How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[BornGinger]

7 hours ago, Vet 0369 said:

A friend of mine, and best friend of one of my wife’s cousins...

What is his relationship to your neigbours?

[Grigb]

16 minutes ago, kraze said:

They were always russian troops with only a very small part of local collaborators, russians decided to "mobilize" locals only now. Easy proof of that is a russian "union of Donbass volunteers" which as far as 2018 already had 40000+ members, all of which are citizens of Russia. Whole Belarus army is about that same number for comparison.

The only home turf advantage of "LDNR troops" they have is that of russians living in houses they "liberated" from locals 8 years ago and now consider their own. But I'm not sure if some buryat or kalmyk stealing someone's apartment thousands of kms away can really be considered as gaining a 'home' mentally even by him. Judging by how Donetsk decayed over 8 years of occupation - they certainly don't really treat it as their home (...or maybe they do and that's why it is like that hurrr hurrr).

Respectfully disagree. These are not some buryats. Some buryats are regular RU forces that ran from Kiev. These are hardcore insurgents. Some buryants with toilets would not push UKR army to the edge of Severodonetsk. Some buryants with toilets would not force UKR army to shout for 1000 guns.

These are not RU regulars, and while their command and support cadre is indeed mix of RU and UKR it makes no practical difference. We are talking about most experienced, cunning, and ruthless men RU who have years of experience of this front.

LDNR is ISIS. RU regulars are like Asad army. They are different.

But the end for all of them will be the same 

[The_Capt]

6 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

ISW's report for June 20th reinforced their statement the day before about the nature of Ukraine's Zaporizhia front switching from defensive to offensive to exploit thinner Russian defenses:

More indications that Ukraine is able to hold the current lines and selectively mass enough forces to achieve a favorable offensive ratio.  At present we know of 3 primary areas of Ukrainian offensive activities:

• directly west of Izyum with the goal of putting pressure on supply lines through that city
• western side of the Zaporizhia front (nearer the Dnepr vs. nearer Donetsk City) with the goal of pushing southward
• Kherson Oblast to the north (Davydiv Brid) and south (just west of Kherson City) with the goal of destroying or retreating Russian forces on the western side of the Dnepr.

Interestingly, we see roughly 3 primary areas of active Russian offensive activities:

• Severodonetsk with the goal of taking that city completely
• northward into Toshkivka with the goal of taking Lysychansk
• westward from the Popasna salient towards Highway T13-02 cut the LOC to Lyschansk

There's some on-off attacks SE from the Izyum bridgehead towards Slovyansk and some small scale activity along the Russian border northeast of Kharkiv.  Other than that, ground attacks along the rest of the front seem to be largely absent.

Steve

The Russian offensive looks more like a single operation aimed at Lyschansk, while the UA c-offensives are separate operations in themselves.

This reinforces the idea that the UA is stressing and testing the RA horizontally by forcing them to shift to react.  This does take pressure off of the Severodonetsk-Lyschansk fight but I think we are all focusing too much on that engagement.  By forcing the RA to pulling forces to-and-fro across broad ranges, this creates offensive pressure on the Russian operational system through its own organic internal friction.

[Grigb]

New Girkin assessment

Quote

According to the situation at the front, offensive battles of the Armed Forces of the LPR continue in the Gorskoye-Zolotoye area. Apparently, our troops managed to completely take the village of Toshkovka and advance to the Gorskoye-Lisichansk highway, taking the garrison of the above-mentioned villages into an operational isolation. At the same time - there is no complete isolation, the enemy can (due to dry weather) both to try to supply their units along numerous field roads, and to withdraw their forces to Lisichansk. The possibility of a counterattack is not excluded. In any case, this section of the front will soon be relegated to the category of "secondary" for the command of both the AFU and the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, since the "battle for the initiative" is clearly expected on other fronts. However, for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation/ LDNR, it is very important to still achieve the liberation of Zolotoye and Gorsky as part of consolidating operational successes after the breakthrough at Popasna (by eliminating the dangerous enemy fortified area on the flank and in the rear of the newly achieved positions). Therefore, the fighting will continue here, as well as on the remnants of the AFU bridgehead south of Severodonetsk.

 

[Beleg85]

Also an update from Tom Cooper -as always heavily centered on Air Force, but interesting snippets on consequences of Russians capturing Tosvkovka and possible RUS moves from there. It seems defenders of Zolotoye may soon face a dilemma if keep the place or retreat.

https://medium.com/@x_TomCooper_x/ukraine-war-20-21-june-2022-de53db94691e

 

[Grigb]

Small quote from civilian analog of Girkin regarding Kaliningrad blockade

Quote

It is also problematic to arrange sea deliveries, in general: in five months the total cargo flow to the region was about 1.2 million tons, and if Lithuania blocked about 40% of this cargo flow, then it is impossible to replace them with three ferries. And, in general, the capabilities of the ports of St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad itself are unlikely to be sufficient for such a sudden replacement.

 

[Grigb]

Found another interesting bit from civilian Girkin (It is infamous in Russia Anatoly Nesmian). While it is not about military I believe some pieces are interesting to get a feel about RU civil life. Tell me if you do not want it.

Quote

Russian mobile operators have started charging for the purchase of SIM cards. MegaFon, Yota and Beeline have set a price for a SIM card in the amount of 50 rubles. The reason is a sharp increase in the cost of SIM cards. This is due to the termination of purchases from Western manufacturers and the transition to Chinese analogues.

50 rubles is not that much money, let's be honest, but the fact that fraternal China is pulling three skins [setting unhuman price] is interesting, it is taking advantage of a hopeless (and it is really hopeless) situation.

And if this is the case, then the news that the shipment of Russian oil to China has increased by 50 percent forces us to ask the question: what is the actual price? The situation with oil exports is also almost hopeless, we have already entered (well, almost entered) the Saddam Hussein scenario, when he was forced to dump oil to anyone, to bypasse sanctions at any price.

 

Edited June 21, 2022 by Grigb

[Huba]

Not a day too soon

 

[akd]

Ossetian battalion “Alania” has been reinforced with a company of T-62M / T-62MVs:

 

[Letter from Prague]

On 6/19/2022 at 6:43 PM, dan/california said:

At least the attitude hasn't extended to the current government. Switching sides is hard for people, just seems to be a fact of life, especially when your side and your career re intertwined. I would love for you to post the link, google translate has gotten rather good. Although I admit I haven't tried it on Czech.

Here it is:

https://www.palba.cz/viewtopic.php?t=5971

https://www.palba.cz/viewtopic.php?t=5972

https://www.palba.cz/viewtopic.php?t=5974

It is called "podpraporshchik Argonantus in war that wasn't" and it's written by two guys - Argonantus who was conscript tank commander serving sometime in 1980 (made commander because he was conscripted after finishing college) and Pátrač or Neferit - logistics and I think formerly recon career officer of Czechoslovak People's Army.

It might be sometimes confusingly written because there's sections that are written as "this is how it was" but sometimes this turns into a dialogue where one of them disagrees or describes different experience. I skimmed how it looks on google translate and it seems somewhat readable, but if you need a paragraph explained, let me know. (One thing I noticed is Google calls podpraporcik either lieutenant or lt. col., but of course he was neither).

At least there's cute hand-drawn pictures of tank tactics.

Hope it helps!

[Beleg85]

30 minutes ago, Huba said:

Not a day too soon

Germany reportedly gave 7, and Netherlands I think 5. So Ukraine may have 12 pieces now.

Let's hope we will soon see effects.

[Grigb]

Interesting small tactical snippet. 

Do you remember talks to supply 105-mm L118 howitzers to Ukraine? They deemed as not very useful comparing to 155mm.

LDNR guys, being much more flexible than RU army are discussing now what to do on static fronts. According to them UKR conducting small cross border raids there and it annoys hell out of RU. RU army being RU army doing the only thing they know how to do - suck. So, volunteers are planning to start there (or at least to try) Toyota war but with drones.

Interesting bit though is they say even 120mm mortar is not enough. It is good but it is better carry D-30around despite all the problems. Thats' because currently it is all about arty fire and arty now is being done at max possible range due to all the counter-battery fire. Coming with mortar to arty fight is not wise. Both side will try to catch other guy's tube with drones. There for mortar armed Toyotas will not survive.  

And here comes 105mm - compact and light with comparable range. I hope UKR are getting 105 and will integrate them into "Toyota" units.

We are entering a period of drone-artillery wars.  

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, Grigb said:

Found another interesting bit from civilian Girkin (It is infamous in Russia Anatoly Nesmian).

War consists of many facets and a lack of understanding in any single major one (military, economy, society, politics) is potential for getting the military side of things wrong.  So yes, discussions about non military aspects of this war are definitely welcome if they are relevant to figuring out how the war is going.  Tidbits from within Russia that aren't in the general media are particularly welcome!

1 hour ago, Grigb said:

While it is not about military I believe some pieces are interesting to get a feel about RU civil life. Tell me if you do not want it.

Of course, this doesn't surprise many of us here.  China is more Capitalist than Communist these days. 

Back in 2014 when Putin first told the world that it was fine without the West because it had China similar things happened.  There were big announcements about a huge oil deal that was going to allow Russia to cut off the West and make them sorry for standing up to Russia.  And what happened?  From what I remember the Chinese said "you pay for the super expensive pipeline through the mountains and we'll buy your oil at a steep discount."  Energy analysts at the time even went so far as to claim that Russia was LOSING money on this deal when true costs were figured in.

Similarly, Putin touted a new telecom deal with Chinese companies.  I don't remember the details, but we had a pro-Russian Westerner poster here who had some inside connection to it and was saying how it was an example of Russia's greatness and the new competition the West could expect in the future.  But telecom experts pointed out it was "vaporware" equivalent and likely would never happen or at least not the way specified.  I seem to remember a year or so later reading that the deal died.

In any case, this is why I didn't get my "knickers in a twist" when people started talking about deals between Russia and China.  Russia for sure will be better off than without new deals with China, but it's like putting a band-aid on a gut wound.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

The Russian offensive looks more like a single operation aimed at Lyschansk, while the UA c-offensives are separate operations in themselves.

I thought about combining them, but I do think they are separate.  The ultimate goal might be to take the rest of Luhansk, but the two pushes seem to be fairly independent of each other and I'm guessing Russia will continue one of them if the other fails.  They are in desperate need of a "victory" of some sort.

Steve

[The_Capt]

2 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I thought about combining them, but I do think they are separate.  The ultimate goal might be to take the rest of Luhansk, but the two pushes seem to be fairly independent of each other and I'm guessing Russia will continue one of them if the other fails.  They are in desperate need of a "victory" of some sort.

Steve

Given the Russian C2 goat-rodeo so far, you may be correct.  They are desperate for a win, but are leaving themselves to be pulled all over the map by c-moves - which suggests that they do not have enough forces to defend what they have taken and wage an major offensive simultaneously.  They are trying to cover their nude shame with a tea towel and it ain't working.

[Huba]

Germany has published an official list of materiel supplied to Ukraine:

https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/themen/krieg-in-der-ukraine/lieferungen-ukraine-2054514

[Battlefront.com]

6 hours ago, Grigb said:

That's not true. Currently there is secret directive to block fresh RU recruits from entering LDNR forces. RU more or less Hight HQs. Tactical commanders and support are LDNRs or "old" RU who fought here previously and have connections.

I completely believe this to be true.

Think about it logically.  In the past 8 years the Russian military wasn't suffering any casualties and was under no stress.  Funneling motivated Russians into DLPR forces was overall beneficial to Russia's war effort.  Things are VERY different now.  Russia's forces have been nearly bled to death and there's no mobilization coming to reverse it.  Finding recruits for the Russian Armed Forces is already difficult and inadequate, and with every battlefield loss it's getting worse.

Why would Russia want motivated Russians going to DLPR forces instead of its own?  That makes no sense in any context, but especially not in Russia's self centered culture of "Russia first".

The only Russian citizens I can see gong to DLPR with Russia's blessing are convicted criminals that are too problematic for Russian forces.  I presume that Russia has broadened it's furlough program in the past few months for criminals looking to get out of prison in exchange for fighting in Ukraine.

As for Grigb's points about the LPR guys fighting comparatively harder than any of the others, this is pretty evident from battlefield results.  It makes sense to me that the higher levels are Russians and the lower levels of locals, especially given the well documented mass conscription of males who have heartbeats.

Steve

[Artkin]

105s might be light and fast, but theyre much closer to the front line, and much closer (in seconds) to enemy counter battery fire. 

 

Close range artillery could be done with a new, specialized department of the artillery battalion with modernized toys. But in their current configuration I see them as easy kills

[Offshoot]

14 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Do you remember talks to supply 105-mm L118 howitzers to Ukraine?

 

The New Zealand Defence Force is providing training for the L119 now (https://mil.in.ua/en/news/ukraine-will-receive-105-mm-l119-howitzers/).

If I recall correctly, the guns themselves were coming from the US?

[Battlefront.com]

46 minutes ago, akd said:

Ossetian battalion “Alania” has been reinforced with a company of T-62M / T-62MVs:

 

I had a quick look at the video and I see at least 5 individual tanks, maybe a 6th.  The video shows most of them twice.  This is about 2 platoons, so either that's all they have or there's another platoon somewhere else.

Steve

[RockinHarry]

39 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Germany reportedly gave 7, and Netherlands I think 5. So Ukraine may have 12 pieces now.

Let's hope we will soon see effects.

Finally! Maybe Putlers latest cuts on gas deliveries helped speed up on it. I´d expect a complete gas cut off more sooner than later now. So hopefully Scholz now gets the balls to send off Leo 1 and Marders as well. High time. Not that 12x PzH 2000 make that big of a difference (at 1 to >10 Arty inferiority), but it´s a start. Would be nice seeing them paired with some Gepards as Russia likely will make them high priority targets for missile or air attacks (if finding them). Still wonder where all the german Roland vehicles went after decomissioning.

 

 

[Huba]

There's some more news regarding situation on the Black Sea.

It seems that Snake Island was indeed hit, on top of the drilling rigs:

Also, one of the platforms hit yesterday is still burning:

 

Edited June 21, 2022 by Huba

[Haiduk]

9 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I had a quick look at the video and I see at least 5 individual tanks, maybe a 6th.  The video shows most of them twice.  This is about 2 platoons, so either that's all they have or there's another platoon somewhere else.

Steve

Russians now are trying to compensate a lack of infantry by esteblishing of "volunteer battalions" in own territorial units. I read about at least four theese battalions of Tatarstan Republic, Bashkiria Repuplic, Northern Osetia Republic and Tuva republic. Probably local authorities and enlistment soffices of other republics and oblasts also has a duty to form such volunteer units. In all cases media pointed the number of personnel in theese battalions - 430 men, looks like this is standart TO&E for them. 

In Russian social media recently was issued a scheme of how Russia takes manpower without mobilization. There was a post "how you can participate in special military operation", where offered 5 ways:

1. Official contract with army in enlistment office.

2. To enlist in volunteer units of "Donbas Volunteers Union"

3. To enlist in volunteer cossack unit

4. To enlist in DPR/LPR units

5. Contract with PMC

So, looks like now we have 6th way - volunteer units, established by local authorities 

 

[Grigb]

26 minutes ago, Artkin said:

105s might be light and fast, but theyre much closer to the front line, and much closer (in seconds) to enemy counter battery fire. 

Yes, but I meant that for 105 there is a job as well. Because the alternative is 120mm mortar which is even closer. Previously due to RU tactics I believed that 120mm is a must for infantry. But now RU said that 120mm mortar range is the issue. The RU guys were discussing carrying D-30 with the range like 15 km. 

 

 

 

[Taranis]

A video with Steve Zaloga about Soviet and post soviet defense industry

↑ Short video about potential and limitation of T-62 (weak armour, reliability issues etc)

Edited June 21, 2022 by Taranis