How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Huba]

@Haiduk @kraze any news on this? I know it's Arestovych, but OTOH it's hard to believe he just plainly invented the whole thing.

 

[Centurian52]

On 5/31/2022 at 5:35 AM, kraze said:

This war is a proof that quantity doesn't have "quality of its own". They even outnumbered us in hardware, still do. And they constantly cut down on their goals.

I'm not so sure. Honestly looking back at the numbers at the start of the war, between the regular army, territorial defense units, and other forces contributing to Ukraine's ground strength, Ukraine had over 200,000 fighters to the 190,000 Russian troops that massed for the initial invasion. So I'm not so sure that Russia ever had a numerical advantage. Their numerical hardware edge was never that great to begin with (in terms of active forces, obviously some of the higher estimates of their reserve and stored equipment looked pretty intimidating) with ~3,000 active tanks to Ukraine's ~2,000 active tanks at the start of the war (albeit Ukraine had very few in reserve or storage). And when you consider that Russia couldn't have massed all of their active tanks at once for the invasion they may actually have been at a slight numerical hardware disadvantage. If at the start of the war you thought that all Ukrainian tanks were T64BVs and all Russian tanks were T72B3s then you could be forgiven for thinking that the Russians had a huge qualitative hardware edge. But of course the reality is that a lot of the Ukrainian T64BVs were T64BV model 2017s. And a lot of the Russian tanks were older T72Bs, T80BVs, and T80Us. So overall Russia may have only had a slight qualitative hardware edge. About the only area where the Russians had a clear edge was in the air, which is important but has never been decisive by itself.

Honestly, if we hadn't been so enamored by the myth of Russian military might, and just looked at the actual numbers on the ground and applied our pre-war rules of thumb (and add in the fact that the Russians were attacking at literally the worst possible time of year), we really should have predicted that the Russian advance would bog down. Perhaps it wasn't unreasonable to predict (assuming that both sides fully mobilized to an equal degree, and that the west didn't send weapons to Ukraine, and that Russian wouldn't be heavily sanctioned) that Russia would eventually win. But it should have been obvious from the start that their initial invasion forces wouldn't be up to the task. Honestly I had guessed that the Russians would have a hard time of it early on, but then I kept revising up the Russian capabilities because I kept assuming that they knew what they were doing. "They wouldn't launch an invasion if they don't know it will succeed" I kept telling myself. "Their generals must know something I don't" I kept telling myself. As we started seeing an early thaw in mid February I started telling my family "historically, this is a bad time of year to invade", and "mud can really bog down an advance". But then I started telling myself "The Russians aren't stupid, they must be aware of the impact of mud, it must not be as important as I thought" and "Bagration was a huge success despite the marshy terrain, mud must be less important than I'd assumed". When I saw the estimate of 190,000 troops on the Ukrainian border I thought "is that all? To invade such a large country?". But then I thought "it must be enough, they aren't stupid after all". But no, they were just inept. The whole "no one could have predicted this" refrain is total BS. All the evidence was there and clear as day. We should have given Russia less credit, and Ukraine more credit, from the very beginning. That is on us. There is no excuse. We let the myth of Russian strength distract us from the actual numbers and conditions.

My key takeaway from this war is this: When predicting the course of a war, do not let the perception of the aggressor's strength or competence make you second guess the actual numbers on the ground and historically tested rules of thumb. Yes, in training and wargames you should assume that your enemy is competent. But, when it comes to the real world, remember that just because it's a stupid idea doesn't mean they won't do it. And just because they are doing it doesn't mean that it isn't a stupid idea.

[kraze]

5 minutes ago, Huba said:

@Haiduk @kraze any news on this? I know it's Arestovych, but OTOH it's hard to believe he just plainly invented the whole thing.

 

 

Only official statements and confirmations. I wouldn't trust Arestovich, no matter how much I want anything he posts to be true, until confirmed (or better - double confirmed).

In fact I find the guy problematic in that he posts something, it gets hyped, then it turns out to be overstated and people start writing "see - Ukrainians lie".

[kraze]

15 minutes ago, Centurian52 said:

I'm not so sure. Honestly looking back at the numbers at the start of the war, between the regular army, territorial defense units, and other forces contributing to Ukraine's ground strength, Ukraine had over 200,000 fighters to the 190,000 Russian troops that massed for the initial invasion. So I'm not so sure that Russia ever had a numerical advantage. Their numerical hardware edge was never that great to begin with (in terms of active forces, obviously some of the higher estimates of their reserve and stored equipment looked pretty intimidating) with ~3,000 active tanks to Ukraine's ~2,000 active tanks at the start of the war (albeit Ukraine had very few in reserve or storage). And when you consider that Russia couldn't have massed all of their active tanks at once for the invasion they may actually have been at a slight numerical hardware disadvantage. If at the start of the war you thought that all Ukrainian tanks were T64BVs and all Russian tanks were T72B3s then you could be forgiven for thinking that the Russians had a huge qualitative hardware edge. But of course the reality is that a lot of the Ukrainian T64BVs were T64BV model 2017s. And a lot of the Russian tanks were older T72Bs, T80BVs, and T80Us. So overall Russia may have only had a slight qualitative hardware edge. About the only area where the Russians had a clear edge was in the air, which is important but has never been decisive by itself.

Honestly, if we hadn't been so enamored by the myth of Russian military might, and just looked at the actual numbers on the ground and applied our pre-war rules of thumb (and add in the fact that the Russians were attacking at literally the worst possible time of year), we really should have predicted that the Russian advance would bog down. Perhaps it wasn't unreasonable to predict (assuming that both sides fully mobilized to an equal degree, and that the west didn't send weapons to Ukraine, and that Russian wouldn't be heavily sanctioned) that Russia would eventually win. But it should have been obvious from the start that their initial invasion forces wouldn't be up to the task. Honestly I had guessed that the Russians would have a hard time of it early on, but then I kept revising up the Russian capabilities because I kept assuming that they knew what they were doing. "They wouldn't launch an invasion if they don't know it will succeed" I kept telling myself. "Their generals must know something I don't" I kept telling myself. As we started seeing an early thaw in mid February I started telling my family "historically, this is a bad time of year to invade", and "mud can really bog down an advance". But then I started telling myself "The Russians aren't stupid, they must be aware of the impact of mud, it must not be as important as I thought" and "Bagration was a huge success despite the marshy terrain, mud must be less important than I'd assumed". When I saw the estimate of 190,000 troops on the Ukrainian border I thought "is that all? To invade such a large country?". But then I thought "it must be enough, they aren't stupid after all". But no, they were just inept. The whole "no one could have predicted this" refrain is total BS. All the evidence was there and clear as day. We should have given Russia less credit, and Ukraine more credit, from the very beginning. That is on us. There is no excuse. We let the myth of Russian strength distract us from the actual numbers and conditions.

My key takeaway from this war is this: When predicting the course of a war, do not let the perception of the aggressor's strength or competence make you second guess the actual numbers on the ground and historically tested rules of thumb. Yes, in training and wargames you should assume that your enemy is competent. But, when it comes to the real world, remember that just because it's a stupid idea doesn't mean they won't do it. And just because they are doing it doesn't mean that it isn't a stupid idea.

it's 190000 attacking force on the border. We had 200000 everywhere, so about half to cover the actual border with the invaders. Same goes for tanks. We can't just pull every tank from everywhere so about half of that 2000 estimate were able to oppose russians in the best case. Especially with the russian enclave in Transnistria, also Belarus and... Hungary.

So yes if talking pure numbers - they had the numerical advantage. On the first day.

Edited June 2, 2022 by kraze

[Battlefront.com]

Not sure I buy this one:

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/putin-thinks-he-s-winning-ukraine-war-russian-political-analyst/ar-AAXZMkm?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=8274db3e5cb14eb883077a83f61d2ac4

Argument from a professional Putin watcher who thinks Putin believes he is winning the war.  I think it's entirely possible that Putin is mislead enough by toadies that he may not realize the extent he's losing, but I don't buy her arguments that Putin is loving the current conditions.  I also don't buy that taking territory wasn't a primary goal for him in this war.  Er, so basically I don't buy much of anything in the OpEd

Steve

[kraze]

3 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Not sure I buy this one:

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/putin-thinks-he-s-winning-ukraine-war-russian-political-analyst/ar-AAXZMkm?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=8274db3e5cb14eb883077a83f61d2ac4

Argument from a professional Putin watcher who thinks Putin believes he is winning the war.  I think it's entirely possible that Putin is mislead enough by toadies that he may not realize the extent he's losing, but I don't buy her arguments that Putin is loving the current conditions.  I also don't buy that taking territory wasn't a primary goal for him in this war.  Er, so basically I don't buy much of anything in the OpEd

Steve

There was a televised meeting between Putin and Lukashenko from some years back where Lukashenko jokingly asked Putin what would be the best way for Belarus to integrate with Russia. And Putin replied "you can simply integrate your oblasts, one by one".

[Kinophile]

1 hour ago, BlackMoria said:

Aahhh..... Those wonder weapons they have faith in?  Like their oversold, overestimated vaulted military.  Someone needs a coffee enema to clear the toxins poisoning their brain.   Maybe, just maybe .... I don't know.... perhaps consider the possibility that your wonder weapons will perform as well as your army and equipment is performing in Ukraine.  Just saying...

Well if the failure rate of their PGMs is anything to go by (and probably not much ref ICBMs, which is very mature tech) their kinzhals et al would hurt but not kill, strategically. Plus I believe the US has stated its developing/ed a successful hypersonic defence. We'll see...

Edited June 2, 2022 by Kinophile

[Huba]

1 hour ago, JonS said:

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/02/russia-and-the-west-compete-to-secure-safe-passage-for-ukraines-grain?CMP=Share_AndroidApp_Other

Very informative article, thanks! 

So according to it, the main plan in the works now is being facilitated by Turkey, and assumes a kind of cooperation between Russia and Ukraine. Ukrainians would agree to de-mine Odessa, while Russians would p**s off of the coast and leave the grain convoys alone. UA wants some security guarantees regarding Russian warships not abusing the situation, but OTOH with the arrival of antiship missiles in numbers this shouldn't be a problem. Russians want sanctions on the fertilizer exports lifted (TBH I'm not sure there are any, just that nobody in UE want's to buy any from them), which sounds reasonable.

What is not reasonable is Russian request to inspect if the ships are not smuggling weapons. It doesn't make sense as all the weapons are arriving by rail from Poland, this sounds just like RU wants recognition of it's non-existing right to interfere with UA trade. I doubt UA would agree to this.

What is also a question mark is the status of Snake Island in lieu of grain convoys passing it. With arrival of MLRS I'm sure this place will see a renewal of hostilities.

In general though, it is quite comforting that real diplomacy is taking place regarding the re-opening of UA grain trade, it really is in everybody's interest to do so.

[Battlefront.com]

Another example, talked about a little here and there, of the major advantage Ukraine had thanks to US intel and leadership... Russian cyber attacks and propaganda campaigns were also anticipated well ahead of time.  New interview confirms US Cyber Command engaged in proactive defensive and offensive activities to thwart Russian activities:

https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/3508639-cyber-command-chief-confirms-us-took-part-in-offensive-cyber-operations/

Steve

[billbindc]

35 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Not sure I buy this one:

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/putin-thinks-he-s-winning-ukraine-war-russian-political-analyst/ar-AAXZMkm?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=8274db3e5cb14eb883077a83f61d2ac4

Argument from a professional Putin watcher who thinks Putin believes he is winning the war.  I think it's entirely possible that Putin is mislead enough by toadies that he may not realize the extent he's losing, but I don't buy her arguments that Putin is loving the current conditions.  I also don't buy that taking territory wasn't a primary goal for him in this war.  Er, so basically I don't buy much of anything in the OpEd

Steve

This quote is just... 

She wrote that the assumption Putin knows he's losing "stems from the mistaken idea that Russia's main goal is to seize control of large parts of Ukraine—and therefore, when the Russian military performs badly, fails to advance, or even retreats, that this amounts to failure."

At the bare minimum, Putin's plan involved decapitating the Kyiv government at the start of the war in the expectation that organized national resistance would collapse. IR people seem to be addicted to clowning themselves regarding this war.

 

[Huba]

Wait, there's more:

However, Stanovaya said that Russia's main goal in Ukraine isn't about seizing territory but is aimed at preventing Ukraine from co-operating with the NATO military alliance and making the country accept Russian influence in the form of "Russification."

If that was Putin's main goal, the war is going far worse than if he just wanted some land. This article is just BS in my opinion.

[billbindc]

16 minutes ago, Huba said:

Very informative article, thanks! 

So according to it, the main plan in the works now is being facilitated by Turkey, and assumes a kind of cooperation between Russia and Ukraine. Ukrainians would agree to de-mine Odessa, while Russians would p**s off of the coast and leave the grain convoys alone. UA wants some security guarantees regarding Russian warships not abusing the situation, but OTOH with the arrival of antiship missiles in numbers this shouldn't be a problem. Russians want sanctions on the fertilizer exports lifted (TBH I'm not sure there are any, just that nobody in UE want's to buy any from them), which sounds reasonable.

What is not reasonable is Russian request to inspect if the ships are not smuggling weapons. It doesn't make sense as all the weapons are arriving by rail from Poland, this sounds just like RU wants recognition of it's non-existing right to interfere with UA trade. I doubt UA would agree to this.

What is also a question mark is the status of Snake Island in lieu of grain convoys passing it. With arrival of MLRS I'm sure this place will see a renewal of hostilities.

In general though, it is quite comforting that real diplomacy is taking place regarding the re-opening of UA grain trade, it really is in everybody's interest to do so.

I am very doubtful this comes to fruition. Russia never sticks to its agreements so Ukraine (and Turkey) are going to require stringent terms it won't want to make. Russia also has little global leverage at the moment. It's best lever after fossil fuels is the ability to squeeze global food stocks to create painful inflation in the coalition against it. The likeliest motivation for Putin to allow these talks to continue fruitlessly to provide a better pretext for the blockade. Russia will tell India, Mexico and others that would be happy to let their grain through but the warmongers in Brussels and Moscow won't allow it.

As always, it's all tactics all the time.

 

[Huba]

7 minutes ago, billbindc said:

I am very doubtful this comes to fruition. Russia never sticks to its agreements so Ukraine (and Turkey) are going to require stringent terms it won't want to make. Russia also has little global leverage at the moment. It's best lever after fossil fuels is the ability to squeeze global food stocks to create painful inflation in the coalition against it. The likeliest motivation for Putin to allow these talks to continue fruitlessly to provide a better pretext for the blockade. Russia will tell India, Mexico and others that would be happy to let their grain through but the warmongers in Brussels and Moscow won't allow it.

As always, it's all tactics all the time.

 

The alternative scenario proposed by countries like UK, Lithuania and Poland assumes no cooperation from Russia, and just an international naval force created by "coalition of the willing" countries, that would escort grain convoys without asking for permission. There's some groundwork being laid  for it, including Polish president's unexpected visit in Cairo few days ago.

This would be a major military operation, and again would require a green light from Turkey. I really don't think though that BSF would contest such undertaking, but of course the risk is there.

Edited June 2, 2022 by Huba

[BlackMoria]

13 minutes ago, Huba said:

Wait, there's more:

However, Stanovaya said that Russia's main goal in Ukraine isn't about seizing territory but is aimed at preventing Ukraine from co-operating with the NATO military alliance and making the country accept Russian influence in the form of "Russification."

If that was Putin's main goal, the war is going far worse than if he just wanted some land. This article is just BS in my opinion.

If that was the intent..... Epic Fail.  Period.

[billbindc]

4 minutes ago, Huba said:

The alternative scenario proposed by countries like UK, Lithuania and Poland assumes no cooperation from Russia, and just an international naval force created by "coalition of the willing" countries, that would escort grain convoys without asking for permission. There's some groundwork being laid  for it, including Polish president's unexpected visit in Cairo few days ago.

This would be a major military operation, and again would require a green light from Turkey. I really don't think though that BSF would contest such undertaking, but of course the risk is there.

That is very unlikely to happen short of Russia using a tactical nuke or a large chemical weapons attack. 

[danfrodo]

27 minutes ago, Huba said:

Wait, there's more:

However, Stanovaya said that Russia's main goal in Ukraine isn't about seizing territory but is aimed at preventing Ukraine from co-operating with the NATO military alliance and making the country accept Russian influence in the form of "Russification."

If that was Putin's main goal, the war is going far worse than if he just wanted some land. This article is just BS in my opinion.

Interesting.  A theory that actually fits none of the known facts of the last 3 months.  Genius analysis!

[akd]

@sburke @Kinophile

Major Vyacheslav Kazakov, unit unknown:

 

[cyrano01]

1 hour ago, Centurian52 said:

My key takeaway from this war is this: When predicting the course of a war, do not let the perception of the aggressor's strength or competence make you second guess the actual numbers on the ground and historically tested rules of thumb. Yes, in training and wargames you should assume that your enemy is competent. But, when it comes to the real world, remember that just because it's a stupid idea doesn't mean they won't do it. And just because they are doing it doesn't mean that it isn't a stupid idea.

I can see where you're coming from although it pays to make sure you are not the Allied high command in France 1940...

[Calamine Waffles]

The problem is that most of the OPEC countries do not have any crash surplus capacity. It will take years for them to bring traditional oil wells online, whereas the US can do it within a few months using shale oil.

[akd]

Not sure if this is saying he was from Khabarovsk or served in Khabarovsk, but if the latter then some element of the 64th MRB probably ended up all the way over on the Kherson front at Davydiv Brid:

 

[Huba]

So more sabre-rattling regarding MLRS. "Strike deadly" was something they tried since day 1 and failed miserably. TBH I'm sure that at least some degree of cross-border counter-battery fire will happen at some point, just not an overwhelming amount at the beginning. In the long term though, situation when Russians shell UA with impunity from within it's own territory is not tolerable. I'm to lazy to look up particular tweets, but already US started to be a bit ambiguous regarding the whole "not striking Russian territory".

 

Edited June 2, 2022 by Huba

[keas66]

2 minutes ago, Huba said:

So more sabre-rattling regarding MLRS. "Strike deadly" was something they tried since day 1 and failed miserably. TBH I'm sure that at least some degree of cross-border counter-battery fire will happen at some point, just not an overwhelming amount at the beginning. In the long term though, situation when Russians shell UA with impunity from within it's own territory is not tolerable. I'm to lazy to look up particular tweets, but already US started to be a bit ambiguous regarding the whole "not striking Russian territory".

 

Boy - he is looking a little drained  !

[Battlefront.com]

And yet again, a Chicken Little OpEd piece.  The author, Professor Andrew Latham, isn't widely quoted in the media/journals, but his voice does get heard.  I feel it's appropriate to show why it is I'm so quick to jump on the Chicken Little guys we keep hearing from.

First, I read the OpEd and rejected its conclusions simply because I found the argumentation highly flawed.  Then I decided to see what this guy was saying pre-war.  Not at all surprisingly, he was in "Russia Is Mighty" camp saying that we in the West should throw in the towel before even a shot is fired.  He was also one that early in the war, when it was clear things were going poorly for Russia, that the West needs to be worried that arming/aiding Ukraine will lead to a nuclear war.

This is a sort of consistent profile I've seen amongst "experts" who don't want to admit they totally blew it.

As for the Chicken Little OpEd piece, Latham communicates to me that he doesn't understand the history of warfare or where this particular war is at.  Specifically, he outlines three (and only three) possibilities for how this war might end.  He is correct on the first, maybe correct on the second, and wrong on the third.  He also has left out other possibilities that don't fit neatly into the three positions he stakes out, yet would have significant impact on his ultimate conclusion should any of them happen.  So here goes me picking them apart...

Quote

The first unrealistic endgame is the reduction of Ukraine to a vassal state of the Russian empire...

While perhaps the initial objective of Russia’s “special military operation,” this outcome is now obviously an impossibility. Russia did not have the ability to impose this vision in February, and it is decidedly less able to impose it 100 days later. Indeed, even the Russians themselves have conceded as much. Their rhetoric and military operations suggest that even they believe such an outcome to be beyond the realm of the possible.

This one, obviously, is agreeable to me   This is as close to fact as one can get.  Even if Ukraine completely collapsed right now, Russia lacks the ability to impose the sort of conditions on Ukraine it was originally after.  Therefore, it is reasonable to consider this one "certain".

Quote

The second impossible scenario is the total defeat of the Russian military and the restoration of Ukraine to its pre-2014 borders...

While advocated by many within and beyond Ukraine, this outcome is simply impossible. Whatever the shortcomings displayed by Russian forces in the opening phase of the war – when they were first stopped at the gates of Kyiv and then driven from the north of the country altogether – recent battlefield developments suggest that they have found their footing and are not going to be pushed out of the territories taken in 2014.

I would say his prognostication here is probably correct.  Not certain, but definitely not likely as it is unlikely to happen.  In fact, I've been saying since the war started that Donbas and Crimea should be worked on after the fighting stops unless Russia collapses (see next point).  Half points for this one

Quote

Indeed, there is no reason to believe that they will even be displaced from much of the territory they have seized along the coast of the Sea of Azov...

The third and final impossible scenario is a limited Ukrainian victory that would reverse all or most of the Russian gains since Feb. 24, 2022. In this scenario, while the Donbas and Crimea remain in Russian hands, all the territory captured by Russia since its recent re-invasion would be liberated by Ukrainian forces and restored to Ukrainian control.

Big thumbs down on this one.  As you guys are well aware, I've laid out (in my view) a strong case that Russia's ability to defend the territory it currently has is shaky already.  The counter attacks in Kharkiv and Kherson are just the start.  While it is true Ukraine's forces are tired and strained, their morale is intact and new units with new weapons are available for the summer offensive season.  Russia, on the other hand, has nothing in reserve and is in danger of losing waves of contract soldiers when their terms expire. 

My understanding of both history and warfare informs me that claiming certainty that Ukraine can't take back the territory lost in 2022 is nonsense.  Even if I turn out to be wrong, there is no reason to conclude today that it's impossible.  And that undermines his entire Sky Is Falling premise:

Quote

While once viewed as a realistic outcome, by now it should be obvious that this is impossible.

Ah, no.  What is really obvious is that the guy doesn't understand military history and the economics of warfare.

In addition to the three above, there is the case where both sides are too weak to continue and Russia has to accept concessions in order to end the war.  There's also my favored scenario, which is regime collapse followed by idiocy that loses Russia the war outright.  Another is that economic collapse causes so much internal discontent that Russia has to cede some of its victories in order to not experience regime collapse.  Etc.

So, with his 1.5 out of 3 points proven and 3-4 more totally ignored, he comes up with this final conclusion:

Quote

Similarly, such an outcome will not satisfy the maximalist ambitions of those in Moscow who thought that their initial thunder run would resolve the Ukraine issue once and for all. But it will satisfy the Kremlin’s most basic and fundamental geopolitical desideratum: a neutralized Ukraine beyond both the geopolitical ambit of NATO and the geoeconomic orbit of the EU. It will also “restore” Crimea to its rightful place in Russia. And finally, it will demonstrate that interfering in Russia’s natural sphere of influence is unwise. In these ways, when the impossible has been eliminated, the resulting outcome will clearly be a victory for Moscow.

Apparently he thinks that Russia has suffered no damage to any of its institutions and international standing because of this war.  Apparently he believes that if Russia manages to get Ukraine to yield it can magically waive away all the serious economic damage, harm to its long term military capacity, trashing of its image as "Global Power", problems with War Crimes, problems being clearly seen as a Fascist state, problems with brain drain, decrease in petroleum sales, decrease in defense industry sales, no international investment, no access to international markets, etc., etc.

Not surprisingly, the author is one who bought into Putin's propaganda.  Just before the war Latham wrote this OpEd piece (be prepared to LOL at the bold parts and extra emphasis on the last bit):

Quote

In recent years, the more dire prophesies of Russian collapse that circulated in the 1990s having gone unfulfilled, such characterizations have given way to a recognition that Russia is in fact a “persistent power.” Fundamentally, though, nothing has changed. Whether rebranded as a mere “nuisance power” or as a perpetually “disruptive” power, Russia is viewed now as it has been since it emerged out of the wreckage of the Soviet Union in December 1991 — as a broken, if sometimes petulant, vestige of a once-mighty superpower. 

But as the crisis in Ukraine has once again demonstrated, such characterizations are grossly misleading. Indeed, they couldn’t be more wrong. Russia is not the geopolitical basket-case it was in the immediate post-Soviet era. Nor is it the bit player on the world stage it is often portrayed as in the Western press. In fact, quite the opposite: Viewed dispassionately and in the cold light of Realpolitik, Russia is unambiguously a “great power” — a country possessing both substantial instruments of national power and the will to use these instruments to influence political outcomes around the world. And any American grand strategy worthy of the name will have to take that undeniable fact into account. 

When it comes to possessing a substantial and varied instrument of power, there can be little doubt that Russia meets the “great power” standard. To be sure, economic woes and demographic challenges continue to plague the country. But the myth of Russian decline is precisely that — a myth. 

The Russian military today is not the poorly trained and ill-equipped conscript rabble that fared so poorly in Chechnya in the mid-1990s. Spurred in large part by that experience, Moscow undertook a radical modernization and upgrading of the country’s nuclear and conventional forces, with staggeringly impressive results. While some asymmetries remain between Russia on the one hand and the United States and China on the other, resurrected Russia’s “hard power” capabilities now place it in the same league as those two recognized great powers — and in a different league altogether than almost every other country on the planet. 

Wow.  Wow.  And yet he still thinks he has what it takes to analyze the situation despite how totally wrong he was prior to the war kicking off?  Wow.

Here's the Chicken Little OpEd:

https://thehill.com/opinion/international/3509458-the-unpalatable-truth-in-ukraine/

And the "Did Not Age Well" lecture on how great Russia is:

https://thehill.com/opinion/international/587281-reports-of-russias-decline-are-greatly-exaggerated/?rl=1

I went through this exercise to demonstrate why it is so important to be skeptical of voices like this when they claim to know so much.  They might indeed know a lot, but obviously not enough about this conflict to have a proper handle on it.

Steve

[Taranis]

 

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, Huba said:

Wait, there's more:

However, Stanovaya said that Russia's main goal in Ukraine isn't about seizing territory but is aimed at preventing Ukraine from co-operating with the NATO military alliance and making the country accept Russian influence in the form of "Russification."

If that was Putin's main goal, the war is going far worse than if he just wanted some land. This article is just BS in my opinion.

 

1 hour ago, billbindc said:

This quote is just... 

She wrote that the assumption Putin knows he's losing "stems from the mistaken idea that Russia's main goal is to seize control of large parts of Ukraine—and therefore, when the Russian military performs badly, fails to advance, or even retreats, that this amounts to failure."

At the bare minimum, Putin's plan involved decapitating the Kyiv government at the start of the war in the expectation that organized national resistance would collapse. IR people seem to be addicted to clowning themselves regarding this war.

 

Yeah, turning Ukraine into a garrison state whose entire reason for being, and means of support is too act as NATO's forward bulwark seems like not a great success. Oh, and they will hate Russia with a violent passion for five plus generations. So much winning....