New Book: "Battlegroup!: The Lessons of the Unfought Battles of the Cold War" (Jim Storr)

[Sgt.Squarehead]

So if we read your books, are you gonna start playing CM? 

[Jim Storr]

I might.  But right now I'm busy with my next book, which goes to the publisher next week.  

Best wishes 

Jim Storr 

[Sgt.Squarehead]

All the best with that. 

[Jim Storr]

On 1/27/2022 at 3:16 PM, Iron Mike Golf said:

I can't speak to UK or BW mechanized forces, but as to US (personal experience, here, so cast it as anecdotal if you like):

The decision to assault mounted or to dismount short of the assault objective is a situational decision. The main factors are cover, concealment, and time.

For the M2, the modifications brought about by the A2 variant were driven by the BMP-2's 30mm autocannon. The  basic and A1 variants were designed to stop 14.5mm and 23mm. The upgrade added heavier armor skirts to the hull flanks (as well as applique plates to the front slope and turret) and the skirts are what covered up the flank firing ports. The rear firing ports remained operational and the vehicle kit retained firing port weapons for those. 

Mounted assault was not, in my experience, dropped from either doctrine or training when the flank firing ports were deleted.

A former Bradley Master Gunner

Thank you for that clarification.  It's important.  Can you then please explain:  if the dismounts didn't fire from the firing ports, I assume they fired from the roof hatches? 

Jim Storr

[Jim Storr]

42 minutes ago, Sgt.Squarehead said:

All the best with that. 

Thank you  

[Iron Mike Golf]

1 hour ago, Jim Storr said:

Thank you for that clarification.  It's important.  Can you then please explain:  if the dismounts didn't fire from the firing ports, I assume they fired from the roof hatches? 

Jim Storr

Certainly!

There is a single hatch over the troop compartment and it is a cargo hatch, not a fighting hatch. The principal task for using that hatch is to reload the TOW missile launcher. And, it's an alternative for resupply if for whatever reason one can't lower the ramp.

In the A2 model, the flank periscopes are basically unusable, as they are also blocked by the add-on hull armor.

Additionally, when the cargo hatch is open, the turret weapons are locked out. There are a number of switches and sensors that result in the main gun elevating to 45 degrees or so (relative to the hull) to prevent the gun barrel from striking an open driver's hatch or the cargo hatch. Had a gunner knocked off the vehicle and also knocked out when the vehicle commander grabbed a palm switch in the turret with the driver's hatch open and the gun too close to it. it's quite a vigorous action.

There were no gunnery table to exercise squads using these weapons. When I as a Division level Bradley Master Gunner, I did some work on seeing if some firing exercises could be fashioned. Consulted with folk at 7th Army Training Command at Graf in the early 90s and our consensus was we couldn't do it safely enough with facilities in existence at the time.

I transitioned from "foot mobile" to BFV Infantryman on the A1. The doctrinal manual at the time and the subsequent one (both editions of FM 23-1) specified fire commands for the firing port weapons. They were termed "right bank", "left bank", and "rear bank".

I never witnessed troops dismounting with the firing port weapons mounted in the ramp. I think the barrels were short enough to keep them out of the dirt, but I'd expect people tripping over them if dismounting in the dark.

"Mounted assault" speaks not to dismounts fighting while mounted, but where they dismount relative to the objective. A mounted assault sees troops being disgorged on the objective as opposed to dismounting in a covered and hopefully concealed location hundreds of meters from said objective.

Even in the basic and A1 models, using the firing ports is about self protection and not assaulting. The weapons are shortened AR-15s. Magazine fed (regular 30 round ones) and no sight system. The doctrine was to shoot all tracer and it was about suppressing very close targets (too close for the turret weapons), not attacking and objective.

[Erwin]

Useful info.  Thank you.  (...and welcome aboard.)

[Iron Mike Golf]

Thank you, @Erwin, on both counts.

@Jim StorrI was hoping to receive your book today, but now it's looking like in the next day or two. I am really looking forward to reading it!

[Jim Storr]

13 hours ago, Iron Mike Golf said:

Thank you, @Erwin, on both counts.

@Jim StorrI was hoping to receive your book today, but now it's looking like in the next day or two. I am really looking forward to reading it!

Enjoy!

[Jim Storr]

16 hours ago, Iron Mike Golf said:

Certainly!

There is a single hatch over the troop compartment and it is a cargo hatch, not a fighting hatch. The principal task for using that hatch is to reload the TOW missile launcher. And, it's an alternative for resupply if for whatever reason one can't lower the ramp.

In the A2 model, the flank periscopes are basically unusable, as they are also blocked by the add-on hull armor.

Additionally, when the cargo hatch is open, the turret weapons are locked out. There are a number of switches and sensors that result in the main gun elevating to 45 degrees or so (relative to the hull) to prevent the gun barrel from striking an open driver's hatch or the cargo hatch. Had a gunner knocked off the vehicle and also knocked out when the vehicle commander grabbed a palm switch in the turret with the driver's hatch open and the gun too close to it. it's quite a vigorous action.

There were no gunnery table to exercise squads using these weapons. When I as a Division level Bradley Master Gunner, I did some work on seeing if some firing exercises could be fashioned. Consulted with folk at 7th Army Training Command at Graf in the early 90s and our consensus was we couldn't do it safely enough with facilities in existence at the time.

I transitioned from "foot mobile" to BFV Infantryman on the A1. The doctrinal manual at the time and the subsequent one (both editions of FM 23-1) specified fire commands for the firing port weapons. They were termed "right bank", "left bank", and "rear bank".

I never witnessed troops dismounting with the firing port weapons mounted in the ramp. I think the barrels were short enough to keep them out of the dirt, but I'd expect people tripping over them if dismounting in the dark.

"Mounted assault" speaks not to dismounts fighting while mounted, but where they dismount relative to the objective. A mounted assault sees troops being disgorged on the objective as opposed to dismounting in a covered and hopefully concealed location hundreds of meters from said objective.

Even in the basic and A1 models, using the firing ports is about self protection and not assaulting. The weapons are shortened AR-15s. Magazine fed (regular 30 round ones) and no sight system. The doctrine was to shoot all tracer and it was about suppressing very close targets (too close for the turret weapons), not attacking and objective.

Thank you.  That is incredibly useful.  

The original intention, going back to DePuy and perhaps Starry, was to actually fight from the vehicle.  You might remember that the Wehrmacht's half-tracked APCs (Sd Kfz 250 and 251) were open-topped, and at least some had a rear pintle-mounted MG.  In some circumstances the panzergrenadiers would actually fight from the vehicle as they assaulted a position.  For example, dropping grenades down into trenches.  That was what inspired DePuy (and perhaps Starry), in the early 1970s.  However the Bradley didn't enter service until 1981.  

I can't say at what point the idea of fighting from the vehicle was abandoned.  It might even have been abandoned before 1981: the trials and development people, with early-model Bradleys, might have realised that it wouldn't work.  You write that your experience, in the early 1990s, was that it couldn't be done safely.  I can quite understand that.  

This discussion indicates a slight difference in terminology.  You describe a 'mounted assault' as having troops dismount on the objective, but dismount nonetheless.  In British Army terminology, the infantry always dismounted.  However, from the late 1970s (and possibly before), the options were to dismount 'well short of', 'just short of', or 'on' the objective.  'Just short of' typically meant close enough that the leading dismounts could grenade, or possibly even bayonet, the enemy in the front trenches.  By 1982, when I commanded a platoon, that was the only option we really considered.  So it looks like US and British Army practice was in practice pretty similar.  

Thanks again for the clarification.  

Jim Storr

[chuckdyke]

Looks like it is becoming an online library here. 

[domfluff]

1 hour ago, Jim Storr said:

Thank you.  That is incredibly useful.  

The original intention, going back to DePuy and perhaps Starry, was to actually fight from the vehicle.  You might remember that the Wehrmacht's half-tracked APCs (Sd Kfz 250 and 251) were open-topped, and at least some had a rear pintle-mounted MG.  In some circumstances the panzergrenadiers would actually fight from the vehicle as they assaulted a position.  For example, dropping grenades down into trenches.  That was what inspired DePuy (and perhaps Starry), in the early 1970s.  However the Bradley didn't enter service until 1981.  

I can't say at what point the idea of fighting from the vehicle was abandoned.  It might even have been abandoned before 1981: the trials and development people, with early-model Bradleys, might have realised that it wouldn't work.  You write that your experience, in the early 1990s, was that it couldn't be done safely.  I can quite understand that.  

This discussion indicates a slight difference in terminology.  You describe a 'mounted assault' as having troops dismount on the objective, but dismount nonetheless.  In British Army terminology, the infantry always dismounted.  However, from the late 1970s (and possibly before), the options were to dismount 'well short of', 'just short of', or 'on' the objective.  'Just short of' typically meant close enough that the leading dismounts could grenade, or possibly even bayonet, the enemy in the front trenches.  By 1982, when I commanded a platoon, that was the only option we really considered.  So it looks like US and British Army practice was in practice pretty similar.  

Thanks again for the clarification.  

Jim Storr

A couple of points on this.

A representative line from the Gefechtsausbildung der Panzergrenadiere (Helmut von Wehren, 1944), translates as:

"The squad fights mounted from the vehicle, as long as enemy fire, terrain and mission permits."

There has been a very common trend, both on this forum and elsewhere, of focusing more on the first part of that sentence than the last.

Indeed, that same manual has a lot of examples of squad attack, and the majority of them are dismounting for combat, with the SPW in support.

I'd suggest that the circumstances where "dropping grenades from the halftrack" are reasonable are going to be those similar to the use-case of the Flamm SPW 251/16 - e.g., used as a reactive force against a counter attack (as per that Panzergrenadier training film, which itself is rather optimistic), and employed against the enemy occupied trenches after the firefight has been won. You can see this kind of situation rather more clearly in Combat Mission that something with the granularity of the WRG rules - since spotting can be on an individual soldier basis, it's not impossible that you can "clear" a trench position, but actually miss an enthusiastic individual with an ATR, who could recover and shoot you in the rear.

A burst of flame or two against an "empty" trench is a quick way of ensuring that there's no surprises waiting for you. This is going to be of chief importance when under significant time restraints, as with the counter-attack example. In that kind of use-case you're trying to seal up the breach in your lines very quickly, before the follow-on forces can exploit it. The expectation, though, is that the fight has been won, so any enemy extant are having some kind of emotional event, and you can reasonably expect to roll up to within grenade range of these trenches without return fire.

Further, the above manual was produced in 1944, but would have been derived from earlier in the war. Earlier in the war, infantry-held AT options were limited, and that's inevitably going to be the chief concern with this.


The second is the essay that John Curry wrote in the back of his publication of the Contact! rules, about the way the BAOR intended to fight. I've asked him for sourcing, since it's the best description I've read for the BAOR doctrine from the strategic to the combat team level. He mentioned that "This should be considered first hand testimony. I was there as an officer. I worked with a number of units and I was briefed on lots of things including the BAOR operational plan."

In that, he discussed the relative paucity of offensive doctrine in the BAOR. Specifically in terms of dismounting FV-432s, and how close this should be to the objective. In that essay, he makes the claim that opinions on this varied, and there wasn't a definitive answer in the British doctrine.


For what it's worth, my opinion on this is that whilst dismounting inside grenade range gets you across the last 300 yards, it represents a tremendous risk. You can't ever know for certain that 100% of their AT assets are supressed or out of action, especially from the back of a vehicle, so leaving the vehicle blind and potentially under fire seems like a huge roll of the dice to me.

It's also worth considering tactical problems such as these: http://armchairgeneral.com/tactic-101-103-bradley-platoon-attack.htm

Where the (modern) Bradley platoon is dismounted a full 2km away from the objective, to make the most use of the Bradley's weapon systems, with the mounted element advancing once the dig-in BMP has been removed. Clearly this increases the time of this platoon attack significantly - pushing it up to 90 minutes, but I suspect it's a good indication of what this kind of thing should look like.


Incidentally, there were two things which I really hoped Battlegroup would do, and was disappointed to see that it didn't really do either. The first was a comparative study on the various NATO concepts of the battlegroup, for instance how British, US and German doctrine differed on the subject, especially at the Combat Team and Battlegroup level. My sources on the Bundeswehr are distressingly limited, and the aforementioned John Curry, uncited essay is the best I've seen on the BAOR. I'm desperate for more on this subject.

The second is a lot more rigor around outlining your methodology. I'm very much a proponent of the power of wargaming as a instructive or investigative tool, but it's extremely hard to understand your conclusions in this case. There's a lot of telling, but not much showing. To use the IFV assault example, I'd have hoped to have see some diagrams and discussion illustrating your attempts to make IFVs work under the WRG rules, and where and when those failed, even if the examples were only representative. Without that grounding, it's very hard to engage with the argument, because an argument isn't really being made - there's no listed assumptions or method to base things on, so the only element the reader has is the claimed result.

[Aragorn2002]

2 hours ago, chuckdyke said:

Looks like it is becoming an online library here. 

There are worse things, my friend. 

[chuckdyke]

45 minutes ago, Aragorn2002 said:

There are worse things, my friend. 

Since I woke up it is all what I see no useful tips or DAR or AAR. 

[Aragorn2002]

5 hours ago, chuckdyke said:

Since I woke up it is all what I see no useful tips or DAR or AAR. 

So what? If it is of interest to other people, let it be. The title of this thread makes it pretty clear what the subject is.

What I would like to see is some pages of the book.

Edited January 31, 2022 by Aragorn2002

[LineOfDeparture]

Hi Forum, 
Hi Jim, 

I was looking for reviews about the book and found this thread. I have read it as well. I just registered for posting here and hope that's okay, haven't played CM in years but I might get back into it. 

I was reading the info on the "Bundeswehr" with great interest, in particular after I wondered for some time what the "untapped" sources would be. I was thinking about two claims for a while now:

 

1.)

I am not quite sure how well the book is served by explaining Bundeswehr tactics from the 80s by overrelying on two books by Middeldorf from the 50s. That's 30 years of tactical development in between. I don't say Middeldorf is irrelevant, but I felt that overall it would have been more appropriate to work with sources from the 80s or late 70s, simply for the sake of being closer to the scope of the book, especially since Middeldorf is cupiously quoted for relatively banal things (the faster the persuit, the greater the success" p. 201).

So when you say "Unsurprisningly, the best discription of the tactics of the delay come from the Middeldorf books." (p. 178) What do you compare that with? Middeldorf himself keeps developing his thoughts on the delay for example until, at least, the 60s when he is trying to take into account the changed environment of the 60s in his later publication "Führung und Gefecht" (1968).

Middeldorf is very important, but I personally feel that he would have required more contextualization to tranasfer his books into the 1980s.

2.)

Similar things go for the size discussion of the divisions. You write that "Both v. Manstein and Speidel wrote divisions over 12 or 13.000 men were unwieldy" (p. 161) and quote v. manstein from 55. That pre-dates the development of the brigade structure in Germany, that is then adopted by most of NATO, hence the shift from the division as the smalles operational element to the brigade. Hence, when Speidel and v. Manstein complain about division size, they still assume the division as the smalles building block. They came up with the brigades after that. The very intense discussion from 55-58 is basically missing. 

When you say "West german Planners really should have payed more heed to Speidel and von Manstein" (p. 173)....that's literally what they did. Speidel and gang came up with the solution further down the road (smalles combined arms element "brigade") to the problem they identified (too large divisions).

There are a few more oddities here and there, like claims that would have needed some source to back them up, mistranslations/misinterpretations of German language/tactical thinking, some quotes that don't seem to add up at times (p. 162, fn 21: The source does not claim this?) , a lot of anecdotes, strong relying on world war II wisdom to explain the 80s, some odd claims about the role of Middeldorf, occasional snarky comments (accepatble style devices though) a la "agilty has been overlooked" (p. 173, and no, it wasn't). Maybe your thoughts on the German perspective should have been subject to a seperate publication, since I feel at times it is overly simplified/shortened. So I am empathatic to your quote from p. 58. "German doctrine is often poorly understood by English-speaking readers." after which you continoue on to give an incorrect explanation of Fingerspitzengefühl. (I have the u with the funny points, so my authenticity is hereby proven )

I really enjoyed the read though! Great to see someone take on this topic and express his thoughts on divisional structure and hypothetical WWIII Combat. And taking on Middeldorf is certainly something! I really appreciated that and learned a few things about BAOR as well. A great non-academic addition from an experienced officers perspective.

I know in these kind of blogs discussions can turn into bilateral "back and forths", so I would like to reserve the right to reply once if thats okay and leave it at that. If you (Jim) or anybody else like to exchange more thoughts, I am happy to exchange contact details (facebook or similar). 

All the best to everyone,

 

LD

 

Edited January 31, 2022 by LineOfDeparture
Addition

[chuckdyke]

5 hours ago, Aragorn2002 said:

What I would like to see is some pages of the book.

Exactly example I play counter attack at Son here is my reference that I use the C2 correctly. Play the game and show where you get your information from. 

Edited February 1, 2022 by chuckdyke

[Jim Storr]

On 1/31/2022 at 12:09 PM, domfluff said:

A couple of points on this.

A representative line from the Gefechtsausbildung der Panzergrenadiere (Helmut von Wehren, 1944), translates as:

"The squad fights mounted from the vehicle, as long as enemy fire, terrain and mission permits."

There has been a very common trend, both on this forum and elsewhere, of focusing more on the first part of that sentence than the last.

Indeed, that same manual has a lot of examples of squad attack, and the majority of them are dismounting for combat, with the SPW in support.

I'd suggest that the circumstances where "dropping grenades from the halftrack" are reasonable are going to be those similar to the use-case of the Flamm SPW 251/16 - e.g., used as a reactive force against a counter attack (as per that Panzergrenadier training film, which itself is rather optimistic), and employed against the enemy occupied trenches after the firefight has been won. You can see this kind of situation rather more clearly in Combat Mission that something with the granularity of the WRG rules - since spotting can be on an individual soldier basis, it's not impossible that you can "clear" a trench position, but actually miss an enthusiastic individual with an ATR, who could recover and shoot you in the rear.

A burst of flame or two against an "empty" trench is a quick way of ensuring that there's no surprises waiting for you. This is going to be of chief importance when under significant time restraints, as with the counter-attack example. In that kind of use-case you're trying to seal up the breach in your lines very quickly, before the follow-on forces can exploit it. The expectation, though, is that the fight has been won, so any enemy extant are having some kind of emotional event, and you can reasonably expect to roll up to within grenade range of these trenches without return fire.

Further, the above manual was produced in 1944, but would have been derived from earlier in the war. Earlier in the war, infantry-held AT options were limited, and that's inevitably going to be the chief concern with this.


The second is the essay that John Curry wrote in the back of his publication of the Contact! rules, about the way the BAOR intended to fight. I've asked him for sourcing, since it's the best description I've read for the BAOR doctrine from the strategic to the combat team level. He mentioned that "This should be considered first hand testimony. I was there as an officer. I worked with a number of units and I was briefed on lots of things including the BAOR operational plan."

In that, he discussed the relative paucity of offensive doctrine in the BAOR. Specifically in terms of dismounting FV-432s, and how close this should be to the objective. In that essay, he makes the claim that opinions on this varied, and there wasn't a definitive answer in the British doctrine.


For what it's worth, my opinion on this is that whilst dismounting inside grenade range gets you across the last 300 yards, it represents a tremendous risk. You can't ever know for certain that 100% of their AT assets are supressed or out of action, especially from the back of a vehicle, so leaving the vehicle blind and potentially under fire seems like a huge roll of the dice to me.

It's also worth considering tactical problems such as these: http://armchairgeneral.com/tactic-101-103-bradley-platoon-attack.htm

Where the (modern) Bradley platoon is dismounted a full 2km away from the objective, to make the most use of the Bradley's weapon systems, with the mounted element advancing once the dig-in BMP has been removed. Clearly this increases the time of this platoon attack significantly - pushing it up to 90 minutes, but I suspect it's a good indication of what this kind of thing should look like.


Incidentally, there were two things which I really hoped Battlegroup would do, and was disappointed to see that it didn't really do either. The first was a comparative study on the various NATO concepts of the battlegroup, for instance how British, US and German doctrine differed on the subject, especially at the Combat Team and Battlegroup level. My sources on the Bundeswehr are distressingly limited, and the aforementioned John Curry, uncited essay is the best I've seen on the BAOR. I'm desperate for more on this subject.

The second is a lot more rigor around outlining your methodology. I'm very much a proponent of the power of wargaming as a instructive or investigative tool, but it's extremely hard to understand your conclusions in this case. There's a lot of telling, but not much showing. To use the IFV assault example, I'd have hoped to have see some diagrams and discussion illustrating your attempts to make IFVs work under the WRG rules, and where and when those failed, even if the examples were only representative. Without that grounding, it's very hard to engage with the argument, because an argument isn't really being made - there's no listed assumptions or method to base things on, so the only element the reader has is the claimed result.

Thank you. 

You make two substantive points.  The first is that you wished there was a comparative study of the various NATO concepts of the battlegroup.  The second is a wish for a lot more 'rigor' around outlining my methodology in relation to wargaming.  

My book was about 98,000 words (plus about 11,000 words of footnotes and references) about 'the lessons of the unfought battles of the Cold War'.  I could have added more on the first point, but I don't personally think it would have added very much.  And I was at pains to suggest the limitations of 'hobby' wargaming, and  that I was cautious about trying to make strong deductions from it.  I also don't think that diagrams of what we might, or might not, have done in any one of 200 wargames would strengthen any discussion.  The subject is not one amenable to hard proof.  I think many readers would accept at face value the assertion that, in 200 iterations over 30 years, we tried many variations and couldn't get them to work; followed by a numerical assessment of how often they failed.  

It would of course be interesting to see more material on either topic; please feel free to write something and submit it for publication.  

Yours sincerely, 

Jim Storr

[Jim Storr]

On 1/31/2022 at 11:50 PM, LineOfDeparture said:

Hi Forum, 
Hi Jim, 

I was looking for reviews about the book and found this thread. I have read it as well. I just registered for posting here and hope that's okay, haven't played CM in years but I might get back into it. 

I was reading the info on the "Bundeswehr" with great interest, in particular after I wondered for some time what the "untapped" sources would be. I was thinking about two claims for a while now:

 

1.)

I am not quite sure how well the book is served by explaining Bundeswehr tactics from the 80s by overrelying on two books by Middeldorf from the 50s. That's 30 years of tactical development in between. I don't say Middeldorf is irrelevant, but I felt that overall it would have been more appropriate to work with sources from the 80s or late 70s, simply for the sake of being closer to the scope of the book, especially since Middeldorf is cupiously quoted for relatively banal things (the faster the persuit, the greater the success" p. 201).

So when you say "Unsurprisningly, the best discription of the tactics of the delay come from the Middeldorf books." (p. 178) What do you compare that with? Middeldorf himself keeps developing his thoughts on the delay for example until, at least, the 60s when he is trying to take into account the changed environment of the 60s in his later publication "Führung und Gefecht" (1968).

Middeldorf is very important, but I personally feel that he would have required more contextualization to tranasfer his books into the 1980s.

2.)

Similar things go for the size discussion of the divisions. You write that "Both v. Manstein and Speidel wrote divisions over 12 or 13.000 men were unwieldy" (p. 161) and quote v. manstein from 55. That pre-dates the development of the brigade structure in Germany, that is then adopted by most of NATO, hence the shift from the division as the smalles operational element to the brigade. Hence, when Speidel and v. Manstein complain about division size, they still assume the division as the smalles building block. They came up with the brigades after that. The very intense discussion from 55-58 is basically missing. 

When you say "West german Planners really should have payed more heed to Speidel and von Manstein" (p. 173)....that's literally what they did. Speidel and gang came up with the solution further down the road (smalles combined arms element "brigade") to the problem they identified (too large divisions).

There are a few more oddities here and there, like claims that would have needed some source to back them up, mistranslations/misinterpretations of German language/tactical thinking, some quotes that don't seem to add up at times (p. 162, fn 21: The source does not claim this?) , a lot of anecdotes, strong relying on world war II wisdom to explain the 80s, some odd claims about the role of Middeldorf, occasional snarky comments (accepatble style devices though) a la "agilty has been overlooked" (p. 173, and no, it wasn't). Maybe your thoughts on the German perspective should have been subject to a seperate publication, since I feel at times it is overly simplified/shortened. So I am empathatic to your quote from p. 58. "German doctrine is often poorly understood by English-speaking readers." after which you continoue on to give an incorrect explanation of Fingerspitzengefühl. (I have the u with the funny points, so my authenticity is hereby proven )

I really enjoyed the read though! Great to see someone take on this topic and express his thoughts on divisional structure and hypothetical WWIII Combat. And taking on Middeldorf is certainly something! I really appreciated that and learned a few things about BAOR as well. A great non-academic addition from an experienced officers perspective.

I know in these kind of blogs discussions can turn into bilateral "back and forths", so I would like to reserve the right to reply once if thats okay and leave it at that. If you (Jim) or anybody else like to exchange more thoughts, I am happy to exchange contact details (facebook or similar). 

All the best to everyone,

 

LD

 

 

[Jim Storr]

Just as an example:  

'Fingerspitzengefuehl' seems to appears in the literature in two contexts:  

a.  In Middeldorf, literally feeling with the fingers (meaning tapping up the front line with reconnaissance) in order to strike with the fist.  

b. Elsewhere, for example by Balck, the almost metaphysical, intuitive ability of very senior commanders to sense and understand the dynamics of battle.  He considered that very, very few divisional commanders had that ability.  

'LD' hides behind his nom de plume and gives some hints as to his claim to better knowledge.  The ability to type a diaresis ('Umlaut', or 'two funny points') does not 'prove' anything.  It does suggest that he is German. 

The wider point that LD alludes to is that there is really nothing between Middeldorf and any good book in English about Bundeswehr tactics.  If there is, he doesn't indicate one, and I couldn't find one.  So 'Battlegroup' is weak in trying to extrapolate between 1955 and, say, 1985.  I did the best I could with the sources available to me.  

I hope we can soon expect a thorough, extensively-researched, typically German academic treatise on the organisation and tactics of the Bundeswehr.  Perhaps when that is published in English, we will find out who 'LD' is.  Until then, I would ask him to stop using unsubstantiated rebuttals and referring to 'you' when he means 'Jim'.  It's not nearly as accurate nor rigorous as his post pretends to be.  

Yours sincerely 

Jim Storr 

 

[chuckdyke]

4 minutes ago, Jim Storr said:

Fingerspitzengefuehl'

Like a piano player who uses intuitively the fingers of both hands for his performance. Or the typist who keeps up with the spoken word with no effort. The outcome of a well-rehearsed drill. 

[BeondTheGrave]

Fingerspitzengefühl is a great German word. 

Edited February 3, 2022 by BeondTheGrave

[arkhangelsk2021]

On 2/1/2022 at 7:50 AM, LineOfDeparture said:

Similar things go for the size discussion of the divisions. You write that "Both v. Manstein and Speidel wrote divisions over 12 or 13.000 men were unwieldy" (p. 161) and quote v. manstein from 55. That pre-dates the development of the brigade structure in Germany, that is then adopted by most of NATO, hence the shift from the division as the smalles operational element to the brigade. Hence, when Speidel and v. Manstein complain about division size, they still assume the division as the smalles building block. They came up with the brigades after that. The very intense discussion from 55-58 is basically missing. 

I'm not sure what he said in Battlegroup, but Storr might actually have touched on it in his 2009 Face of War. Namely:

Quote

Being constrained to 12 divisions, Manstein recommended the enlargement of divisions to about 25,000 men. This allowed the formation of very powerful brigades. Manstein explicitly stated that ‘[i]n reality the suggested brigades are equivalent to small divisions’.59 Critically, the internal structure of those brigades contained regimental staffs between brigade and divisional level. Thus Manstein’s proposed brigades can be seen as systems to generate and sustain up to eight companies in combat. They had the internal structure of a division.

Storr, Jim. Human Face of War (Birmingham War Studies) . Continuum UK. Kindle Edition. (Location: 2626 of 5980)

Of course, the problem is that the divisions never quite reached over 20000 men either. They were about 12 maneuver companies in three battalions in peacetime, or in wartime it becomes 12 companies in four battalions. Which is not the same thing.

[Iron Mike Golf]

@Jim StorrGot my copy and put a dent in it. Got me reviewing the history of doctrine development with a different azimuth of view. Thanks!

Reading some earlier writings of Starry, you can definitely see the genesis of AirLand battle (looking for good pull quotes). He seemed convinced, using a target servicing rate model in the sims of the time, that the forward deployed forces could handle the entire first echelon (including second and follow-own echelon regiments of the first echelon) if the pacing of introduction of WP combat power into the FEBA could be well managed.

He saw that "surveillance line" of sensors available to a Corps commander weren't up to that task (national recon assets were needed, so speedy dissemination of that info was also needed) and fires available to the Corps Commander didn't have the range to alter WP momentum. That meant using air power. So, using air power to influence the 24-72 hours in the future.

As so the apparent disconnect between Active Defense and AirLand Battle, that may be a result of the pre-cursor architect for want of a better term) having been an 11 ACR and V Corps Commander. Decade too late, but Starry lived 20 minutes away from me. *sigh*. Anyway, from a V Corps perspective, the difference between Active Defense and AirLand Battle comes to the fore once the IGB Covering Force has been collapsed and the Divisions have deployed from garrison. 

My experience and study (thus far) don't qualify me to comment on other sectors. I was an AMF and V Corps guy in my 3 tours in Europe,

As to mounted assaults, I need to dig more. Starry was a Cavalry guy first and armor guy second. Maybe something written by Depuy? I don't know. I have a gut feeling the West's (sans British, perhaps) position was a result of Wehrmacht and WP experience/thought. The fact, IMO, was WW II experience in such tactics (along with tank riders, or "armor desant") was largely invalid by the 80s (if not earlier), owing to a different battlefield lethality environment.

Now, that doesn't mean that aren't times where dismounting infantry on or very near (< 1000m from) the objective doesn't make perfect sense. Grabbing  a piece of terrain and having an hour or two to get ready for the inevitable counter-attack is a gem beyond price.

 

[Begemot]

Some questions for Jim Storr.

Starting with something non-contentious. You indicated that you and your brother developed a method in your gaming that reduced the "God's Eye View" factor and it seems allowed for actual surprise to occur on the game board. Would you care to tell us what you did to achieve this?

In your footnotes you reference particular games you and your brother played (e,g. "Battle 164, 12 January 2003." - pg. 231). Are these games referred to in the footnotes available somewhere to examine? If so, where? If not, why the footnote?

More contentious:

On page 149 you state: "Soviet artillery fire would probably be very heavy but inaccurate, and its fire planning crude." I don't feel you properly justified this comment in the preceding text and to be frank I find it doubtful for two reasons. First the importance that artillery has played in Russian and Soviet military tactics. And second, your assessment suggests a low standard of training. I know that the Soviets had artillery academies devoted to producing artillery officers. These were academies with four year programs that produced company/battery grade officers with engineering degrees. I can't imagine that such an education would produce incompetents. My wife's deceased father was a colonel in the Soviet artillery and was on the faculty of such an institution. He was a university mathematics student when he was recruited into the Soviet Army. Perhaps I am wrong, so can you explain why an army that prized artillery, seems to have placed it high in their tactical system and seems to have invested quite a bit in the education of its artillery officers would produce and be satisfied with such dismal results as "... heavy but inaccurate [fire], and its fire planning crude"?

Regards.