer battalion, but spotters of this battalion were enough busy to attach them for maintaining of tank indirect fire. But now, with new techologies and more universalization of training (basic spotting now have to know even squad leaders) this forgotten ability of tanks became actual again.

[sburke]

12 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

@sburke

Lt.colonel Dmitriy Golosenko, deputy regimental commander of rear service (supply), 1st GTR of 2nd GMRD "Tamanskaya". Got lost 25th of Feb

His name already appeared in captured document about losses as far as in March, but only now it was confirmed by Russian media

 

got it.  Had him down as MIA previously

[Grigb]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Interesting.  This is going to change the nature of fighting fairly soon but, like Girkin (ironically), I don't see it producing much more than a pile of Russian dead and wounded.  I also wonder if these volunteer battalions will hold together as well as the PMCs.  I doubt it as the PMCs are heavily populated by ex-soldiers with combat experience in search of better pay.  The volunteer battalions seem to be mostly regular people (perhaps with dated military experience) in search of money.

I think this is a solid assessment.  However, I would say that the counter points you raised aren't likely big concerns for the Russians right now.  They fall into the category of "having to figure out what to do after a breakthrough is a problem we'd love to have".  This is the sort of operations we've seen from Russia since the start of the war.

Another point that should push the Russian leadership into a Zaporozhye offensive is that they desperately need to distract Ukraine from Kherson.  The only realistic way of doing that is launching an offensive somewhere else.  Figuring out what to do with the Ukrainian response is a problem they want to have because it means they might have bought some time for Kherson.

Interesting that they (probably) concluded that a renewed push towards Kharkiv isn't a viable alternative despite the shorter LOCs.  My assumption is there simply isn't enough military infrastructure in the area to support a new Russian style offensive, so it has to be in the south where there is something meaningful to build off of right now instead of in 3 months.

Steve

I believe that if reports are true, it will be like a Wehrmacht Panther Brigade in 1944. Impressive on paper but extremely vulnerable in real fight. 

And this might be the biggest RU gamble so far - if they push it bold enough it might evaporate quickly and that will be severe stress for RU morale. The front seems to be stalled everywhere so they have nothing to distract the public from the disappearance of the Uber Formation. And if they do not push it hard it would be just a waste and they still have nothing to show to the public.

Regarding Kharkiv I believe it is combination of several issues: all the difficulties to advance there (there was bunch of RU Nat complains about it) + probably heavy losses suffered there (my gut feeling because they are unusually shy discussing fighting there) + they cannot take Kharkiv so it is like dead end for them.

So, indeed, South.

[Grigb]

1 hour ago, chrisl said:

Is there any info out yet on the actual strength of the "fresh" 3rd Corps?  RU has been struggling since before day 1 to fill out its units to anything close to the full number of people.  Is this going to be the same thing, but with even less training?  They can send all the equipment to make it look like they're going to start an offensive in Donbas, but if nothing has more than a poorly trained driver and assistant driver, they're just going to get blown up in the parking lots.

AFAIR it has no more than 70% of strength because they cannot find volunteers anymore. So, yes it looks like it will be the same but with less training. 

Edited August 27, 2022 by Grigb

[Huba]

12 minutes ago, Grigb said:

I believe that if reports are true, it will be like a Wehrmacht Panther Brigade in 1944. Impressive on paper but extremely vulnerable in real fight. 

And this might be the biggest RU gamble so far - if they push it bold enough it might evaporate quickly and that will be severe stress for RU morale. The front seems to be stalled everywhere so they have nothing to distract the public from the disappearance of the Uber Formation. And if they do not push it hard it would be just a waste and they still have nothing to show to the public.

Regarding Kharkiv I believe it is combination of several issues: all the difficulties to advance there (there was bunch of RU Nat complains about it) + probably heavy losses suffered there (my gut feeling because they are unusually shy discussing fighting there) + they cannot take Kharkiv so it is like dead end for them.

So, indeed, South.

This is just fantasizing of course, but I wonder if actually letting Russians "breakthrough" around Zaporozhiya, letting them in 30 kilometers or so, and then just crushing unexpectedly elongated LOCs and the advancing units themselves would make sense.I just cannot imagine how RU could expect to achieve anything decisive there.

[Haiduk]

Nova Kakhovka now

Kherson now. Locals write about detonations on the terrtory of correctional facility #90, where Russians established own base.

 

[Grigb]

3 minutes ago, Huba said:

This is just fantasizing of course, but I wonder if actually letting Russians "breakthrough" around Zaporozhiya, letting them in 30 kilometers or so, and then just crushing unexpectedly elongated LOCs and the advancing units themselves would make sense.I just cannot imagine how RU could expect to achieve anything decisive there.

Such military disaster is a high reward but high-risk situation because UKR gov and UKR army will need to survive political fallout for several days. Recent Pisky fallout was not very good, living through another one so soon is not something I would advise. 

But it is my personal opinion, and I am biased toward playing safe. On other hand holding it in place will signal RU that they became weak and cannot achieve breakthrough even with fresh formation. Given the front is stalled everywhere it will be painful enough for RU morale and very uplifting for UKR morale.