How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, panzermartin said:

It's not a russian specific the conscription of poor, uneducated guys with no dads money. For many armies around the world this is the case I think.  Western countries just have the luxury of paying more their unfortunate sons. 

While Russia is relying on the bottom of the barrel as you say , Ukraine has embattled the best they have as they are defending their homeland, many educated young men, volunteers etc. It's no surprise they did so well in the ambush warfare and high tech stuff. 

This is not wrong, but it is not the entire truth.  The armed forces in the West are generally regarded positively by the population as a whole.  This does not seem to be the case in Russia (that Tweet isn't the only time I've heard this).  This is a very important difference.

Because Western nations staff their militaries through volunteers, they need to offer incentives for them to join and minimize the incentives for them to stay away.  We've already touched on the ways the West minimizes the disincentives (housing, food, work hours, work safety, etc.), but now is a good time to mention the incentives.

I can't speak about the other Western countries, but in the US there are a lot of very good reasons to sign up.  Pay is decent, educational opportunities are made available (even required in the case of officers), professional development is promised (though imperfectly implemented at times), there's a raft of benefits for veterans after leaving, and if you stick with it there's a significant pension paid out for the rest of your life.

I know a LOT of people in Western militaries and I think they are at least as smart, motivated, and caring as the average citizen. 

The problem with under funded conscript type forces is they have none of this.  They just grab who they can grab and make due with that.  Since the best/brightest have multiple paths to avoid military service, that pool is unavailable to the military.  Because the military isn't geared towards attracting and retaining the best and brightest for leadership positions, they have to make due with whatever they get.

Contrast this with Ukraine where the incentives to join the military are quite high.  Lately they've spent a lot of time reforming to make themselves into a Western style professional volunteer service.

This is not to say that all Russian conscripts and officers are of low quality and all Ukrainians are the best of the best.  What I'm saying is more likely that quality soldiers are the exception for Russia and more likely the rule for Ukraine.  There is no doubt in my mind we are seeing how big an impact this plays in wartime.

Steve

[The_Capt]

10 minutes ago, acrashb said:

On this point I disagree - our armour would have better APS and be fed better situational awareness from an info grid including on-board sensors such as infra optics and laser sensors (which the Russians have but seem to be largely absent through theft and/or incompetence and/or financial constraints); would be used much better tactically (not run down roads in close order; not parked in clumps 'safely' behind buildings; not run off roads and bridges in (as much) panic and fatigue; not driven like a row of ducks into swamps; not used independently in built-up areas; not abandoned for lack of logistics - fuel, recovery vehicles, etc.; not bereft of preparatory artillery fires and air support; and so on.

This is exactly what I am talking about.  "No need for us to worry because...Russians suck and we don't"

There are a lot of assumptions here, and I am always cautious around assumptions at times like these.   We do have better C4ISR but spotting and engaging a two man team out at 2+kms is nearly impossible if they don't want to be spotted, we found that out in spades in Iraq and Afghanistan.  We are very spottable at 2+kms.  APS, sure, and so long as every logistic truck and re-fueler has APS, every infantry vehicle and every command vehicle, every artillery piece and every engineering vehicle.  APS is what we have but I am not sure how it performs against a Javelin-like system or a Switchblade and I am pretty sure the Chinese are figuring that one out as I type.

Tactical movement, again I am not sure what that means anymore.  We can spread out in our formations and use the terrain but we would still be spotted and engaged at long range, I am not sure spreading out will matter in this context.  And, again, our LOCs are just as long and vulnerable.

Look, we are not "ok" until we know we are "ok".  And right now we do not know if we are ok.  The Taliban choked out the best the west could send with a whole lot less than what Ukrainian defence brought to bear, took a lot longer but I shudder to think about a western intervention against an asymmetric foe armed with the Chinese equivalents for Javelins/NLAWs (or whatever comes next) and cheap unmanned systems and munitions.

 

[The_Capt]

12 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Here the photos. In comment under twitter post, some of railroad personnel wrote this can be not a work of SOF, but coincidence of two factors: poor maintainanse of infrastrucure + violation of speed mode by trains, loaded with armored vehicles. This caused damage of bridge constructions

Gotta agree, no blast damage from what I can see.  Unless US SOF came at this with cutting touches to weaken the structure this does look like an over-stressed bridge.  The crushed and broken wooden sleepers are a give away.

[Battlefront.com]

8 hours ago, Zeleban said:

Romanivka was not captured by Russian troops. Throughout the battle for Kyiv, a humanitarian corridor was organized there, which allowed the evacuation of civilians from Irpin Bucha and Gostomel. I myself evacuated along this route on 03/05/22, when the Russians entered Irpin and street fighting began. This route was under heavy artillery fire for about 3 weeks.

I don't think anybody has formally welcomed you to this Forum.  "Welcome to this Forum".  There, now that is all taken care of

We look forward to your view of the war from your location in the previous front lines.  I think it goes without saying that the people here are all thinking of you and all Ukrainians constantly each and every day.  It might not be much considering the high cost Ukraine is paying for being next to Russia, but I hope it helps in some way.  I also suspect a fair amount of money has been sent by Forum members to help out.  And if not, then they should get onto PayPal now and fix that

Steve

[Haiduk]

93rd brigade attacked small convoy of 423th Guard MRR of 4th Guard TD. At least two BMP-2 destroyed

...also one tank and BMP are seen intact, but maybe BMP is Ukrainan. Tank has H2200 marking, usual for Russian vehicles during railroad transportations

... The chevron of 423th Guard MRR

Despite 4th GMRD consider as "elite", it still to use Soviet BMP-2, as in this regiment.

Edited April 12, 2022 by Haiduk

[Aragorn2002]

7 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

This is exactly what I am talking about.  "No need for us to worry because...Russians suck and we don't"

There are a lot of assumptions here, and I am always cautious around assumptions at times like these.   We do have better C4ISR but spotting and engaging a two man team out at 2+kms is nearly impossible if they don't want to be spotted, we found that out in spades in Iraq and Afghanistan.  We are very spottable at 2+kms.  APS, sure, and so long as every logistic truck and re-fueler has APS, every infantry vehicle and every command vehicle, every artillery piece and every engineering vehicle.  APS is what we have but I am not sure how it performs against a Javelin-like system or a Switchblade and I am pretty sure the Chinese are figuring that one out as I type.

Tactical movement, again I am not sure what that means anymore.  We can spread out in our formations and use the terrain but we would still be spotted and engaged at long range, I am not sure spreading out will matter in this context.  And, again, our LOCs are just as long and vulnerable.

Look, we are not "ok" until we know we are "ok".  And right now we do not know if we are ok.  The Taliban choked out the best the west could send with a whole lot less than what Ukrainian defence brought to bear, took a lot longer but I shudder to think about a western intervention against an asymmetric foe armed with the Chinese equivalents for Javelins/NLAWs (or whatever comes next) and cheap unmanned systems and munitions.

 

I like your way of thinking. Not only the Russians have a lot to learn. 

[Der Zeitgeist]

16 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I also suspect a fair amount of money has been sent by Forum members to help out.  And if not, then they should get onto PayPal now and fix that

I sure did. And not just for humanitarian aid...

I don't even know if this is exactly legal in my country, but so far, no one has complained. 

[Kinophile]

47 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Khametov was repoted, should be in list

He looks like Wreck-It-Ralph's father...

[Jace11]

Don't want to trivialize what's happening IRL but as far as CM is concerned...

I'm never going to complain about the bogged mechanic again.

Edited April 12, 2022 by Jace11

[acrashb]

16 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

This is exactly what I am talking about.  "No need for us to worry because...Russians suck and we don't"

While I appreciate your expressed concern, and share fully the concern about an asymmetric force with good anti-tank teams (Chinese-supplied or otherwise), when responding to your statement "our armour is just as vulnerable" I meant to convey something like less absolute, like "Russians suck big ***** ***** and we suck a lot less" - doesn't have to be a black and white thing, just our armour is less vulnerable due to better / more widely spread tech and better TTPs.  I suppose one could still say that "less" vulnerable is still "too" vulnerable - it may be a step function, which is quite concerning to contemplate - and carry on from there, and your point about armour vulnerability including the entire LOC is significant, but there again a less-extended front and fewer pincers with better rear-echelon defence solves a lot.

I agree that, with oncoming near-perfect tactical intelligence, better TTPs won't be enough (e.g., clumped vs. spread); but clumping up and other significant failures still increases vulnerability, e.g., to ambush / IEDs.  And as you've previously mentioned we don't let our drivers get so fatigued that they fall asleep and run off of bridges.

It would have been interesting to see how T-14's faired tactically; they would have had the same operational issues as every other piece of RA armour 

 

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, Ultradave said:

c. This part I don't know. In the US a Brigade Combat Team is a more or less permanent organization. Company Teams and Battalion Task Forces are designed to be flexible in their cross attachments, depending on objective and opposing forces. The Russian BCT seems to be more of a one size fits all organization designed specifically for movement and breakthrough. I'm not sure it's suited to the type of actions we've seen in the north. An infantry heavy/tank light TF with plenty of fire support would be more suited. 

A critical difference between the Western and the Russian approaches to "Battalion and Below" organization is what Dave mentioned above... permanence.  Or put another way, default state.

In the West, by default, there is little difference between TO&E (technical organization) and Order of Battle (organization for combat ops).  If you are in 1st Squad, 1st Platoon, 1st Company, 1st Battalion in peacetime, you are by default going to war in exactly the same position.  Your battalion will by default stay within its parent Brigade and Division too.  However, for a particular combat operation your battalion or entire Brigade may be placed into a different chain of command (OB).  Under most circumstances the West tries to minimize disruption of existing chains of command and, when disrupted, tries to switch them around again as little as possible.  After the operation is over the battalion would most likely go back to its parent unit by default or perhaps the whole augmented OB would conduct a new operation with as few changes as possible.

Even at the lowest tactical level this is the case.  Sure, 2 platoons of infantry from X might be combined with 1 platoon of tanks from Y.  However, these changes are usually for a very specific purpose (short lived) or designed to remain consistent for a campaign (longer lived).  This means the 2 platoons of X and 1 of Y are not swapped out on a daily basis with others.

The thing to keep in mind here is that disruption of long standing chains of command is deliberately avoided from the ground up.  And *ALL* of this is accounted for by training, doctrine, and equipment.  In other words, the theory of how this all works is fully supported in every single way imaginable.

With Russia... not so much

Basically, none of what I just said seems applicable to Russian BTGs in practice.  In a way their normal means of operation is what the West would consider a worst-case scenario where chains of command are so broken, forces are so decimated, and the situation so desperate that everything is ad-hoc.  Worse for the Russians is they don't seem to have the doctrine, training, and equipment to support such a standard means of operating.  This results in all the things we've talked about... low morale, poor coordination of arms, terrible communications, seemingly no situational awareness, etc.

Steve

[The_Capt]

3 minutes ago, acrashb said:

I suppose one could still say that "less" vulnerable is still "too" vulnerable - it may be a step function, which is quite concerning to contemplate - and carry on from there, and your point about armour vulnerability including the entire LOC is significant, but there again a less-extended front and fewer pincers with better rear-echelon defence solves a lot.

Also keep in mind we have a few unique constraints of our own, not least of which is a low tolerance for casualties.  I can't speak for any nation but my own but if we lost more troops in 6 weeks than we did during the last war we would lose our collective minds.  Political pressure against large losses is significant in the West, short of an existential war, is not insignificant.  If our current methods will see us being attrited at much higher rates, even if they are nowhere near what the Russian's are suffering, we could be in trouble in some far flung field.

I think everyone is looking out for the infamous T-14.  I am wondering if they will ever push the 3-4 they have operational or are they saving them for the 9 May victory parade? (tee hee) 

[Haiduk]

@sburke @Kinophile

This guy should be out of high-officers list, because he is DPR-officer, but just for information.

Mayor (?) Pavel Yevgkevskyi. Commander of 4th battalion of 105th rifle regiment of DPR's 1st Army Corps. This is third spotted number of rifle regiment for conscripts (now we have 105th, 113th, 127th). This person had typical military career of Soviet officer.  Initially he graduated military college in Minsk. Then, he graduated high military collage in Donetsk. This collage existed up to 1995 year and was for training of junior officers - political instructors ("politruks") for engineer and liason troops. He received the rank of lietenant and further his biography is unknown, but pointed he paticipated in many local conflicts. Probably passed Chechen wars. Then returned to Donetsk again. Since war in Donbas began he took the side of DPR and became a commander of 2nd special forces company or Republican Guard. Got injuries in 2015 and probably retired after this. His shoulder strips have mayor star, but unknown who promoted him. Mobilzed again in 2022, appointed as battalion commander. Was killed on 9th of April in Mariupol - he led attcak of own battalion

 

 

Edited April 12, 2022 by Haiduk

[Battlefront.com]

The_Capt's point about examining only how poorly Russia is doing does not paint the full picture of what is going on with this war.  I share his belief that if one were to game out the Ukrainian organization and tactics for this war with a NATO force substituting for the Russians, the result for the NATO force would not be pretty.  That is because Russia is not just loosing because it's badly prepared to fight ANY war, but it is particularly bad at fighting the war Ukraine has obligated it to fight.  This means Ukraine is doing a lot of things right.

That said, I agree with acrashb that there would be a qualitative difference in the battle to protect LOCs.  One of the primary reasons Ukraine is scoring so many successes in this regard is that the Russians have very little idea what is going on.  A NATO force would likely have vastly better situational awareness and, through that, more likely to direct forces in a way that would make it more difficult for a Ukrainian type force and tactics combo to be as effective.

The_Capt just chimed in with a point about Western tolerances for casualties coming into play.  This is true, but I think it is also true for Ukraine.  One of the primary reasons this war is going so well for Ukraine so far is Russia hasn't been able to kill/capture large amounts of Ukrainian forces while at the same time offering them the opportunity to kill and send fleeing large amounts of Russians.  If Ukraine's enemy had it inverted, where it inflicted mass casualties onto Ukraine and kept friendly casualties proportionally lower, then it is possible Ukraine's organized defensive capabilities might have collapsed and left it only insurgent type activities (which should not be underestimated!).

Steve

[Harmon Rabb]

40 minutes ago, Der Zeitgeist said:

I sure did. And not just for humanitarian aid...

I don't even know if this is exactly legal in my country, but so far, no one has complained. 

Same. I helped a little by donating half a grand USD to the Ukrainian military.

If any member of this forum or lurker wants to donate, here is the link to the special account that the National Bank of Ukraine opened to support the Ukrainian military.

https://bank.gov.ua/en/news/all/natsionalniy-bank-vidkriv-spetsrahunok-dlya-zboru-koshtiv-na-potrebi-armiyi

[dan/california]

Two related things regarding the the Ukrainians on offense. First, their biggest problem is the air and missile defense they don't have. The Stingers have made close air support too expensive to conduct, but Russian SRBMs and cruise missiles in particular seem to get through, maybe not all the time, but enough of the time. This means the Ukrainians just CAN'T mass for an offensive in a concentrated way. To their credit, they have mostly had the sense not to try.

This leads to my second point, what the Ukrainians are doing on offense is more a form of focused attrition than an attempt to actually seize a given spot by force. Instead the Ukrainians pick a place, either because it is a good spot for them operationally, or a bad spot for the Russians, Like the critical road and bridge junctions northwest of Kyiv, and simply make it too expensive to be there. Eventually the Russians give up and evacuate the spot in question. The question I have not figured out is where it makes sense for the Ukrainians to apply this after Kherson. I am quite sure the very next thing the Ukrainians need to do is drop those two bridges feeding the Russians in Kherson, and then make being on that side of the river unbearable.

Obviously the best thing NATO can do for the Ukrainians is to SOLVE their air defense problem. Patriot/ThAAD batteries operated by "foreign  volunteers" needs to be a thing, YESTERDAY. We also need to give the Ukrainians some level of ~100 mile deep strike capability, so the Russians have to worry about THEIR concentrations at the operational level.

[Zeleban]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Я не думаю, что кто-то официально приветствовал вас на этом Форуме. «Добро пожаловать на этот форум». Вот теперь обо всем позаботились

Мы с нетерпением ждем вашего взгляда на войну с вашего местонахождения на предыдущих линиях фронта. Я думаю, само собой разумеется, что все люди здесь постоянно думают о вас и всех украинцах каждый день. Возможно, это не так уж много, учитывая высокую цену, которую Украина платит за то, чтобы быть рядом с Россией, но я надеюсь, что это хоть как-то поможет. Я также подозреваю, что члены Форума отправили изрядную сумму денег, чтобы помочь. А если нет, то они должны сейчас войти в PayPal и исправить это.

Стив

Thank you very much for your care. I am sure that the Ukrainian people will never forget your help.

[The_Capt]

6 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

That said, I agree with acrashb that there would be a qualitative difference in the battle to protect LOCs.  One of the primary reasons Ukraine is scoring so many successes in this regard is that the Russians have very little idea what is going on.  A NATO force would likely have vastly better situational awareness and, through that, more likely to direct forces in a way that would make it more difficult for a Ukrainian type force and tactics combo to be as effective.

I do not disagree that we would likely do better on LOCs but I am not convinced it would be "better enough".  @acrashb proposed that:

36 minutes ago, acrashb said:

and carry on from there, and your point about armour vulnerability including the entire LOC is significant, but there again a less-extended front and fewer pincers with better rear-echelon defence solves a lot.

And here I do not disagree but the magnitude of "less-extended front", "fewer pincers" and "better rear-echelon defence" "solving a lot" is potentially enormous.  Translating this into theory we are talking about force-to-space ratios in the frontages, manoeuvre restrictions we do not have a playbook for, and "better rear-echelon defence" are four words that could very well mean "redesign our entire logistics system".   As a minimum our force planning density is in question, our "just in time" logistics model which we spent the last 20 years building is in question - which impact the entire tooth to tail discussion, and while rear area security as an area defence problem is not new, defence against self-loitering munitions swarm attacks from the ground and/or the air is very new.  

I guess my point is that as a long time professional there are some fundamental and foundational concepts that are being challenged by what I have seen, and they extend well past the fact that the Russian military definitely and definitively failed the opening rounds in this war.

[Haiduk]

First visually confirmed destroyed 9P162 Kornet-T tank destroyer. This is BMP-3- based vehcile, which has been coming to service since 2013-2014 year.

Kornet-T has 12 9M133 (AT-14) missiles in autoloader and additional 4 in stock for manual reload. Launcher has two tubes, two missiles can be lauched and guided in one target simultainously. Also the portable launcher 9P163 can be assembled for the usage outside of vehicle.

Vehicle is equipped with 1PN80 Kornet-TP thermal sight with detection range in 4000 m and recognition range in 3500 m

 

[panzermartin]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

This is not wrong, but it is not the entire truth.  The armed forces in the West are generally regarded positively by the population as a whole.  This does not seem to be the case in Russia (that Tweet isn't the only time I've heard this).  This is a very important difference.

Because Western nations staff their militaries through volunteers, they need to offer incentives for them to join and minimize the incentives for them to stay away.  We've already touched on the ways the West minimizes the disincentives (housing, food, work hours, work safety, etc.), but now is a good time to mention the incentives.

I can't speak about the other Western countries, but in the US there are a lot of very good reasons to sign up.  Pay is decent, educational opportunities are made available (even required in the case of officers), professional development is promised (though imperfectly implemented at times), there's a raft of benefits for veterans after leaving, and if you stick with it there's a significant pension paid out for the rest of your life.

I know a LOT of people in Western militaries and I think they are at least as smart, motivated, and caring as the average citizen. 

The problem with under funded conscript type forces is they have none of this.  They just grab who they can grab and make due with that.  Since the best/brightest have multiple paths to avoid military service, that pool is unavailable to the military.  Because the military isn't geared towards attracting and retaining the best and brightest for leadership positions, they have to make due with whatever they get.

Contrast this with Ukraine where the incentives to join the military are quite high.  Lately they've spent a lot of time reforming to make themselves into a Western style professional volunteer service.

This is not to say that all Russian conscripts and officers are of low quality and all Ukrainians are the best of the best.  What I'm saying is more likely that quality soldiers are the exception for Russia and more likely the rule for Ukraine.  There is no doubt in my mind we are seeing how big an impact this plays in wartime.

Steve

I think US army is on a different league on all levels. The funding is insane 10 times up compared to the second Russia I think. Everything is better and of course the soldiers are more respected and have better future prospects. Not everyone can afford this! 

I served one mandatory year with the hellenic infantry and our professional soldiers didn't impress me much...There were mostly goofy kids out of villages and poor rural areas. Air force, Navy and special forces were an entirely different case. Still sometimes I think, you don't have to attend university to be a foot soldier maybe in the long term you need rugged young people that can endure the misery of prolonged warfare. 

But I agree Russia has always been cruel with the lowly infantryman and this war has reminded me how much. The state  feeds those godamn oligarchs that can have their shinny 1 billion superyacht but they give so little to the poor foot soldier.

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

Gotta agree, no blast damage from what I can see.  Unless US SOF came at this with cutting touches to weaken the structure this does look like an over-stressed bridge.  The crushed and broken wooden sleepers are a give away.

The fact that it failed form being overstressed, as opposed to blown up doesn't mean it is isn't busted. And that is not the easiest kind of failure to fix. The entire structure is probably really compromised way back from the actual failure there at the abutment. How much of the Russian rail road capacity wast this, Because it is out for several days, at a minimum.

 

[Der Zeitgeist]

New video of the tank vs. Ukrainian infantry incident we saw earlier. This one is filmed directly from the soldiers that were shot.

https://t.me/ZeRada1/8384

[Battlefront.com]

15 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

I do not disagree that we would likely do better on LOCs but I am not convinced it would be "better enough".

Neither am I.  Especially if Western forces don't spend quite a bit of time trying to make sure it is "better enough" by adopting new doctrine to account for this sort of hybrid conventional/unconventional warfare.  I don't think what we have on paper right now is sufficient.

I expect the solution is to go with the "Ike doctrine" of WW2, aka "Broad Front".  Move forces forward with an eye on force protection more than rapid seizure of far flung objectives.  Don't just drive down roads, dismount and sweep the forests.  As the advance continues ensure that there are "garrisons" left in key spots (with all kinds of ISR toys) that are capable of at least temporarily challenging platoon sized attacks. Run fewer, but better protected resupply convoys.  In hotter spots, proactively run infantry along routes just ahead of a convoy to keep the attacker off kilter.  Don't run convoys on any sort of schedule and try to vary supply routes as much as possible.  And above all else, have the skies above supply routes swarming with drones 24/7.

That sort of stuff needs to be gamed out to test, then tried out in the field, then codified as draft doctrine, and repeat the cycle until it seems solid enough to rely upon.

Steve

[acrashb]

9 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

which impact the entire tooth to tail discussion,

At least we (the West) are having this discussion.  This is another reason Western forces are so effective: they swim in and are culturally influenced by open societies and so can adapter faster than their counterparts.

Having said that, it took several years in the second gulf war for the US military to a) recognize that it was now fighting an insurgency and b) issue FM 3-24 to support counter-insurgency doctrine (re-learning British knowledge from the Malaya Emergency and the US' knowledge from the Philippine-American war, among others).  One hopes we collectively learn faster from this war; I am heartened by the recent, relatively timely pivot (at least in public announcements) from highly asymmetrical warfare to more peer- and near-peer to peer planning, doctrine, and force structures.

[Battlefront.com]

About that Russian bridge... infrastructure in the US is in a very bad state of repair overall.  I can not even imagine how bad it is in Russia!  All infrastructure, no matter what it is, will fail at some point.  Sometimes through routine use or existence.  However, added stress can greatly accelerate catastrophic failure.

In the US we have bridges that are sufficiently weakened that they have weight restrictions placed on them.  This means cars and normal commercial activities are OK, but heavy industrial uses are not.  This not only reduces the chances that the bridge might collapse, but it also extends the length of time before it must be replaced.

I doubt Russia's infrastructure is in good condition and I doubt they take proactive steps to avoid problems like here in the US.  Now take that and put years worth of stress onto a bridge within a few weeks... failure is inevitably going to happen sooner.

Steve