How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[FancyCat]

Big props must go to Ukraine for her relentless advocacy for the equipment and weapons needed to defeat Russia, and their intelligence in using what limited Western equipment they get to hurt Russia and illustrate further shipments are well used but if Biden pulls off the complete defeat of Russia in Ukraine thru the slow, seemingly lackluster supply of Ukraine, it will be a masterclass in IR management of nuclear power proxy conflict.

While everyday I wish for F-16s in Ukrainian colors to fly over Ukrainian territory, I will settle for the strategy of providing very little to Ukraine, then more.

 

Edited July 19, 2022 by FancyCat
dang it, I'm late

[Haiduk]

Some UKR counter-battery results

Msta-S with detonation, 7 km NW from Izium

Arty of 28th mech.brigade cought position of Russian 4-barrel battery of towed howitzers in Kherson oblast

 

[akd]

@sburke @Kinophile

Thought maybe he had already been reported, but not finding via search of thread.  Lt. Col. Sergey Mikhailov, motorized rifle battalion commander, unknown unit:

 

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, Beleg85 said:

very nature of close combat in pre-gunpowder era made impossible to turn warrior into automaton, regardless how strict was discipline (the only exception seem to be Macedonian phalanx- but not necessarly its Greek counterpart).

Very true, however agency was also dangerous (still is) as it was how formations failed and collapsed.  It is super interesting to look back at warfare back and then and see it as far more complicated than we assume.  The Roman’s likely wrestled with the balance between agency and formation as much as we do.  For more on pre-civilization warfare Turney-High and Lawrence Keeley have laid down some foundational works.  The punch line was that historically speaking when small-high agency met large formation mass, mass won…eventually.  And then the Romans built what looks like smarter more agile mass, which makes me wonder if they did not inculcate some of the tribal approaches.

I am sure official histories tell how colonial wars were sideshows quickly forgotten but that is not really how military culture works.  We tend to admire those we fight, particularly if they do it well.  The lessons of our opponents tend to leech into the bloodstream.  We definitely saw this one the North American continent with the (re) invention of Light Infantry mirroring indigenous warfare and in most cases fighting along side them.

I personally find tribal based pre-history warfare fascinating, but that is me.

[The_Capt]

51 minutes ago, Hapless said:

I mean, that sounds like every war ever in some fancy word dressing, but I think there's a dynamic between Mission Command and more Control focused methods where they cycle depending on the situation. They both have advantages and disadvantages and operate at different levels and scales with different impacts for different units. So... hybrid command styles?

Frankly if it does take us back to “every war ever” it would be revolutionary.  We were convinced that the digital battlefield would fundamentally change command - and here we are wrestling with the same issues.

I suspect it was, and always will be hybrid in nature (re: command approaches).  The shift may be in intensity.  Phase 1 of this war on the UA side had hallmarks of hybrid warfare and a command structure that appeared almost inverted at times.  Self-synchronizing distributed command essentially inverts command and control from push to pull - again not new but having peer tactical units self organize to the level they did appears as something else.

And now we have highly centralized operational command ISR that can see more than tactical units, and directly effect the battle space as well.  I am not sure if that has led to more Detail/Task Command or not.

Finally, the balance between Manoeuvre and Attrition warfare is definitely changed.  We have seen highly decentralized Mission Command (above) be very effective in Attrition warfare but it is a new type.  Precision weapons provides a hi-resolution attrition that appears to be able to yield similar effects we were looking for with Manoeuvre warfare, manoeuvre via attrition?  It is weird and making me uncomfortable.

There is definitely a shift occurring in the attrition-manoeuvre balance, one need to do the former to do the latter…which was not supposed to happen but evidence is that it must (and this goes back to Gulf War).  Like Threat Based Planning, I suspect that this war will push us to rebalance command, warfare approaches and re-think mass entirely.  At least two principles of war are in trouble, concentration(at least how we thought of it - firepower anyone?) and surprise (at least for one side) - and figuring out what that means will take some time.

[Bearstronaut]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

 Even those 30 somethings are still one step above todlers. 

Gee, thanks

[akd]

Not an officer, I think, but his story contains some interesting information, likely related to the stripping of Northern Fleet units to reconstitute the 200th MRB.  At the time of his death on July 12, Vladimir Moldanov was reportedly one of the remaining 7 men left alive out of his company of 92.  He served on contract in the village of Gadzhiyevo, Murmansk Oblast, which corresponds to the base of the Northern Fleet's 58th Separate Security Company (в/ч 10672). He was sent to Ukraine in May (when the 200th MRB was redeployed):

Seems there are also trying to strip Air Force units for infantry replacements (but they refuse en masse):

 

Edited July 19, 2022 by akd

[JonS]

16 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

[Good stuff]

As they say: the enemy has a vote. Dancing up and down the centralise<--->decentralise spectrum successfully depends, I think, on accurately understanding the enemy. When the bad guys are coherent and organised then you need to centralize in order to mass effects to overwhelm the enemy (see: WWI 1915-1917, Ukraine now). When the bad guys are incoherent and disorganised you can decentralise because mass effects aren't necessary (see: WW1 100days, Ukraine Ph.1)

(Brief because on phone)

Edited July 19, 2022 by JonS

[Beleg85]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

And then the Romans built what looks like smarter more agile mass, which makes me wonder if they did not inculcate some of the tribal approaches.

They did precisely that- Romans did fought in phalanx earlier, and by 4th cent BC they resorted to smaller units quincunx mainly because of battles with local hillybilly tribes in Central Italy like Samnites, Lukanians and other Oscans. Other factor was recruitment system, when warriors from allied polities fought under one banner in new smaller maniples/cohorts. Which is one of many ancient examples btw how constant elements of warfare are always here, and seem to be banal- but they were quite a discovery back then:

1. Battlefield environment shapes military culture and tactics

2. Political/social system is always connected to military one

3. Military knowledge can be comprehend, rationalized, retought and reshaped again (quite an achievemnt back then, when battles were giant hack and slash melees)

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

Very true, however agency was also dangerous (still is) as it was how formations failed and collapsed.  It is super interesting to look back at warfare back and then and see it as far more complicated than we assume.  The Roman’s likely wrestled with the balance between agency and formation as much as we do.  For more on pre-civilization warfare Turney-High and Lawrence Keeley have laid down some foundational works.

Of course, there was very important element of military thought that start to appear in classical antiquity- combined arms, at which especially Hellenistic commanders excelled and seem to be rarely present in earlier pre-state warfare. Good use of light infantry and cavalry were always a massive factor and could bring victory against superior, close-packed mass of heavy formations. Serious studies about their importance only recently started to appear, as our sources often underestimated their role in favour of hoplites/legionaires.

I know Turney-High, the other will check. On Roman (and generally ancient) military culture there is accessible, very interesting book Soldiers and Ghosts by J.Lendon. It basically shows how Romans were successfull because they married virtus (manliness, personal bravery) and disciplina (broadly obedience, but also knowledge of tactics and of technology). This is more or less what we talke about here.

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

I personally find tribal based pre-history warfare fascinating, but that is me.

Definitelly, their whole systems of fighting and waging war was very alien to modern concepts.

No less fascinating is how some pre-gunpowder societies adapted when met with Europeans. It struck me when I started to read on them  how often it was these "savages" now armed with rifles and/or horses that were actually victorious on battlefields in New World(s) over  "modern" heavy formations. Iroqis, Dakotas, Siouxs, Maori, Apachi- all have quite impressive list of victorious engagements when using their own adaptive tactics. They were usually only beaten on strategic level (could not securre logistics- food) or by relentless fortification efforts.

 

Back to the topic- reportedly Russian plane shot down near Kahkovka.

https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1549465609896923137

Edited July 19, 2022 by Beleg85

[Harmon Rabb]

Not going to read too much into this but still an interesting video from Putin's meeting with Erdogan.

[Holien]

10 minutes ago, Harmon Rabb said:

Not going to read too much into this

I am and has made me smile, I know the games played by board level €ick heads and that will have super pissed Putler off.

[Lethaface]

6 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Well it was a matter of time until someone brought this up.  Watching the video now and it kinda sounds like an academic semantics argument up to the 1 hour mark.  I really like the link back to the 19th century and colonial wars but did not hear the most interesting leap.  Auftragstaktik, as a concept as we envision it...no matter where it came from has a very long history in "the way of war of the savages".

If one studies pre-history warfare, indigenous warfare and/or war amongst horse borne tribes from the steppes to the American West, "mission command" was simply an extension of a way of life.  Warrior based culture did not have hierarchical chains of command we see in modern militaries.  For example, in the Comanche culture a war leader was followed only as long as he was winning, often by extended family members.  There was no legal constraints nor punishment for leaving a war party; there were for cowardice in battle, but this was a cultural stigma as opposed to a formal legal mechanism.

In Europe, Central Asia and the Far East as armies got bigger the ability to move and fight larger formations required a whole system of command, control and training - we invented "formation" so that mass human power could be marshalled, sustained and directed. To do this we had to remove human agency from those standing "on the line".  Tales of 19th century officer standing tall as cannon balls flew at their heads is a poignant example of the power of formation and conformity.  This system worked great for phalanx, pikes, muskets and rifles - mission command was relegated to the cavalry as an enabler arm for the most part.  And when cavalry was decisive it had to mass up old school regardless and take the guns to the front.

Then we ran head long into massed firepower and the whole thing came apart.  Mass was just a quick road to "mass death", as was proven repeatedly on the Western Front.  In WW2 we invented armor and mech and suddenly the main thrust of warfare could move, quickly.  So Mission Command, or at least the original idea was designed to build on this new ability to move and allow for initiative and agency in a hybrid modern military form.  I like to think we got the idea from the colonial wars of the 19th century and its philosophical influence on a generation of officers in the late 19th century. 

And then it got political.

My hypothesis is that modern "Mission Command" as a cornerstone of Manoeuvre Warfare a la Cold War was more sales job than actual military doctrine.  The idea is still seen in modern doctrine where Manoeuvre Warfare - empowered by Mission Command - allow friendly forces to exercise initiative [aside: it also plays well as an extension of 'democracy' but isn't] to go along with all that new found mobility.  This combination means much smaller (and affordable) forces can dance around and through much larger ones to create effect.  This whole thing built up into AirLand Battle as an idea; however, remained largely untested.  It did however become a cult as the entire west, following the US, bought into the uni-polar philosophy of Mission Command and Manoeuvre as how we will defeat a larger, dumber and more command constipated opponent.

As I said...where was the proof?  We got hints of it in the Arab-Israeli war, Gulf War and '03 but these were not definitive, particularly the last two as mass airpower appeared to play as much, or more a role than the land doctrines.  Then we had all sorts of COIN/interventions where nothing worked, Mission or Detail Command did about as much as air supremacy in Afghanistan.  The Taliban employed it far better and more than we did but it worked for an insurgency likely because of its root in tribal based warfare to start with.

And now we have this war, and why so many are watching so closely.  Is Mission Command delivering?  Is Manoeuvre War delivering?  What are the trends and where do thing seem to be going?  My guess today is "its complicated".  There are definitely signs the UA is employing a form of this to effect, we saw this in Phase I; however, there are also signs that on the digital battlefield higher may know more than lower due to modern ISR and as such Detail Command may be back on the rise.  Attrition warfare is clearly not going anywhere, so fast cheap and easy wars may have been a mirage all along.

So what?  Well what we do not know about warfare as a result of what we are seeing in Ukraine is growing, not shrinking.  I do not know if Mission Command and Manoeuvre Warfare will survive as concepts - we will definitely hold onto them tightly as we have invested a lot into them.  My sense is that something else is emerging from this war that we can only see peeks, shades and outlines of based on events so far.

Quick reply with some Normandy wines devoured. In other words not sober while writing this but the rest of my holiday 'company ' has gone to bed while I catch up some stuff

For sure many of the lessons we learn have been learned before. Cave dwellers might have came up with great concepts for whatever but unfortunately weren't in the position to turn it into doctrine or whatever written form.

Coming back mission command / auftragstaktik it is a subject I have been interested in since a long time (privately) and have been digging into from another perspective: work.

Most people will be knowledgeable about Taylor(ism). Quite a few people will also know about the differences between 'anglo american' / anglosaksian and the rhinelandic organisation model. In part this has connections to philosophical/ cultural differences between consequantialism and non-condequantialism and other schools of thought. 

Even today there are quite large differences in societies and legal systems when comparing countries like German/NL and UK/US.

Not to say that every individual or organisation in such countries will conform to either model/concept. 

What I do know is that until today there are many organisations who go by either concept in a predominantly fashion. Both on the public (including military) and private level. 

I have worked in organizations utilizing both concepts but have a (big) preference.

Anyway even today many large organizations/militaries adhere to a concept of organising/structure where the how, what and why is dictated from higher up; you have a certain function to play in the whole scheme of things and if stuff doesn't work that means that the proces wasn't followed correctly. 

Another way of organising things is training everyone in various disciplines including cooperation and setting high level goals while trusting the people on operational/tactical level to know how to achieve these goals.

That only works if you have very well trained and motivated people who are committed to work together towards the commin goals (especially trained on cooperation).

Bureaucracy and abundance of detailed 'orders' are detrimental to performance of individual/groups of professionals which know how to do their job. Let alone corruption or nepotism.

This in turn is why kampfgruppe as a concept worked for the (early) wehrmacht while it won't work for the RF.

Imo drones etc doesn't make the battlefield less complex; so higher shouldn't be trying to control the chaos but rather make sure they share all the info to those at the frontline; the lowest capable level

FWIW I thought Mattis was a great secretary of defense for US because he understood very well the job of the military and what goals/directions to give while what was best to leave at the (lowest) capable level. Our government can learn a lot from him imo. If they have the balls to look at the unclean wehrmacht/reichswehr/kaisersheer, they could learn some stuff as well

 

Edited July 19, 2022 by Lethaface
alcohol

[billbindc]

38 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

No less fascinating is how some pre-gunpowder societies adapted when met with Europeans. It struck me when I started to read on them  how often it was these "savages" now armed with rifles and/or horses that were actually victorious on battlefields in New World(s) over  "modern" heavy formations. Iroqis, Dakotas, Siouxs, Maori, Apachi- all have quite impressive list of victorious engagements when using their own adaptive tactics. They were usually only beaten on strategic level (could not securre logistics- food) or by relentless fortification efforts.

 

If you have not read The Comanche Empire by Pekka Hämäläinen, I cannot recommend it enough. 

[Lethaface]

4 hours ago, poesel said:

Now Reuters reports that gas will flow to Germany after downtime (at 40%):

https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/exclusive-russia-seen-restarting-gas-exports-nord-stream-1-schedule-2022-07-19/

I think that must be Schrödingers gas - you only know when you see it.

LoL

[Lethaface]

4 hours ago, Huba said:

If you were to pick one answer, would you say that people in Germany are more concerned/scared by this situation, or annoyed/ outright furious? 

Not German but have Prussian blood so might qualify for an answer

I think people don't really care as long they don't freeze next winter and want to trust their government. 

[Lethaface]

double post 

Edited July 19, 2022 by Lethaface

[akd]

11 minutes ago, billbindc said:

If you have not read The Comanche Empire by Pekka Hämäläinen, I cannot recommend it enough. 

War of a Thousand Deserts by Brian DeLay is also very good (and draws heavily from Hämäläinen's book, IIRC).

[billbindc]

1 minute ago, akd said:

War of a Thousand Deserts by Brian DeLay is also very good (and draws heavily from Hämäläinen's book, IIRC).

Yes. The historical preface to the events of Cormac McCarthy's Blood Meridian. 

[Lethaface]

6 hours ago, Huba said:

Oh please. Like it was about money for Poland. We bought 250 brand new M1s from US  instead. And got 116 used  "for free" - only that many, cause we can't afford to maintain more, they are just too expensive to run. US is still making a killing on that deal. The problem with DE proposal was that it was just a homeopathic amount, and way too late. 

What I was hinting at was that DE has hardly anything to offer regarding heavy land forces equipment, both due to not maintaining any reserves, and not having meaningful production capacity anymore, and can't be a serious partner in the defence business in anything but total peace conditions. 

And as I said, it's not about bashing, it is just that the state of affairs that was bared by the war in UA is not only sad, it is outright scary. To the point that Poland has to review it's security arrangements and give up on it's biggest partner in armor, cause he's just not up to the task. IMO  it calls for a certain amount of outrage on our part. 

While I don't always agree with my fellow countrymen Aragorn, especially politically (or CMRT releases) I think he has a good point. 

How is Poland going to pay for 400 M1 with their turbine engines let alone 500 Himars? 

Personally I have some doubts about many of these things materializing into tangible stuff in the long term.  Sorry but not sorry if I poop on parties, that's our national trait init?

FWIW i hope PL will have 300+ M1A2SEPV3 sooner rather than later and that they will perform in CMBS 2. I don't even care if some EU money will gets utilised for it.

 

[rocketman]

Blood Meridian is really a gut punch of a novel. But a great one.

[Lethaface]

6 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Funny enough, I'm re-reading a sci-fi book from the 1990s where Earth comes into contact with an alien civilization that is inherently adverse (and bad at) warfare, despite fighting a war for thousands of years.  One of the many aspects they struggled to understand about Humans was its hierarchical military command structure.  In their culture it made no sense at all.  When they saw how Humans applied it in warfare they had an ah-ha! moment and determined the lack of parallel and "artificial" command structures was likely partly responsible for their own suboptimal combat results.

It got me thinking how natural this concept is to those of us who study and/or work in/with Western based traditional corporations, law enforcement, military, large government, or similar.  Every person has a place and that place is inherently irrespective of things outside of that particular sphere.  For example, a 60 year old worker with 5 years experience working for a 30 year old with 10 years experience.  Yet outside the work environment that 30 year old might respect and even revere the 60 year old's wisdom and life achievements.  In traditional societies they are all kinda mushed into one concept.

Anyhoo, it's an interesting thing that I hadn't thought much about in a long time.  I very take it for granted.  And with that, my wife is telling me it's time for lunch.  Because I understand the command structure, I'm off for some lunch

Steve

Which sci-fi book is that?

[Lethaface]

3 hours ago, Beleg85 said:

Very nice summarise. However, just to clarify (not nitpicking) from pre-modern perspective not all close order infantry units devoid soldiers of agency; very nature of close combat in pre-gunpowder era made impossible to turn warrior into automaton, regardless how strict was discipline (the only exception seem to be Macedonian phalanx- but not necessarly its Greek counterpart). This is one of the breaktroughts in our understanding of pre-modern close combat that was put forward in lats 30-40 years thanks to works Keegan, V.D. Hanson or Goldsworthy. Btw. we just lately started to "unchant" our understanding of ancient Greek/Roman warfare from "mechanical" and "disciplinarian" Prussian school- it's mindblowing how these guys still influence our understanding of how Ancients foughts. That is, among others, why I always hate when somebody writes about "fighting machines" when describing any military structure before XIX cent.

If we get back to Antiquity, actually first "mission command" idea came with Romans. Their manipules were much more flexible and elastic than phalanxes, and we have plenty of specific instances when even lower commanders (centurions or younger officers) acted on their own bringing victory against more static/dispersed enemies. So there is nothing new under the sun here- it was expicitly stated by Polibios and in several other works.

Concept of soldier as "background to his musket" started to appear late in XVI/XVII cent. after which then developed into classical codified linear drill maybe around 1700+. Only by this time size of  "killing zone" was usually enough for soldiers to stand down in line, concentrate on loading his musket and praying the other one side will broke down first, even despite human debris of his comrades being splashed around. Even M.Foucault-hardly a military historian- had some very interesting concepts that this automatization of presence came together only because change in power structures/military technology during Enlightment. Before that battlefields were still full of "free-roaming" gentlemen with halbards and swords that were rather only roughly formed.

If I remember works on history of Enlightment Military concepts (would need to search for titles) they claimed that at least in British and French Empires lesson from frontier, colonial warfare were collectively forgot every time or deemed unsutaible for european battlefields. Only French-Prussian war and Boer wars changed attitude somehow, when it was simply impossible to keep long and dense firing line as basic formation. But could be wrong here.

Yeah, words marked. Not that they are especially wise, since you clearly are biased and have no idea what the issue is about. Early in war there were apparently behind-door talks when Germany stated it will be able to replace at least part of our tank fleet if we gave our tanks to Ukrainians in reasonable time, but as it came out it was just another example of scholzing. Sorry, but everybody would prefer 100 dusty US marines Abramses in 3 years than one Leo2 every month in a decade. And regardles of your opinion, all NATO higher officers seem to agree frontier state needs sizeable mechanized force if it borders with Russia/Belarus. Independence of Baltic states also hangs on Suwałki gap, so I wouldn't be so arrogant when describing those concerns.

Nice post. Regarding musket times it is interesting as well to look into Dutch 'innovations' fighting the Spanish. But that had little/nothing to do with 'mission command'. Unfortunately I don't have capability to react in more depth now. Sleep is calling. 

[cesmonkey]

2 hours ago, Huba said:

More HIMARS announced. I'll watch the whole thing and bullet point it later:

 

He says the new package "will include more HIMARS" but he doesn't specify how many. Also additional rounds for MLRS and artillery systems.

[Lethaface]

2 hours ago, Haiduk said:

Some UKR counter-battery results

Msta-S with detonation, 7 km NW from Izium

Arty of 28th mech.brigade cought position of Russian 4-barrel battery of towed howitzers in Kherson oblast

 

nice. Keep up the pressure  

[chris talpas]

Some good analysis of the state of the central Asian republics in light of the Ukraine war